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ABSTRACT
Slavery, Sacred Texts, and the Antebellum Confrontation with History
By
Jordan Tuttle Watkins
Dr. David F. Holland, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of North American Religious History
Harvard University
In the first six decades of the nineteenth century, America’s biblical and
constitutional interpreters waged their hermeneutical battles on historical grounds.
Biblical scholars across the antebellum religious spectrum, from orthodox Charles
Hodge’s Calvinism to heterodox Theodore Parker’s Transcendentalism, began to
emphasize contextual readings. This development, fueled by an exposure to German
biblical criticism and its emphasis on historical exegesis, sparked debate about the
pertinence of biblical texts and the permanence of their teachings. In the 1830s, the
resurfacing slavery issue increased the urgency to explore the biblical past for answers,
which exposed differences between ancient and American slavery. Some still posited the
persistence of the Bible as a whole and others rescued a Testament, a text or a teaching,
but a few, including Parker, proved willing to let the old canon drift into the past.
Slavery bound these arguments to another debate about a historical text from a
more recent past. In the 1840s and 1850s, national observers in an expanding political
culture focused their attention on the Constitution in hopes of resolving the growing crisis
over the peculiar institution. The passing of the founding generation cultivated great
interest in founding-era sources and antislavery readers began debating the interpretive
importance of publications like Madison’s papers (1840). The Fugitive Slave Law
iii

(1850), the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), and the Dred Scott decision (1857) further
nationalized the issue and put more pressure on constitutional interpreters, who, in turn,
scrutinized the founding era for answers. From radical abolitionist Wendell Phillips to
southern Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, readers aimed to recover and use
the framers’ intent to interpret the Constitution. The resulting historical explanations and
narrations indicated that much had changed since ratification. Even when antislavery
constitutionalists like William Goodell and Lysander Spooner rejected the emphasis on
contextual interpretation, their accounts highlighted slavery’s presence at the founding
and traced the anachronistic rise of the Slave Power since that period. Some upheld the
Constitution as a enduring national covenant, others read it in light of the Declaration’s
egalitarian promises, and a few, including Parker, stood ready to dismiss it as outdated.
More moderate antislavery interpreters, who acknowledged historical distance
from the biblical and Revolutionary pasts, formulated readings that allowed them to
maintain their religious and legal faith. Biblical scholars like William Channing and
Francis Wayland contended that Christ and his apostles had inculcated principles meant
to abolish slavery in time, while constitutional interpreters like Frederick Douglass and
Abraham Lincoln contended that the framers’ had crafted their creation with the
expectation that change would remove the national blight. Narratives focused on original
expectations cultivated awareness that real historical distances separated Americans from
their most favored and familiar pasts, but they also ensured these periods’ persistence as
usable pasts. In contrast to the traditional view of the shallowness of antebellum historical
thought, I argue that historical consciousness in that period took the form of an awareness
of historical distance that allowed for and even encouraged the continued use of the past.
iv
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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1857, in a speech given in Springfield, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln
crafted a historical narrative of the American founding that countered the one Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney had provided in the Dred Scott decision three months prior.
Taney had admitted that if “the general words” of the Preamble to the Declaration of
Independence “were used in a similar instrument at this day” they would be understood to
“embrace the whole human family,” but, as Lincoln explained, the Chief Justice had
argued that “the authors of that instrument did not intend to include negroes.”1 In
opposition to the assumption “that the public estimate of the black man is more favorable
now than it was in the days of the Revolution,” Lincoln argued that “the change between
then and now is decidedly the other way.”2 “In those days,” he noted, “our Declaration …
was … thought to include all,” but now it was used “to aid in making the bondage of the
negro universal and eternal.”3 The Kentucky-born lawyer conceded that the Declaration’s
signers “did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying
that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact,”
he stated, “they had no power to confer such a boon.” Instead, he continued, the founders
“meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as
circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society,” he
argued, “which should be … constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even

1

Dred Scott v. John F A. Sandford, 60 US (19 Howard) 393, 410 (1857);
Abraham Lincoln, “Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857,” in The Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1953-55), 2:405 (hereafter as Collected Works).
2
Lincoln, “Speech at Springfield,” in Collected Works, 2:403, emphasis in the
original.
3
Ibid., 2:404.
1

though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to
all people of all colors everywhere.”4 Otherwise, Lincoln explained, if the Declaration
was a temporary measure and not meant “for future use,” then the “doings of that day had
no reference to the present,” serving only as “an interesting memorial of the dead past.”5
The premonition of a dead Revolutionary past, in particular, never loomed larger.6
Lincoln harnessed the power of the founding era, but in noting the founders’ expedient
approach to slavery, in identifying their original expectation of liberty’s spread, and in
lamenting the proslavery betrayal of that expectation, he drew attention to the historical
distance from the founding era. Although they fundamentally disagreed on the founders’
intentions, Taney and Lincoln concurred on a crucial point: times had changed. And
while interpreters on opposing sides of the slavery controversy valued change differently,
their efforts to either reject or privilege the interpretive importance of context
underscored the distance that divided their own time from that of the founding
generation. As Americans confronted the question of whether slavery was still morally
acceptable—as they did so in a culture shaped by sacred texts, mythic pasts and a
conflicted present—they awoke to an unprecedented awareness of historical distance.

4

Ibid., 2:406, emphasis in the original.
Ibid., 2:406, 407.
6
I use the term Revolutionary past to refer to the period to which Lincoln and
many other Americans appealed in calling on the framers of the United States
government and its founding documents. This period includes the time between the
writing of the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the Constitution. In this
study, then, Revolutionary past signifies not only the time in which England and its
American colonies struggled for control of the eastern seaboard, but also the periods
immediately preceding and following the war, including the founding moment, wherein
the colonists formed a new nation. I also use the term founding to refer to this period.
5

2

Lincoln’s response to Dred Scott, along with Taney’s decision itself, followed
from decades of interpretive debates over slavery and represented the culmination of a
series of intellectual developments in the antebellum period. The historical nature of
Taney’s decision and Lincoln’s response was symptomatic of the increasingly dominant
approach to interpret the Constitution in particular and the founding era more generally
through the use of historical exegesis. The potential for such an approach was evident at
the founding itself, when the framers crafted national documents and a federal
government meant to endure—compasses that their descendants would continue to use as
guides even after their crafters had passed on. When the founding generation, and, more
specifically, the last of the framers passed from the scene in the 1820s and 1830s, a range
commentators and observers, including historians, orators, newspaper writers, lawyers,
and politicians—in hopes of retaining the presence of their now deceased forebears—
sought to rescue the framers’ writings and apply their original truths to contemporary
problems. As the slavery debates reached a fever pitch in the 1840s and 1850s,
constitutional interpreters either upheld as paramount or dismissed as extraneous sources
such as James Madison’s published papers. Soon, those privileging the use of historical
evidence carried the day. Interpreters on either side of the slavery issue accepted the
historical grounds of debate and crafted historical arguments meant to claim the
Revolutionary past as either antislavery or proslavery. Thus, Taney believed that a
historically grounded decision would settle the issue. Dred Scott affirmed the
authoritative nature of historical appeals and critics of the decision, including Lincoln,
countered with historical narratives of their own. In the process, these historical
arguments—which illuminated historical context and change—uniquely exposed the

3

temporal distance from the founding era, an era culturally and socially distinct from the
United States of the 1850s. And an awareness of historical distance simultaneously called
into question the Constitution’s relevance and inspired innovative interpretive approaches
that began to read it as a flexible text capable of adapting to historical change.
That development depended on the constitutionalization of the slavery issue,
whereby politicians and other commentators came to believe that an answer to the
national problem over slavery depended on the right interpretation of the nation’s
supreme source of legal authority. That process peaked in Dred Scott, when politicians
looked to the Supreme Court to adjudicate the matter. The growing stress on a
constitutional resolution developed in relation to the primarily historical debates about
the Constitution’s relationship to slavery, which gained a wider audience via political
developments in the 1850s. Thus, two already related and symbiotic intellectual
developments, a then prevalent interpretive approach stressing the use of context and a
growing imperative to defer to the Constitution to decide slavery’s fate, powerfully
converged in Dred Scott. This high-level union had a profound potential to spread a new
awareness of the kind of historical distance that results from the realization of the
temporal dislocation between past and present that accompanies a recognition of
profound differences in historical context.7 Historical debates about the nation’s hallowed
legal text and its mythic Revolutionary past spread a knowledge of real temporal
differences and changes since the founding era, which promised to foster an awareness of

7

As explained in greater detail below, “historical consciousness” and “historical
awareness” are scholarly terms of art that require some finessing. I most often use them
to signify a growing awareness of historical distance between past and present eras, or, in
this case, between biblical and Revolutionary times and nineteenth-century America.

4

historical distance from that period. This development alone warrants explanation in its
own right, but a more complete and rich telling depends on a parallel account tracing how
intellectual processes historicized another favored past, the biblical era. After all, the
Constitution was not the only sacred text—and the Revolutionary era was not the only
sacred past—to which antebellum Americans appealed for direction.
The move to privilege historical examinations of the Constitution and the
resulting realization of historical distance from the founding era followed from and
overlapped with a similar, if more obscure, development in biblical hermeneutics. Indeed,
I argue that an understanding of the constitutional debates that culminated on a national
stage in Dred Scott and in the responses to it depends on an awareness of contemporary
biblical debates, which, though somewhat esoteric, also stressed historical readings. Like
their constitutional counterparts, antebellum biblical exegetes also prized historical
approaches, which had begun to replace conventional interpretive forms in the eighteenth
century. Those forms often ignored questions of historical specificity in discerning
meaning and tended to flatten out time in making modern applications. The turn to
historical explication in biblical interpretation began in earnest in the first two decades of
the nineteenth century when the lessons of biblical criticism, and the emphasis on
contextual interpretation in particular, infiltrated influential segments of antebellum
religious discourse.
Joseph Stevens Buckminster, who was elected as Harvard’s first professor of
biblical criticism in 1811, explained that “instead of looking into every text, separated
from its context, we should be content to understand the apostles, as they meant to be
understood by those to whom they wrote. … They were not,” he stated, “on every
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occasion, delivering a system of dogmas for the instruction of all succeeding time.”8
Buckminster’s more theologically conservative contemporary, Andover’s Moses Stuart,
agreed. In his lectures on hermeneutics, delivered around the same time, he urged his
students to “let every writer be placed in his own age.” Stuart encouraged them “to reject
the monstrous exegesis” that treats the apostles’ words as though spoken “but yesterday
and with all our feelings and prejudices.”9 To be sure, Unitarians like Buckminster,
Congregationalists such as Stuart, Presbyterians like Charles Hodge, and
Transcendentalists such as Theodore Parker differed from one another in their selective
incorporations of biblical criticism, but in combination their uses unmistakably, if often
inadvertently and indirectly, exposed the Bible’s time-bound characteristics. Parker, who
went further than perhaps any of his American contemporaries in engaging and
incorporating the principles of German biblical criticism, drew attention to historical
distance to privilege conscience and to damn outdated creeds. Even when Buckminster,
Stuart, or Hodge partook of traditional approaches by ignoring historical distance in
applying scripture on questions such as slavery, their studies highlighted the distance
from biblical eras and thus problematized attempts, including their own, to conflate time
and assert the continued relevance of certain biblical teachings. These relatively isolated
discussions about biblical interpretation had far-reaching implications. The historical
nature of these somewhat recondite interpretive discussions informed the constitutional
debates that followed or, at least, readied participants in those debates, including some of
the same figures, to engage in similar kinds of historical argumentation. Learned
8

Joseph S. Buckminster, “Philemon,” in Sermons by the late Rev. Joseph S.
Buckminster, 2d. ed. (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1815), 83, 83-84.
9
Moses Stuart, Lecture 6, Lectures on Hermeneutics, quoted in John H. Giltner,
Moses Stuart: The Father of Biblical Science in America (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988), 54.
6

conversations about historical readings of the Bible among intellectual elites reverberated
in public debates about historical readings of the Constitution. And, in both cases, the
growing slavery crisis raised the stakes. It placed an unprecedented amount of pressure
on the Bible and the Constitution through relatively rigorous historical examination,
which accentuated the historical distance from the biblical and founding eras.
In this dissertation, I demonstrate how the growing slavery crisis in antebellum
America heightened the contestations in biblical and constitutional interpretation and
brought those interpretive traditions together. And I argue that the parallel interpretive
debates about slavery significantly historicized the nation’s two most favored and useful
pasts. The Bible and the Constitution took on special meaning in the new republic. Many
Americans began pointing to the era of Revolution and ratification as the starting point to
their history as a Christian nation and singled out the Bible and the Constitution as their
founding religious and legal texts. This set the stage for discussions about sacred texts
and hallowed pasts with timeless appeal. Americans used these historical eras in ways
that made them especially favored and uniquely familiar. However, the textual nature of
these pasts also held unique potential to expose historical distance when slavery inspired
unprecedented historical investigation of the Bible and the Constitution. This
development in American historical awareness coincided with broader intellectual shifts
and changes in the Western world, including an understanding of time as progressive and
linear, rather than cyclical, a realization of the chronological depth of the earth’s history,
and the development of more mechanistic and materialistic, rather than providential,
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approaches to the natural world.10 The interpretive debates over slavery, then, contributed
to the rise of a more modern historical awareness in American intellectual culture.
This is not a study of the Bible and of the Constitution, or even of slavery, per se,
but rather an exploration of the role antebellum slavery debates played in historicizing
America’s sacred religious and legal texts and their venerated pasts. In particular, I aim to
explain how the interpretive debates over slavery spread awareness of historical distance
among a broad group of interpreters. Some minimized and some maximized the
interpretive importance of historical distance, but in either case their debates brought new
attention to it. Constitutional arguments like Lincoln’s, which stressed the antislavery
expectations of the nation’s founders, and similar biblical arguments that emphasized the
antislavery principles inculcated by Christianity’s founders, tended to disclose the
historical distance from the very pasts to which Americans looked for answers. The idea
that certain historical figures had articulated, in certain historical texts, specific universal
promises that they could not realize in their own time but that future generations could
and would, encouraged an emphasis on historical difference from and change since the
biblical and Revolutionary pasts. I thus contend that biblical and constitutional debates
over slavery combined with broader developments in historical thought to deepen and
expand American historical awareness in ways heretofore overlooked. And the process of
historicizing America’s sacred texts and favored pasts—historical documents and eras

10

On the realization that the earth’s history stretched back well beyond available
human records and, especially, on the efforts of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
scientific figures to understand that history, see Martin J. S. Rudwick, Bursting the Limits
of Time: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Revolution (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2005); and Martin J. S. Rudwick, Worlds Before Adam: The
Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Reform (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2008).
8

with seemingly timeless appeal—contributed to the a growing sense that nothing existed
outside of time and that everything bore the marks of temporal vicissitude. In essence, the
crisis over slavery in America became a crisis of historicity. While the deepening
awareness of historical distance led some to repudiate the Bible and the Constitution as
products of foreign pasts, it also inspired innovative approaches wherein interpreters read
them as flexible guides to the present and future. The development would allow Lincoln
to assert that the proper circumstances had emerged in which he was duty-bound to fulfill
the antislavery promises of the founders. Thus, the antebellum confrontation with history
complicated but did not discourage the use of the past; instead, it compelled Americans to
adopt new approaches to favored pasts and sacred texts.

The Historiographical and Historical Groundwork
Scholars often attribute the spread of European historical awareness to the failures
of the French Revolution and the upheavals of the Napoleonic Wars.11 Historical

11

For an analysis of how the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars
deepened European historical consciousness, see Peter Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present:
Modern Time and the Melancholy of History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2004). On the relationship between the French Revolution and German historicism in
particular, see Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition
of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University
Press, 1968), 3-89. On the complicated relationship between the Enlightenment and
German historicism, see Peter Hanns Reill, “Science and the Construction of the Cultural
Sciences in Late Enlightenment Germany: The Case of Wilhelm von Humboldt,” History
and Theory 33 (1994): 345-66; and Jonathan Knudsen, “The Historicist Enlightenment,”
in What’s Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question, ed. Keith Michael Baker and
Peter Hanns Reill (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 39-49. For ways in which
the French Revolution cultivated a new and renewed interest in history in France,
specifically, see Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics After the Terror: The Republican
Origins of French Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 31-35, 82-84,
264-74; Martin S. Staum, Minerva’s Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution
(Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 4, 136-37, 218-23; and Tom
9

consciousness or awareness12 is often characterized as a belief that all aspects of human
experience can best be explained historically, that is, in terms of historical
development—a concept frequently labeled as historicism13—and a concomitant

Stammers, “The Refuse of the Revolution: Autograph Collecting in France, 1789-1860,”
in Historicising the French Revolution, ed. Carolina Armenteros et al. (Newcastle, UK:
Cambridge Scholars, 2008), 39-63. On the development of European historicism more
generally, see Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: A Study in NineteenthCentury Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). Much of the
historiography on the spread of European historical consciousness follows from Georg
Lukács’s The Historical Novel (1937), wherein he argues that “the French Revolution,
the revolutionary wars and rise and fall of Napoleon…for the first time made history a
mass experience, and moreover on a European scale.” Lukács, The Historical Novel,
trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1962), 23, emphasis in
original.
12
While focused on historical distance as a measure of modern historical
consciousness, this study is also interested in a number of related ideas associated with
the term, including a general realization that past, present, and future temporalities are
self-contained and separate fragments of time, that unpredictable change constitutes
human existence, and that historical development is a contingent process bound up with
human action. These ideas inform and are informed by the historicist belief that societal
and cultural forms and, in its more radical form, human nature are best understood as
products of non-teleological historical forces. One might also describe historical
consciousness as an orientation (e.g. classical, biblical, medieval, Revolutionary). For
theoretical discussions about historical consciousness from the perspective of memory
studies and psychology, see Peter C. Seixas, ed., Theorizing Historical Consciousness
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). See also, Jürgen Straub, ed., Narration,
Identity, and Historical Consciousness (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).
13
“Historicism,” like “historical consciousness,” is a tricky term with a
complicated history. It has been used to signify a variety of historiographical practices,
approaches and concepts, both overlapping and diverging from the meanings of historical
consciousness. It also holds different if related meanings across scholarly disciplines. In
the discipline of history, perhaps most frequently the term has been attributed to a
popular strand of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German philosophical and historical
thought and practice. Previously, thinkers used the term “historism,” or historismus, in
reference to this intellectual tradition, but in the latter half of the twentieth century,
“historicism” gradually replaced “historism.” Since that time, historicism has picked up
more expansive meanings, though ones still tied to the German school of historical
thought. For an account and critique of the German historicism of historians such as
Wilhelm von Humboldt and Leopold von Ranke and their successors, who believed
human existence could be best explained through historically and nationally determined
values, see Iggers’s classic text, The German Conception of History. For an account that
historicizes the crisis of relativism among early twentieth-century historicists by
10

widespread realization of substantial historical change and contingency. The rise of
historical consciousness in the United States—which was insulated from the full
intellectual fallout of the French Revolution—seems to have followed a different
trajectory than European historical consciousness. Historians have largely assumed that
Americans, as opposed to Europeans, did not develop a modern historical consciousness
(in which periods of time were seen as shaped by materialist historical contingencies that
rendered them fundamentally distinct and temporally distant) until the late nineteenth
century. This narrative holds that the success of the American Revolution fueled linear
millennial and cyclical republican notions, which combined to delay the incorporation of
historicist thinking even among German-educated historians like George Bancroft.
Unsurprisingly, the thesis of a delayed shift from the providential, Romantic, and literary
approaches espoused by antebellum writers like Bancroft to the objective historicist
outlook associated with late nineteenth-century thinkers and historians, first found
articulation among the latter group.14 More recently, the thesis has come to rest on the

describing it as a spatial issue resulting from historicism’s failure to solve the immediate
problems of post-World War I Germany, see Colin T. Loader, “German Historicism and
Its Crisis,” Journal of Modern History 48 (September 1976): 85-119. For a brief
description of the displacement of the term historism for historicism, see Carl Page,
Philosophical Historicism and the Betrayal of First Philosophy (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 11-45. See also, Georg Iggers, “Historicism,” in
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener, vol. 2 (New York: Charles
Scribner, 1968), 456-64.
14
See, for example, James Franklin Jameson, The History of Historical Writing in
America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891). In tracing the relationship between
nineteenth-century German and American historical thought, one must also attend to
different measures. One historian, at least, has challenged the assumption that the
professionalization of history in the United States. followed the German model. See
Eckhardt Fuchs, “Conceptions of Scientific History in the Nineteenth-Century West,” in
Turning Points in Historiography: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Q. Edward Wang
and George G. Iggers (Rochester, NY: The University of Rochester Press, 2002), 147-61.
For a discussion of the Pragmatist contribution to a historicist outlook in the late
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assumption that historicism was, in Dorothy Ross’s words, “closely bound up with the
process of secularization.”15 According to this formulation, secular trends advanced and
spread a sense among Europeans that real changes divided qualitatively distinct historical
eras from each other, while religiosity—with its appeal to ahistorical and unseen forces
that united surface level differences—blunted a similar development across the Atlantic.
This narrative fails to identify how the efforts of antebellum historical writers
advanced historical methodologies. More importantly for the purposes of this study, by
focusing on how religiosity hindered the development of historical consciousness—and
assuming that the process was strictly secular—this account overlooks the ways in which
religion spurred that development both in Europe and in America.16 The traditional

nineteenth century, see Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in
America (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2001).
15
Dorothy Ross, “Historical Consciousness in Nineteenth Century America,”
American Historical Review 89 (1984): 909-28, quotation on 910. In her discussion of the
Progressives’ historical thought, Ross relies on Morton White’s, Social Thought in
America: The Revolt Against Formalism, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). For an
alternative account that describes historical consciousness—defined as consciousness of
historical thinking—as a unique aspect of Western Christian civilization, and which
separates historical from scientific thinking, see John Lukacs, Historical Consciousness;
Or, the Remembered Past (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
16
In The Plain and Noble Garb of Truth: Nationalism & Impartiality in American
Historical Writing, 1784-1860 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2008), Eileen
K. Cheng has recently challenged the traditional narrative on historical writing in
America. She confronts the Whiggish view which posits a clear evolution from the
shallow, mythic, and filiopietistic histories of amateur antebellum historians to the
objective and critical histories of late-nineteenth-century professional historians. Her
analysis of antebellum historical writers demonstrates how their conflicting nationalisms
and exceptionalisms cultivated rather than hindered the development of modern
methodologies, directing attempts at impartiality, objectivity, and originality. She also
evidences that the rise of the novel shaped methodological and topical debates about
historical writing, which set the stage for the emergence of history as an autonomous
discipline. In a recent review of Cheng’s work, Dorothy Ross, a relatively recent
purveyor of a more sophisticated version of the traditional narrative, grants that “Cheng
makes her point,” and writes that “future examinations of nineteenth-century historical
consciousness will have to take into account the ability of American exceptionalism to
12

understanding, then, distorts developments on both sides of the Atlantic. One corrective
to this myopia might involve highlighting the religious underpinnings of the historicism
of figures such as German historian Leopold von Ranke, which would help remedy the
proclivity to see a yawning gap between American and European thought while also
correcting the secularist assumptions about the rise of modern historical consciousness.17
Taking a related tack, Thomas Howard argues that “theological presuppositions and
religious attitudes shadowed and shaped nineteenth-century historicist thinking.”18 More

dramatize contingency as well as extrahistorical foundations, to deepen historical
awareness as well as annul the perception of historical change.” Dorothy Ross, “A New
Look at Nineteenth-Century Historical Consciousness from the Modern/Postmodern
Divide,” Modern Intellectual History 9, no. 2 (2012): 455-56.
17
Historians have misinterpreted Ranke’s historicism, which relied on a
panentheistic view, wherein the particulars of the past correspond to the totality of God.
On the misinterpretation of Ranke, see Georg G. Iggers, “The Image of Ranke in
American and German Historical Thought,” History and Theory 2, no. 1 (1962): 17-40;
Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American
Historical Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 21-46; and
Dorothy Ross, “On the Misunderstanding of Ranke and the Origins of the Historical
Profession in America,” in Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical
Discipline, ed. Georg G. Iggers and James M. Powell (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1990), 154-69. For an example of Ranke’s panentheism, see Ranke,
“On Progress in History,” in The Theory and Practice of History, ed. George G. Iggers
and Konrad von Moltke (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 53. In Cheng’s reading,
Bancroft and Ranke displayed important methodological affinities, as both shared an
interest in primary sources, impartiality, and providence. Indeed, she contends that
Bancroft’s interest in unintended consequences followed from his providential
understanding, showing that religious views fostered the development of historical
thinking. Cheng, Plain and Noble Garb, 143-51.
18
Thomas A. Howard, Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W.M.L. de Wette,
Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical
Consciousness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), quotation on 4. Howard
defines historicism as “heightened sensitivity to history and to the ‘constructed’ character
of one’s beliefs” (ibid., 1). He distinguishes between two variants of historicism,
including “classical historicism,” associated with the scholarly practice of Ranke and his
successors, and “crisis historicism,” identified with relativism. Howard allows that the
first informed the appearance of the second in some settings, as in the case of Ernst
Troeltsch, but argues that “crisis historicism” developed as a theological and
hermeneutical problem within Protestantism. While focused on different eras of
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specifically, he contends that the historicism of German historian Jacob Burckhardt must
be understood as having developed in dialogue with the biblical scholarship of his
mentor, the German theologian Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette. Howard proposes
that the historical-critical approach to scripture in nineteenth-century Europe “created in
large part the preconditions for the emergence of historicism and for the academic
independence of secular historiography.”19 He concludes, then, that European
Protestantism served as a “codetermining factor” in the emergence of secularism.20 This
dissertation demonstrates that American Protestant thought, and biblical scholarship in
particular, played a similar role in the development of American historical consciousness,
and in a growing awareness of historical distance in particular. Antebellum biblical
scholarship spread a realization of the qualitative temporal divisions separating biblical
from modern times and attuned participants in constitutional interpretation to historical
approaches and arguments that led to a similar realization of the historical distance
separating the Revolutionary past from mid-nineteenth-century present. Biblical debates

American historical writing, a number of scholars have argued that religious worldviews
stunted and that secularized developments advanced historical methodologies. See, for
example, Peter Gay, A Loss of Mastery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); and Lester Cohen, The Revolutionary
Histories: Contemporary Narratives of the American Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1980). For more nuanced discussions of the role of religion in the
development of American historical thought, which nonetheless take cues from the
traditional narrative of American historical awareness, see Caroline Winterer, The
Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 17801910 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 89-92; and Eran Shalev,
Rome Reborn on Western Shores: Historical Imagination and the Creation of the
American Republic (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 91-93, 112-13.
19
Howard, Religion and the Rise, 15.
20
Ibid., 22.
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among religious thinkers, then, had long-term implications for the emergence of a
modern American historical consciousness.21
A few scholars interested in antebellum biblical criticism have examined the
historical nature of such criticism, but they have not explained how this relates to the
development of American historical consciousness.22 As does this dissertation, Michael J.
Lee’s recent work, The Erosion of Biblical Certainty (2013), traces American biblical
interpreters’ growing emphasis on historical readings. Lee demonstrates that, beginning
in the eighteenth century, theologically conservative American interpreters, including
figures like Jonathan Edwards, Joseph S. Buckminster, Andrews Norton, and Moses
Stuart used historical interpretation to defend the Bible. In the process, Lee argues, these
21

More generally, a few scholars posit the importance of religious thought in the
development of a modern historical consciousness. For example, Anthony Kemp argues
that the continuous rejection of immediate pasts for the purity of primitive pasts in
Christian thought created an awareness of supersessive change. Kemp’s narrative adds a
deep Christian dimension to the revolution in historical consciousness that accompanied
the Renaissance thinkers’ rejection of the “dark ages” and their appeal to the classical
golden age. Anthony Kemp, The Estrangement of the Past: A Study in the Origins of
Modern Historical Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Kemp’s
account provides an alternative to that of J. G. A. Pocock, who argues that a realization of
secular time and an understanding of substantial historical change arose in the postRenaissance period, when Florentine, English, and American civic humanists conceived
of the republic as an institution meant to counter the chaos of a seemingly inevitable
cyclical historical process. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1975).
22
See Jerry Brown, The Rise of Biblical Criticism in America, 1800-1870: The
New England Scholars (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969); Richard A.
Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics: Institutional Authority and the Higher Criticism
of the Bible (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991); and Elizabeth Hurth, Between
Faith and Unbelief: American Transcendentalists and the Challenge of Atheism (Leiden:
BRILL, 2007). In his recent work, Sacred Borders: Continuing Revelation and Canonical
Restraint in Early America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), David F.
Holland contends that in their historical examinations of the Bible, liberal and
conservative biblical interpreters “drove the historical distance of the ancient scriptures
deeper into the center of Americans’ religious thought” (ibid., 105). This dissertation
seeks to further explore this development.
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interpreters undermined the traditional view of the scriptures as infallible divine texts. He
thus corrects the impression that Americans did not deal with the problems raised by
biblical criticism until late in the nineteenth century. I trace a similar development across
an even broader scale of biblical interpreters. I include a discussion of Edwards, and
focus on contextual interpretation among both antebellum conservatives like Stuart and
liberals like Norton, but I also give sustained attention to more radical thinkers such as
Theodore Parker. This inclusive approach introduces narrative complications. Displaying
the varieties of approaches among different groups of interpreters can create confusion.
However, it allows me to trace actual historical conversations and to highlight both the
distinctive interpretive approaches and the shared emphasis on historical explication that
emerged from those conversations. While I emphasize the growing emphasis on
contextual interpretation and the undermining potential of that interpretive decision, I am
most concerned with how these developments created and deepened awareness of
historical distance and how the issue of slavery furthered that process.23
A number of works on the biblical debates over slavery make mention of the
historical nature of these arguments, but, with the recent exceptions of Eran Shalev’s
American Zion (2013) and Molly Oshatz’s Slavery and Sin (2012), their projects are not
concerned with the implications of the historical components of those debates.24 Shalev
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See, for example, Mark A. Noll, “The Bible and Slavery” in Religion and the
American Civil War, ed. Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout, and Charles Reagan Wilson
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 43-73; Mark A. Noll, The Civil War as a
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outlines the prevalence of “Old Testamentism” in the political culture of the early
republic and the antebellum era, explaining how Americans’ Old Testament associations
tended to bring together biblical and American times. He also describes the declining
appeal of the Hebrew scriptures, which began around 1830, and attributes this
development to democratization, the Christ-centered religion of the Second Great
Awakening, and the biblical argument over slavery. Shalev explains that “the new
historical consciousness that arose as a result of the repeated comparisons between
biblical and American slaveries would further render the American Israel as an
anachronistic image for exactly those who were its most ardent proponents.” Such
comparisons revealed the contrast between the ancient and the new Israel. This
dissertation expands on the process of historicizing the Old Testament, showing the role
of biblical criticism in setting the stage for this development. It also shows how the
slavery debates highlighted historical distance from primitive Christian times and
troubled New Testament uses and associations.25
In her study, Molly Oshatz more directly focuses on the antebellum slavery
debates, which she ties to the emergence of liberal Protestantism. Oshatz traces how
moderate antislavery Protestants, including William Ellery Channing, Francis Wayland,
and Moses Stuart, began to develop an argument that although slavery was mala en se—
evil in itself—the revelation of that understanding evolved in relation to the varied
circumstances and contexts of human existence. She contends that while these writers

and Christian Moral Debate,” Religion and American Culture: A Journal of
Interpretation 10 (Summer 2000): 149-86.
25
Eran Shalev, American Zion: The Old Testament as a Political Text from the
Revolution to the Civil War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), quotation on
152.
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were unaware of the radical implications of their reasoning—that “individual moral
responsibility varied according to social context”—their innovative theological argument
for moral progress informed late nineteenth-century liberal Protestant understandings and
articulations of the revelatory process as organic and developmental. Oshatz writes that
the Civil War and emancipation, which confirmed and made obvious the insight that
God’s revelation progressed in relation to historical context, concealed the origins of the
insight. Similar to late nineteenth-century historians, post-bellum liberal Protestants
failed to acknowledge that their antebellum predecessors had laid the groundwork for
their positions. As with Oshatz’s narrative, this study also attends to the ways in which
the antebellum biblical debates over slavery deepened historical awareness, but rather
than explain that process in terms of the gradual emergence of relativism, it focuses on
the related but distinct realization of historical distance.26
This dissertation further reconsiders religion’s role in antebellum historical
thought by exploring how Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore
Parker used biblical criticism to unhinge religious truth from its necessary connection to
ancient biblical texts and actors and instead locate it in human intuition. Oshatz adds a
neglected and useful context to the development of liberal Protestantism in America, but
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Molly Oshatz, Slavery and Sin: The Fight Against Slavery and the Rise of
Liberal Protestantism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), quotation on 83.
Although focused on a later cast of characters, Grant Wacker also examines religious
thought to understand the development of American historical consciousness. As with
traditional narratives, he focuses on late nineteenth-century figures. He trains his
attention on the work of Baptist Augustus H. Strong, in particular, who stood between
liberals who understood religious truths as mediated through historical processes and
conservatives who asserted that such truths had been ahistorically received. Strong came
to the conclusion that religious knowledge was a historical product but that religious truth
still stood above and outside of time. Grant Wacker, Augustus H. Strong and the
Dilemma of Historical Consciousness (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985).
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in doing so she lends credence to the caricature of Transcendentalist thinking as
ahistorical by contrasting their ideas with the historical arguments of moderate
antislavery advocates.27 This depiction, only the latest in a long line of similar portrayals,
mischaracterizes the Transcendentalists by ignoring the historical components of their
projects.28 Scholars have only recently begun to evidence the more nuanced historical
nature of their writings, including their biblical scholarship.29 For example, Elizabeth
Hurth argues that many of them, including Emerson and Parker, maintained that the New

27

See Oshatz, Slavery and Sin, 4, 61-62, 102-5, 123-27.
For an example of a treatment that identifies Emerson and Parker, in particular,
as ahistorical thinkers, see R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy,
and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
For a list of other scholars who treat Emerson as an ahistorical thinker, see Eduardo
Cadava, Emerson and the Climates of History (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1997), 10.
29
The historiography countering the ahistorical depiction of Emerson, in
particular, is growing. A number of historians contend that an engagement with the past
was crucial to Emerson’s intellectual project. For example, in demonstrating the
influence of European Romanticism on Emerson, Lucy Pearce shows the centrality of
history in his worldview. Lucy Pearce, “Re-Visioning History: Countering Emerson’s
Alleged Ahistoricity,” European Journal of American Culture 26, no. 1 (2007): 41-56.
See also, Patrick Keane, Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason: The Transatlantic
“Light of All Our Day” (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005), 193-97.
Similarly, in “The Metempsychotic Mind: Emerson and Consciousness,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 71 (July 2010): 433-55, John Michael Corrigan argues that Emerson’s
“intellectual engagement with history is…equated with the awakening of the soul’s
power” (ibid., 437). Eduardo Cadava contends that Emerson understood language as a
political and thus historical product, which allowed him to appropriate language and put
it to use, as in his tropological associations and natural metaphors. Cadava, Emerson and
the Climates of History. Others trace how the realization of deep time, through geological
findings, created a sense of displacement that led Emerson to focus on the here and now
and accept change as a powerful part of modern life. See James R. Guthrie, Above Time:
Emerson’s and Thoreau’s Temporal Revolutions (Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 2001), and Thomas M. Allen, A Republic in Time: Temporality and Social
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2008), 186-216. These and similar works provide a useful corrective,
though some of them tend to swing the pendulum too far the other way. In their focus on
the Transcendentalists’ awareness and acceptance of historicity and historical change,
they sometimes lose sight of their persistent appeal to religious universals.
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Testament texts and the person of Jesus Christ correlated to historical realities.30 This
dissertation shows how they used historical reasoning to escape the problems inherent in
a historically grounded belief system and suggests that the critique of what they observed
to be their contemporaries’ overreliance on certain biblical texts and figures had the
potential to deepen attentive Americans’ awareness of temporal distinction and distance.
As with the related developments traced in this examination, the deepening of that
awareness was not necessarily an intended consequence or a straightforward process.
Each of the writers discussed in this study approached historical explication differently,
and each approach raised the issue of historical distance in unique ways, but all of them
brought new attention to it. Awareness of historical distance helped historicize American
Protestants’ sacred texts and favored pasts, but that process also called into question the
timelessness of the Transcendentalists’ presumably ahistorical basis of faith. If
Emerson’s and Parker’s writings indicated that all pasts, even the most useful and sacred,
could be historicized, then why not the eternal now as well? As Parker used biblical
criticism to exalt what he perceived to be a universal religious sense, his observations led
him to conclude that religion progressed over time and in relation to varied
circumstances. This position highlighted the contingent nature of divine illumination.
Further, holding onto a few permanent truths as existing above time while pointing out
the many transient ideas existing in time expanded the sphere of the material, a sphere
that threatened to engulf Parker’s eternal basis of belief despite his best efforts to escape
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Elizabeth Hurth, Between Faith and Unbelief, 31-76. While highlighting the
Transcendentalists’ historical thought through an examination of their biblical criticism,
and thus helping correct the ahistorical label, Hurth contributes to the irreligious
depiction in arguing that “the tendencies toward atheism were inherent in
Transcendentalist thought” (ibid., 2).
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it. In tracing these developments, this dissertation revalues the role of religion in the
development of American historical awareness.
Relative to the scholarship on biblical interpretation, there are even fewer studies
on the process of historicizing the Constitution and the Revolutionary period in the
antebellum era. There are a number of important works examining the role of the
Revolutionary past in that period, but most of them focus on the usefulness of the
Revolution rather than explore the ways in which historical epistemologies problematized
such usage.31 Eran Shalev’s Rome Reborn on Western Shores (2009) provides a partial
exception. In his final chapter, he argues that the early republic’s historians, including
Mercy Otis Warren and David Ramsay, classicized the Revolution in their accounts,
depicting it as an epic event filled with classical-like heroes. These writers described the
Revolutionary era as a kind of classical golden age from which Americans, due to a loss
of virtue, had since departed. Their declensionist tales created the perception of greater
distance than actually existed. For a time, the Revolution seemed more like an ancient
foreign event than a recent American undertaking. But upholding a past as a golden age
also implies the possibility of its recovery. In other words, if these accounts introduced a
kind of historical distance from the founding era, that perception was diminished by the
implication that the nation’s citizens could reclaim that period through their virtuous acts.
31

See, Michael Kammen, A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the
Historical Imagination (New York: Knopf, 1978); Alfred Fabian Young, The Shoemaker
and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon, 1999); and
Sarah J. Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). See also, Margot
Minardi, Making Slavery History: Abolitionism and the Politics of Memory in
Massachusetts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), esp. chaps. 3 and 5; and
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esp. chap. 5.
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Republican views of time were fundamentally cyclical; and those views persisted in the
new republic. Such outlooks contributed to a growing sense of corrupting change, but
they also lent credence to the idea of virtuous redemption.32 My dissertation is similarly
focused on the emerging perception or awareness of historical distance from the
Revolutionary era, but I am most concerned with discovering the ways in which debates
over slavery contributed to a realization of distance from that period resulting not from a
nostalgic desire to recover the past, but rather from a willingness to acknowledge that
recovery might not be possible or even desirable.
Studies examining the relationship between history and law in nineteenth-century
America are scarce, and while a few works on specific thinkers, such as Supreme Court
Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis, or certain cases, including Dred Scott, attend to the
historical components of constitutional interpretation, the relationship between
constitutional construction and historical awareness remains largely unexamined.33 A
recent study briefly explores the antebellum origins of originalist thought in America, but
it focuses on the twentieth century and is not concerned with the implications of
32

Shalev also attends to the Revolutionaries’ view that perhaps the new republic
would escape the republican cycle of a rise and fall traced in Pocock’s Machiavellian
Moment. Shalev, Rome Reborn, 73-113. On a sense of breaking free from history in this
period, see also, Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican
Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984). In The Elusive
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On Curtis’s constitutional thought, see Stuart Streichler, Justice Curtis in the
Civil War Era: At the Crossroads of American Constitutionalism (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2005). The classic work on Dred Scott and its historical
aspects is Don E. Fehrenbacher’s The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law
and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
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originalism for historical awareness.34 Two other recent works, David Rabban’s Law’s
History (2013) and Kunal Parker’s Common Law, History, and Democracy in America
(2011), attend to the historical nature of American legal thought. Rabban breaks apart the
caricature of late nineteenth-century legal thought as dominated by deductive formalism
in arguing that historical thinking pervaded legal scholarship in this period. His
compendious and convincing study helps bridge the supposed gap between European and
American thought. However, his analysis focuses on the post-bellum period, lending
itself to the traditional narrative of America’s delayed turn to history. Thus, it threatens to
obscure the rich historical nature of antebellum legal thought.35
In contrast, Kunal Parker uncovers the historical components of legal thinking in
America from the late eighteenth century up through the nineteenth century. He aims to
look behind the modernist legal tradition that emerged in the work of figures such as
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who rejected what he perceived as law’s claim of
atemporality and sought to unveil its temporal origins. Parker argues that throughout the
nineteenth century, common-law thinkers knowingly subjected law to history even while
they found it to embody the direction of history. He includes a discussion of the slavery
debates, tracing, for example the thought of antislavery constitutionalist Lysander
Spooner, who separated the natural and permanent antislavery laws he found embodied in
the Constitution from the unnatural and temporal state laws upholding southern slavery.
When he received pushback from Garrisonian Wendell Phillips, who critiqued his
position as unrealistic, Spooner suggested that common law conformed to natural law. In
34
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response to abolitionist arguments, southerner George F. Fitzhugh characterized slavery
as a natural and universal societal law while describing free societies as unnatural and
unsustainable. Similar to Spooner, however, he believed that common law embodied
determinative societal law. In Parker’s account, these figures subjected common law to
seemingly unchanging natural and social laws, even while suggesting that those laws
aligned with the slow and gradual process of history.36 I likewise aim to outline the
relationship between nineteenth-century legal thought and history, though I am less
interested in showing how common-law commentators understood the relationship
between law and historical contexts and circumstances than I am with demonstrating how
the issue of slavery led constitutional thinkers to discover historical change and distance
and to read the Constitution in the light of history.
William W. Wiecek wrote the seminal text on the American constitutional debate
over slavery. His narrative, which focuses on the period between 1760 and 1848, traces
the development of antislavery argumentation until its concretization in the 1840s, when
radical antislavery constitutionalists contended that the Constitution did not simply limit
slavery as a state institution but actually made illegal that institution’s existence in the
American South. Wiecek mentions the constitutionalists’ special focus on the Declaration
of Independence and, though he emphasizes their dismissal of historical evidence as
extraneous to constitutional interpretation, he also notes their attempts to locate
antislavery sentiment in the founding era. His narrative demonstrates how even those
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who downplayed historical sources were drawn into historical argumentation. Wiecek’s
work provides an important starting point for an analysis of the historical implications of
antislavery constitutionalism.37 Other works, although they too only mention the
historical components of antislavery argumentation in passing, help fill out the story of
antislavery constitutional discussion in the 1840s and 1850s. For example, James Oaks
identifies Frederick Douglass’s and Abraham Lincoln’s appeals to the framers’
antislavery expectations, and John Burt, in a sophisticated reading of the LincolnDouglas debates, lends further insight into the Great Emancipator’s discussion and
application of the founders’ implicit promises.38 Burt offers the pregnant proposal that in
the case of slavery’s abolition, Lincoln came to a position where “loyalty to the Founders
is not expressed by repetition of their practices, but by allowing one’s self to be rebuked
by the promises they knew they could not keep but made anyway.”39 I demonstrate the
presence of such an idea among antislavery advocates in sources that predate Lincoln’s
speeches. They uncovered an original expectation that historical changes would create the
circumstances necessary for the realization of promises that the founders had made but
that their eighteenth-century context did not allow them to fulfill. They also argued that
historical changes had, in fact, made the nineteenth century an era in which slavery must
be abolished, but that the rise of an anachronistic Slave Power had halted the progress of
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freedom. This historical narrative, I argue, which came to inform Lincoln’s politics in the
1850s, indicated the reality of temporal distance from the founding era.40

Historical Actors, Historical Methodologies, and Historical Distances
This study moves attention away from the historical writings of self-conscious
historians like William Prescott and George Bancroft and toward the biblical and
constitutional commentaries of ministers, theologians, lawyers, reformers, judges, and
politicians, including, among others, Joseph Stevens Buckminster, William Ellery
Channing, Andrews Norton, Charles Hodge, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Lysander Spooner,
William Goodell, William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Frederick Douglass, and
Benjamin Robbins Curtis. Theodore Parker, Moses Stuart, Roger B. Taney, and Abraham
Lincoln, in particular, play lead roles in the narrative. These historical actors weighed in
on the slavery controversy from distinct and in many ways opposed religious and
political positions and in doing so engaged one another’s historical arguments in both
direct and indirect ways. The focus on these thinkers and their interpretive debates
protects us from the tendency to equate historical consciousness with historical
methodology by offering alternative means of gauging antebellum historical thought.41
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Because these sources are not straightforward articulations of historical awareness—as
few sources are—and because historical consciousness often remains unexpressed or
inexplicit even in historical writings, I read these texts in search of their multivocalities,
their unwritten assumptions, and their complex relationships to various contexts,
especially other texts. Taking a methodological cue from historian Dominick LaCapra,
who writes that “intellectual history should be a history of intellectuals, of the
communities of discourse in which they function, and of the varying relations ... they
manifest toward the larger culture,” I examine the intersections among these thinkers and
their texts, and between them and their antebellum contexts. To use terms employed by
LaCapra, I seek to identify the presence of both the symptomatic and the critical, both the
representative and the unconventional, in religious, legal, and political texts written by
conservative, moderate and radical authors.42 Within each text I locate the presence of
approaches, narratives, ideas, and concepts that reveal awareness of historical distance or
that exposed that distance. Measuring an abstract concept like historical consciousness
presents numerous challenges, but a careful reading of antebellum biblical and
constitutional interpretation reveals much about the development of Americans’
understandings of their favored pasts and their distance from them.
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Examining such sources also allows us to get beyond the ideas of a confined
group of thinkers. To be sure, this dissertation devotes many pages to the sermons,
lectures, speeches, letters and publications of figures like the learned ministers and
lawyers and elite judges and politicians noted above, but their interpretations were aimed
at and often reached broad audiences who not only believed in their right to engage the
debates—and to interpret the Bible and the Constitution on their own—but who accepted
the historical terms of those discussions. This is not to suggest that most interested
readers actively participated in the debates, much less engaged in a rigorous historical
examination of biblical and constitutional passages, but that they understood the nature of
the discussion and that those who did participate, especially in dealing with the nation’s
founding era, often crafted historical accounts to defend and advance their positions.
Further, in an era when American political culture expanded, due in part to advances in
communication and transportation technologies, and when issues resting on the margins
of that culture came to occupy its center, a growing number of commentators voiced their
opinions. That the slavery debate took a historical turn only emboldened them to enter the
conversation. A writer for Putnam’s magazine wrote that the Dred Scott decision “does
not rest so much upon any interpretation of the law as it does upon a construction of the
facts of history.”43 The implication was that anyone could learn such facts, and thus
anyone could take on Taney’s argument. Even when unaware of these debates or in
choosing not to engage them, many Americans were deeply invested in the Bible, the
Constitution, and slavery, and thus these discussions had far-reaching implications.
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Without question, many antebellum Americans, including many of the thinkers
that populate this dissertation, retained traditional simplistic historical views, linking vast
periods of time with grand narratives—such as providentialist millennialism or whiggish
progressive liberalism. In both of these schemes there was a sacralized moment of
creation and a sacred text: the biblical era and the Bible, and the Revolutionary era and
the Constitution. In reading these pasts and their texts, many held onto conventional
hermeneutical approaches, conflating historical difference and collapsing historical
distance in applying canonical imperatives. To the extent that the sacred texts were seen
as timeless, they contributed to an intellectual atmosphere in which epochs of time did
not seem significantly different; a nineteenth-century American might consider Moses or
Madison as contemporaries, uttering truths that were as valid and clear in 1850 or 1857 as
they were in 1500 BC or 1787. Such assumptions partook of a long-standing ahistorical
view. The Puritans believed that their generation may have broken an ancient covenant,
or fallen from a primordial Eden, but obedience to timeless laws could immediately turn
back the clock of declension. This was not a matter of time, but of holiness; in their eyes,
Puritan New England lay closer to the ancient truth than medieval Rome.44 Even the
generation of American Revolutionaries, who hoped to restore the glories of classical
Rome or to recreate the non-feudal Saxon period of the English history, seemed set on
measuring their progress in terms of the past.45 Such historical approaches understood
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past and present times as fluid and interchangeable eras of temporal conflation rather than
impenetrable and discrete epochs of temporal distinction.
While most scholars see that ahistorical tendency on the wane by the late
nineteenth century, an issue at the center of that historicizing process has received
insufficient attention. Slavery, above all else, led Americans to rethink their relationship
to their favored pasts and to the past as a whole. The most recognized forms of
interpretation suggested that the Bible and the Constitution endorsed the institution.
However, transatlantic engagements with European historical criticism and the focus on
slavery at home raised the level of scrutiny directed at these founding texts and
encouraged new interpretive approaches aimed at uncovering their meanings. The
resulting historical explications highlighting the context of these texts and narrations
tracing changes since their production compelled many Americans to confront the reality
of historical difference and distance. When it proved exegetically impossible for
antebellum abolitionists to deny that Jesus tolerated slavery in primitive Palestine, or that
James Madison sanctioned it in the nascent United States, they faced two choices: 1)
reject the Bible and the Constitution as worn out and obsolete (and some did just that) or
2) insist that they were written in fundamentally different historical circumstances and
that one must be hermeneutically attuned to that fact (more did this). Even conservative
and moderate interpreters, who ignored historical distance and asserted the applicability
of Jesus’s or Madison’s words, inadvertently drew attention to the vast differences
dividing biblical and Revolutionary pasts from the present through their contextual
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explications. In addressing slavery, then, American interpreters became aware of
historical distance to a degree unmatched by their predecessors.
This kind of examination of the biblical and constitutional debates over slavery
reveals the rise and development of historical awareness in antebellum America and gives
historical shape to an often broad and loose notion of historical consciousness. It
demonstrates that some Americans in the national period did, in fact, think historically
and shows that their historical thinking took the form of an awareness of the qualitative
historical distance that results from a confrontation with distinct historical contexts and
qualitative historical distances. This dissertation, then, corrects the assumption about the
shallowness of antebellum historical thought by outlining the specific nature of that
thought, which resulted from biblical and constitutional debates over slavery.
The overlap traced in antebellum hermeneutical approaches to the Bible and the
Constitution signals one of the most important insights of this analysis. Both interpretive
traditions were preoccupied with uncovering the “original meanings” of sacred texts from
hallowed historical eras. Jaroslav Pelikan, who has explored this relationship in general
terms, notes that “both the New Testament and the Constitution are set within historical
periods that are endowed with a special aura by their traditions and that carry a unique
authority for their communities.”46 This examination adds historical specificity to
Pelikan’s discussion, showing how slavery brought together distinctive interpretive
practices at a certain moment and demonstrating how that process gradually revealed the
time-bound nature of presumably timeless eras. Historians have yet to adequately
demonstrate the centrality of slavery in the complicated but clear intellectual processes by
46
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which the biblical and Revolutionary pasts were historicized in antebellum America. In
outlining these processes my dissertation will shed light on the emergence in America of
the kind of historical thinking that we take for granted in the twenty-first century.

Context and Change: Realizing the Pastness of Antebellum America’s Favored Pasts
While slavery, more than any other antebellum issue, inspired a growing
awareness of, and demanded responses to, the challenges of historical distance, the
eventual realization of that distance through biblical and constitutional interpretation first
depended on the usefulness and importance of founding texts and pasts. The realization
of historical distance occurs with the recognition that profound and irrevocable changes
separate one period from another and that, as a result, people from different eras inhabit
fundamentally different worlds, exhibit distinct cultural and societal characteristics, and
hold unique mentalities and worldviews. Paradoxically, the potential for this development
is greatest when pasts with assumed cultural and ideological affinities with the present
receive sustained attention. In other words, awareness of a past’s pastness (i.e. its cultural
distinctness in terms of human experiences, attitudes, and mentalities) depends first on its
emergence as a useful past. A past becomes useful as individuals and groups appeal to a
certain historical era to address present social, cultural, and political issues. To be sure,
pasts are useful in terms of both affinities and contrasts, but in each case such use
assumes correspondence in presupposing that lessons from a past apply in the present.
Some useful pasts obtain shape as favored pasts through consistent and meaningful use.
In such cases applicants make the chosen past more familiar than foreign. Thus, a past’s
persistence as an object of attention, and thus as a potential object of historicization, rests
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on its presentness (i.e. its apparent affinity with the present in terms of human
experiences, attitudes, and mentalities).
Discussion of neglected or unfamiliar pasts can also fuel historical awareness. To
a certain extent, one assumes historical distance with pasts receiving little notice. For
example, to the extent that they were aware of them at all, most antebellum Americans
likely assumed historical distance from the ancient Asian and African pasts. But minimal
engagement with those pasts, combined with the existence of more useful and familiar
historical periods, would have made that a surface level realization only. An awareness of
temporal distance is most complete when favored pasts are understood as past due to an
increased historical recognition of the different historical contexts and circumstances of
past eras and not only because other pasts have taken their place. Depicting a past in a
negative light, as in the case of the so-called Dark Ages or the centuries of supposed
corruption from Christianity’s origins, created a sense of temporal distance and change,
but that realization was mitigated by simultaneously appealing to pure pasts or golden
ages, like the classical period or Puritan New England. Even when erstwhile favored
pasts, including the classical and colonial eras, lost some of their usefulness, other pasts,
such as primitive Christianity and the American founding, replaced them and thus
reduced the potential realization of historical alienation.47 Thus, the most profound form
of historical distance results with the recognition that unbridgeable historical divisions
and irreversible historical changes separate even the most favored pasts from the present.
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It is the shock of realizing that those pasts that feel closest, those that seem most worthy
and capable of recovery, are deeply different and perhaps best left behind that pushes the
process of historicization most violently forward. And so, although the enduring textual
basis of both the biblical and the Revolutionary pasts promised to make them most
favored, it also set the stage for sustained historical investigation of their texts, which
threatened to historicize them and expose a certain archaism. And when those pasts were
characterized as archaic, it suggested that no historical era could claim to transcend time.
Historical eras, including the classical and colonial periods, competed with the
biblical and Revolutionary pasts for Americans’ favor in the antebellum era. Americans
drew a number of political lessons from the classical past and while Revolutionary uses
of that past tended to collapse time, antebellum uses highlighted historical differences as
Americans increasingly found greater use in Greece as an antidote to, rather than Rome
as a mirror of, their current situation. Historical criticism also contributed to the
estrangement of the classical period. In the 1820s American classicists like Edward
Everett used contextual explication to address issues raised about the authorship of the
Iliad and the Odyssey. The realization of historical distance began to undermine direct
appeals to, and challenge the prominent place of, the classical world in American culture
and higher education.48 The potential anxiety associated with the realization of the
classical period’s pastness was mitigated by the usefulness of another favored ancient
period: the biblical past. The Bible’s religious significance to generations of Christians
48
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placed it and its past on a higher plane than the classics and the classical period, seeming
to offer a greater level of protection from historicization. To an extent, the time
separating the sacred biblical past from the present ensured its persistence as perhaps the
antebellum period’s most important historical point of reference. And yet, when scholars
began to illuminate the biblical past with historical research, when they dug up the details
of culture and geography and language, the vast temporal distance between biblical and
modern times seemed to widen rather than contract.
Antebellum Americans also found important uses for more recent historical
periods, including colonial times. Colonial experience was vital to the new republic’s
political instruction, though often refracted through the lens of an antislavery
Revolutionary epoch. Puritans became proto-Revolutionaries and antislavery advocates
in the era’s histories. Further historical research questioned such representations. For
example, in response to the first volume of John Gorham Palfrey’s hagiographic History
of New England (1859), fellow Harvard alumnus Francis Bowen informed the author that
the Puritans “were mortal men; they made blunders, they shared the errors of their
times.”49 Similarly, Moses Stuart responded to abolitionist claims by locating slavery in
New England’s past, which he explained as understandable given their temporal setting.
Such explanations could expose historical distance between the progressive present and
the Puritan past, working against efforts, including Stuart’s, to draw lessons from an
earlier era. Furthermore, in depictions stressing the gradual development of democratic
principles toward epochal revolution, either as fulfillment of or departure from the period
of Puritan settlement, the Revolution became the historical starting point in the national
49
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drama.50 At once, the founding era seemed to signal the culmination of colonial historical
development and to promise permanent relevance. The establishment of an
unprecedented point of historical departure placed intense scrutiny on a fixed point in
time, a development that held great potential to draw attention to historical distance when
later generations looked back for instruction.
Similar to representations of the colonial period that traced progress toward the
Revolution, the common law emphasis on the accumulation of legal wisdom stretching
back into the British past stressed the value of historical development. Some antebellum
Democrats dismissed common law as a product of the dark ages, while Whigs like
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story argued that because it was based in custom and
grounded in a deep legal tradition, common law possessed the capacity to adapt to
changing circumstances and specific cases even as precedent promised to check arbitrary
judicial application. The emphasis on incremental advances accentuated continuity over
change.51 In contrast, the Constitution, upheld as the nation’s supreme legal source,
demanded that America’s legal minds focus their gaze on a static historical document
from a fixed founding period when addressing the most pressing legal and political
questions of the day. Though it did not replace common law, the Constitution illuminated
precedential decisions. The post-founding canonization of that document, which
applicants valued as the nation’s founding text above other possible choices, such as the
Articles of Confederation, raised the favored founding era to rival the importance of the
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biblical past, while also initiating a unique historical conversation.52 The development
directed adherents to look to a set historical era—the period of Revolution and
ratification—for the nation’s political and legal direction, a process that promised to raise
far-reaching questions about how events, people, and documents from a specific era in
the past spoke to the needs of the present, and thus carried a unique potential to instill
awareness of historical distance.
The nation’s preeminent religious and legal texts, the Bible and the Constitution,
directed Americans’ attention to certain historical periods, particularly in their attempts to
resolve issues of great moral and political importance. As this study demonstrates,
slavery brought together two distinct interpretive practices in unprecedented ways,
despite the unique nature of the sacred texts and favored pasts under examination. The
number of years dividing the present from the Revolutionary era was, of course, very
brief compared to that separating it from the biblical past, but the dominant Protestant
hermeneutic, which stemmed from an ad fontes epistemic determined to lay aside
traditions and focus on the Bible itself, was largely uninterested in the nearly two
millennia that divided the present from the biblical past. Many Christians read the Bible
as if the nineteenth century had followed the first. However, when scholars began to
illuminate the biblical past with historical research, it signaled the presence of the
intervening centuries that separated biblical from modern times. A deep study of the
erstwhile familiar and favored biblical era illuminated the immediate historical contexts
52
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of biblical passages, which drew attention to historical particularity and suggested that
much had changed in the period between primitive Christian times and modern America.
In comparison to the erstwhile familiar biblical times of Jesus and Paul, or of
Moses and Abraham or Adam and Eve (not to mention the much less useful archaic
periods), the nation’s founding era seemed more present than past, a fact that might
protect it from historicization. History, for many, was ancient and classical, not modern
and American. The new nation’s historians introduced some distance by draping the
period in classical terms and lamenting the loss of classical virtue since that time, but that
brought the classical past forward as much as it pushed the founding era backward.
Further, that the Constitution was relatively untested actually fostered its sacralization as
a timeless text. And yet, precisely because relatively little time had passed since the
originating era, knowledge about the period was accessible and widespread, and thus
historical differences and transformations could be easily demonstrated. As with
historical distance from biblical times, an awareness of historical distance from the
founding era depended on contextualizing constitutional clauses, but also on evidencing
changes since their creation. The sense of historical change that resulted from a study of
the nation’s short history loomed large. Perhaps the relatively short time between the two
periods discouraged Americans from listening to abolitionist cries of the Constitution’s
obsolescence, but even efforts to dismiss historical insight and change as irrelevant to
constitutional construction raised questions about the founding document’s relationship
to temporal evolution. Arguing that historical context and change should not affect
interpretation only reified their reality. Denying the interpretive relevance of slavery’s
presence in the founding era highlighted context and dismissing as inconsequential to
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construction the rise of antislavery sentiment drew attention to change, both of which
signaled the existence of an unbridgeable historical distance. Those who used historical
distance or denied its interpretive importance spoke of its presence. The potential for a
widespread realization of such distance resulting from a fixation on periods of religious
and political founding remained suppressed until events pushed slavery to center stage
during the nineteenth century’s middle decades. In antebellum era, this development
above all others fostered a realization of historical distance and fueled conversations
about the place of the Bible and the Constitution in the American present.

Chapter Summaries
The narrative that follows offers a chronological account of these developments.
Rather than separate out antebellum thinkers into groups based on the rigor of their
historical investigations or the depth of their historical consciousness, I trace the
emergence of their historical awareness in relation to the their interpretive contestations.
In other words, because these thinkers displayed historical awareness through biblical and
constitutional debates about slavery rather than by providing abstract articulations of
historical consciousness, I examine their historical thought by narrating their interpretive
debates over slavery. Grouping thinkers according to the sophistication of their
contextual readings, the depth of their historical awareness, and the degree to which they
used historical distance in interpretation would have resulted in a neater narrative. At
some points this account demands that the reader exhibit some patience with sections that
detail important ideational distinctions between the thinkers discussed. However, this
organizational choice allows me to give some flavor of the intellectual discussions and
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debates among antebellum historical actors and, more importantly, it reveals the central
argument of this dissertation: that the immediate context in antebellum America—and the
issue of southern slavery in particular—created awareness of historical distance.
The first two chapters focus on the transatlantic development toward viewing the
Bible as a historically situated set of texts in need of historical explication. The first
chapter begins by briefly tracing European biblical scholarship in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. It outlines the emerging view of the Bible as a historical text. This
short discussion examines how that development influenced the thinking of American
theologian Jonathan Edwards. The bulk of the chapter outlines the growing attention to
biblical criticism in America in the early nineteenth century and explains the implications
for how scholars viewed the Old and New Testament pasts. I demonstrate that thinkers
across the antebellum religious spectrum, from Charles Hodge’s orthodox Calvinism to
Andrews Norton’s liberal Unitarianism, variously appropriated the lessons of biblical
criticism and accepted history as the discursive currency of choice in debates about the
canon, religious truth, and pressing social issues. These approaches challenged the
proclivity to collapse the temporal distinctions between ancient and modern times and to
conflate the moral imperatives of different historical eras. Even as more conservative
Protestants used biblical criticism to defend the biblical canon’s timelessness and to
assert its relevance in addressing modern problems such as American slavery, their
contextualized readings inadvertently contributed to the Bible’s historicization.
The rise of biblical criticism in America led prominent religious thinkers to stake
their claims on historical grounds and it also directed some of the nation’s more
heterodox figures to abandon those transient grounds in favor of what they understood as
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a transcendent moral sphere. The second chapter focuses on Transcendentalists Ralph
Waldo Emerson’s and Theodore Parker’s engagement with biblical criticism, which
nourished their sense that the fount of religious truth flowed directly to the human soul. It
also highlights how such engagement inspired Parker’s distinction between permanent
religious truths and their transient biblical bearings. Although he believed that the
Gospels and their Jesus rested on a historical foundation, Parker severed the Unitarians’
evidentialist tie between Christian truth and what he perceived as the unstable basis of
historical texts, persons, and events. The move to disconnect religious truth from
historical facts informed his identification of certain biblical teachings as outdated. As
slavery gained political prominence on the national stage, Parker dismissed proslavery
biblical teachings as antiquated. A similar approach allowed him to interpret the nation’s
sacred legal document—the Constitution—as a flawed text with temporary proslavery
features. In this way, biblical discussions prepared the way for constitutional debates, and
slavery brought together two distinct interpretive traditions.
The third chapter highlights the rhetorical affinities in antislavery readings of the
Bible and the Constitution and describes the role of historical reasoning in shifting the
grounds of the debate from one ancient favored past—Old Testament times—to a more
recent, but still ancient, favored past—New Testament times—and finally to the most
proximal favored past—the Revolutionary era. This chapter explores the arguments of
figures such as William Ellery Channing, Albert Barnes, William Lloyd Garrison, and
William Goodell to demonstrate that historical argumentation began to dominate biblical
and constitutional interpretation in the debates over slavery, and to show how the
publication of Madison’s papers in 1840 led interpreters such as Lysander Spooner and
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Wendell Phillips to either deny or affirm the use of historical sources in constitutional
interpretation. Regardless of how one valued contextual readings, in both biblical and
constitutional debates, antislavery interpretations emphasized that Christ and his apostles,
in the case of the biblical past, and the founding fathers, in the case of the founding era,
had planted the seeds of slavery’s abolition. They thus posited that Christian and national
founders had thought historically in expecting time to cultivate the antislavery principles
they had inculcated. Such readings blamed the rise of the Slave Power, which they
characterized as an anachronistic development, for Christian Americans’ failure to realize
those expectations. These interpreters highlighted historical distance in arguing that
unique figures had carefully inculcated universal principles meant to flower in a future
period and in suggesting that the time for fulfillment had arrived but had been thwarted
by outdated thinking and archaic institutions.
The fourth chapter traces how the above approaches commingled, developed and
spread in the furor surrounding the Fugitive Slave Law (1850) and its enforcement. It
explains how respondents, including Daniel Webster, Moses Stuart, and Theodore Parker
debated the role of both the Bible and the Constitution in determining the justice of the
new law. It also examines the writings of Frederick Douglass, Benjamin R. Curtis, and
Abraham Lincoln to explain the ways in which, during the 1850s, a public and political
constitutional debate took precedence over the relatively isolated biblical debate that it
paralleled and drew strength from. This process suggested that the nation’s legal and
political rather than its religious texts held more importance in determining slavery’s fate,
while also subjecting the founding era to new levels of examination and scrutiny.
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When political efforts failed to resolve the growing sectional problem, Americans
turned to the Supreme Court. And in constitutionalizing slavery in a period wherein
constitutional interpreters emphasized contextual readings, America’s political and legal
thinkers made slavery primarily a historical issue. The fifth and final chapter examines
the Dred Scott decision (1857), the apogee of slavery’s constitutionalization, which
turned Americans’ attention to the most recent favored past and carried unprecedented
potential to unveil historical change since and distance from that period. This chapter
explains the historical implications of the both the decision and the dissenting opinions.
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney formulated his argument in the wake of decades of
interpretive emphasis on historical explication. He believed that a historical argument
would settle the issue and thus rested his argument on historical grounds. He contended
that because the framers had designated blacks as non-citizens at the founding, he could
not now declare them citizens in 1857, despite the alternative construction that the spirit
of abolitionism, which he found obscuring and deviating, might provide. In response,
dissenting Justices John McLean and Benjamin Curtis echoed decades of antislavery
articulation in their counter-narrative of founding and of post-founding-era developments.
They argued that some blacks had voted as citizens during ratification and uncovered,
behind the Slave Power’s cloak, the founders’ expectations of change in the form of
developing egalitarian sentiment. This allowed the dissenters to call for constructions that
valued historical change. These public readings incited further debate and brought
increased attention to historical distance from the founding era.
Such arguments also helped Abraham Lincoln articulate his political position. In
the conclusion, I will suggest ways in which the antislavery reading of the founding era
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informed his antislavery response to Dred Scott, further demonstrating that historical
consciousness did not preclude the use of the past. The deepening of historical awareness
resulting from biblical and constitutional hermeneutics led many Americans to reconsider
both the biblical and Revolutionary pasts as distinct and distant periods of historical time,
but it also led a substantial number of them to reinterpret both the Bible and the
Constitution as malleable texts meant for use in various historical contexts. The Civil
War, along with the assumption, planted by late nineteenth-century thinkers, that
antebellum Americans failed to reason historically, obscured this development. I aim to
get behind that occlusion by tracing how slavery led American interpreters of the Bible
and the Constitution to recognize that historical distances divided them from even their
most favored pasts. In short, this work explains the process by which antebellum
Americans began to realize that, to invoke L. P. Hartley’s famous line, “the past [was] a
foreign country.”53
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CHAPTER 1
“RECOURSE MUST BE HAD TO THE HISTORY OF THOSE TIMES”: THE
ARRIVAL OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORICAL LESSONS OF
ACCOMMODATION
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Unitarian minister Joseph Stevens
Buckminster encouraged his congregants to adopt a “historical explication” of the Bible.
He warned against “looking into every text, separated from its context” and insisted that
the biblical authors “were not, on every occasion, delivering a system of dogmas for the
instruction of all succeeding time.”1 Biblical criticism led prominent American religious
thinkers like Buckminster to stake their claims on historical grounds. I argue that while
they incorporated the lessons of biblical criticism in different ways, thinkers across the
antebellum religious spectrum, from Charles Hodge’s orthodox Calvinism to Andrews
Norton’s liberal Unitarianism, accepted history as the favored discursive currency in
debates about the canon and religious truth. They defended canonical choices with
historical arguments, grounded their hermeneutics in historical analysis, and centered
their epistemologies in historical knowledge. As a result, these scholars were confronted
with evidence that profound contextual differences separated their world from the biblical
world that they looked to for inspiration and guidance. Unlike their hermeneutical
predecessors, they came to realize that the biblical authors did not always write “for the
instruction of all succeeding time.” However, a priori assumptions about the nature and
word of God informed their canonical choices and shielded them from historical
criticism’s threat of textual and moral relativism. Ultimately, most antebellum religious
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scholars, including Buckminster, continued to rely on the Bible’s perceived atemporal
features despite their exposure to historical distance. Nonetheless, their engagement with
biblical criticism, which included both the rejection and incorporation of certain
hermeneutic principles, left a new and indelible imprint on their understanding of the
Bible as a historical text from an ancient past.
Most historians have left unexamined the engagement with biblical criticism
among more orthodox thinkers such as Charles Hodge. In a recent publication, Michael
Lee provides an important corrective to the narrative of biblical scholarship in America
by explaining the ways in which theologically conservative thinkers accepted the
empirical grounds of debate prepared by the Bible’s critics, including and especially
deists. He demonstrates how figures like Joseph Buckminster, Moses Stuart, and
Andrews Norton followed their eighteenth-century predecessors in using historical
reasoning and argumentation to defend the Bible and to affirm their religious beliefs. Lee
argues that in the process these biblical defenders inadvertently undermined the divine
stature of the scriptures.2 The next two chapters trace a similar development among these
and other antebellum religious thinkers while also highlighting the implications of that
development for the potential realization of historical distance from biblical times. While
it took a civil war to resolve a question that theologians could not—whether American
slavery was indeed anachronistic—these pre-war rhetorical engagements along religious
lines nourished, if in uneven and inadvertent ways, an emerging historical consciousness,
while also setting the stage for a constitutional debate with similar implications.
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“Though They Are Histories”: The Revaluation of Historical Knowledge in Seventeenthand Eighteenth-Century Hermeneutics
The rise of biblical criticism in early nineteenth-century America followed from
prior developments in European hermeneutics. Christianity originated as a faith centered
in historical texts and figures, but the shakiness of those foundations began to appear only
in relation to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemological and methodological
evolutions that privileged historical knowledge and a historical explanation of the Bible.
The major thinkers of the Reformation, including Martin Luther and John Calvin, had
believed that the Bible’s content directly corresponded to actual historical realities and
that substantive religious truths bound together its two Testaments, despite clear
differences in the presentations of moral teachings and the forms of religious rituals
between the Old and the New. In both literal and figurative interpretations, readers
assumed that the words of the sacred texts bore a close relation to historical truths. The
Bible could be received as the sole source of divine revelation and trusted as an authentic,
accurate, and embracing historical account of God’s workings with humankind.3
This reading persisted in the eras that followed, but a few seventeenth-century
thinkers began to challenge some of these suppositions. For example, early modern
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes questioned the authenticity of certain Old
Testament texts. Hobbes used the Bible to promote the idea that to ensure the safe
exercise of human liberty, that liberty had to be limited. Paul D. Cooke argues that he
replaced the biblical law of God with the laws of nature, though, aware of his Christian
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audience, he artfully aligned the latter with the former. In the process, Hobbes challenged
the received authorship of the first five Old Testament books. In 1651, near the end of the
chaotic and bloody English Civil War, he published Leviathan, wherein he emphasized
the need for an absolute sovereign. In the text, he denied the Mosaic authorship of the
Pentateuch, as would a number of his contemporaries. He also distinguished between the
original writings of the apostles and the books of the New Testament as they were then
constituted. Even Christ, in Hobbes’s work, became a promoter of natural rights rather
than the singular savior of humankind. Despite such strictures, he accepted the biblical
texts as accurate historical accounts of God’s word based on the determinative word of
the civil sovereign. In raising issues with the biblical record, then, Hobbes demonstrated
the potential dangers of using historical analysis to scrutinize the Bible without the
supervision and direction of an autonomous ruler.4
Baruch Spinoza went further than Hobbes in historicizing the Bible. Samuel J.
Preus argues that the Dutch philosopher also used the Bible to advance his political
purposes. That process involved displacing the authority of the canon itself through a
rigorous historical-critical approach, wherein Spinoza interpreted the Bible as historical
in terms of its creation, transmission, and content. Like Hobbes, in his TheologicalPolitical Treatise (1670), Spinoza rejected the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. And,
as the English thinker had disassociated Israel’s theocratic government from both Puritan
and Catholic rule in England, Spinoza dismissed affinities between Israelite wars and
Dutch struggles for independence, positing rather that the former demonstrated the
problems of theocratic rule. Rather than assume that past prophets had spoken to people
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in all ages, an assumption that produced anachronistic readings, he contended that the
biblical texts must be understood in terms of the historically conditioned intentions of
their authors. In turn, while Hobbes placed the power of interpretation in the civil
sovereign, Spinoza aimed to wrest authority from the public purveyors of biblical
understanding and exalt individual readers to the status of interpreters. He did not mean
to suggest that the Bible contained no truth or that all truth was relative. Rather, he used
reason to measure the truth of all ideas, including biblical teachings. Preus contends that
Spinoza’s efforts have been overlooked because, unlike later German thinkers who
“domesticated” historical exegesis, he did not aim to derive religious value from them.5
Regardless of how far Spinoza carried his historical approach, most biblical
readers remained oblivious to these isolated discussions and, for the most part, continued
to assume that the Bible faithfully recounted actual historical occurrences, conveyed a
cumulative story, and stretched to include all of human existence. However, by the late
seventeenth century, English philosopher John Locke challenged those assumptions when
he began incorporating narrow biblical narratives into a much more expansive human
story, rather than cramming world history into a presumably all-encompassing Bible.
Locke did not question the Bible’s historicity and he continued to uphold it as an
exceptional work, but he read it in terms of a much more embracive idea of human
experience. In the eighteenth century, deism, empiricism, and historical criticism began
to raise new questions about the nature of the Bible and the connection between biblical
stories and historical realities. For instance, in addressing the relationship between the
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Old and New Testaments, deist Anthony Collins dismissed scripture’s factuality when
read literally and its meaningfulness when read typologically. Literal and figurative
approaches began to clash once thinkers separated religious meanings from their
erstwhile historical referents. In response to these interruptive arguments, inheritors of
the figurative approach, who continued to interpret the Bible as a cumulative text,
propagated providentialist readings to establish a bridge of religious meaning across the
chasms of historical difference that divided biblical texts. Meanwhile, successors to the
literalist approach strove to capture the original sense of specific passages and to
determine their relationship to historical facts. While conservative interpreters accepted
biblical narratives as factually reliable sources of revealed truth, their liberal counterparts
began to doubt that reliability. In short, as Hans Frei notes, “Everything conspired to
confine explicative hermeneutics to meaning as references—to equate meaning with
knowledge of potential or actual reality—and to make the primary reference historical
rather than ideal.” Historical reasoning began to control biblical interpretation.6
Historians often assume colonial America’s isolation from the more unsettling
pulls of these intellectual currents, but recent scholarship has illustrated how Calvinist
preacher and theologian Jonathan Edwards was drawn into them in a number of ways. In
contrast to Hobbes and Spinoza, who, like deists and Quakers, had derived religious
knowledge from a priori understandings rather than historical texts and traditions,
Edwards assumed that the Bible’s historicity related to its moral function. He broadened
Locke’s sensationalism to include divine intuition, which he believed the Bible
cultivated, but after internalizing the critique of revelatory epistemology from deists such
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as Collins and Matthew Tindale, Edwards came to believe, as Robert Brown states, “that
historical religious knowledge was the only source of human ideas about religion.”7 It
became paramount for Edwards to defend the Bible and the Christian religion on
historical grounds.
In one of his notebooks from the mid-1750s, which a later editor titled “Defense
of the authenticity of the Pentateuch as a work of Moses and the historicity of the Old
Testament narratives,” Edwards upheld Hebrew scripture with historical arguments. In
general, he accepted the Bible’s historical authenticity simply because it presented itself
as historical. For example, because “some of the STATUTES of the Law [of Moses] are
delivered in the FORM OF HISTORY,” he accepted those statutes as an accurate account
of past events. But Edwards also followed English apologists in using external and
profane knowledge to confirm the Bible’s truth. He drew on the history of pagan
religions to verify its historical accuracy and to favorably compare its contents. He wrote
that “the history of Moses, though it be full of things more wonderful, yet are nothing
akin to the fables of man’s inventing in old times about deities and invisible beings, and
their intercourse with men, which were agreeable to the carnal dispositions and taste of
mankind. … But these facts of Moses are extremely diverse and of a quite opposite
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nature, all pure, holy and spiritual.”8 Similar statements and the same kind of reasoning
abounds in Edwards’s “Notes on Scripture” and his “Miscellanies.” In the latter, for
example, he included the entry, “History of the Old Testament from Moses’ time
confirmed from heathen traditions and records.”9 In his “Catalogue” of books one finds
lists of numerous historical sources, both ancient and modern, which further attest that
although he remained apologetic in his reasoning, Edwards accepted the historical
grounds of the biblical debate that had been prepared by figures such as Hobbes, Spinoza,
and Locke.10
Although his religious orthodoxy would not allow him to be as unflinching in his
reading of the sacred canon, in a sense Edwards valued historical reasoning much more
than the Bible’s critics for the very reason that he believed the Bible to be the primary
repository of divine revelation and the measuring stick of religious truth. Edwards
believed that tradition had brought ancient truths down to his time, and he also believed
in the book of nature, but in terms of religious and moral instruction he used the Bible to
gauge those truths and thus, once he accepted the historical approach to scripture, he
focused on using historical arguments to back the Bible. So while his use of extra-biblical
sources shows that he took very seriously the deists’ stricture of revelatory knowledge, he
scoffed at their objection “against a book’s being divine merely because it is historical.”11
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Edwards made this statement in A History of the Work of Redemption, a collection of
sermons that he first delivered to his Northampton congregation in the spring and
summer of 1739 and revised for publication throughout the remainder of his life, though
it only reached the press in 1774, nearly a decade and a half after his death. In this
expansive project—although in inchoate form, it represented the crystallization of his
thought in many ways—Edwards contended that the historical nature of the Bible
confirmed its revelatory status.
The colonial theologian interpreted history through his conception of the “Work
of Redemption.” This work focused on Christ’s salvific providences—revivals in
particular—which, to Edwards’s understanding, functioned as the motor of historical
change. Avihu Zakai argues that in outlining his “theological teleology of history” in
Work of Redemption, Edwards rejected the Enlightenment’s mechanical philosophy of
time and its anthropocentric concept of progress toward a millennium. Instead, argues
Zakai, Edwards stressed God’s sovereign control over historical development through
continual redemptive workings and contends that it was in this light that Edwards
understood the revivals of the Great Awakening, which, he believed, effected change
toward denouement within time, although redeemed souls only would enjoy the full fruits
of those workings outside of and beyond time. This conception of history informed
Edwards’s readings of the Bible.12
Even while he used extra-biblical sources and acknowledged ancient human
experience not recorded in the Bible, Edwards maintained that all human existence, past
12
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and present, fit within the biblical framework. As he summarized in his first sermon in
the series, the Work of Redemption “‘tis all but one work, one design. The various
dispensations and works that belong to it are but the several parts of one scheme.”13 In his
tenth sermon, he further explained that “there are two ways of the Scripture giving an
account of the events by which the Work of Redemption is carried on: one is by history
and another is by prophecy. And in one or the other of these ways,” he asserted, “we have
contained in this holy book an account of how the Work of Redemption is carried on
from the beginning to the end.” Cognizant of new historical information about extrabiblical peoples and settings, Edwards had to admit that “the Scripture don’t [sic] contain
a proper history of the whole, yet,” he maintained, “there is contained the whole chain of
great events by which this affair has been carried on from the foundation soon after the
fall of man to the finishing of it at the end of the world.”14 And even in those cases where
the Bible did not offer a “proper history” of its own historical subjects, such as the period
between the Babylonian captivity and the coming of Christ, “God in his providence took
care that there should be authentic and full accounts of the events of this period preserved
in profane history.”15 Edwards proposed that these accounts, which “wonderfully agree
with the many prophecies that we have in Scripture of these times,” further attested to the
accuracy of the biblical account.
Having confirmed the Bible’s factuality from extra-biblical historical sources,
Edwards recognized the need both to account for the historical nature of the Bible and to
distinguish it from other historical sources. This, he set out to do, in his thirteenth
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sermon. In response to the view that the historical nature of the biblical texts placed them
alongside other histories and thus desacralized them, Edwards posited that “though they
are histories, yet they are no less full of divine instruction … than other parts of the holy
Scriptures that are not historical. To object against a book’s being divine merely because
it is historical is a silly objection,” he supposed, “just as if that could not be the word of
God that gives us an account of what is past.”16 Indeed, he went on to argue, “so far from
being a weighty objection against the historical parts of Scripture being the word of God
that ‘tis a strong argument” in its favor. If reason led “all civilized nations to keep records
… how much more may we expect that God gives the world a record of the dispensations
of his divine government.”17 Edwards held that this record offered unique insight into the
ancient past, stating that “the times of the history of the Old Testament are times that no
other history reaches up to.”18 But the Bible was not only unique because of what
Edwards considered its historical depth, but also because it alone gave “an idea of the
grand scheme of divine providence.”19 The “Work of Redemption” distinguished the
Bible and it also ensured the present usefulness of all its parts.
“Some,” Edwards bemoaned, “are ready to look on the Old Testament as being, as
it were, out of date and as if we in these days of the gospel had but little to do with it.”20
Historical research had revealed an insurmountable historical distance to certain
readers—that segment of readership would expand greatly in the nineteenth century—but
they failed to recognize that “all parts of the Old Testament have their places in terms of
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the scheme of redemption,” for “Christ and his redemption are the great subject of the
whole Bible.”21 The difference in presentation between the testaments led to this failure
to find Christ throughout the Bible. “The whole book,” Edwards declared, “both Old
Testament and New, is filled up with gospel, only with this difference, that the Old
Testament contains the gospel under a veil.”22 Based on this premise, Edwards continued
to read the Bible typologically and maintained the relevance of even the Old Testament,
despite the strictures of modern scholarship. Indeed, he had become convinced that extrabiblical sources confirmed and the Bible’s historical nature confirmed the authenticity of
the Christian canon. Over the course of a few generations, American exegetes would all
but contend that far from being less divine because historical, the Bible’s divinity rested
on its historicity. That move placed the Bible in a precarious position.
As deism helped direct America’s preeminent Protestant theologian to prize
historical knowledge, so it also contributed to the rise of biblical criticism as an
autonomous academic discipline in eighteenth-century Germany. In the 1770s, Gotthold
Ephraim Lessing, a lead figure in the German Enlightenment, published portions of a
work by deist Hermann Samuel Reimarus that dismissed Jesus’s miracles and denied the
historical accuracy of the New Testament texts. In response to such arguments, Johann
Saloma Semler asserted the factuality of the events there recorded but posited that those
events, including the miracles, were best explained in the light of historical context. It
was in works such as Semler’s critical analyses of the received canon, Johann David
Michaelis’s historical introductions to the New Testament, and Johann Gottfried
Eichhorn’s historical introduction to the Old Testament that Spinoza’s, Hobbes’s, and
21
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Locke’s anticipatory questions received their first thorough treatments. Using
philological and historical tools to ascertain the origin, context, and factual veracity of the
Bible’s narratives, these German critics maintained that the textual content was of a
historical nature, and while they did not draw a straight line from historical content to
religious meaning, these scholars sought to recover the cultural conditions in which
biblical texts were produced so as to determine their religious value. To their way of
thinking, applicable religious meaning was not indistinguishable from historical facts or
wholly explainable through reference to historical contexts, but those facts provided a
basis for belief and those contexts served an important function in weighing truth. Such
efforts raised questions about the canon’s unitary meaning. Indeed, even before the
publication of Reimarus’s strictures, Semler had separated out biblical books based on
their religious value. Unlike Edwards, he did not think that each book preached of Christ
equally. These arguments opened the door to Johann Phillip Gabler’s contention that
religious meaning was derived from textual referents in the form of authenticated
historical facts.23
Developments in America also leaned towards an emphasis on applying historical
reasoning to biblical interpretation and even if that hermeneutic was in many ways less
critical in approach than the German scholarship, it was often even more invested in the
historical nature of the biblical texts. As the seeds of a bible-based historical theology
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took root in Germany, Scottish Realism spread its branches across the Atlantic.24
Glasgow native Thomas Reid, who revised Locke’s sensationalist epistemology to
combat David Hume’s skepticism, asserted that ordinary experience revealed the
universal presence of internal first principles, which attested to the existence of the self
and the reality of objects perceived via the senses. When radical deists like Thomas Paine
exalted reason and battered the Bible as irrational, proponents of evidential Christianity
like College of New Jersey (later Princeton) President Samuel Stanhope Smith borrowed
the empiricism of Francis Bacon and relied on the bolstered sensationalism of Scottish
Realism to stress the limits of reason even as they marshaled internal and external
evidences to defend the reasonableness of biblical revelation. While orthodox belief
guarded most American biblical scholars from the kind of rigorous examination of the
biblical texts found among their German contemporaries, the effort to evidence the truth
of Christianity uniquely drew together historicity and religious meaning. Historical
reasoning became a principal concern for American exegetes and evidential Christianity
set the stage for the qualified introduction of biblical criticism in antebellum America.25
Thus began the exegetical march in America toward reading the Bible as a historical text,
followed soon after by a budding realization that could not assume historical transference
between the biblical past and the American present.
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The Introduction of Biblical Criticism and Joseph S. Buckminster’s “Historical
Explication”
The institutional arrival of biblical criticism in America and the corresponding
appeal to contextual exegesis owed much to the same sources (i.e. “deistical
publications”) that directed German developments.26 Convinced that older and newer
deistic works obscured the truths of Christianity, Samuel Dexter set aside $5,000 in his
will for Harvard to promote “that most useful branch of learning, the critical knowledge
of the holy scriptures.” He proposed that the testators acquire relevant scholarly works,
purchase and support the production of new translations of the Bible, and fund learned
lectures “for the purposes of critically explaining either the history, doctrines, or
precepts, of the gospel.” Even when not mentioned specifically, history figured
prominently in Dexter’s discussion, as in his emphasis on the “usefulness of explaining
idioms, phrases, and figures of speech, which abound in the scriptures; and the usages
and customs therein referred to; and of clearing up the difficulties in sacred chronology
and geography.”27 Biblical criticism was often a historical endeavor, as Dexter and the
first Dexter Lecturer knew well.
In 1811, the year after his death, Dexter’s trustees elected New Hampshire native
Joseph Stevens Buckminster as Harvard’s inaugural Dexter Lecturer, the first American
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academic appointment dedicated to biblical criticism.28 Upon receiving official notice of
the election, Buckminster wrote to Harvard President John Thornton Kirkland of the
“unexpected appointment to the office of first Lecturer on the Dexter foundation.” The
young but capable minister expressed his conviction that perhaps the lectureship should
be “entrusted to some one whose age and acknowledged merits in theology will gain for
them more consideration than will probably be secured by the present appointment.”
However, in the event that those in charge of making the appointment already had
addressed that question, Buckminster stood ready “to execute as well as the time allows
and my own health will permit.”29 Neither time nor his health complied. In 1812, before
he could start lecturing, the promising twenty-eight-year old succumbed to epilepsy.
However, as minister of the Brattle Street Church and as Boston’s foremost orator,
Buckminster had already displayed a respectable understanding of German biblical
scholarship and had attempted to encourage historical exegesis. He upheld the Bible as
the final authority on religious truth, but used historical insight to explain its teachings.
Buckminster developed an interest in both history and biblical criticism at an
early age. He had learned Greek and Latin as a child and had graduated from Harvard
with a bachelor’s and a master’s degree at sixteen. As a student in Cambridge, he wrote
various pieces on history and the Bible, including an essay on “Biblical Criticism.” The
essay showed very little of what Buckminster would soon learn from German scholars—
it contained copied passages from Herodotus and Thucydides and extracts from
evidentialist Samuel Clarke’s notes on Homer, and also discussed Hebrew grammars—
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but, along with hinting at the close relationship that existed between classical works and
the Bible in the period, the piece shows his early interest in biblical scholarship.30
In a more illuminating and original, though preliminary and brief student essay
entitled “Study of History,” Buckminster demonstrated a youthful fascination with the
utility of the past. Granting that studies such as metaphysics provided delight and others,
such as poetry and oratory, ornamentation, he wrote, “To History alone can we resort in
circumstances the most intricate and situations the most hazardous. Here is collected in
one vein the universal experience of human nature, ever employed on similar subjects of
investigation, and successively exhibited in parallel situations. Here we survey a map of
the human heart.” Buckminster’s emphasis on history as a guide to all human endeavors
echoed the apparently classical idea, famously expressed by Lord Bolingbroke and
repeated throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that “history is philosophy
teaching by examples.”31 History gave to the present the collective wisdom of
generations past. Buckminster proposed that “the utility of the study of history results
from the truth of this principle, viz. that human nature remains throughout all ages
essentially unaltered.” The universality of human nature ensured history’s continued
usefulness. Thus, while Buckminster acknowledged that “precisely the same
circumstances can never twice occur, and consequently precisely the same line of
conduct can never be wisely attempted,” he proposed that “where a strong analogy or
resemblance can be traced we are justified in similar conduct of sentiment.” Without

30

Joseph S. Buckminster, “Biblical Criticism,” Joseph Stevens Buckminster
Papers, BA.
31
Bolingbroke attributed the idea to the Greek historians Dionysius of
Halicarnassus. See Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study and Use
of History, 2 vols. (London, 1752), 1:15.
61

reading too much into a short student essay, here we find a traditional belief in human
nature as static, but also a more modern awareness of the differences in historical
circumstances that resulted from contingencies; we find the coexistence of interest in the
universal and recognition of the particular. The attention to historical particularity and the
emphasis on recovering atemporal truths from past eras resurfaced in Buckminster’s later
writings, specifically in those focused on biblical texts.32
In 1805, Buckminster, who was in his early 20s, became minister of the Brattle
Street Church. In 1806, he left his flock behind for a time to travel to Europe, as was
common among Harvard graduates. He collected various works, including studies of the
Bible. An 1810 letter to New Testament scholar Herbert Marsh, an English bishop who
had studied with Michaelis in Germany and had translated his mentor’s introduction to
the New Testament, Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes (1750),
reveals that Buckminster obtained works such as Johann Jakob Griesbach’s manual
edition of his two-volume work on the Greek New Testament, Novum Testamentum
Græce (1774-1775), which, according to his letter, Buckminster persuaded Harvard to
reprint and use as a textbook.33 Such works informed the sermons that he delivered to his
Boston congregants, which again display Buckminster’s interest in the past and also
demonstrate his emphasis on a historical approach to the Bible.
The text of one undated sermon in particular, marked “On Studying the N.T. as a
historical record,” encapsulates Buckminster’s approach to the Bible as a historical text,
32

Joseph S. Buckminster, “Study of History,” Joseph Stevens Buckminster
Papers, BA.
33
Joseph S. Buckminster to Herbert Marsh, 13 May 1810, Joseph Stevens
Buckminster Papers, BA. Marsh provided an English translation of Michaelis’s fourth
edition (1788), which differed significantly from the first edition, as Introduction to the
New Testament, 4 vols. (Cambridge, 1791-1801).
62

while also suggesting its prevalence among at least some of his fellow ministers. Writing
in shorthand, Buckminster noted,
To many xtns [Christians] it appears superfluous and vain to insist so much as we
do on the study of the books of the N.T. as historical records. We do this not only
because the importance of the facts there recorded justifies and demands the
closest attention, but because this is the only method by wih [which] we can
arrive at the understanding of the primitive simplicity of xtnity [Christianity], and
correct there mistakes into wih [which] we are continually led by the sound of
words and phrases taken out of their connexion, and by the mis application of
phrases appropriate to certain times and circumstances to the all ages, and all the
world.
Understanding the texts as historical and aware, at in least to some degree, of the
contextual nature of biblical language, Buckminster aimed to avoid anachronistic
readings and applications even as he strove to recover religious truth. He held that “the
study of the N.T. is the first duty of a xtn [Christian] minister, the understanding of its
primary meaning his most essential knowledge, and it is only so far as his hearers take an
interest in the same inquiries and are furnished with similar information that his
discourses can be truly profitable.” Buckminster hoped that his congregants would
recognize the importance of historical exegesis and listen to his sermons with that mode
of interpretation in mind. In particular, he believed that “the circumstances of the first
chhs [churches] of xt [Christ], to wih [which] Pauls epistles are directed, make a very
interesting and profitable subject of inquiry.” He thus made the epistles the subject of his
historical explications.34
Buckminster’s sermon “Philemon,” in particular, which he likely delivered
sometime in the summer or fall of 1809 or the spring or summer of 1810, evinces his
understanding of biblical criticism as a historical endeavor. Following Michaelis in
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drawing distinctions between the two testaments, Buckminster received the Gospels as
canonical based on apostolic authorship, which was confirmed by internal consistency
and external evidences, such as miracles and fulfilled prophecies. Certain that intertextual analysis ensured historical accuracy, extra-textual historical evidence could
confirm but not unsettle the canon. While allowing that criticism might alter his beliefs,
Buckminster’s reliance on textual evidence alone as historically authenticating limited the
extent to which extra-biblical evidence could shape his canonical and theological
positions. He measured the authenticity of other New Testament texts against the
Gospels, and Paul’s epistle to Philemon passed the test.
After a verse-by-verse examination of the epistle, including a discussion of Paul’s
direction that Onesimus, a slave, return to Philemon, his master, Buckminster proposed
that “in an historical explication of the writings of the New Testament, such as we have
now given of this short letter, would be found the most interesting and satisfactory mode
of studying them.”35 What did “historical explication” signify? Buckminster explained
that “instead of looking into every text, separated from its context, to find something
which may bear upon a favourite system, we should be content to understand the
apostles, as they meant to be understood by those to whom they wrote. … They were
not,” he insisted “on every occasion, delivering a system of dogmas for the instruction of
all succeeding time.”36 Historical context rather than present concerns should direct
biblical interpretation. This emphasis marked a departure from traditional readings that
assumed the timeless nature of the Bible’s words. Rather than interpret the text as if
contemporaries of biblical peoples, readers should focus on the intentions of historical
35
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authors and the reception of historical audiences to determine meaning. Buckminster
noted that “Paul, in particular, consulted the circumstances of his correspondents,
reasoned with them sometimes on their own assumptions, and sometimes upon prevailing
hypotheses, now according to their peculiar habits of interpretation, and then upon
suppositions and accommodations of his own.”37 The apostles’ writings must be read,
first and foremost, as historically situated records, produced in “particular
circumstances,” written “in a popular style,” and “influenced no doubt, by the prevailing
notions of their own age and nation.”38 In some ways, the New Testament belonged to a
peculiar, unfamiliar, and foreign past.
Buckminster used works such as Michaelis’s studies on the New Testament as
historical helps to assist in orienting the reader during his sojourn to this foreign country.
Like Dexter and most of biblical criticism’s foremost proponents, Buckminster used new
insights to illuminate and affirm rather than complicate and undermine the chosen canon.
His mode of historical explication followed from rather than drove toward the
establishment of historicity. Inter-textual examination helped to establish the canon, but
once established, Buckminster turned his attention to how the texts illuminated the
biblical past. The texts throw “light upon the early history of the gospel,” enable “us to
enter into the character of the apostles and converts,” and assist “us in judging of the
probability of the principle facts mentioned … in one word,” Buckminster summarized,
“they are documents, which awaken an interest in, and add confirmation to the wonderful
history of Jesus and his apostles.” While this approach could assist in authenticating the
canon, it could also draw attention to historical distance by identifying the historically
37
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conditioned nature of much of the text. The Brattle Street minister supposed that “it
would … be a subject of curious inquiry to ascertain, if we could, what the apostles
thought upon some subjects of modern speculation; but” he acknowledged that “it is
likely that few, perhaps none of them, ever once entered their minds.” As with their ideas,
so too the apostles’ style of writing is “by no means nicely accommodated to the
metaphysics of our times.”39 Buckminster stressed to his congregants that in most
instances temporally located concerns shaped the content and form of the apostles’
teachings and language.
Buckminster’s reading raised the question: if the authors and their writings were
subject to the same constraints as other humans and texts, how could one be sure of the
historical accuracy of the canon or the truth of its teachings? Buckminster rejected the
notion of plenary inspiration. Though the apostles’ writings constituted the word of God,
he did not inspire their authors in every particular. Still, Buckminster thought that God
“would not suffer them, in writing on any occasion in which his revelation was even
remotely concerned, to give a false or mistaken statement of his truth.”40 While at pains
to explain that the apostolic authors responded to specific circumstances in time-bound
ways, Buckminster assured his congregation that an eternal God chose his temporal
servants wisely and guarded them from factual errors. In fact, divine guidance made the
Gospels the most accurate of ancient texts. To a degree, Buckminster privileged
recovering historical understanding above uncovering clear instances of divine
inspiration: the apostles’ “testimony to facts is all that is of indispensable importance.”41
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Struggling against a firmly entrenched non-contextual approach to scripture,
Buckminster’s emphasis on historical explication at this stage stood little chance to
spread awareness of historical distance in ways that might raise serious concerns. He
worried about winning over an audience that might be skeptical of his historical
approach, rather than warning them about the skepticism that might follow historical
exegesis. Even still, his efforts and those like them set the stage for when the increasingly
incendiary slavery crisis would raise the stakes and fostered the Bible’s historicization.
At this point, Buckminster drew on historical facts to confirm religious truths, but even
his early efforts address the issue of slavery, which, in time, would make the challenges
of historical distance difficult to ignore.
Returning his attention to the content of Paul’s letter, Buckminster illustrated how
comparing New Testament texts could confirm their histories and truths. He asked his
listeners to imagine the executor of Philemon’s estate, having read Acts, perusing Paul’s
letter to Philemon and then listening to a public reading of his letter to the Colossians.
Such experiences, he suggested, would verify the “history of the apostle” and his
relationship with Philemon, while also attesting to Paul’s greatness.42 In a move
reminiscent of Edwards, Buckminster appealed to a contemporaneous non-biblical text to
elevate Christianity above other belief systems and to confirm the plausibility of Paul’s
decision to return the slave Onesimus to his master Philemon. He cited an extant letter
written by Pliny, “who lived in the same age with the apostle,” which the Roman
“addressed to one of his friends, upon an occasion precisely similar to this of Paul,
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interceding for the pardon of a runaway slave.”43 Having used the letter to corroborate
Paul’s account, Buckminster noted that Pliny’s epistle, though written by a man of
literary learning, “is altogether inferiour, not merely in affection, in dignity, and the spirit
of christianity, of which Pliny was ignorant, but also in the subordinate beauties of
style.”44 The classical past attested to both the factuality and the superiority of the New
Testament past. Given the text’s historical accuracy and superior literary value, the
author’s magnanimity, and Christianity’s greatness, “what ideas would the reader of this
letter form of the nature and spirit of christianity?”45
Christian universalism was among the religious truths Buckminster extracted
from Paul’s letter. Here the reader “would learn, that the soul, even of a fugitive slave, is
not unworthy of being rescued from the tyranny and misery of sin; that the gift of eternal
life, in the sight of Jesus and of Paul, is no less important to Onesimus, than to his
master.” But freedom from sin did not signify freedom from slavery. Buckminster
explained that the reader, “in remarkable coincidence with the doctrine of the apostle in
other epistles … would find, that Christianity made no alterations in the civil or political
relations of the converts, for Paul demands not the emancipation of the slave, but, on the
contrary, returns him to the service of his master.”46 Buckminster highlighted
congruencies between apostolic texts to authenticate Paul’s letter, marshaled extrabiblical historical evidence to confirm its history, and then made Paul speak for “all
succeeding time” on the present question of slavery and fugitive slaves.47 Using an epistle
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that dealt directly with slavery to illustrate the idea of historical explication was not an
arbitrary decision on Buckminster’s part. Section 9 of Article 1 of the Constitution had
protected the slave trade up until 1808, a year or two before his speech, when Congress
passed an act that prohibited the importation of slaves. Between the start of the
Revolution and 1804, every northern state had passed antislavery laws and by 1810 most
slaves in the North had been manumitted. Although anticipated, illegalizing the
transatlantic slave trade worried some southern slaveholders, whose dependence on the
internal slave trade, the policing of slaves, and the return of fugitives increased. In light
of these developments, Buckminster used his historical insight to chide overzealous
antislavery northerners while easing the fears of anxious proslavery southerners.
In his reading, Buckminster had repeatedly referenced the historical distance
separating modern present from ancient past, but once he uncovered an apparently
timeless teaching—“the attachment of a master and his domestics”—he critiqued his
age’s failure to collapse that distance and live as Paul had, exclaiming, “how unlike the
customs and the spirit of modern society!”48 Certain human relations, along with human
nature, remained constant despite historical distinction and change. This interpretation
and application of Paul’s epistle to Philemon, made consistent with the Constitution’s
fugitive slave clause and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, would echo loud and clear in
subsequent decades, culminating in southern and northern defenses of the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850. Like those interpreters, present concerns constrained Buckminster’s view of
Christian freedom and encouraged him to set aside historical difference.49 However, in
drawing attention to the temporal and transient nature of the Bible’s content, his historical
48
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explication, like the ones that followed, could also be used to insist that the ancient
scriptures had little relevance in addressing contemporary issues like American slavery,
or that their relevance depended on interpreting them in light of historical change.
Buckminster’s biblical criticism was synonymous with his historical explication.
He began with the contention that Christianity as presented in the New Testament “is
conveyed to us in the historical form.”50 Internal and external evidences and inter-textual
analysis confirmed an apostolic text’s historicity. The authenticated text, divinely
protected from errors, functioned as a uniquely accurate historical account of the times.
An attention to historical context, captured within the text itself and uncovered in extrabiblical sources, illuminated an ancient era. On the basis of a text’s historicity and an
understanding of the historical situation in which it was produced, timeless religious
truths could be extracted from transient temporal facts. Buckminster’s emphasis on the
need to recognize the historical situatedness of an apostolic author, his text, and his
audience and the historical distance between said author, his text, and the present yielded
to the idea that, on crucial issues such as the relationship between a master and his slave,
the canon transcended time. But while Buckminster conceived of historical understanding
and religious truth as allies, making that truth epistemologically dependent on “an
historical explication” had the potential of arming historical understanding against
religious truth. Armament for such a conflict depended on the spread of the principles
that Buckminster espoused. Over the next few decades, as slavery maintained and then
increased its hold on the national consciousness, it created the conditions for a much
more consequential biblical debate over slavery and for a greater realization of historical
50
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distance. Meanwhile, a greater number of biblical scholars began to emphasize the same
kind of historical explication that Buckminster had promoted.

“Rules of Interpretation Modified by the Special Circumstances”: Religious Liberals and
Conservatives in the Battle for the Elevated Grounds of History
As America’s foremost proponent of biblical criticism, Buckminster’s influence
remained mostly limited to his Brattle Street congregation. His appointment as Dexter
Lecturer promised the extension of his principles to a wider and more engaged audience.
Death robbed him of the opportunity, but it also propelled the spread of biblical criticism
in ways that a lifetime as Dexter Lecturer might not have. Indeed, it might be said that
two deaths, Samuel Dexter’s and Joseph Buckminster’s, gave life to American biblical
criticism. Other students of the Bible, who knew of Buckminster’s European travels and
acquisitions, attended the public sale of his library that followed his death. The auction
placed works of biblical scholarship known for “their rarity in our country” into the hands
of those who became some of the period’s foremost advocates of biblical criticism, at
least in a qualified form.51 We might expect that attendees included Unitarians such as
William Ellery Channing, Edward Everett, and John Thornton Kirkland, but
Congregationalists, including Jeremiah Evarts and Moses Stuart, also turned up for the
event. When Stuart outbid his friend Everett for Eichhorn’s five-volume introduction to
the Old Testament, Einleitung ins Alte Testament (1780-1783), he ensured that defenders
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of orthodoxy would challenge promoters of liberal religion in debating canonical choices
and doctrinal positions on biblical criticism’s elevated historical grounds.52
Still, Unitarians figured most prominently among the antebellum religious groups
that promoted historical explications of scripture. William Ellery Channing, whose
relatively conciliatory approach to biblical criticism mirrored a rather cautious handling
of the slavery question, briefly succeeded Buckminster as Dexter Lecturer from 18121813. He most successfully publicized the Unitarian approach to scripture in the sermon
he later gave at Jared Sparks’s ordination in 1819. In “Unitarian Christianity,” Channing
stated his preference for apostolic texts and upheld reason as the indispensable
interpretive tool in examining them. He asserted that because God conformed to human
language, “every word and every sentence must be modified and explained according to
the subject … the purposes, feelings, circumstances and principles of the writer, and …
the genius and idioms of the language which he uses.”53 One hears Buckminster in
Channing’s caution that “the different portions of this book, instead of being confined to
general truths, refer perpetually to the times when they were written, to states of society,
to modes of thinking, to controversies in the church, to feelings and usages which have
passed away, and without the knowledge of which we are constantly in danger of
extending to all times, and places, what was of temporary and local application.”54 Like
the first Dexter Lecturer, Channing encouraged readers to avoid anachronistic
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applications. His understanding of inspiration and interpretation also matched
Buckminster’s. “That the Holy Spirit did not so guide the Apostles as to suspend the
peculiarities of their minds,” Channing instructed, “and that a knowledge of their
feelings, and of their influences under which they were placed, is one of the preparations
for understanding their writings.”55 One must first recover the historical context in which
the apostles operated and then use such knowledge to separate general truths from
particular facts. Historical distance required, and historical knowledge informed, a
reasonable reading of scripture. This approach allowed Channing later to posit that the
apostles had taken expedient measures to start the process of slavery’s abolition.
Channing’s sermon provoked responses from conservative religious scholars and
Andrews Norton’s appointment to succeed Channing in 1813, which placed a much more
militant defender of liberal Christianity in the position of Dexter Lecturer, had already
ensured the continuance and deepening of canonical and interpretational debates.
Whereas Channing had healthy interactions and exchanges with more conservative
religious figures such as Moses Stuart and more liberal religious figures such as
Theodore Parker, the contentious Norton often found himself embroiled in heated debate
with those outside the fold as he battled to position Unitarianism against Calvinism on the
right and Transcendentalism on the left. In 1812, he had opened the General Repository
with an attack on orthodox interpreters of scripture, who, he argued, “do not expect to
find the meaning much disguised by peculiarities of expression of the writer or of the age
or country to which he belonged; they pay but little regard to the circumstances in which
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[the writer] wrote, or to those of the persons, whom he addressed.”56 In contrast, Norton
posited, liberals attend “to all these circumstances.”57 He believed the Bible, and the New
Testament in particular, to be the source of Christian truth, but he stressed the importance
of historical explication in attempts to grasp the meaning of sacred texts.
In 1818, due to Norton’s pleadings and President Kirkland’s efforts, the Dexter
Lectureship became the Dexter Professorship of Sacred Literature with Norton as its first
occupant. This marked the beginning of a serious and prolonged engagement with
biblical interpretation that culminated in his The Evidences of the Genuineness of the
Gospels, published in three volumes between 1837-1844. These later publications
displayed Norton’s attempt to use historical evidence to defend the authorship, general
accuracy, and relevance of the Gospels from scholarship, purveyed by radicals such as
Parker, which threatened to undermine their canonical status. Much of his prior work,
however, aimed to distinguish liberal from orthodox interpretation along lines of
historical explication. Indeed, Norton believed that the historical peculiarities of the New
Testament texts reinforced their genuineness; their archaic components signaled their
historicity. Only later, when Parker and others used historical insights to question the
historical basis of Unitarian faith, did scholars began to recognize that highlighting
historical particularities could threaten the Gospels’ relevance just as easily as it might
evidence their authenticity.
A number of Norton’s notebooks and the manuscripts of his Harvard lectures
display his emphasis on reading the scriptures in relation to historical circumstances and
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contexts. One notebook contains a section labeled “Materials for Lectures on Biblical
Criticism,” wherein Norton included references to scriptures to measure “the character of
the Evangelists as historians,” to illustrate their “figurative language,” and to identify
“precepts to be explained by a consideration of circumstances.”58 He fleshed out these
ideas much more fully in his lecture notes. In one lecture in particular, numbered
“Lecture 5,” Norton stressed the need to interpret the New Testament writings in relation
to the circumstances in which their authors wrote them. He outlined three kinds of
knowledge necessary to understanding the scriptures, beginning with “a knowledge of the
circumstances under which the discourses of our Saviour were delivered, and the writings
of the evangelists and apostles [were] composed.” The second and third forms of
knowledge referred to an understanding of the style of their writings and the meanings of
their words and phrases, which, as Norton made clear, were also questions of historical
research. Throughout the manuscript, he emphasized the need to “acquire … a distinct
conception of those more temporary and transient circumstances, of those particular
incidents and situations, which gave occasion to many passages in the discourses of our
Saviour or the writings of his apostles.”59 Norton contended that the reader could
apprehend the truths of the sacred texts in no other way.
Like Buckminster, Norton held that “the fundamental principles of religion and
virtue are always the same,” but, like Buckminster, he also affirmed that “the particular
rules derived from these vary with the varying circumstances of men.” Norton
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emphasized that “we must know the situation and character of those to whom any
particular rules are addressed, before we can judge of their reasonableness, of the
extensiveness of their application to others.” Focusing on the particular would reveal the
universal. Otherwise, Norton explained, “we shall interpret all these [scriptures] very
erroneously if we neglect their original application, and suppose them to have a direct
relation to ourselves.” Failing to take note of errors and controversies “which have
become long since wholly obsolete,” and supposing that the apostles wrote “with the
express design of affording instruction to all Christians in all ages,” blinded readers from
comprehending original and universal Christian truths.60 Christ and his apostles, Norton
believed, addressed the particular needs and problems of particular audiences.
Norton proposed that “the whole preaching of our Saviour and his apostles must
have been accommodated to the understandings, to the character, and to the situation of
those whom they addressed.” “Accommodation” became a popular term among
American interpreters in this period. While some of them damned the German born
“theory of accommodation,” which was often used to dismiss certain biblical passages
and teachings that conflicted with modern sensibilities, an expanding group of American
biblical scholars accepted and advanced at least a variant on that theory. Norton
spotlighted accommodation to the apostles’ audiences, and even he went so far as to
suggest that “we have indeed no reason to believe that the minds of the apostles
themselves were unaffected by the intellectual character and prevailing opinions of the
age and nation.” Apparently, even Christ’s most intimate disciples could not help but be
influenced by contemporary ideas and notions. Regardless, he continued, “they must still
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have taught with reference to [the prevailing opinions of the age], and conformed
themselves as far as possible to the apprehension of their disciples.” While noting that the
“great truths of our religion … are of permanent and universal interest,” Norton
reemphasized that “the manner of their exhibition was conformed to temporary and local
circumstances.” The sacred writers “had in mind no readers but their contemporaries”
and anticipated “none of those difficulties which would occur to other men than those in
their own age.” As a result, Norton insisted, in a directive reminiscent of Johann
Gottfried Herder’s historicism, the reader must “leave behind him and forget our modern
doctrines, and prejudices, and associations. He must make himself familiar and
contemporary with men” from New Testament times. Norton, in essence, challenged
Christian Americans’ assumed affinities between biblical and modern times by
emphasizing the historical situatedness of New Testament authors and audiences, and
then posited that one could indeed become familiar with them, but only by recovering
and participating in their ancient mentality through historical research.61 However, the
attempt to familiarize readers with a foreign past exposed the historical distance from that
most sacred historical era and threatened to undermine the very familiarizing project that
Norton had outlined and advocated. This gradual turn in American exegesis from
assumed contemporaneity with biblical figures to a stress on historical sympathy,
contributing to a broader realization of historical particularity.
Norton again stressed the particular and peculiar nature of the New Testament in
discussing the style of Christ’s discourses and the evangelists’ and apostles’ writings.
Citing the ancient Jews’ “oriental modes of expression” and noting their “comparatively
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rude and uncivilized” state, Norton again argued that the reader must take note of
“temporary, and local causes.” In analyzing specific words and phrases of the New
Testament, Norton, more than Buckminster, displayed an awareness of the evolutionary
nature of language. Noting the changing signification of words, he warned that readers
“must be careful to understand” a text’s “words in their original sense, and not that which
they have acquired in modern times.” Norton earnestly believed that as the “meaning [of
a text] appears more distinctly” through this approach, “we shall see more reason to
admire the simplicity, the purity, and the sublimity of it’s [sic] moral precepts and it’s
[sic] religious doctrines.” Rigorous and sophisticated historical research revealed
straightforward and simple eternal truths.
Further, and of growing interest to Norton, he maintained that the peculiar
historical nature of the New Testament offered a strong proof of the genuineness of its
texts. Human wisdom might assume that the scriptural canon had been written for
“Christians in all ages and countries; and of course should contain little or nothing of a
merely local or temporary nature.” However, if such had been the case it would have
raised questions about the authenticity of the New Testament texts. But God, in his
providence, allowed the sacred writer to have “nothing in view, but to be understood by
the person or persons whom he is addressing.” The presence of peculiar historical
features also marked the authenticity of ancient texts such as Cicero’s letters. Norton’s
comparison between biblical and classical texts, similar to Buckminster’s, served to
confirm the authenticity of the New Testament, though it could also demote the Bible as
one among a number of historical texts. Norton believed that the New Testament’s
archaic features attested to its historicity, but that historicity might also indicate the
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historical distinctions and distances that separated biblical from modern times, especially
when antislavery writers contrasted ancient with American slavery.62
Norton later advanced such arguments in defending the genuineness of the
Gospels in print, but he also used these ideas to publically promote what he viewed as the
liberal attention to circumstances against what he understood as orthodox interpretations
that read the texts in isolation. In 1819, responding to an exchange occasioned by
Channing’s ordination sermon between Channing and Congregationalist Moses Stuart,
Norton reiterated that liberal Christians rightly explored the ways in which contexts and
circumstances shaped the meaning of words and texts. He argued that an interpreter must
account for a writer’s “habits of thinking and feeling, his common style of expression, his
settled opinions and belief, the extent of his knowledge, the general state of things in
which he lived, the particular local and temporary circumstances present to his mind
while writing, the character and conditions of those for whom he wrote, [and] the
opinions of others to which he had reference.” Norton’s instructions stressed the need to
recognize the foreign nature of the biblical past. To understand biblical passages, he
argued, the reader must learn the cultural languages of particular times and places. In a
note, Norton drew attention to Stuart’s use of certain German scholars, but found them
“defective in the most essential particular necessary to qualify them for the work. … It is
necessary to have just notions of the intellectual and moral character of our Saviour and
his apostles, and of the circumstances under which they spoke or wrote.”63 As with
Buckminster and Channing, Norton championed a historical explication of the scriptures,
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while deriding Stuart for his apparent neglect of context in emphasizing grammar. He
failed to notice that Stuart, not to mention the German critics that Stuart had referred to in
his pamphlet, also stressed the historical situatedness of biblical texts, which again
signaled the historical distance that resulted from a realization of contextual difference.
Perhaps Norton perceived similarities between his cherished Unitarian and
condemned German modes of interpretation. In a vigorous disassociation effort he
vociferously contested Stuart’s claim that Channing was traveling down the heretical path
staked out by figures such as Semler, Eichhorn, and De Wette, and quickly rejected the
invitation to imbibe German offerings if only for the purpose of casting aside their more
unsavory opinions, as Stuart had done. Perhaps antebellum religious thinkers’ contempt
for all things German can be attributed to what Sigmund Freud later described as the
“narcissism of small differences,” which posits that “it is precisely the little
dissimilarities in persons who are otherwise alike that arouse feelings of strangeness and
enmity between them.”64 This also might help explain the darts that Norton directed at
the increasingly heretical Theodore Parker, who seemed to confirm everything that
conservatives feared liberal religion would lead to and everything Norton assured them it
would not. Nonetheless, real doctrinal differences did exist both on the left and the right,
and regardless of the reasons for his distrust of German scholarship, Norton’s reading of
Stuart led him to the erroneous conclusion that in emphasizing grammar Andover’s
principal biblical scholar had neglected context.
Stuart was, in fact, the nation’s most competent Hebrew and Greek grammarian.
But, as Norton well knew, grammatical issues were tied to historical questions. As
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Professor of Sacred Literature at Andover Theological Seminary, Stuart taught grammar
and a form of biblical criticism. In 1807, in partial response to Harvard’s appointment of
the liberal Henry Ware to the Hollis Chair of Divinity at Harvard in 1805, a group of
orthodox New England Congregationalists, including Eliphalet Pearson, Jedidiah Morse,
and Leonard Woods, founded Andover, the second American academic institution
promoting a brand of biblical criticism. Within three years they appointed Stuart to help
stem the tide. In the letters he wrote in response to Channing’s ordination sermon, which
he published in 1819, Andover’s eminent appointee demonstrated a keen awareness of
German scholarship, to which he had applied his facility with the German language, and
showed his interest in distilling biblical criticism’s more benign principles. He focused on
doctrinal differences and noted canonical distinctions. He agreed that the New Testament
more clearly delineated gospel truth, but worried that Channing had too easily dispatched
the Old Testament, which, according to Stuart, the Gospels authenticated. Still, he found
similarities between his and Channing’s rules of interpretation, embracing “with all [his]
heart” the Unitarian’s directive to modify biblical language according to the specific
subject, motivations, principles, and “special circumstances” of the author.65 Seeming to
agree with Norton’s approach to the Bible as a historical text, in a later letter Stuart noted,
“I read John, and interpret him just as I do any other author, ancient or modern, by the
general rules of interpretation modified by the special circumstances and dialect in which
he wrote.”66 Stuart placed emphasis on the rules of interpreting words in their historical
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context, which included an investigation of their “relation to the context, and (of course,)
of their local meaning,” but differentiated these rules from extra-biblical knowledge
about peculiar circumstances, writing that “whatever aid I may get from other sources …
must be that which is superadded to the explanation that these rules will afford.”67 Norton
recognized this distinction and argued that Stuart, like other orthodox interpreters,
ignored historical peculiarities and circumstances in his grammatically based
interpretation.
Perhaps in an attempt to satisfy Norton, or at least to defend himself from his
attacks, Stuart added a few sentences in the third edition of his Letters to Channing, also
published in 1819, which further exhibited his appreciation for historical knowledge. In
place of the above statement on “other sources,” Stuart wrote, “I may obtain aid from
many sources, to throw light upon the meaning of words and sentences. From a
knowledge of the geography of any country … as well as of the manner, customs, laws,
history, &c. of its inhabitants, I may obtain assistance to explain its language, and must
obtain it, if I mean to make out a satisfactory interpretation.” Correct interpretation
required the use of all available historical knowledge. “But,” and this was Stuart’s central
point, “I can never dispense with the laws of grammatical analysis.” He granted primacy
to grammatical rules in part because they could be universally applied to scriptural
passages independent of extra-biblical findings, which were relatively scarce and often
unverifiable. “Admitting these rules to be the best and surest guide to the meaning of
language,” Stuart wrote, “we cannot supersede them, by supposing, or conjecturing
peculiarities in a writer. It is only when these peculiarities are proved, or, at least,
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rendered probable, that they can be admitted to influence our interpretation of any
passage.”68 Although interpreters in the antebellum era began to stress contextual
readings, some also pointed out the difficulties involved in accurately recreating
historical contexts. Stuart’s caution here anticipated arguments in both the biblical and
the constitutional debate over slavery, when some interpreters found it useful to point out
the conjectural nature of a historically grounded reading. Despite his careful approach,
Stuart did not value ahistorical grammatical rules over historical explication, but rather,
as the period’s preeminent popularizer of the grammatical-historical method he prized a
demonstrable inter-biblical and language-based historical explication above a dubious
extra-biblical one.
In fact, Stuart was defending this approach against a presentism that he associated
with the German-born theory of accommodation advanced by Semler, who proposed that
Jesus and the Gospel writers had accommodated their teachings to the ignorance of the
Jews, which accounted for their obvious misapplication of the Old Testament. Stuart held
that some German critics, including Semler, Eichhorn, and Bauer, relied on this approach
to explain away stories like the Genesis account of the Creation and the Fall as poetical,
naturalize miracles, including those ascribed to Christ, and dismiss doctrines that failed to
align with their present philosophical and theological positions. But, as far as Stuart could
tell, “Accommodation has been sifted, attacked, defended, explained, moderated,
modified, itself accommodated; so that at last it is nearly driven from the ground.”69
Now, rather than assigning unacceptable teachings and supposed miracles to Jewish
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ignorance, some critics explained them according to “the idiom and ignorance of
antiquity in general, and in particular of the sacred writers themselves.”70 New Testament
audiences and authors held outdated and thus dismissible beliefs. Some abolitionists
would soon make similar claims about the framers and their audience. These readings
depicted the past as a whole, rather than in part, as bound up in time. Stuart believed that
if one accepted the theory of accommodation, then this was the more historically sound
approach. He differed from the German critics “in sentiment” and found their views
“subversive of Christianity,” but was “under great obligations to them … for convincing
me that we need nothing more than the simple rules of exegesis, and a candid, believing
heart, to see in the Scriptures … all the substantial and important doctrines, which have
commonly been denominated orthodox.”71 Stuart wrote that “if the sentiments that I
espouse will not stand the test of investigation, then I will abandon them,” but, echoing
Jonathan Edwards, he felt that “the real truth and importance of evangelical doctrines …
are greatly strengthened” by this method.72 Stuart worried that Channing had
incorporated the presumed historicist principle of accommodation to twist ancient and
authoritative writings in support of newly propounded Unitarian teachings. In truth,
Norton, at least in his lecture notes, had expressed the idea that the apostles could not
escape their historical setting. Stuart held that the Unitarians neglected the Germans’
redeeming interpretive methods while seeming to embrace their damning liberal
sentiments. Their efforts, it seemed, threatened to banish the canon as a whole to the past.
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Stuart maintained that “we are agreed as to principles of interpretation, in most
things that are of importance.”73 While real departures came in the application of
interpretive principles, he and his Harvard counterparts shared an interest in the historical
situatedness of the scriptural authors and, presumably, a consequent awareness of the
historical distance separating biblical from modern times. Unwittingly echoing Norton’s
lectures, Stuart instructed his Andover students to “let every writer be placed in his own
age, and if possible, transfer yourself back there, with him.” He urged ascription “to
every sacred writer, views on such subjects consonant with his character and his age—
and to reject the monstrous exegesis which explains him as though he spoke but
yesterday and with all our feelings and prejudices.”74 Stuart’s orthodoxy limited his
willingness to historicize the biblical past, even as he believed the Unitarian’s liberalism
hampered their interpretations, but he held that “on all subjects, not pertaining directly to
the development of moral or religious truth … the sacred writers [express] the common
view of their age & time.”75 Stuart asserted the Bible’s primacy and unity, defended
plenary inspiration, and assigned accommodation to God rather than his scribes. As with
Buckminster, on issues of moral truth he spoke of Paul “as though he spoke but
yesterday.” Indeed, Stuart would later echo Buckminster’s reading of Philemon to
criticize those opposed to the Fugitive Slave Law. But, also like Buckminster and his
successors, Stuart upheld historical explication as the premier exegetical mode. In doing
so, together these American exegetes inadvertently backed into an awareness of the kind
of qualitative historical distance from biblical times that emerged through contextual
73
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readings. In turn, that distance became difficult to ignore in their applicative efforts,
especially when it helped arm more radical readers, including abolitionists who were
willing to question the contemporary value of an ancient text.
Some colleagues grew suspicious of Stuart, in part due to his engagement with
German scholarship, but he was not the only Congregationalist to value historical
explication. Jeremiah Evarts, for example, was also present at the landmark auction,
where he purchased works on the New Testament by Göttingen scholar Johann Friedrich
Schleusner and Semler disciple Johann Griesbach. Best known for his later opposition to
Andrew Jackson’s Indian Removal Act (1830), Evarts served on the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions from 1812-1831 and edited the Panoplist from
1805-1820. Compared to the Unitarian’s General Repository, the Congregationalist-run
Panoplist gave little space to biblical criticism except to counter its potentially
destabilizing efforts to historicize the canon’s creation and transmission.76 But in the
same year that Buckminster became Dexter Lecturer, the missionary-minded magazine
diverted attention from its evangelical emphasis to praise Englishman Thomas Scott’s A
Commentary on the Whole Bible. “Scott’s Family Bible,” introduced to the American
market in 1804, anticipated a bourgeoning book trade of bibles with commentaries,
introductions, illustrations, and maps, new translations from first texts, and geographical
studies like William Thomson’s The Land and the Book (1858). In an important way, the
deepening of historical awareness in antebellum America depended on technological
advances in the publication and dissemination of historical knowledge, including works
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containing information about the most esteemed of ancient texts. Those who upheld the
Bible as “the standard, and only standard, of truth,” might view such works with
suspicion.77 And yet, even orthodox figures such as Evarts and the Panoplist’s publisher
Jedidiah Morse, famous American geographer and father to painter and inventor Samuel
F. B. Morse, recognized “that the Bible abounds with allusions to manners, customs and
facts” the explication of which requires “some knowledge, drawn from other sources, of
the general history of the ages and countries in which the Scriptures were written.”78
Even religious stalwarts like Morse, a lifelong critic of liberalism, believed that the
historical distance separating ancient and modern necessitated the use of scholarly guides
and helps to illuminate the Bible’s past environments for present readers. While intended
to expand the Bible’s reach and appeal, these works contributed to its historicization and,
as historian Paul Gutjahr puts it, “While many still believed it to be ‘the book of books,’
it was equally true that the Bible was increasingly a book among books.”79
Calvinists also contributed to this development. More leery of biblical criticism
than the either the Unitarians or the Congregationalists, Charles Hodge’s Biblical
Repertory nonetheless aimed to “excite a spirit for Biblical Studies.”80 Hodge, described
as “the Pope of Presbyterianism” by his biographer, was a product of Princeton, which
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was a more conservative institution than the Congregationalist institutions of Andover,
and, especially Yale.81 In 1820, before Hodge began teaching at Princeton, he traveled to
New England where he visited with figures such as Nathaniel Taylor, Edward Everett and
Moses Stuart. Stuart encouraged his orthodox Presbyterian counterpart to learn German
to combat the Unitarians. Hodge followed his direction and when he formed the Biblical
Repertory in 1825, which he edited for nearly five decades, he did so to counter the
writings coming out of Cambridge. He envisioned the quarterly “as a substitute, for the
possession or perusal of works, which … it may neither be easy nor desirable to put into
general circulation.”82 Although Unitarians such as Buckminster seemed more willing to
encourage the spread of biblical criticism, more conservative religious figures like Stuart
and Hodge also desired, at least selectively, to distill and then disseminate that
knowledge by publishing “interesting articles on the manners, customs, institutions, and
literature of the East—on various points in Biblical Antiquities—and on the Literary
History of the Sacred Volume.”83 Stuart hoped to use biblical criticism’s more benign
principles to counter its more lethal lessons, but he maintained the essential neutrality of
critical study and the usefulness of historical knowledge to biblical interpretation.
The Repertory’s opening issue included partial translations of German philologist
Christian Daniel Beck’s work on the New Testament, Monogrammata Hermenuetices
Novi Testamenti (1803), and German theologian Charles Christian Tittmann’s
commentary on the Gospel of John, Meletemata Sacra (1816), works that grounded
81
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biblical exposition in historical explication. Hodge wrote of the lengthy Beck selection
that it “was to give an account of the character, age, origin, and history of each particular
book, and the commentaries upon each.”84 Beck informed readers that “those passages
which are inconsistent with the Christian religion or history … are to be regarded as
spurious” and the teachings and style of the New Testament texts are to be judged
“according to the opinions and manner of writing prevalent in the times of the sacred
penmen.”85 As “much belongs to the means of determining the historical sense,” Beck
encouraged the acquisition of “the knowledge of history and antiquities of the Jews,
Greeks, and Romans, especially of the age in which the Sacred Writers lived.”86 All of
these insights would allow one to better understand the language and content of the New
Testament’s authors, who, Beck explained “were obliged to accommodate themselves, in
some measure, to the character of their readers, and to the object which they wished to
accomplish.”87 Although Beck seemed to reject the more radical accommodation theory
that Stuart had deplored and that Norton seemed open to, which posited that then
prevalent notions had even constrained the apostles’ attempts to proclaim gospel truths,
he proposed that of necessity the “Sacred Writers” had to speak the language of their
historically situated audiences.
Tittmann, in his selection, sought to dismantle the theory of accommodation as he
understood it, which, he wrote, aimed to discover “not what [the New Testament authors]
taught, but what the measure of light then in the world, and their own talents, enabled
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them to teach.”88 Similar to Stuart, Tittmann upheld the grammatical mode of
interpretation as the best, though he also recognized that “grammatical interpretation is
for the most part Historical.” The interpreter must attend to the usus loquendi, or the
customary manner of speaking, which “is a matter of history” as it reveals “the import of
every expression, at every different period … with each particular author and nation, and
in each specific connexion or passage; all which are historical facts, which history only
can teach us.”89 Tittmann asserted that in deciphering both doctrinal and historical
passages, “recourse must be had to the history of those times … and in this way, and in
no other, can the true meaning of the passages be evinced.” While renouncing the purely
“historical mode of interpretation” as presentist and ahistorical, he conceded “that the
Sacred Writers … so accommodated themselves to the genius of their age, as to use a
style and language which they would not have used, had they written for different people,
and at another time.”90 Tittmann granted accommodation in form rather than content,
writing that “the peculiar mode of exhibiting these doctrines was adapted to the condition
of those who had been Jews” and directing the interpreter to “discover in what instances
Sacred Writers have accommodated themselves to the genius of their age, as to the mode
of discussion, and the import of figurative language.”91 Regardless of how they
accommodated, the New Testament authors lived in a different world, the historical
comprehension of which was a prerequisite to understanding their words. Historical
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knowledge proved useful in establishing authenticity and, coupled with an awareness of
historical distance, in explicating meaning.
Hodge’s own writings show that he incorporated the focus on contextual biblical
readings that he found in the portions of the German works he made available for public
consumption. While those incorporations appear in a number of his works beginning in
the 1820s and 1830s, the clearest articulation of his emphasis on historical interpretation
came in his magnum opus, Systematic Theology (1871-1873), which he published near
the end of his life. There Hodge used words similar to those in the Beck translation,
writing that “the fundamental principle of interpretation of all writings, sacred or profane,
is that words are to be understood in their historical sense; that is,” he explained, “in the
sense in which it can be historically proved that they were used by their authors and
intended to be understood by those to whom they were addressed.” Again, historical
readings of the Bible stressed the importance of original audiences. Hodge continued,
“Unless words are taken in the sense in which those who employ them know they will be
understood, they fail in their design. The sacred writings being the words of God to man,
we are bound to take them in the sense in which those to whom they were originally
addressed must inevitably have taken them.”92 Similar to Stuart, Hodge believed that
proper interpretation demanded that readers recognize the ways in which God had
accommodated to biblical audiences when inspiring his prophets. Such recognitions
implied an awareness of distinct historical contexts.
Hodge’s statement, along with his reproductions of Beck and Tittmann showed
much of the same historical awareness that Unitarians and Congregationalists exhibited,
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while similarly ignoring historical distance when it came to core truths. Indeed, in the
Tittmann piece, the German theologian urged that “we cannot too severely reprobate the
sentiments hence deduced by some of our contemporaries, that what we find thus
communicated is not to be considered as pertaining to all Christians, and that the
doctrines thus revealed are by no means common, and necessary to every age, in such a
manner as to be a perpetual rule of faith and practice.”93 On the contrary, he affirmed that
religious truth “is equally applicable to all men, in every age.”94 While fully
acknowledging the differences between biblical past and modern present in terms of
language and modes of thought, these interpreters insisted that the Bible remained
relevant and could not be dismissed simply as a product of the ancient past. These varied
efforts to ward off attempts to completely historicize the Bible and its teachings were
largely successful in the short term, but even in attempting to minimize the interpretive
importance of the historical distance their research uncovered, these interpreters
contributed to a new understanding that the text to which Christians looked had been
produced in a very different time amongst a very different people.

Conclusion
Important doctrinal and canonical differences separated antebellum Unitarians,
Congregationalists, and Presbyterians, and each of the above figures promoted unique
modes of historical explication. The liberal Unitarians accepted as canonical certain New
Testament texts, authenticated and illuminated through internal and external evidences
and a reasonable use of inter-biblical and extra-biblical historical knowledge. They
93
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emphasized the historical situatedness of authors, texts, and audiences to better
understand the scriptures and to guard against ahistorical applications. Differences
existed even among the Unitarians. They all denied plenary inspiration, but while
Buckminster upheld the canon as a uniquely accurate historical text, Norton received it as
an occasionally flawed historical text, owing in part to the Gospel writers’
accommodations, if not their failure to escape the characteristic ideas and notions of their
times. The orthodox Congregationalists and Presbyterians affirmed, with some
exceptions, the traditional canon, and often appealed to internal and external evidences to
assert its unity, historicity, and historical accuracy. They emphasized the historical
situatedness of authors to better comprehend the Bible’s universal meaning. While they
rejected the theory of accommodation to protect against presentist readings, Stuart and
Hodge allowed for God’s accommodation to human language. Stuart privileged interbiblical to extra-biblical historical knowledge, but both he and Hodge accepted historical
insight from extra-biblical sources.
Many more nuances separated these thinkers’ ideas on how to best explain the
scriptures through appeals to historical knowledge, but that each of them accepted history
as the grounds of debate, and that all of their efforts drew attention to historical distance
in one way or another, bears emphasizing. Both liberals and conservatives recognized the
need for an historical exegesis of one kind or another. Edwards’s affirmative answer to
the question of whether the Bible could be historical and divine had been replaced by the
assumption that its divinity rested, in some sense at least, on its historicity. More than
ever, America’s pious biblical scholars valued the canon as historical texts in need of
historical illumination, even when they remained focused on grammatical interpretation.
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The unprecedented focus on the historical nature of the biblical texts in canonical debates
between liberals and conservatives drew new attention to the historical distance
separating its ancient setting from its modern audience. As David F. Holland writes, “In
making their case, both sides committed themselves to careful examinations of the
Bible’s history—and in the course of their conflict, they drove the historical distance of
the ancient scriptures deeper into the center of Americans’ religious thought.”95
Questions about eternal truths inspired a greater interest in the historical facts that had
come to serve as the foundation for knowledge about those truths, and the recognition of
historical distance that resulted reinforced the value of and desire for historical
knowledge. In turn, the historical research that followed made historical distance more
apparent as the search for the universal exposed the vastness of transient.
Some of these figures used the historical lessons of biblical criticism to reject the
historicity of certain biblical texts and, in the case of the more liberal minded, to dismiss
certain teachings as antiquated instructions meant for ancient audiences. The process of
separating out specific biblical books and principles expanded the sphere of the temporal
and shrunk that of the timeless. The biblical debates over slavery would further
encourage interpreters to make canonical distinctions and to differentiate transient from
permanent principles. But even attempts to challenge certain texts and teachings most
often prefaced the more urgent effort of establishing a canon and presenting its timeless
truths. History was more often used to reveal rather than question a text’s meaning. Once
the Unitarian, Congregationalist, and Presbyterian expositors had established their
versions of the canon, historical knowledge became a crucial component to understanding
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God’s eternal verities. Even the Unitarians, who accepted that most of the Bible’s content
applied to a now irrelevant past, asserted that once the canon was established, its
universal truths were just as applicable in the present as in the past. Rational
supernaturalism was, in many ways, historical supernaturalism. The temporal revealed
the eternal. But, as Transcendentalist Theodore Parker made clear, the transient could
also undermine the textual source of the permanent.
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CHAPTER 2
“THE GROUND WILL SHAKE”: TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACHES TO THE
BIBLE AND THE BIBLICAL PAST
In a February 1839 letter addressed to his mentor and fellow Transcendentalist
Convers Francis, Theodore Parker freely expressed his views of the Bible. “Let any sober
man read de Wette’s Biblical Dogmatics,” he wrote to his friend, “and he will be
astonished to see how many doctrines are taught in the Bible which enlightened men
cannot believe. I must think that by and by, centuries hence, the O.T. will be dropped out
from the church, then the N.T. will follow, or only be used as we now use other helps. I
cant [sic] but wish with you, that Jesus had written his own books, but even then, they
must have contained some things local and temporary.” The passage of time and the
development of religious views made sacred historical texts obsolete and not even Jesus
could have ensured their timelessness. In this letter, Parker articulated the difference
between traditionalist and Transcendentalist interpreters of scripture, writing that “the
orthodox place the Bible above the Soul. We the Soul above the Bible.” Parker believed
that the soul, unlike the Bible with its myriad mediations, enjoyed a direct connection
with the divine. Thus, Transcendentalists answered the questions of whether “‘the canon
was closed’” and “revelation is at an end” with a resounding no.1 While biblical criticism
dictated that America’s biblical scholars rest their arguments on historical grounds, it also
directed one of the nation’s most heterodox figures to abandon those transient grounds in
favor of what he understood as a transcendent moral sphere.
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Parker used historical knowledge to replace transitory biblical texts and figures
with a divine intuitive sense as the source of unchanging religious truth. As with his
contemporaries, theological understandings shaped his historical sensibilities. However,
his rather abstract and minimalist belief—“no master but God, no creed but Truth, no
service but Love”—along with his privileging of permanent truths and principles over
mutable doctrines, ceremonies and structures, and his distinction between those truths
and transient texts, meant that the undermining potential of historical criticism that
Hodge, Stuart, and Norton avoided or attacked, posed no threat to Parker.2 Sure of his
direct connection with a timeless God, he could afford to use historical arguments to
unchain eternal truths from temporal facts. American proponents of evidential
Christianity placed the Bible and its teachings on a presumably firm historical footing.
Parker revealed the cracks and breaks in the footing and highlighted its susceptibility to
wear and tear. Just as quickly as historical evidence might authenticate a sacred text it
might also falsify that text and thus render it banal. Rather than rest his faith on those
unstable grounds, Parker centered his belief in an atemporal and innate religious sense.
Thus, when evidence established that a text rested on a faulty historical foundation, he
painlessly dispatched it as inauthentic. And when historical distance demonstrated the
temporariness of an authentic text’s teachings, he dismissed the teachings as antiquated.
While orthodox and liberal religionists used historical texts to set aside historical change,
Parker used historical change to disregard the teachings of historical texts.
To be sure, Parker believed that portions of the Bible remained useful as the
historical expression of true religion and often used it to evidence the universality of an
2
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innate religious sense, but his beliefs freed him from allegiance to literalist and static
meanings and allowed him to posit the text’s malleability. The debates over slavery, in
which Parker became embroiled in the 1840s and 1850s, cemented his position. He could
accept as historically accurate Buckminster’s contextual reading of Paul’s epistle to
Philemon, which affirmed that Paul had directed a slave to return to his master, and then
replace that outdated original meaning, formulated in a world quite different from his
own, with a universal meaning that had emerged due to what he understood as the
development of religion and the progress of freedom. While Parker’s religious opponents
used historical stasis, grounded in a founding religious text, to combat change, he used
historical change, informed by an illuminated conscience, to combat stasis. In the
process, both sides brought new attention to historical distance. One did so inadvertently
in an attempt to dismiss the use of that distance in interpretation and the other explicitly
in an attempt to use it. Historical distance made it easier for Parker to privilege what he
identified as present imperatives over outdated past teachings. This approach, which
extended to other favored pasts, including the Revolutionary era, became most clear in
his contention that whatever the position of the prophets and apostles or the founders and
framers on slavery, the present age, as an age of freedom, demanded slavery’s abolition.
Historicity, it turned out, was a double-edged sword, and in this Transcendentalist’s hand,
one edge seemed sharper than the other.
Like most antebellum biblical scholars, Parker sought the eternal. Norton, Stuart,
and Hodge asserted their canon’s transcendence and the timelessness of certain biblical
truths, which trumped historical change. Parker, on the other hand, asserted the
transcendence of conscience and the timelessness of intuited truths, which trumped the
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historical canon and changed the meaning of biblical texts. Both sides used historical
insight to reveal the eternal, but because those more orthodox than Parker rested their
faith on the increasingly historical foundation of the Bible, discussions focused on that
text especially threatened to expose apparently permanent truths as transient facts. To an
extent, even Parker’s position was suspect. When contextual exegesis exposed the local
and transient nature of sacred biblical teachings, it suggested the potential transiency of
all truth. Even if Parker’s temporally transcendent position protected his truths from the
same level of historicization for a time, the discussion contributed to the development
toward the idea that all truth is temporally constructed. Distinct paths led to the same
destination. Regardless of where these thinkers centered religious truth, each of their
approaches to the Bible cultivated historical awareness. Their contextual interpretations
exposed the historical differences and distances separating peculiar biblical pasts from
the nineteenth-century American present, while creating the intellectual conditions for a
similar process that indicated historical dislocation from the Revolutionary era.
Scholars of Transcendentalism have too often emphasized the movement’s
ahistorical nature without identifying how historical arguments freed heterodox thinkers
such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore Parker in their attempts to build atemporal
worlds.3 As traced in the first chapter, historical argumentation became standard among
thinkers across the antebellum religious spectrum. Most used it to ground universal truths
in a biblical past, and a few, including some Transcendentalists, to unmoor such truths

3

In one recent study, for example, Richard A. Grusin contends that an analysis of
their engagement with higher criticism shows that rather than arriving at an antiinstitutionalist position, the Transcendentalists came to realize that the self was a
historical product resulting from social institutions. Grusin, Transcendentalist
Hermeneutics.
99

from that temporal setting. In the process, an awareness of historical distance emerged
among these antebellum biblical scholars and religious thinkers, most using it to separate
out historically grounded and biblically based eternal truths from temporal facts, and a
few, including Parker and Emerson to detach less precarious and permanent atemporal
truths from a mutable and transient biblical past.
Transcendentalism’s break with New England orthodoxy was not a wholesale
renunciation of the past and its lessons, but rather a deep historical critique of the ancient
book and world on which Trinitarians and Unitarians grounded their beliefs. Emerson
and Parker used historical reasoning to call into question the singular status of the Bible
and biblical figures. While the level of their critique was unique, it followed a long
tradition of rejecting the authority of one historical era for that of a purer past. During the
Reformation, Protestants dismissed the traditional authority that Catholics placed in
historical continuity, finding instead change and corruption, and replaced it with the Bible
and the primitive church. New England Puritans, in turn, found corruption in Protestant
England, and claimed for themselves the early Christian past. Later American restoration
movements, such as the Disciples of Christ and the Latter-day Saints, repeated this
narrative of corruption and renewal, repudiating the elongated immediate past and
seeking union, or at least correspondence, with a distant biblical one.4 While the above
displacements aimed to reclaim the primitive Christian and, in the case of the Mormons,
even the ancient Old Testament pasts, Transcendentalists preferred, as Emerson put it, an
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“original relation to the universe.”5 The primitive past the Transcendentalists sought
seemed to extend backward and upward beyond a temporal timeframe. Although their
appeal seemed to follow a long tradition interested in restoration and renewal,
Transcendentalists broke from that tradition in their emphasis on the present moment.
They were not claiming contemporaneity with a pure past or golden age, but rather
positing that the present, the eternal now, was pregnant with promise. Still, they did not
dismiss as fiction what their intellectual predecessors had upheld as fact; Emerson and
Parker maintained that the New Testament and its Jesus corresponded to a historical
reality.6 Though imperfect historical accounts, the Gospels rested on a foundation of
some historical truth, making their passages and personages useful. Historicity, however,
signified temporal limitation and attempts to evidence authenticity revealed historical
distance. Thus, once America’s Christian theologians tied universal religious truth and
authority to what was an increasingly historical text, it was left to thinkers such as
Emerson and Parker to point out how temporal constraints made that foundation
inevitably unstable. Drawing attention to the remoteness and the shiftiness of historical
evidence and the limitations of historical time revealed the transience of the historical
grounds on which Americans based their faith.
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“Peculiar” Old Testament “Usages” and a Gospel for “All Countries and Times”: The
Particular and the Universal in Emerson’s Vestry Lectures
Transcendentalists confronted biblical criticism with a vigor unmatched by any
other collection of individuals in the antebellum period. An examination of Ralph Waldo
Emerson’s and Theodore Parker’s writings on the topic highlight the variety in
Transcendentalist approaches to biblical scholarship and demonstrates the varying
implications of those approaches for realizing historical distance. Their interest in biblical
criticism’s historical critique emerged within a faithful tradition, as seen in their early
uses of biblical scholarship, but the potential for disillusion with that tradition was
present from the start. Emerson’s brother William, along with fellow Massachusetts men
George Ticknor, George Bancroft, and Edward Everett, encountered Johann Eichhorn’s
biblical criticism first-hand as students at Göttingen, a hub of German biblical
scholarship. Although Eichhorn was constructive in his approach to the canon, many of
his American students perceived the undermining potential of his criticism for a faith
grounded in historical fact, which informed their decision to forego careers in the
ministry and instead find occupations as literature professors, orators, statesman, and
historical writers. Emerson also gave up the ministry after dismissing the necessity of the
Lord’s Supper, but not before a short stint (1829-1832) as a pastor in Boston’s Second
Church.7
The sermons Emerson delivered as pastor included his Vestry Lectures, a series of
nine discourses on the Gospels delivered in the spring of 1831. He presented the first
lecture at the dedication of the Second Church Vestry on March 1, and the last he gave
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two months later on May 3. The lectures focus on the authors of the first three Gospels
(Matthew, Mark, and Luke), outline the transmission of their accounts, and provide
background and analysis of the early chapters of Matthew. They demonstrate Emerson’s
early apologetic use of figures such as Johann Michaelis and his students like Eichhorn
and Marsh, while also showing the awareness of historical distance that was
characteristic of scholars attentive to recent developments in biblical criticism.
Emerson’s brief discussion of the synoptic authors shows his grasp of their
historical situatedness. He noted, for example, that, “as St. Mark wrote for the immediate
use of the Romans, he sometimes gives explanations which were necessary for foreigners
though not for the inhabitants of Palestine.”8 Similar to his contemporaries, Emerson
recognized that the biblical writers wrote to historically situated audiences. In turning to
the transmission of the biblical texts, he traced a neat line from the creation of the King
James Bible backward through the efforts of William Tyndale and Myles Coverdale to
Saint Jerome and early Church Fathers Origen and Ireneaus. He supposed that “an
unbroken chain of evidence” connected “the books from which we now draw our rule of
faith and duty with the books first written by the four apostles 1800 years ago.” Criticism
focused on the transmission of the biblical text soon problematized such streamlined
accounts. At this stage, though, Emerson held that God protected the Christian canon,
which “outlasted the barbarous institutions of the middle ages—and have now come
down safe to our eyes and our ears and our hearts across the vast tract of so many ages of
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war and ignorance.”9 Emerson asserted the preservation and transmission of the sacred
text in spite of decline, corruption, and the passage of so much time. His historical
narration, wherein he posited that the canon retained its integrity, paralleled biblical
scholars’ historical explications, wherein they asserted that its teachings retained their
relevance. In both cases, though, either to insist on the salience of biblical ideas or assert
canonical continuity, the use of historical scholarship brought new attention to historical
context, change, and distance. Emerson attended to both the history of the text and
historical distinction, mentioning, for example, that Ireneaus wrote “very much in the
mystical style of the age.”10 The interest in contextual understanding, more than the
review of textual transmission, had the potential to reveal historical distance in a nation
where Christians trained their attention on the words of the Bible rather than its creation
and life as a text.
Turning to the synoptic Gospels, in particular, Emerson outlined various theories
put forth to explain the similarities between the three accounts, citing arguments that the
authors had the various texts in their possession or that they drew from a common written
source. He preferred, though, the alternative explanation provided by Johann Karl
Ludwig Gieseler, another Göttingen scholar, which drew attention to an important
“difference of circumstances,” including the fact that “not books but oral instruction was
the great mode of communication in that age.” Emerson held that an examination of this
approach “will show satisfactorily why any darkness hangs over this history and why the
microscopic criticism that has been directed towards it has served to confirm rather than
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shake the faith of inquirers.”11 The prominence of an oral tradition in the period
accounted for both the similarities and the differences between the accounts. The early
Emerson, like his predecessor Edwards and his contemporary Stuart, believed that
historical criticism confirmed the Bible’s authenticity. But, as with Norton, pointing out
historical particularities to authenticate the text tended to historicize the biblical past.
In turning his attention toward the background to Matthew’s Gospel, Emerson
retained his apologetic tone, writing of the Jews that “the unbeliever in vain throws
doubts on their miraculous history.” While noting “usages so peculiar” to that people, he
found in their laws the foundation of modern legal codes. “Whence came those [laws],”
he stated, “wonderful and connected with strains of religious poetry the most sublime, if
the history is not true—[laws] which presuppose the truth of the history and connected
too with historical actions and confirmed by [the] concurrent history of other nations,
which were done in the belief of this history.” The endurance of Jewish law, the historical
writings of Josephus, and accounts of modern travelers attested to the veracity of Hebrew
scripture.12 Historical research authenticated biblical texts, but it also drew attention to
the historical peculiarities of their ancient peoples.
While using recent scholarship to authenticate the Bible, Emerson also showed an
interest in identifying permanent religious truth, again highlighting how historical
criticism directed America’s biblical scholars to acknowledge and account for historical
difference through an appeal to accommodation. In his discussion of the first few
chapters of Matthew, Emerson posited that “the human mind is the same when it opens
itself to the light in Judea or in Greece [or in] Rome or in America.” This interest in a
11
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universal nature of religious sentiment fast became a central pillar of Transcendentalist
thought and would soon support the idea that though historical and useful, the New
Testament and its Christ were unessential in the search for salvation, and Philemon and
its author Paul were irrelevant in addressing the slavery crisis. At this juncture, however,
Emerson focused on the universal meaning of the words ascribed to Christ.13
Although his message was universal in meaning, Emerson explained that “Jesus
adopted [the Jews’] language to impart a new and a sounder sense,” and thus one should
guard against a strict literal reading of the text, and, even further, one should allow that
through such accommodations mistaken beliefs found their way into the text.14 As an
example, he cited Matthew 4:24, which makes reference to demonic possession.
Anticipating discussions surrounding the miracles controversy that would break apart
American Unitarianism, Emerson attributed the presence of such an idea to then
prevalent understandings. “It is maintained,” he wrote “that this was a popular
superstition of the Jews which they received when they were in captivity … and that
Jesus accommodated his words to the usual modes of speech.” Emerson noted that “the
apostles and evangelists” also used “these expressions which in their time were in
common use.” As with Unitarians like Channing and Norton, Emerson found
accommodation in both language and meaning, and asserted the truth and relevance of
those meanings perceived to be timeless, but he also seems to have anticipated his later
stance on the other side of the debate over New Testament miracles, when he regarded
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the Unitarian investment in those miracles, which historical evidence might disprove, as
misplaced.15
Indeed, Emerson’s early transcendentalist leanings, as much as his Unitarian faith,
informed his early search for permanent truths. In an addendum to the lectures, he
referenced the love at the heart of Christ’s beatitudes and wrote that “it is this sense that
fits the Gospel to all countries and times.” Perhaps speaking of the Mosaic Law in
particular, rather than the later Jewish law that he had previously lauded, he stated that
“the Jewish code is not only a burdensome ceremony but a local code fit for that
particular region—fit only for a small country.” In contrast, he contended that, “With the
law of love at the bottom, [the Sermon on the Mount] is as good at Rome as [at]
Jerusalem—at Boston as at either. It is for all places where the human heart beats. … It is
for the soul. If this whole system of worlds, this universe of matter, should pass away it
would still be eternally true that purity and love and wisdom would be heaven or the right
and happy state of the soul as it was nineteen centuries ago to the little company of poor
Jewish peasants whom Jesus Christ addressed.”16 Again, Transcendentalists such as
Emerson and Parker also sought the eternal, but reducing the permanent and universal
component of the Bible to a basic element of Christian love signaled the surfacing of a
minimalist position that designated the rest of the Bible’s content as local, transient, and
forgettable. It cultivated greater cognizance of temporal distance and robbed the Gospels
and Christ of their exceptional historical roles.
Emerson publically articulated a more advanced formulation of these ideas in his
Harvard Divinity School Address (1838), years after he had resigned from the pulpit and
15
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left behind much of his interest in biblical scholarship. As with his brother and other
Harvard graduates who had studied in Germany, biblical criticism informed Emerson’s
choice of a career outside the ministry as an orator and his decision to turn from biblical
topics. Emerson’s philosophical stance in the late 1830s and early 1840s assumed
historical distance from the biblical past, but he was no longer concerned with providing
close contextual analysis of biblical passages. While he chose to turn from the ministry,
Theodore Parker struggled to preserve his place at the pulpit and retained a keen interest
in biblical studies. In his writings and speeches, the potential to uncover and highlight
historical distance from the biblical past was especially pronounced.

“Not Common Historical Ground”: Theodore Parker and the Transience of the
Testaments
Similar to Emerson, Parker’s early writings on biblical topics show a rather
orthodox understanding of scripture giving way to a more critical approach. Within the
period of a decade, he moved far beyond the exegetical positions of the Unitarians. One
way to trace this development is through his engagement with the biblical criticism of
two German scholars: Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette and David Friedrich Strauss.
De Wette showed Parker historical problems with the Old Testament texts, while
reinforcing his belief in an essential inner religious sense, and Strauss unveiled to him
historical issues with the Gospels. The biblical debate over slavery, which tested
canonical loyalties among a number of antislavery readers, would further cement this
approach to the testaments. Parker held some reservations about German biblical
scholarship, including Strauss’s reading of the Gospel accounts as myths representative
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of the time in which they were written, but his religious convictions allowed him to
uniquely engage some of the period’s most devastating biblical critiques without fear of
losing his faith. In turn, he became less attached to more of the Bible, which allowed him
to dismiss most of its texts and teachings as relics of a bygone era.17
But in the early 1830s, even after Unitarians such Andrews Norton and William
Ellery Channing had left behind the Old Testament and promoted contextual
interpretations of the New, Parker viewed the Hebrew Bible as an accurate historical
account. In 1832, he wrote a text for student use entitled, “A History of the Jews,” in
which he presented a straightforward narrative that showed an orthodox approach to Old
Testament miracles. Soon, though, Unitarian minister Convers Francis introduced Parker
to biblical criticism and within two years he began a seven-year project of translating De
Wette’s historical introduction to the Old Testament, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen
Einleitung in die kanonischen und apokryphischen Bücher des Alten Testaments (1817),
which demonstrated a shift in his thinking to a more critical approach.
Informed by Immanuel Kant’s religion of reason, Friedrich Schelling’s view of
the Bible as the expression of the Absolute, and Jakob Friedrich Fries’s distinction
between understanding (reason) and revelation (Reason), De Wette aimed to unhinge the
religious significance of the Bible from historical facts. He viewed Old Testament
miracles as mythic expressions of ancient Hebrew faith. This protected the ancient
scriptures from the unsettling historical criticism of scholars such as Eichhorn and Bauer,
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who, in search for historical information brushed aside supernatural embellishment and
discarded central narratives with deep symbolic meaning. In contrast, while De Wette
dismissed the historical value of the Pentateuch, he accepted much of the Hebrew
scriptures as religious poetry representative of ancient thought. Perhaps the Old
Testament did not constitute an accurate account of past events but did capture ancient
instantiations of divine revelation. De Wette approached the New Testament in a similar
manner, preferring to measure the religious value of the ideas expressed therein
according to the religious ideal—or Reason—rather than in terms of their relationship to
historical events. Contending that faith resulted from Reason distinguished him from the
supernaturalists and the naturalists, both of whom measured revelation according to
reason. Still, he asserted that the Gospels rested on enough of a historical foundation and
believed Christ to be the historical expression of the ideal. So, when Strauss’s Das Leben
Jesu, Kritisch bearbeitet (Life of Jesus, Critically Examined) was published in 1835, De
Wette granted that his compatriot had raised important questions about the historicity of
the Gospels, but argued that the scarcity of extra-synoptic and extra-biblical
contemporary accounts arrested Strauss’s critique. De Wette believed that a lack of
historical evidence undermined the mythological approach and thus remained confident
in Jesus’s role as Christianity’s founder. This time, historical skepticism undermined the
work of the skeptic.18
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Parker’s “Report on Germany Theology,” which he read before the Philanthropic
Society at Harvard in 1836, shows an early attachment to De Wette and an awareness of
the German intellectual context. Parker had begun attending the Divinity School in the
spring of 1834 and in the fall of 1835 he began editing the Scriptural Interpreter, which
fed subscribers a steady diet of biblical criticism and further exposed Parker to German
writings. In contrast to American attacks on German thinkers as infidels and atheists,
which his countrymen would soon direct at him, Parker believed that history showed that
the Germans possessed a natural inclination toward religiosity.19 He narrated the history
of German theology and biblical scholarship from Luther up to the more recent writings
of Reimarus, Michaelis, Semler, Kant, Herder, Eichhorn, Fichte, Schleiermacher,
Schelling, De Wette, and Bauer. He separated strains of contemporary German religious
thought into four categories: deists and freethinkers; naturalists; rationalists; and
supernaturalists. Dedicating most of his space to those he labeled rationalists, which he
divided between thinkers who argued that religion originated in understanding from those
who posited that it originated in feeling, Parker showed his affinity with the second
group, which included De Wette. He wrote, “the fact that religion does originate in the
feelings is one of the grandest discoveries of modern times.” But in this report, Parker
remained focused on the first group and their scriptural hermeneutic. He referenced
Bauer on the Old Testament and Paulus on the New, and explained how both scholars
accounted for biblical miracles by referring to the age of the world in which the texts
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were written, for “what are miracles to one age are not so to another.”20 The mythical
nature of biblical passages attested to the antiquity of the biblical texts, but it also
highlighted the historical distance between biblical pasts and the present.21
Reading, translating, and editing De Wette likely informed Parker’s separation of
the Old from the New Testament. Contemporaries like Channing and Norton had already
made that canonical distinction without the German’s help. Parker outlined problems
with the Hebrew scriptures in various writings from the period, including a pair of
sermons he formulated on “The Contradictions in Scripture,” which he wrote in 1837, but
did not deliver until 1839. In the first sermon, he challenged the Old Testament’s
narration of the creation as a six-day event, its early depictions of God in physical form,
and its moral contradictions, including its presentation of the Canaanite massacre as a
divinely commanded and sanctioned act. He would soon fix his attention on the moral
contradiction of ancient slavery, but in the second sermon, he described the Bible itself as
a contradiction, privileging the New over the Old Testament, as was common among
liberal Christians. He believed that historical evidence required him to distinguish the
Greek from the Hebrew scriptures, but his emphasis on internal religion, which he found
clearly articulated in the teachings and example of Jesus, directed that distinction. Soon,
though, Parker began to wonder if the New Testament might be a collection of myths as
well, and another German scholar guided him down that path.22
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Parker first read Strauss’s Life of Christ in 1837 and the critiques that the German
theologian raised soon began to weigh on the American theologian’s mind. As Dean
Grodzins writes, “If some in New England saw Schleiermacher and De Wette as infidels
thinly disguised, most thought that Strauss had torn off the mask.”23 The supernaturalists
interpreted scriptures literally and the rationalists explained them naturally, but both
believed in the historicity of the Gospels. Strauss, on the other hand, contended that the
narratives emerged through an unconscious myth-making process and thus reflected the
beliefs of the times in which they were produced. This reading suggested that the Gospels
revealed more about the mindset of the writers than the actions and teachings of a figure
named Jesus. The question Strauss raised was not how much Christ had accommodated to
the traditions and customs of the Jews, but rather how much the authors of the Gospels
had unintentionally used local beliefs and mentalities to create myths around a historical
figure identified as Jesus. This kind of historicization undercut the historicity of the
Gospels, leaving those who had dug in their heels on historical grounds sinking in
quicksand. It also exposed the cultural differences separating New Testament and modern
times by pointing out the peculiar historical nature of the biblical past.
By the time William Ellery Channing urged him not to translate, and William
Ware, editor of the Christian Examiner and General Review, asked him to critique,
Strauss’s controversial publication in 1839, Parker, who had demonstrated a keen interest
in the historical accuracy of the Gospels, began doubting the reality of the miracles
depicted within its pages. However, warned that Ware would not publish a controversial
review, Parker repressed his private thoughts. Seeming to don the cap of an apologist, he
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informed readers that Strauss’s publication would have been more adequately titled, “A
Fundamental Criticism on the Four Gospels,” and labeled it a “conjectural history.”24
Like Stuart and De Wette, Parker could play apologist in pointing out the conjectural
nature of historical research.
However, he would not hide the difficult problems the work raised. Indeed, in
summarizing its introduction, Parker made a statement that represents one of the
antebellum era’s clearest articulations of the idea that historical distance resulted from a
historical explication of sacred texts from favored pasts. Neatly encapsulating the
inevitable problem that temporal distinction created for Christianity, he wrote that “if a
form of religion rest on written documents, sooner or later, there ensues a difference
between the old documents and the modern discoveries and culture shown in works
written to explain it.”25 This statement not only highlighted the problem of historical
distance for Protestants, but it also anticipated a similar development among Americans
who looked to a document from a set period in the past for legal guidance. Modern
historical investigation of historical texts drew attention to the dissonance between past
and present cultures. Parker wrote of the distance from the biblical past that the critic may
acknowledge the dissonance or “blind himself to this inconsistency, and seek merely to
unfold the original meaning of the text.”26 He would later highlight this dissonance to
condemn proslavery readings of the Constitution, which, in his opinion, aimed to uncover
original meaning without a proper understanding of the founding era or of developments
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since then. In the review, he proceeded to trace developments in scriptural interpretation,
noting instances in which readers had used non-literal readings to account for
inconsistencies. He referenced the work of Eichhorn and Heinrich Paulus on the Old and
New Testaments, respectively, and outlined the mythical response of De Wette and
others. This brought Parker to Strauss, who applied the mythical interpretation to the
Gospel accounts of Jesus’s last three years, which even De Wette assumed were authored
by eyewitnesses. Strauss regarded them “as spurious productions of well-meaning men,
who collected the traditions that were current.”27 He made the Gospels historical not by
evidencing their historical accuracy, but by showing how the texts reflected the mentality
of a specific time and place.
Strauss defined myth as an unhistorical and fictive account. In his view,
witnesses’ accounts are unhistorical if they counter the known laws of causality and
contain circumstantial contradictions, and are fictive if they are poetical in form and
agree in substance “remarkably with the preconceived opinions of the community where
[they] originate.”28 Parker explained how Strauss applied this approach to the narrative of
John the Baptist, Jesus’s birth, his public ministry, his miracles, his death and
resurrection. Of the appearance of a “miraculous star,” for example, Parker summarized
Strauss’s position that “the whole story is mythical, and is derived from ideas and
opinions commonly held at the time. The ancients,” he summarized, “believed a heavenly
body sometimes appeared on great occasions, for example, a comet, at the birth of
Mithridates, and at the death of Julius Caesar. … In ancient times, it was supposed stars
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guided men.”29 An understanding of the ancient mythic mindset explained the
miraculous. The same was true with accounts of possession: “It was a common opinion
of the Jews, that certain diseases were caused by demons; Jesus himself seems to have
shared this opinion.”30 In his Vestry Lectures, Emerson proposed that Jesus had
accommodated to the opinions of the times on this point but Parker seemed to agree with
Strauss’s idea that even Jesus had held these outdated views. Parker would later advance
this position more explicitly. This approach could authenticate teachings, as Bauer, and
even Jonathan Edwards, had shown with the Old Testament, or as Norton had
demonstrated with the New. Parker noted, for example, that “Strauss thinks the
controversial discourses of Jesus are genuine, because they correspond so closely to the
spirit and tone of rabbinical explanations of Scripture, at that time.”31 But referencing the
“spirit and tone” of the time to authenticate certain teachings undermined their present
relevance. In a sense, Parker finished what Edwards’ had started, but rather than use
historical proofs to confirm the Bible’s divinity, he admitted historical evidence that
demonstrated its temporality. Still, although Parker recognized that Strauss’s approach
rested on an awareness of historical distance, a position he was sympathetic with, he
remained invested in the permanent he found in the Gospels.
Before offering a brief critique, Parker attended to Strauss’s concluding treatise,
noting his Hegelian-informed philosophical position that the ideal rested in humanity
rather than in the figure of Jesus. This immanent interpretation of Hegel’s concrete
universal set the stage for Feuerbach to completely unhinge Hegelianism from its
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Christian bearings.32 The anthropomorphizing move paved the way for another revolution
in historical thinking—the understanding that “men make their own history,” even if
“they do not make it as they please.”33 Parker, though, who rejected Hegel’s dialectic in
favor of a Platonic idea of God, remained focused on the Gospels and their Christ.34 He
viewed the idea that the Gospels were inauthentic as more presupposition than proof,
noting Strauss’s reliance on internal evidence and his neglect of “the [external] evidence
of Christian, Heretical, and even Heathen Antiquity.”35 As with De Wette, Parker found
the German unconvincing in his historical argumentation and too liberal with his
mythical approach, writing that “men do not make myths out of air, but out of historical
materials.”36 Rather than accept the mythical interpretation or the opposed supernaturalist
reading, which posited the historical validity of the Bible as a whole, Parker adopted a
middle-way approach, which held that the New Testament, at least, “always rests on
historical ground, though it is not common historical ground, nor is it so rigidly historical
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that no legendary or mythical elements have entered it.”37 He thus held that “if there was
not an historical Christ to idealize, there could be no ideal Christ to seek in history,”
while still critiquing the modern desire to obtain a full rendering of Christ. Following De
Wette, he suggested that not even the apostles, “though they were eye-witnesses, had
such a complete, consistent, and thoroughly historical picture of the life of Christ, as we
seek after.” As with some of his contemporaries, Parker showed an awareness of the
limits of historical interpretation, even as he championed it as the best available
approach. Parker was relieved to find that Strauss, in the third edition of the work,
recognized the shortcomings of his historical critique and left room for Jesus in history.38
Parker felt that enough historical material existed to confirm but not deny his life: “if we
cannot prove all things, we can hold fast to enough that is good.”39 He conceded that
Strauss’s text—“the production of the age”—had initiated an unprecedented crisis for
Christian believers, compared him to Spinoza—“both struck at the most deeply cherished
doctrines of their times”—and described his work as “colder than ice” and labeled it “the
most melancholy book we ever read.”40 But, Parker professed that it did not remove “the
Redeemer’s image” which “has been stamped ineffaceably on the hearts of men.”41 This
affirmation did not signify a belief in the necessary authenticity of the Gospels, but rather
that essential Christianity had found historical expression in Jesus.42
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Through readings, translations, and reviews of De Wette and Strauss, Parker came
to the conclusion that some biblical texts stood on a firmer footing than others, including
the accounts of the life of Christ, but he also followed these scholars in unhinging his
religious belief from biblical texts, including those deemed authentic, which rested on
grounds that new evidence might unsettle. He followed De Wette, in particular, in
locating the source of religious belief in an innate religious sense. Both this emphasis and
historical evidence led Parker to appreciate the New more than the Old Testament. In the
teachings of the New Testament Christ, Parker discovered truths that corresponded to the
truths emanating from his soul, and it was on this basis, and not on that of Christ’s
miracles, that he remained invested in the historicity of the Gospel accounts.

“I See Not How a Miracle Proves a Doctrine”: Parker, the Miracles Controversy and the
Permanence of the Religious Element
Though his review, completed on 1 April 1839, fit comfortably in the Unitarian
Examiner, Parker himself had grown uneasy with Unitarianism. Around the time of its
completion and months before its publication in July, he contributed to the growing
division between Unitarians and Transcendentalists. He entered the acrimonious miracles
controversy, a New England polemic that erupted when Unitarians, including Andrews
Norton and George Ripley, took opposing positions in a pamphlet war over the
relationship between Christianity and Christ’s New Testament miracles. In an article on
Schleiermacher, Ripley praised the German theologian’s emphasis on intuition-based
religious experience, and in a review of James Martineau’s The Rationale of Religious
Enquiry (1836), he agreed with the English theologian’s move to sever the evidentialist
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tie between Jesus’s miracles and his gospel message.43 In his reply, Norton damned
Ripley’s reasoning as heretical and forcefully asserted the necessity of a link between the
authenticity of the Gospels and the reality of Christ’s miracles.44 Thus, while figures such
as Norton argued that Christian faith depended on the historicity and literality of the
accounts of Christ’s miracles, figures such as Ripley, who granted that such miracles
might have occurred, saw no such necessary relationship.
Another prominent Transcendentalist soon threw his weight behind those
emphasizing a faith centered in an internal religious sense rather than grounded on
external evidences. In his infamous address to the Harvard Divinity School’s graduating
class of 1838, Emerson leveled a powerful blow in the battle over the relationship
between Christ’s miracles and Protestant belief. There, he stated that Christ “spoke of
miracles” but quickly qualified that statement in clarifying that Jesus “felt that man’s life
was a miracle.” Christ “saw with open eye the mystery of the soul,” Emerson explained,
he saw a direct pathway from God, the divine fount of religion, to the human soul.45 The
Galilean’s salvific message rested not in an atoning sacrifice but rather in the teaching
that each human possessed divine attributes and a revelatory prerogative. His exceptional
status depended on the fact that he was, as Emerson stated, “the only soul in history who
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has appreciated the worth of man.”46 Drawing attention to Protestant contemporaries’
sense that miracles stood in opposition to or apart from nature, Emerson also lamented
that “miracle” “is not one with the blowing clover and the falling rain.” He believed that
verbal misuse had turned “Miracle” into an epistemological and theological “Monster.”47
Belief in Christianity had mistakenly come to rest on whether or not Gospel miracles
reflected ancient realities. In shifting his evidentiary weight to the indwelling presence of
the divine in nature and, above all else, in the soul, Emerson struck at Unitarianism’s
shaky foundation of belief.
Righteous indignation reigned down from America’s Christian watchtowers. As
expected, Norton, who had turned his attention from schooling Congregationalists in
biblical interpretation to raising the spectre of Transcendentalism, was at the forefront of
those signaling the warning. A year after Emerson’s address, “the Unitarian Pope,” who
had been in the audience, delivered an address of his own to the alumni of the Harvard
Divinity School, which included others who also had been present at Emerson’s oration
the previous summer. Norton sought to not only respond to Emerson but also aimed to
address the larger disease of which he believed Emerson was a symptom. Citing recent
political and intellectual attacks on traditional powers and modes of thought, Norton
warned that a new form of infidelity, one that had been spawned “in Europe, and
especially Germany, has made its way among a very large portion of nominally Christian
theologians.”48 Like Spinoza, Norton explained, these theologians used orthodox terms to
mask heretical and even atheistic notions. What was at the heart of the debate? “The
46
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latest form of infidelity is distinguished by assuming the Christian name, while it strikes
directly at the root of faith in Christianity, and indirectly of all religion, by denying the
miracles attesting the divine mission of Christ.”49 In stressing the ultimate implications of
that denial, Norton made clear the historical nature of those religious roots, stating that to
“deny that a miracle is capable of proof … is, in effect … to deny the existence of
God.”50 Miracles, external evidences, proved God’s reality. And New Testament
miracles, as historical facts, proved Christianity’s truth.
Outlining the recent German approaches to New Testament miracles, Norton
explained that some scholars spoke of them as exaggerated natural events, others as
“prodigies, adapted to rouse the attention of a rude people, like the Jews; but not required
for the conviction of men of more enlightened minds,” and still others denied them
outright.51 Norton argued that Christ’s “whole history, as recorded in the Gospels, is
miraculous,” and thus, in explaining away the miracles one inevitably threw out the
Gospels too. “If the accounts of Christ’s miracles are mere fictions,” as some claimed,
“then no credit can be due to works so fabulous as the pretended histories of his life” and
no one can regard Christ himself “as an object of veneration or to consider his teachings
… as of any importance to himself.”52 This was an all-or-nothing equation: either the
miracles were factual occurrences, and Jesus was the Christ, and, thus, Christianity was
true, or they were fictions and Christianity was a farce. Norton conceded that “certainty,
in the metaphysical sense of the word, has nothing to do with the concerns of men,” but
he, similar to Edwards in the previous century, upheld historical evidence, understood
49
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through the use of reason, as the surest foundation of human knowledge about religious
truth.53 He thus protested against the “rejection of all that mass of evidence, which in
view of a Christian, establishes the truth of his religion.” As he saw it, the Germans and
their American followers “complain, that the solid earth is not solid enough for them to
rest on. They have firm footing on the clouds.”54 Norton’s characterization was not far
off. The Transcendentalists did find the historical grounds “not solid enough,” and surely
they realized that their more abstract footings were less susceptible to the undermining
potential of rigorous historical examination. Norton, though, contended that “there can be
no intuition, no direct perception, of the truth of Christianity.”55 Intuition might not fall
prey to historical criticism, but it provided no surer epistemology of truth, and indeed
conscience seemed to lack any kind of foundation whatsoever.
In the appendix of the published version of this address, Norton included “SOME
FURTHER REMARKS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN GERMAN SCHOOL OF

INFIDELITY,” and a second note “ON THE OBJECTION TO FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY, AS
RESTING ON HISTORICAL FACTS AND CRITICAL LEARNING.” In

both, he focused on the

historical foundation of Christian faith. He pointed to De Wette and Schleiermacher as
examples of German theologians who placed faith in “a pious apprehension of things”
and who argued against faith “being founded on a historical acquaintance with
Christianity.”56 He noted that Strauss went even further in arguing that the Gospels were
“destitute of historical truth.”57 In Norton’s framework, that conclusion demolished
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Christian faith. Such thinkers seemed to hold that “Christianity is no permanent thing, but
must, with the advance of men, go on improving, and divesting itself more and more of
its historical relations.”58 Holders of such a position stood little to lose in the face of
historical distance. Indeed, the position depended, in some sense, on the recognition of
that fact. Norton, despite his heavy-handed approach, could be quite perceptive in his
critiques. In Parker’s case, while he actually believed with Norton that “true Christianity
is always the same,” he had a more minimalist and atemporal understanding of
Christianity and did, in fact, hold that the innate religious sense, used to perceive
Christian truth, became less obstructed over time.59 In January of 1839, he had written to
Convers Francis, asking whether he thought “the apostles understood Christianity as well
as some in these times?”60 Parker certainly did. This sort of thinking and these sorts of
questions proved influential when confronted with contextual explanations of the
apostles’ and, later, the American founders’ approach to the moral issue of slavery. Yes,
he would grant, perhaps they did sanction slavery, but, he would stress, their historical
contexts had blinded them to the sin, and progress since then had removed the blinders.
In his second note, Norton addressed the objections to the idea that Christian faith
rested on historical grounds, asserting that “there is … no other mode of establishing
religious belief, but by the exercise of reason, by investigation, by forming a probable
judgment upon facts.”61 Such facts, though ascertained “by only a comparatively small
portion of” learned men, could be distilled and enjoyed as “a common property and a
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common blessing” by the mass of humanity, but the foundations of De Wette and his ilk
seemed understandable only to an initiated few.62 Norton stressed that epistemological
dependence on an elite group was characteristic of all fields of inquiry and contended that
nothing “gives to Christianity a different character from what belongs to all the higher
and more important branches of knowledge.”63 Norton did not notice that in
characterizing knowledge of truth as of the same epistemic makeup as other subjects, he
helped denude Christianity of its supernaturalism. And he did not realize that in resting
his faith on historical grounds, he and others like him contributed to the growing
awareness that historical peculiarities could be used to disprove the New Testament texts
and historicize the New Testament past just as easily as they could be used to
authenticate the Gospel accounts. He proposed that exegetes interpret the Bible as
scholars read other ancient texts and suggested that adherents approach Christianity as
they might approach other historical subjects. In fact, Norton had already done that very
thing in the first of three volumes of his Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels
(1837-1844). He marketed his works in drawing attention to their principal subject—“the
genuineness of those books.” Norton was no longer preoccupied with whether orthodox
readers like Moses Stuart attended to circumstances in their interpretations, he now
fixated on defending the authenticity of the Gospels with historical reasoning.
Indeed, in a surprising move, Norton now called on those more orthodox readers
for help. A volley of exchanges between he and Ripley followed Norton’s Discourse.64
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The level of Norton’s contempt became evident when he put to use an article written by
Princeton Presbyterian Charles Hodge—which included a cutting review of his own
Discourse—a portion of which he reprinted as a pamphlet along with a biting critique of
Transcendentalism that Hodge’s co-religionists James Alexander and Albert Dod had
written.65 Alexander and Dod exposed Emerson’s affinities with the Germans and Victor
Cousin, their French counterpart, and excoriated his exaggerated opinion of man, which
undercut the authority of God.66 For his part, Hodge rejected Norton’s reliance on
miracles as the sole evidential grounds of Christian belief, holding up the Bible as a
whole as proof of Christian truth. Hodge’s foundation, though, remained historical. He
also exposed Emerson’s philosophy as Hegelian, aligning him with the heretical
Strauss.67 When Norton used Hodge to combat Transcendentalism, Parker entered the
fray, picking up where Emerson had left off. In response to Norton, he published a
satirical announcement of the former’s pamphlet, an elucidating essay on
Transcendentalist views, and a damning “Desultory Notice.” In the short notices, he
briefly dismissed the arguments of Hodge for his reliance on Berlin biblical literalist
E.W. Hengstenberg, and those of Alexander and Dod for their ignorance of German
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philosophy.68 But it was in the more substantial essay, which Parker penned under the
pseudonym of Levi Blodgett, that he aimed at the heart of the debate.69
In addressing the question of whether miracles form the basis of belief in
Christianity, Parker attempted to establish, through philosophical and historical
demonstration, the universal presence of an innate religious element, which, he
contended, led the human soul to believe in, and recognize one’s dependence on, God.
Parker used historical evidence to buttress his claims rather than serve as their
foundation, and thus he could use such evidence without contradicting his belief in a nonhistorical source of religious truth. In accounting for perceived differences in awareness
and evidence of the “higher faculties of the soul” among past peoples and prophets, he
emphasized the “progress and development of religion in man.”70 Parker posited that “as
the tribe of race improves, the manifestations of religion become more perfect. The form
changes to suit the culture of the age.”71 He believed that while religious truth remained
constant, its expressions became clearer as religious forms developed and accommodated
to more enlightened circumstances. Although teleological and in some ways similar to
enlightenment thinkers’ turn from tradition and their emphasis on progress, this idea
fostered an awareness of historical difference and change, and of distinct historical
periods.72 Stressing the progress of religion supported Parker’s belief that some in the
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present understood Christian truth and moral issues better than the primitive Christians.
Parker’s continued study of the past would only bolster that belief.
He wrote that individuals who communicate with the divine through the religious
sentiment “create new religions and make religious epochs,” and explained that though
some “of these men are deemed gods,” they “are subject to the various peculiarities of
their nation, place and age, and to their own idiosyncracies [sic].” Because the
peculiarities “perpetually change, the old form of religion, unable to change with them,
gradually becomes obsolete. A new teacher of religion arises; starts from a higher stand
and separating the peculiarities of the old form which adapted it to its age … constructs a
new form suitable to the altered condition of mankind, which shall, for its season, carry
forward the good work, until ‘in the fulness of time,’ it gives place to somewhat higher
and better.”73 Parker’s belief in the progress of religion related to his sense that true
religion adapted to new circumstances. This broad understanding placed him at the far
end of the spectrum of antebellum religious thinkers who accepted that the sacred writers
had accommodated their messages to specific times and audiences. Stuart and Hodge
granted that sacred writers accommodated in language, while asserting that the Bible
remained the repository of divine revelation. Norton contended that those writers
accommodated in content as well, but argued that New Testament, and the Gospels in
particular, served as the fount and foundation of Christian faith. Parker agreed that
religious truth found expression in the Bible, but only to the extent that circumstances
development as cyclical, with alternative periods of rationality and irrationality. Some,
for example, thought of the classical era as a kind of golden age. For a recent discussion
of French enlightenment thinkers’ complicated relationship to the past, see Dan
Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2010).
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had allowed. True religion existed independent of time but, because it functioned in
relation to individual enlightenment, it evolved in time according to the development of
the soul. Parker held that truth itself accommodated. Although the Transcendentalists
Emerson and Parker maintained the permanence of divine truth and of God as the
originator of that truth, they placed the development of religion in human hands, which,
to someone like Norton, was tantamount to the humanistic and atheistic positions that
Hegel had spawned, Strauss had nurtured, and Feuerbach had perfected and unleashed.
Applying his understanding to true Christianity, which he held “to be the highest
form of religion,” Parker explained that though he could conceive of “no more perfect
moral and religious incarnation of God than Jesus of Nazareth,” he could not designate
Christianity “absolute religion” or label Christ “the ultimate incarnation of God.” Rather,
in Christ he saw someone who “attempted to excite in man a more living consciousness
of” God’s existence and of human dependence on him.74 Parker believed that “Jesus …
wrought miracles.” But he saw “not how a miracle proves a doctrine,” which allowed him
to sidestep “some historical difficulties in the way of establishing all the miracles which
[Jesus] wrought.”75 Part of these historical difficulties included an awareness of historical
context. Parker pointed to the “tendency to the marvellous in all ancient nations,
especially among the Jews, before and after the time of Christ,” and of the evangelists in
particular, he argued that “their inspiration did not free them from the notions of the age
and nation.” He assured his readers that he believed in “the general accuracy of their
history of Christ, at least during his ministry.”76 His insistence that Christian truth flowed
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from an internal source rather than resting on external evidences did not necessarily
imply a dismissal of New Testament miracles as the fictions of fabricated accounts. The
issue was not whether or not Christ had existed or performed miracles, but whether or not
the truth of Christianity rested on the miracles he had presumably performed. So, when
someone like Norton, or even Hodge, accepted that historical circumstances shaped
biblical language and content, but insisted that Christ’s miracles had occurred as related
in the Gospels and resisted viewing the accounts of those miracles as productions of the
age, Parker thought that they had rested their belief on “insecure” grounds. In his opinion,
they were “at the mercy of scoffers, scholars and critics” who had dismantled the Old
Testament miracles and discredited those of the New.77 Parker stressed the shakiness of
their chosen historical foundation. “You make our religion depend entirely on something
outside, on strange events which happened, it is said, two thousand years ago, of which
we can never be certain, and on which yourselves often doubt, at least of the more and
less.”78 Some, including Parker himself, had pointed out the limits of historical
explication to protect the canon from the deepest critiques, but the historical skepticism
that historical distance introduced could also be used to demonstrate the difficulties
involved in upholding a faith based on historical facts. Parker preferred a more reliable
basis of faith, or, rather, one that was less susceptible to deterioration and falsification.
Parker believed that the endurance of the gospel message contained in the New
Testament rested in its relationship to the universal religious sentiment, which found
residence in the soul. He further outlined this conviction in an updated version of his
sermon, “The Relation of the Bible to the Soul,” which he published in two articles in the
77
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winter of 1840-41.79 In the first, he began by stressing the Bible’s high status as “the
Book of Books.”80 In an attempt to explain its elevated position, he first described what
the Bible was not. It was “not the master of the Soul,” or “the foundation of Religion,”
and was “not greater than Conscience and Reason.”81 In part, the ancient text was not
ancient enough. “Religion is older than the Bible,” Parker posited, just as justice is older
than legal tradition.82 The legal parallel he raised here held great promise in a nation
preoccupied with law.
Parker held that eternal sentiments formed the basis of legal and religious truths,
while biblical and legal codes were “simply [their] historical form.” The essential truths
of Christianity were “not simply ‘as old as the creation,’ but far older; ancient as the
eternal ideas of Justice, Love, Holiness and Truth.”83 This was, of course, not a strictly
historical claim; it was not an attempt to reclaim the teachings and principles of a pure
past, but rather an appeal to truths above time and space. Anticipating his later statements
about slavery, and adding a token of support to the Garrisonian critique of Constitution
worship, Parker disconnected eternal juridical and religious truths from sacred historical
texts. Indeed, it was during this period that he began to address, if haltingly, slavery as a
subject of reform.84 Before long, it would become the subject of his reform efforts, efforts
that became enveloped in constitutional debate. In this article, Parker wrote that that
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“men sometimes think the statues of the land were providentially struck out, in some
happy moment, which will never return—that if these should perish, so would Order and
Justice decease from being.” Parker seemed to have in mind the favored founding era to
which his generation habitually referred to and longed to recreate. This anticipated his
critique of the fixation on a period in the American past, which, in terms of moral insight,
he believed the American present far exceeded. In this article, though, Parker remained
focused on religion. “They say the same of the Bible,” Parker continued, “and assert that
Morality and Religion would have been quite lost from the world, if the Bible had
chanced to perish.”85 Parker’s absolute religion was ahistorical:
granting it were shewn, in opposition to the greatest amount of historical evidence
ever brought to bear on one point,—that the facts related in the Gospels, were not
facts, but fictions; that Jesus never rose from the dead; never died, as it is related;
never wrought miracles, taught doctrines, or even lived—still Christianity would
be as true, as lasting, as now it is, when environed by all these historical
statements.86
Parker’s formulation contradicted Norton’s equation. His separation between external
evidences in the form of the truthfulness of the Gospels and the miracles recounted
therein, paralleled De Wette’s distinction between historical facts and religious meaning.
Parker’s proposition, as with Emerson’s salvo, shook the religious foundation of thinkers
such as Norton, who rested their Gospel-centered faith on historical grounds. It
undermined the exceptional status of the New Testament, of Christ’s miracles, and even
of Christ himself. Parker did not cast Christ aside but he measured his teachings against
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“Reason and Conscience.”87 After all, “The Bible was made for man, not man for the
Bible.”88
In a slightly longer second installment, Parker set out to explain the Bible’s
central role as instructor. Rather than “teach men by pouring certain abstract doctrines
into all minds,” the Bible, a product of the soul, “teaches by arousing the soul. … It
reveals the true idea of a man, the divine man … tells him of his noble nature—the image
of God. It sets before him the noblest aim—‘Be perfect as God.’”89 Parker held that,
unbounded and universal, the “spirit of God everywhere reveals itself,” as seen in the
sacred books of India, Persia, Egypt, and Greece. While he granted that it is revealed
“perhaps more clearly in the Old Testament than in any other witness of equal antiquity,”
he held that “pupils outgrow their teachers.” Parker compared outdated Old Testament
passages to “laws and political institutions. Like old garments which were fine in their
day, they are laid aside when their end is answered.”90 He allowed that Moses “was a
prophetic man” who saw “far onward into futurity,” and that his laws were “wonderful
for his age,” but noted that “it is only the true, the universal, the divine part of them, that
thus extends itself and still lives. All peculiar institutions of his system, which belong to
the man Moses, not to the divine idea of justice, holiness and love, have long since fallen
to decay.” Before long, Parker would train his focus on one peculiar institution in
particular. A belief in the universal and unchangeable nature of the religious sentiment
led him to dismiss as peculiar and passing much of Moses’s teachings and to posit that
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“we too are men, and have seen what he and Solomon desired to see and saw not.”91
Parker conceived of revelation as progressing rather than historical. Thus, he could
highlight historical distance without repercussions. This understanding would allow him
to shine a spotlight on the discrepancies he found between ancient and modern views on
servitude, or even mid-nineteenth-century and late-eighteenth-century understandings on
slavery.
Parker’s belief in the universal sentiment and the progress of religion supported
his separation of the Hebrew and Greek scriptures, but it also directed him to question the
relevance of the New Testament and its actors. “If the Old Testament,—which Paul
considered imperfect and transitory … has been superseded,” he asked, “how do we
know that the New Testament, the Gospel, nay, even Christianity itself, shall not one day
be passed by and forgotten, having prepared the way for a more beautiful revelation of
the divine image than Jesus himself?”92 Parker was almost willing to leave behind the
whole Christian past, in part because he believed that “doubtless there are men at this day
who understand Christianity far better than it was understood by its teachers in the first
ages of our era.”93 Such clarity, however, did not obviate the importance of the original
Christian truth, which “can never pass away. … No sign of decay is written on it; no
mark of age appears.” Parker saw the passage of time as the sifter of religious truth. “The
lights of old time, like lamps in the street, are passed by, diminished by the distance, and
gradually lost sight of; while … Christianity still shines with mild and tranquil light, and
appears clearer and more lovely to man as he awakes more broadly from his dream, and
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is refined and elevated by the science and culture of successive ages.” Distance rendered
much of the past and its teachings obsolete, burnt up in “the furnace of time,” as change,
in the form of progress, made permanent Christian truth, “which knows nothing of time
or space,” clearer. “Three thousand years, that are past” and “eighteen hundred years of
change, downfall, progress, and retreat” could not dim the light of eternal truth.94 Clearly,
Parker’s efforts to separate out the timeless from the time-bound truths more explicitly
drew attention to historical distance than did those of his contemporary exegetes, but in
stressing context and accommodation they also identified the transient nature of the
Bible’s content and thus highlighted that distance as well. In essence, even if they used
knowledge of historical distance differently in their interpretations, they all recognized
the pastness of the Old and New Testament pasts.
In Parker’s case, held that because Jesus taught pre-existing Christian truths, and
not because those truths resided in him alone, “Christ will always teach” and his gospel
will “be an eternal text-book.”95 Parker’s accommodation theory prescribed that “the
form of Christianity will change, to suit the character and wants of different nations and
ages.” His historicism stood in tension with his assertion that “the essence of Christianity
can never change.”96 He attended to both sides of the equation, the transient and the
permanent, but toward the end of the article he focused on the former. He again noted the
Old Testament’s imperfections. Specifically, he cited its “degrading views of God and
man” and bemoaned his contemporaries’ use of Moses’s writing to justify “war, capital

94

Ibid., 392.
Ibid., 393.
96
Ibid.
95

135

punishment, [and] slavery.”97 Parker again brought together issues of both secular law
and sacred scripture, a link made clearer in the next two decades. As the debate over
slavery gained steam in the 1840s and 1850s, interpreters would appeal to both the Bible
and the Constitution, and abolitionists like Parker would highlight historical distance to
question those appeals. Even in this article, he decried readers’ adherence “to the
[Bible’s] letter, while the spirit has long since gone.”98 Parker retained his distinction
between the Old and New Testaments, writing that “the old dispensation has passed
away. … But the Gospel will teach to the end of time.”99 But the limitations he found
with ancient Israel and its prophets also applied to the New Testament and its apostles:
“Paul, and Peter, and James, and John, saw not all things; nor were they placed above the
reach of passion, human weakness, the dreams of that age, and that imperfection of
wisdom incidental to this mortal state.” Although sometimes prophetic, the biblical
writers had existed in time and space and were subject to human weakness and temporal
limitation and, as a result, often failed to draw “a sharp line between the fabulous and the
historical.” Despite this, Christian ministers “will tell you the canon of revelation is
closed—that you and I … must be poor imitators of two or three men, who have
incarnated in past ages, all of God’s spirit that can be embodied in mortal flesh.”100
Parker echoed Emerson’s shocking statements in his Divinity School Address, where he
had observed that “the divine nature is attributed to one or two persons, and denied to all
the rest, and denied with fury,” and had lamented that “men have come to speak of the
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revelation as somewhat long ago given and done.”101 While encouraging the use of “the
revelation made to others,” as did Emerson, Parker joined the Sage of Concord in
directing believers to “seek new ones in himself.”102 An awareness of the transient in and
transience of the Bible highlighted the need for permanent and ongoing revelation.
During the late 1830s and early 1840s, Parker’s religious position became
detached from the historicity of the Bible. He had grown skeptical of the Old Testament
narratives and dismissed much of the Hebrew scriptures as products of an outdated past
with little meaning to offer the present. The miracles controversy allowed him to further
articulate his position against that of Unitarians like Norton, who asserted that Christian
faith rested on the historicity of New Testament miracles. In contrast to this position,
Parker posited that Christian truth existed independent of historical facts and flowed from
an innate and ubiquitous religious sense that time had cultivated. Parker continued to
distinguish between the Old and New Testaments, but this distinction came to rest less on
a belief that the Gospels were the first and final repository of religious truth and instead
followed from his understanding that enough historical evidence existed to confirm that
true religion found expression rather than embodiment in a person named Jesus. Now
Parker was willing to suggest the transience of even that particular historical expression.

“The Inward Christ, Which Alone Abideth Forever, Has Much to Say Which the
Historical Jesus Never Knew”: The Transient Jesus and the Permanent Christ
The themes in these sermons and writings developed in relation to Parker’s
continued attention to German literature and his ongoing translation of De Wette. Those
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sermons and writings served as the intellectual backdrop to his two most important
publications on the relationship between Christianity and history: A Discourse on the
Transient and Permanent in Christianity and A Discourse of Matters Pertaining to
Religion.103 The first, published in June of 1841, resulted from a sermon Parker wrote in
January and preached in May. The second resulted from a series of lectures he delivered
in the fall of 1841 and published in May of 1842. In these writings, as much as in any
other source from antebellum America, one can see a thinker whose engagement with
biblical criticism created an acute sense of the historical transience and pastness of the
Bible and its central figure.
The first discourse paid homage to Strauss’s “On Transiency and Permanency in
Christianity,” wherein the somewhat repentant German critic had made room for the
historical Jesus.104 Parker did too, but he located the permanent in Christ’s eternal words
rather than his temporal person. Distinguishing between the eternal and true religion (the
permanent) and the religion of the people (the transient), he explained that the latter “has
never been the same thing in any two centuries or lands, except only in name.”105
Parker’s studies led him to recognize temporal distinctions, a realization that created an
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awareness of unbridgeable historical gaps. In contrast to restorationists and Christian
primitivists, he found efforts to reclaim religious forms futile: “neither God nor the world
goes back.”106 He found that the forms and rites of religion, like the outward facts of
nature, pass away in time while true religion, like the law of nature, transcends
temporality. Universal moral truths remained permanent, but the historical forms and
expressions approaching those truths often obscured more than they revealed and thus
possessed little purchase in the present.
“Nothing changes more from age to age than the doctrines … insisted on as
essential to Christianity and personal salvation,” Parker stated.107 He used familiar
examples—the authority of the Bible and the authority of Christ—to make his point.
Tracing the tradition of belief in the infallibility and unmatched authority of the Bible
from the first centuries after its creation to the present, he noted that such a belief “is now
the general opinion of religious sects at this day.”108 With some relief, he observed that
“modern Criticism is fast breaking to pieces this idol which men have made out of the
Scriptures.” Historical criticism identified the biblical authors as “men who in some
measure partook of the darkness and limited notions of their age.”109 Parker also
addressed the proclivity to make “Christianity rest on the personal authority of Jesus.” He
highlighted the changing opinions about Christ to evidence the “transitoriness” of this
belief.110 He conceded that Christianity “depends on [the New Testament] for the
historical statements of its facts,” but insisted that “we do not require infallible inspiration
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on the part of the writers, more than in the record of other historical facts.”111 Historical
evidence still convinced Parker that the Gospels rested on historical grounds, but he did
not rest his faith on those grounds: “If it could be proved … that the gospels were the
fabrication of designing and artful men, that Jesus of Nazareth had never lived, still
Christianity would stand firm.” Christianity was “tried by the oracle God places in the
breast” rather than the evidence offered by the critic.112 Parker agreed with contemporary
interpreters such as Stuart and Norton that the Bible should be interpreted as a historical
text, but he refused to base his belief in that text or the people and events it described.
Freedom from transitory doctrines, Parker argued, allowed believers to
understand the Bible and Christ as God intended. Read with “Reason, Conscience, and
Faith fully active,” the Bible presented a “whole library of the deepest and most earnest
thoughts and feelings and piety and love, ever recorded in human speech.”113 Viewed in
such light, Christ’s words “solve the questions of this present age.”114 While rejecting the
transient as outdated, Parker affirmed the continued relevance of the permanent. Indeed,
he would later argue that the spirit of Christianity, which existed above time, if not a
literal reading of the New Testament text, which was grounded in time, condemned
slavery. Parker pointed out cultural differences between past ages and his own, but he
upheld as ahistorical the permanent that essential Christian truth that taught the “method
of attaining oneness with God.”115 Part of attaining oneness with God depended on
cultivating the divinity within. Echoing Emerson, Parker believed that in making Christ
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“the Son of God in a peculiar and exclusive sense—much of the significance of his
character is gone.”116 Instead, his significance was based on the fact that he, as Emerson
stated, was “the only soul in history who has appreciated the worth of man.”117 Parker
explained that “in an age of corruption, as all ages are, Jesus stood and looked up to God.
There was nothing between him and the Father of all. … He would have us do the same;
worship with nothing between us and God.”118 Other biblical teachings fell prey to the
past. Parker warned that “the ground will shake under” the feet of those who focused on
“the surfaces of things.”119 Indeed, “the form Religion takes … can never be the same in
any two centuries or two men,” but, he asserted, “the Christianity holy men feel in the
heart—the Christ that is born within us, is always the same thing to each soul that feels
it.”120 Bold statements such as these came at a cost.
Even when the religious press damned Parker as a deist and fellow minister
refused to share the pulpit with him, he persisted in promulgating his views. His
Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion represented a kind of culmination of the
ideas contained in his prior sermons and publications.121 Following from “The Transient
and the Permanent,” he summarized his purpose in recalling “men from the transient
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shows of time to the permanent substance of Religion.”122 He revisited and expanded the
familiar themes of the innate religious element and its relationship to God (inspiration), to
Jesus (Christianity), the greatest book (the Bible), and the greatest human institution (the
Church). He announced the historical implications of this discussion at the outset,
declaring that “our reverence for the Past, is just in proportion to our ignorance of it.”123
Historical ignorance had led Christians to make idols out of a historical text and a
historical figure, blinding them from the fact that religious truth rested within themselves.
As in his previous writings, Parker first sought to establish the universal presence
of the religious element. He contended that the ubiquity of this “religious element is
confirmed by historical argument.”124 And historical circumstances and development, he
posited, explained perceived differences in the presence and power of that religious
element. Again, Parker persisted in his use of historical evidence to confirm his views
rather than insist that they constituted the basis of them. Indeed, in the winter of 18411842, as he prepared to publish his sermons as Discourse, his reading of Comte
convinced him that human existence started in an uncivilized state and progressed from
lower to higher levels of being. The historical evidences he found in Comte’s work
supported his historical conclusions about the progress of religion. He soon associated
golden age thinking with the Old Testament mythmaking, finding both characteristic of
ancient times.125 By the early 1840s, then, the intellectual framework was in place for
Parker to critique what he viewed as his contemporaries’ overreliance on the archaic if
not barbaric teachings of historical sacred texts from favored pasts for insight into
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nineteenth-century questions of religious truth and legal sanction. The issue of slavery
would drive him to further historicize the biblical and founding eras. And once these
golden ages became objects of historicization, it left all periods of time susceptible to
historical critique and explanation.
Turning to the issue of inspiration in the Discourse, Parker used his new
understanding to condemn Protestants’ golden age mentality, which shut communication
with God between the two lids of the Bible. At Harvard, Emerson had stated, “I look for
the hour when that supreme Beauty, which ravished the souls of those eastern men, and
chiefly the Hebrews, and through their lips spoke oracles to all time, shall speak in the
West also.”126 Parker similarly contended that “now, as in the days of Adam, Moses,
Jesus, he that is faithful to Reason, Conscience, and Religion, will, through them, receive
inspiration.”127 In Christ, then, Parker found a historical expression, rather than the
exclusive embodiment, of absolute religion.
Unlike knowledge of absolute religion, which came directly via intuition,
“knowledge of the doctrine taught by any teacher of ancient times,” a “historical
question” that rested on secondary sources and testimonies, was “more difficult.”128 The
problem, in part, as biblical criticism made clear, was the constraining historical context
of the testators: “Their national, sectarian, personal prejudices must color their
narrative.”129 Hence the problem with making the reality of the miracles of Christ—a
“purely historical question”—the basis of Christianity.130 Consistent with his prior
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position, Parker argued that “if we look after the facts of the case, we find the evidence
for the Christian miracles is very scanty in extent, and very uncertain in character,”
adding that “the current belief of the times” favored miracles created more problems.131
Parker proposed that, if the evangelists were to be trusted, even Christ himself held
erroneous opinions characteristic of the times. Allowing that baptism and the Last Supper
seemed “to have been an accommodation,” on the part of Christ, “to the wants of the
times,” and were not intended to “last forever,” Parker held that Jesus was “mistaken in
some points, in the interpretation of the Old Testament, in the doctrine of demons, in the
celebrated prediction of his second coming and the end of the world.”132 As with the Old
Testament and its prophets and the New Testament and its apostles, the Christ of the
Gospels could not escape the temporal limitations of his era. That fact left Parker
unshaken. He averred: “Let it be shewn … that the Gospels are false, and Jesus mistaken,
still Christianity is eternally true if it be the Absolute Religion.”133
Parker still believed in the historical basis of the Gospels and of Jesus and in them
he found the summarization of Christianity: “Love to Man—Love to God.”134 This
practical method of living set Christianity apart as absolute religion and absolute
morality. Parker rested his religion in universal precepts rather than particular peoples,
encouraging his contemporaries to “worship with no master but God, no creed but Truth,
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no service but Love.”135 To this, Parker added the universal privilege of inspiration,
declaring that Jesus “never speaks of his connection with God as peculiar,” but rather
“represents himself as but the type of that relation which all good men sustain to God.”136
In short, Parker gloried that “the experience of the past lives in the present.” As Emerson
listed Boston alongside Rome and Jerusalem, so Parker posited that “the light that shone
at Nineveh, Egypt, Judea, Athens, Rome, shines no more from those points; it is
everywhere.” Parker’s religion was not restricted to a place, a past, a book, or a man, but
“the inward Christ, which alone abideth forever, has much to say which the Bible never
told,” or, as he added in a later edition, “much which the historical Jesus never knew.”137

Conclusion
Parker clung to an idea of universal and unchanging religious truth as much as
Channing, Norton, Stuart, Hodge, and other antebellum Christians, but he unbound those
truths from historical facts, events, and figures. His rare willingness to travel down the
various paths of historical criticism outlined by De Wette and Strauss informed his urgent
rejection of the idea that the permanent relevance of religious truth rested in historical
texts and actors. From the mid-1830s, at least, Parker affirmed that religion originated in
feeling and his engagement with biblical criticism revealed the benefits of this belief.
Liberal and conservative scholars recognized the need to attend to historical context in
discerning the meaning of scriptural passages, including the Gospel accounts, and
through that recognition exposed that real temporal distances separated even the pure
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primitive Christian era from the American present. Rather than simply point out historical
distance through contextual interpretation, and then mute its presence in scriptural
application, Parker came to assume such distance in his writings. Instead of struggling to
separate the transient from the permanent through historical explication, Parker measured
the transient and the permanent according to conscience. In analyzing this sifting process
among America’s biblical scholars, one finds a spectrum, from those retaining faith in the
Bible as a whole, such as Stuart and Hodge, to those claiming the New Testament or the
Gospels alone as canon, such as Channing and Norton, to those focused on the actions
and teachings of Jesus himself. Regardless of those positions, however, each of these
interpreters granted, and indeed, insisted that his chosen canon contained time-bound
teachings meant for a particular ancient audience. Parker stood at the far end of the
spectrum. He accepted a few specific messages he gleaned from Christ’s teachings as
permanent religious truths, and all else he let drift away into the sea of the distant past.
This position armed Parker, who had endured ecclesiastical controversies that his beliefs
created, for engagement in the nation’s most wrenching moral, political and legal crisis.
In 1850, the Congregationalist Stuart echoed the Unitarian Buckminster by using
historical reasoning to interpret Paul’s decision to send a slave back to his owner and—
muting historical distance—asserting the correspondence between that decision and the
Fugitive Slave Law.138 Parker’s engagement with biblical criticism and his deep-seated
belief in an innate religious guide and the progress of religion led him to accept Stuart’s
interpretation as historically accurate and then dismiss it as historically dated. Parker had
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already cast as past what he perceived to be the historical Jesus’s false ideas. Damning
Paul’s directive seemed a small thing in comparison. In the Discourse, Parker echoed his
prior critique of his contemporaries’ use of the Old Testament to justify evil, lamenting
that “men justify slavery out of the New Testament, because Paul had not his eye open to
the evil, but sent back a fugitive. It is dangerous,” he warned, “to rely on a troubled
fountain for the water of life.”139 In the early 1840s, Parker, as with the nation itself,
began to direct his attention to slavery, a process that further raised questions about the
relationship between the imperatives of the past—the biblical and Revolutionary past—
and the duties of the present. In the wake of what Parker perceived as proslavery
consolidation in the late 1840s and early 1850s, which, in his view, paralleled the
progress of antislavery sentiment, Parker’s reference to Paul’s error would pick up a new
punctuation mark: “Paul had not his eye open to the evil, but sent back a fugitive!”140
Slavery raised the historical stakes.
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CHAPTER 3
“OF WHAT AVAIL ARE A FEW TEXTS, WHICH WERE DESIGNED FOR LOCAL
AND TEMPORARY USE”: SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN ANTEBLLUM BIBLICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Debates about slavery had been raising the historical stakes for some time, and
not just in terms of the Bible and the biblical past. Discussions about the South’s peculiar
institution also inspired questions about the historical nature of the nation’s legal guide—
the Constitution—and the place of the Revolutionary past in the nineteenth century. As
noted above, in “The Relation of the Bible to the Soul,” Parker compared the Bible to
legal codes, citing common law, in particular, and arguing that biblical texts and legal
statutes are historical forms of “the indestructible religious sentiment” and “the sense of
justice in the Soul.” Parker offered the latest instantiation of a Western intellectual
tradition in which legal and scriptural interpretations had long been intertwined. Perhaps
in reference to the ratification of the Constitution, he explained that “men sometimes
think the statutes of the land were providentially struck out, in some happy moment,
which will never return—that if these should perish, so would Order and Justice decease
from being. They say the same of the Bible,” he observed, “and assert that Morality and
Religion would have been quite lost from the world, if the Bible had chanced to perish.”1
Parker, of course, believed that such people had confused mutable historical expressions
of immutable truths with the truths themselves. In 1840, the year that he published this
article, the publication of Madison’s papers directed unprecedented historical attention to
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the Constitution and its moment of creation. Soon, the nation’s sacred legal text became
the subject of deep historical inquiry alongside the nation’s sacred religious canon.
The potential for overlap in antebellum biblical and constitutional hermeneutics
was most pronounced in rhetorical clashes over southern slavery and this potential
increased in the buildup to actual war. Slavery linked these distinct interpretive traditions
along lines of historical argumentation, even if commentators seldom made the
connection explicit. To be sure, critical conversations about the Bible reached a high
level of intensity long before historical readings of the Constitution became relevant. The
emphasis on original contexts and circumstances in explicating the Bible resulted from
engagements with biblical criticism in the first four decades of the nineteenth century, but
it was not until the 1840s that constitutional interpreters also began to stress the use of
historical insight in their readings. The latter development did not simply follow from the
former. Attempts to recover and use the framers’ writings in constitutional interpretation
resulted, in part at least, from the passing of the founding generation, which was
symbolized in the deaths of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams on July 4, 1826, and of
the primary crafter and last living signer of the Constitution, James Madison, a decade
later. As one Boston paper explained after the publication of Madison’s papers, “the
further we recede from the birth of the constitution, the more precious do contemporary
expositions of it become.”2 By midcentury both biblical and constitutional exegetes used
historical research and reasoning to uncover original and timeless truths. The growing
crisis over slavery increased the urgency to understand and put to use original meanings
of the nation’s religious and legal texts, which created numerous possibilities for
2
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interpretive overlap and opened up new possibilities for realizing and confronting
historical distance. While presentism remained a powerful factor in religious and legal
interpretation, interpreters’ contextual readings and their narrations of change further
exposed historical distance and troubled attempts to see past and present temporal frames
as fusible and the teachings and imperatives of even the most favored pasts as fixed.
In biblical battles over slavery, the historicizing process began with the most
distant period in question, the Old Testament era, and worked its way forward toward
more recent New Testament times. A number of factors contributed to the historicization
of the Old Testament, including, as discussed in the previous chapters, certain religious
proclivities and the exposure to the principles of biblical criticism. Liberal Christian
scholars who identified with the God of the New more than that of the Old Testament
found biblical criticism useful in upholding the former as the premier canonical text.
When the slavery debate further highlighted the peculiarities of Patriarchal and Mosaic
times, American Protestants—orthodox and liberal, proslavery and antislavery—trained
their focus on the Gospels and the Epistles.3 The results of this shift in interpretive
attention suggested that historical distance could call into question the relevance of even
the New Testament past. Although most biblical scholars accepted the reasonableness of
the proslavery interpretation, a number of slavery’s opponents developed alternative
arguments.4 Some differentiated ancient servitude from American slavery while others, in
a more innovative approach, outlined a variant of the accommodation theory. They
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suggested that Christianity’s founders had chosen not to condemn slavery openly and
loudly, so as not to upset the established social order, but instead carefully sowed the
seeds of its gradual destruction. These approaches, like Theodore Parker’s, posited the
progress of moral sentiment since the time of Christ. And as with Parker, their appeal to
almost hidden universal truths buried in the soil of the New Testament past indicated the
general transience of that period and its teachings. Although antislavery truths had been
planted in that era, the promises they contained could only flower in a distant and
different future. Antebellum antislavery interpreters began to imply that they inhabited
that future, while abolitionists said so outright. Such readings displayed awareness of
historical distance, which might threaten to undermine the Bible’s relevance, but also
could encourage more flexible readings of God’s word.
The shift in focus to the New Testament, the set of scriptural texts that American
Protestants increasingly valued most in their attempts to live Christian lives, raised the
temperature of the debate and this particular strain of the rhetorical contest maintained its
high and heated level through the Civil War. That temperature increased to a fever pitch
when, in the 1840s and 1850s, politicians, judges, and citizens focused their attention on
reading and using the nation’s founding documents to resolve the growing crisis over
slavery. As the use of historical texts in this debate expanded from the Bible to the
Constitution, so did the impulse to historicize. Moving the battleground from one favored
past to another more recent chosen period raised the historical stakes once more. When
the realization of historical distance from favored pasts drew closer to the present, the
process of historicizing the past as a whole neared completion. Appeals to the past to
answer current problems revealed that historical distance separated Americans from even
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the most familiar historical eras, increasing an awareness that temporal distinctions and
changes distinguished all past eras from the present and from each other a real possibility.
Slavery shrunk the sphere of the timeless and expanded the realm of the temporal.
As in biblical debates, most American commentators assented to the proslavery
constitutional reading, including both radical abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison
and moderate antislavery advocates like Moses Stuart, but antislavery constitutionalists
developed a range of alternative approaches, which paralleled antislavery biblical
interpretations in a number of ways. Moderate antislavery constitutionalists, such as
Gamaliel Bailey, reasoned that the framers had secured extant slavery in the Constitution
only because they realized the futility of abolishing it at that time. Thus, the framers
satisfied themselves with allowing the egalitarian principles incorporated in the founding
texts to work a gradual abolition in the states. This process, the moderates opined, was
interrupted by the unforeseen emergence of the Slave Power, which many antislavery
proponents described as antithetical to the spirit of the age. At times, more radical
antislavery constitutionalists, including Lysander Spooner, rejected historical evidence in
advancing their arguments, but even denying slavery’s presence in the Constitution
highlighted its place in the founding era. Further, in seeking political and constitutional
means to bring about slavery’s immediate abolition, the radicals also uncovered
founding-era antislavery sentiment. As some antislavery biblical readings highlighted
differences between ancient and modern slavery, some antislavery constitutional readings
highlighted slavery’s changed status in the nation since the founding. And, similar to
“accomodationist” antislavery readings of the New Testament, these readings suggested
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that though the founders had respected the limitations of their historical setting they had
advanced ideas that would ultimately abolish slavery.
In contrast to antislavery biblical readings, which often separated a presumably
proslavery Old Testament from an antislavery New Testament, antislavery
constitutionalists tied together the nation’s canonical texts, reading the Constitution in
light of the Declaration of Independence, even as a growing number of southerners
rejected that document as a unreasonable rag that put forth false and impractical
propositions. While harnessing the Declaration’s revolutionary power, Garrisonians used
historical research to reject antislavery interpretations of the Constitution as irresponsible
failures to admit its proslavery nature. Each of these approaches, though, even those
interpretive practices that upheld the founding era as pregnant with present relevance,
highlighted qualitative historical distance from that period. Despite vast differences in the
use of historical sources, both antislavery constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists
crafted historical narratives positing that the founders’ had expected slavery to die out.
These positions drew attention to slavery’s presence at the founding, but posited an
original expectation of change in the form of slavery’s abolition. This furthered a belief
in the Constitution as a flexible set of guidelines rather than a strict set of legal rules.
This chapter outlines biblical and constitutional antislavery interpretive practices
during the 1830s and 1840s, tracing the rhetorical parallels between them and
highlighting their implications for historical awareness. It examines the role of biblical
criticism in both of these discussions. The use of words such as context, circumstance,
and accommodation informed debates among biblical scholars but also seeped into the
interpretations of those who demonstrated little interest in or awareness of biblical

153

criticism. This chapter suggests that even biblical interpretations that did not privilege
historical explication could challenge the assumption of a close correspondence between
biblical and modern times. It also demonstrates the growing attention to context and
change in constitutional readings and highlights the role of Madison’s published papers in
that development. Similar to the biblical debates, even those who denied the importance
of historical resources in constitutional interpretation crafted historical narratives that
exposed historical distance from the founding era, which created challenges for using the
Constitution to solve the present crisis. Most Americans, including those studied here, did
not set out to explore the historical differences of their favored pasts, nor did many of
them consider their interpretations’ implications for realizing historical distance. Indeed,
most desired to recover static original truths in hopes of using them to resolve the slavery
crisis. Their efforts, though, had undeniable potential to evidence the reality of historical
distance.

“The Unreasonableness of Perpetual Unconditional Slavery”: Patriarchs, Prophets,
Apostles and the Shifting Grounds of the Biblical Debate
If the proslavery biblical argument triumphed in antebellum America, it came at a
price for the Old Testament. As the debate over southern slavery reached a national scale
in the 1830s and increased in the following decades, the reverberations of Joseph Stevens
Buckminster’s reading of Philemon to sanction both slavery and the return of fugitive
slaves grew louder. The proslavery appeal to Philemon came as a response to antislavery
readings of the New Testament. Liberal Christians’ antislavery proclivities contributed to
and affirmed the decision to privilege the New over the Old Testament. To be sure, some
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of slavery’s opponents continued to call on the Old Testament, holding that slavery did
not exist among the Israelites, or refocusing the argument by accepting its nominal
existence while maintaining that it differed in crucial respects from southern chattel
slavery. But when that discussion affirmed the foreignness of the Old Testament past and
thus the inapplicability of Old Testament precedent, most antislavery interpreters
designated the New Testament as the central biblical battleground. Their proslavery
opponents eagerly met them there. This development in historical understanding carried
significant canonical implications. It further undermined the privileged place that the
Hebrew scriptures had enjoyed in the United States until, not coincidentally, about 1830.5
It also threatened to unveil dissonance between the New Testament and the new republic
to an extent that antebellum biblical criticism alone had not. Shifting the grounds of
debate to the New Testament held threatening implications.6 Where would Americans
look for religious guidance if the most recent biblical past also proved too far away and
too foreign for use?
Proslavery exegetes agreed to meet their counterparts on the chosen grounds but
dictated that the issue was not whether slavery was wrong in certain circumstances (mala
prohibita) as some contended, but whether slavery was wrong in all circumstances (mala
en se). Moderate antislavery Protestants, including liberal Christians such as William
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Ellery Channing and more orthodox figures such as Moses Stuart and his student Francis
Wayland, accepted the terms of the debate and, given their scriptural commitments,
attempted to explain how slavery became a sin, formulating what historian Molly Oshatz
describes as a theological innovation of moral progress. The North and the South
believed in social progress but neither northern abolitionists nor proslavery southerners
thought that the moral law itself, which they viewed as static and unchanging, progressed.
In juxtaposing the moral law with the Bible’s teachings, abolitionists either accepted the
proslavery reading and then damned the Bible, as would William Lloyd Garrison, or
posited a fundamental difference between ancient and modern slavery, as did Theodore
Weld. Moderate antislavery proponents, however, developed an argument that though
slavery was mala en se, the revelation of that truth evolved in relation to the varied
circumstances of human existence.7 The question of slavery’s morality, then, brought
together thinkers such as Channing and Stuart on this point. Although his use of the New
Testament to support the Fugitive Slave Law demonstrated that Stuart still encouraged
strict applications of the biblical text in 1850, slavery led him to emphasize that historical
conditions constrained even Christ and his apostles in some ways. He seemed to hold that
even after nineteen centuries the time had not arrived to abolish slavery, but believed that
the passage of time did show that Christian truth spotlighted the sin of slavery.
Each of these antislavery positions had the potential to reveal historical distance.
When Garrisonians contended that slavery was prevalent in biblical times and that, in
fact, the Bible did support proslavery claims, it suggested that southerners used an
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obsolete text to justify a barbaric practice. When some antislavery interpreters argued that
ancient servitude was profoundly different than modern slavery, and thus that the Bible
could not be used to justify the southern institution, it highlighted historical differences as
well. When moderate antislavery proponents insisted on the progress of moral sentiment
and posited that neither Old Testament precedent for nor the New Testament presence of
slavery could be used to condone the peculiar institution in the enlightened present, it
signaled qualitative historical change. And when some abolitionists proposed that enough
historical change had occurred to implement the antislavery principles that Christ and his
apostles had taught, it pushed the period to which they appealed further into the past. In
most cases, slavery did not lead its critics to abandon the Bible, but it did inspire them to
interpret the sacred canon in such as way as to indicate that the biblical past was a foreign
country.
These arguments received their clearest articulation during the 1830s, 40s, and
50s, though one can find components of each much earlier. African American minister
Daniel Coker, who had been ordained a deacon by Francis Asbury and was familiar with
Absalom Jones, helped Richard Allen organize the African Methodist Episcopal Church
in 1816. Six years before, in 1810, he had published a fictitious dialogue between an
African minister and a Virginian slaveholder, wherein the minister convinced the
slaveholder of the sin of slavery and the virtue of gradual emancipation.8 Coker granted
that the Romans, other “ancient nations,” and modern “barbarous tribes” made slaves of
war prisoners, but protested that “it is a cruelty that the present practice of all civilized
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nations, bears testimony against.”9 His temporal distinctions made modern slavery
anachronistic. Despite these distinctions, however, Coker believed that the Bible, an
account about a favored ancient past, condemned the practice. Christians had long made
an exception with biblical times when dividing ancient and modern, barbaric and
civilized. Coker, then, voiced a conventional understanding that hallowed the biblical
past as timeless. He argued that Abraham’s command to circumcise purchased servants
had granted those servants “all the common privileges of citizens.”10 Ancient Abrahamic
religion, according to Coker, offered freedom for all. Sharpening his gaze, he argued that
the Atlantic slave trade, outlawed in the United States only two years before, lacked an
Old Testament precedent, writing that “the Israelites were not sent by a divine mandate,
to nations three hundred miles distant … in order to captivate them by fraud or force.”11
On the one hand, progress from ancient to modern times had made slavery anachronistic.
On the other hand, declension since the golden age of Old Testament times had
introduced the slave trade. Coker’s discussion demonstrated the conflicted nature of the
development of historical consciousness, as traditional historical understandings
intermingled with new historical reasoning.
Turning to the New Testament, Coker continued his proof-texting approach, but,
seeming to take a cue from William Paley, he also emphasized context in dealing with
Paul’s teachings, writing that “to understand rightly the matter, we should recollect the
situation of the Christians at that time.”12 Noting Roman rule, “a heathen” polity that he
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contrasted with the new republic’s “Christian government,” Coker explained that “in such
circumstances … had the apostle proclaimed liberty to the slaves, it would probably have
… injured the cause he loved so well, and that without the prospect of freeing one single
individual. … Therefore it was wisdom in him, not to say a single word about freedom,
more than he did.”13 Circumstances dictated that Paul use prudence, but Christian
teachings clearly opposed servitude. “Though the apostle acted with this prudent
reserve,” Coker continued, “the unreasonableness of perpetual unconditional slavery,
may be easily inferred from the righteous and benevolent doctrines and duties, taught in
the New Testament. It is very evident,” he explained, “that slavery is contrary to the spirit
and nature of the Christian religion.”14 The Golden Rule stood in contrast to the South’s
slave codes, even if it had been taught in a time where those codes would have fit the less
civilized state of the ancient world. Though less developed than later antislavery
readings, some of which drew on the German biblical scholarship being introduced by
ministers and scholars such as Buckminster, Coker’s pamphlet contained many of the
contentions that became the focus of later writers. Even in his early antislavery biblical
reading, one finds assertions of temporal distinction and a recognition of historical
difference, which expanded as the debate over slavery gained momentum.
Shifting the grounds of debate from the Old to the New Testament was a gradual
process. Coker’s antislavery arguments from the Old Testament found expression
throughout the antebellum period, perhaps most famously in Theodore Dwight Weld’s
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The Bible Against Slavery (1837).15 Weld received training and direction from some of
the period’s most well-known religious and reform personalities, including Charles
Finney, Lewis and Arthur Tappan, James G. Birney, and Sarah and Angelina Grimké. He
married Angelina in 1838. While a student at Lane Theological Seminary in 1834, Weld
had led debates on a range of issues, including slavery, that inspired his antislavery
efforts. Leaving Cincinnati for New York, he became involved in the newly formed
American Anti-Slavery Society (1833). His subsequent publications on slavery, which
ranged from biblical and legal interpretation to exposés on the nature of slavery and the
slave trade, show his interest in both biblical and constitutional interpretation.16 A
growing number of national commentators would demonstrate this dual interest in the
1840s and 1850s, as the slavery debate became more intense.
In his 1837 publication, Weld brought his powers to bear on the biblical debate.
Anticipating national commentators’ increasing focus on constitutional issues in the
succeeding decades, he referenced legal differences between Abrahamic bondage and
southern slavery, noting that “Abraham had neither ‘Constitution,’ nor ‘compact,’ nor
statutes, nor judicial officers to send back his fugitives.”17 Like Coker, Weld found
declension when measuring American slavery against Old Testament servitude, a
position that once again called attention to temporal incongruities by upholding the
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ancient past as a kind of golden age. While highlighting differences between Abrahamic
and American circumstances, Weld contrasted the Mosaic system of “Divine authority”
with that of his patriarchal predecessors, of whom Weld wrote, “God has not made them
our examplars [sic].”18 Slavery encouraged some interpreters to make canonical choices
among Old Testament texts and to value the newer Mosaic over the older Patriarchal
dispensation. While still using the Hebrew scriptures to condemn the practice, Weld
suggested that the oldest portion of the Old Testament past had no claim on the present.
Slavery encouraged the move from appealing to more distant to more recent favored
historical periods. In this case, Weld aimed to undermine the proslavery position by
arguing that slavery did not exist among the Israelites. He made a semantic distinction
between the words servant and slave to argue that they did not reduce men to “articles of
property,” to “things,” as was the case with “American slavery.”19 Again, part of his
argument displayed a conventional belief that the biblical past, or at least a portion of that
past, exhibited timeless appeal. However, when further examination highlighted the
peculiar nature even of Mosaic practices, favorably comparing the ancient past to the
American present served to identify slavery as the great contradiction of modern
civilization more than to uphold the Old Testament past as a golden age. Later antislavery
writers who were more attentive to biblical scholarship and more open to biblical
criticism conceded that historical evidence demonstrated slavery’s existence in
Abrahamic, and Mosaic, and Christian dispensations. Some would refocus the argument
in expanding the contention that the southern system differed in significant respects from
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what existed in biblical times, or contend that progress in moral understanding had
revealed the sinfulness of slaveholding.

“Principles Which, However Slowly, Could Not but Work Its Destruction”: The Christian
Founders and the Antislavery Argument from Expediency
In closing his discussion, Weld noted that he had intended to include “an Inquiry
into the teachings of the New Testament.”20 Perhaps he felt that ground had been
adequately covered. The turn to a focus on the Greek scriptures was already well under
way. In 1819, William Ellery Channing had demonstrated his preference for contextual
interpretation and had made clear his canonical preference for the New Testament. His
openness to new research led him to argue in an 1835 publication that polygamy, like
slavery, “was allowed to the Israelites, was the practice of the holiest men, and was
common and licensed in the age of the Apostles.”21 Channing assumed that southerners
agreed that polygamy belonged in the past. In highlighting its biblical sanction he called
into question southern reasoning, quipping, “Why may not Scripture be used to stock our
houses with wives as well as with slaves?” Approach the issue with another line of
reasoning, Channing asked what “was slavery in the age of Paul?” and, with some
embellishment, he explained that it included the enslavement of white men, of Greeks, of
“the virtuous, educated, and refined.”22 To drive his point home, he made a modern
comparison. Had Napoleon, through his military victories, enslaved “the delicate, refined,
beautiful young woman,” or “the minister of religion, the man of science, the man of
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genius … we should then have a picture in the present age of slavery as it existed in the
time of Paul.” More than Coker or Weld, Channing stressed the differences between
ancient, in this case New Testament, and modern slavery to emphasize that “such
slavery” could not have been “sanctioned by the Apostles!”23 Others more fully drew
attention to these temporal distinctions to undermine the authorizing potential of biblical
precedent. Although Channing favorably compared ancient to modern slavery in this
passage, his purpose was to draw attention to the irony of slavery’s existence in America.
He was not denying that slavery existed in the biblical past, indeed, he stressed that it
held a firm grip on society in New Testament times. Focusing on the relationship
between primitive Christianity and slavery, Channing echoed Coker’s argument in
emphasizing context, writing that “slavery … had so penetrated society, was so
intimately interwoven with it … that a religion, preaching freedom to its victims, would
have shaken the social fabric to its foundations, and would have armed against itself the
whole power of the State. Of consequence,” he explained, “Paul did not assail it. He
satisfied himself with spreading principles which, however slowly, could not but work its
destruction.”24
Channing’s reading might be read as a critique of radical abolitionists who called
for immediate rather than a gradual abolition. Indeed, Channing only later adopted an
immediatist position. Even still, here he offered an alternative interpretation to the one
Buckminster had provided of the oft-cited New Testament passage, proposing that Paul
had instructed Philemon to receive Onesimus as a brother, “thus asserting for the slave
the rights of a Christian and a Man.” Channing was unwilling to concede the historical
23
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grounds to the proslavery interpreters, emphasizing the differences between ancient and
modern slavery and preferring to interpret the New Testament according to “the general
tenor and spirit of Christianity.” But the thrust of his argument rested in the idea that
Christ and his apostles had planted seeds of progress because their environment would
not allow them to abolish the system outright. In an approach that aligned with Theodore
Parker’s distinction between the transient and the permanent, Channing asked an
incendiary question with unsettling implications: “Of what avail are a few texts, which
were designed for local and temporary use, when urged against the vital essential spirit,
and the plainest precepts of our religion?”25 Channing remained invested in the historical
Jesus and the historicity of his Gospel miracles, but he concluded that certain portions of
the New Testament, including those that seemed to sanction slavery, had short shelf lives.
Further, he believed that despite their temporal teachings, Christianity’s founders had
inculcated universal antislavery principles. In outlining distinctions between ancient and
modern slavery or in positing the apostolic expectation of slavery’s demise, Channing’s
arguments drew attention to the temporal chasm separating the nineteenth from the first
century.26
In a book also published in 1835, New York Baptist Francis Wayland made a
similar argument. He acknowledged that, while a deviation from God’s original law,
slavery was allowed to exist in Old and New Testament times. As a student of Moses
Stuart’s at Andover Theological Seminary, Wayland had been trained in the new methods
of biblical exegesis and was probably aware that historical evidence attested to slavery’s
25
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existence in biblical times. Wayland’s publication demonstrates that although Stuart and
Channing emphasized different practices in their discussions of biblical hermeneutics,
their approaches overlapped in important respects, and the issue of slavery could
accentuate those similarities. Like Channing, Wayland compared the practice to
polygamy, another clear corruption of God’s original law and of “the gospel law of
marriage,” which was also allowed anciently.27 This tie between slavery and polygamy
only grew stronger, placing southerners on the defensive and later undermining the
position of polygamous Mormons.28 More immediately, when proslavery exegetes
contended that the gospel abolished polygamy but not slavery, the debate about the
relationship between the two practices ensured the Old Testament’s dethronement.
Wayland asserted that in the gospel, a system “designed … for all races, and for all
times,” as opposed to the law of Moses, which was designed for the Israelites alone, God
revealed truths meant “not to abolish this form of evil for that age alone, but for its
universal abolition.” He placed emphasis on historical context and “circumstances,”
suggesting that the gospel worked to “quietly and peacefully modify and subdue the evil
passions of men, and thus, without violence, work a revolution in the whole mass of
mankind.” If the gospel “had forbidden the evil, instead of subverting the principle;” he
posited, “if it had proclaimed the unlawfulness of slavery, and taught slaves to resist
oppression of their masters; it would have arrayed the two parties in deadly hostility …
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and the very name of the Christian religion would have been forgotten.”29 According to
Wayland, Christ intended to rid the world of slavery by teaching universal principles that
would flower, in the appropriate circumstances, to overcome particular corruptions.
Anticipating arguments about the framers of the Constitution, Channing and Wayland
held that the founders of Christianity planted the seeds of slavery’s destruction, which
time would nourish.30
To retain a claim on the New Testament, proslavery exegetes asserted continuity
with the Old Testament. This argument supported the contention that slavery “was an
early arrangement of the Almighty, to be perpetuated through all time.”31 In the wake of
the split between Baptists along sectional lines in 1845, which followed the 1844
Methodist break, South Carolinian minister Richard Fuller answered his coreligionist’s
arguments in a letter that represented the tenor of the southern position. Recognizing that
“compared with slavery, all other topics which now shake and inflame men’s passions in
these United States, are really trifling,” Fuller argued that “the Old Testament did
sanction slavery,” citing a favorite proslavery passage from Leviticus.32 He then
attempted to show that “in the Gospels and Epistles, the institution is, to say the least,
tolerated.”33 Fuller responded with contempt to the idea that Christ and his apostles
refrained from a straightforward denunciation of slavery for the sake of expediency,
mocking the notion that “they who proclaimed and prosecuted a war of extermination
29
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against all the most cherished passions of this guilty earth … shrank from breathing even
a whisper against slavery, through fear of consequences!”34 Turning to Channing’s
reading, in particular, Fuller wondered, if “nothing but this unyielding, uncompromising,
condemnation of every sin could content him,” then why Paul had “declined uttering a
word” on slavery, preferring to allow “millions on all sides” to sink “into hell through
this crime” while “spreading principles which would slowly work a cure!”35 Fuller’s Paul
did not lack for temerity and was not limited by temporal constraints. Having established
continuity between the Testaments, Fuller sought to untie the noxious knot between
polygamy and slavery by applying to the former practice the argument that many
antislavery readers applied to the latter, arguing that “the gospel does forbid, and did at
once abolish polygamy.”36 Fuller viewed polygamy as a corruption from the divinely
instituted original practice of monogamy. To the extent that proslavery advocates
displayed a distinction between polygamy and slavery under the gospel, it undercut the
authority of the Old Testament, which, in turn, troubled the argument from continuity.
And to the extent that the argument from continuity retained force, the New Testament
stood to suffer from its association with the Old and its outdated practices.
In response to Fuller’s letter, Wayland broadened his argument from expediency
to a claim about the progressive nature of revelation. Maintaining that slavery “is always
and everywhere … a moral wrong,” he conceded its existence in both the Patriarchal and
Mosaic eras.37 To explain this seeming inconsistency, he proposed that “God did not see
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fit to reveal his will on this subject, nor indeed on many others, to the ancient
Hebrews.”38 Thus, Old Testament permissions were “peculiar” and “anomalous”
allowances and so, instances like the command to destroy the Canaanites did not
“authorize American citizens … to destroy, or to enslave, or to hold in slavery, the people
of another continent.”39 Wayland reasoned that Fuller’s assumption that “whatever God
sanctioned among the Hebrews, he sanctions for all men and at all times” was “at
variance with the whole theory of divine dispensation.”40 God “has seen fit to enlighten
our race progressively,” he explained, and thus “we cannot plead … that what was
permitted without rebuke in a darker age is permitted to us to whom greater light has
been given.”41 Wayland used the idea that biblical peoples lived in different time periods,
described as dispensations, to advance an understanding of revelation quite similar to
Theodore Parker’s idea of the progress of religion. In both cases, their positions led them
to reject slavery as an antiquated practice. Like Channing, Wayland also stressed
historical distinctions. Even if “whatever was sanctioned to the Hebrews is sanctioned to
all men at all times,” he did “not see what manner it could justify slavery in the United
States,” given the differences between the two systems.42 Believing that “the Jewish law
was made exclusively for that people,” he argued that it “can be pleaded in justification
by no other people whatever.”43 Emphasizing the progress of God’s revelation and
spotlighting differences between ancient servitude and modern slavery allowed Wayland
to dismiss Old Testament precepts as peculiar to a bygone past.
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Presuming that southerners would not want to mirror the peculiar Mosaic system,
Wayland assumed that “the Scriptural argument in defence of slavery is narrowed down
to the limits of the New Testament,” a text given not “to one people, but to the whole
race; nor for one period, but for all time.”44 Stressing “a consideration of the
circumstances,” he wrote that “at the time of our Saviour and his apostles, slavery was
universal,” which stemmed from “the moral darkness of the age.”45 Thus, rather than
teaching precise precepts, Christ and his followers inculcated broad principles, such as
the brotherhood of man and their equal relationship to God, timeless truths which, once
“instilled into the public mind, must of necessity abolish slavery.”46 Wayland’s
developmental argument took historical limitations into account. Citing the “longmindedness of the Deity,” he argued that “God treats his intelligent creatures according to
the nature which he has given them. … He promulgates truth of universal efficacy, but
frequently allows long time [sic] to elapse before the effect of it appears, in order that that
effect may be the more radical and comprehensive.”47 While it was a moral advancement
over Patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations the gospel era emerged in a dark time, and “it
was necessary that this darkness should be dispelled, before the moral light could shine
upon slavery.”48 Wayland found that moral light in a more recent favored past.
In a clear instance of overlap in biblical and legal interpretation, which also
suggested a turn to the founding era as the most useful favored past, he argued that the
gospel truths, which had evolved since the New Testament times, received “their fullest
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development in the principles of the Declaration of Independence.”49 Wayland went so
far as to posit that “the gospel of Christ, on the subject of human rights, falls infinitely
below the Declaration,” though he believed that the flowering of the principles in that
document relied on the cultivation of original gospel truths.50 This kind of reasoning
brought together the biblical and Revolutionary pasts, but it also marked the beginnings
of an emphasis on Revolutionary era texts as authoritative in the slavery debate. In
answering the question as to how to implement antislavery principles found therein, he
granted that “we are at liberty to use the same manner, in just so far as our circumstances
and those of the early Christians correspond,” before arguing that “the cause with us is
different. … We, in our Declaration of Independence, have already acknowledged the
very principles now in question.” For primitive Christians, “laws were nothing but the
published will of a despot. … It is by no means the same with us. We make our own
laws.”51 Rather than suggest that the US legal system granted greater protection for
slaveholders than that of ancient Israel, as had Daniel Coker, or that slavery in New
Testament times paled in comparison to modern slavery, as had Channing, Wayland
stressed the democratic nature of the American republic and the amendatory potential of
its laws. Change was now in the hands of the people. The time was ripe to pick the fruit
born of gospel seeds. All this indicated historical distance from the New Testament era.
Before letting the subject rest, Fuller responded in a series of letters, which, in
1845, were published together with Wayland’s. Fuller reasserted that “WHAT GOD
SANCTIONED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, AND PERMITTED IN THE NEW, CANNOT BE SIN.”
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Having posited that “both Testaments constitute one entire canon” and “furnish a
complete rule of faith and practice”—a position undermined by his statements on
polygamy—he attacked the abolitionists’ scriptural elasticity.52 “The Bible operates too
slowly for our reformers,” he sneered, dismissing “the germinal principle, which, in
subsequent ages, and under the genial influence of the reformers, should expand and
ripen.”53 Believing that Wayland wrongly had conflated southern slavery with the
South’s slave laws, and thus mistakenly compared slavery as an institution to the peculiar
Old Testament laws, he posited that “the moral character of [ancient] actions is
immutable.”54 Fuller granted that the Mosaic laws and the slave codes differed, and even
allowed that reform of the latter might be right, but argued that the example of biblical
prophets demonstrated that slaveholding, in and of itself, was not sinful. Attention to
historical distinction could be used to justify, as well as condemn, modern slavery.
Though emphatic in his argument for canonical continuity, Fuller realized that temporal
differences separated the biblical past from the American present. He, then, also
recognized transient aspects of the biblical record in his attempt to rescue permanent and
immutable truths. Rather than conflate Abrahamic servitude with American slavery,
Fuller called on the biblical past simply to show that “slavery is not necessarily, and
always, and amidst all circumstances, a sin.”55 Like his opponents, Fuller recognized
historical differences, but he believed that exemplary actions could be recovered to
demonstrate that slavery was similar to a “large number of actions whose moral character

52

Ibid., 170.
Ibid., 169, emphasis in original, 172.
54
Ibid., 180-82, quotation on 80.
55
Ibid., 170.
53

171

depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.”56 While some antislavery readers
argued that progress in moral understanding made slavery’s immorality clearer in the
present, Fuller contended that present circumstances made slaveholding itself moral in
the American South. Fuller’s argument, which resurfaced in other proslavery defenses,
downplayed historical distance, but in positing the contingent nature of some sins, his
reading also stressed the importance of historical context and particularity.
Fuller, though, stood firm in his belief that God had revealed all moral truth in the
gospel and that the first Christians understood that truth perfectly well. “Nothing can be
more utterly sophistical,” he wrote, “than the idea that we have any light, as to matters of
pure revelation, which the first Christians had not.” He acknowledged “that the world has
made prodigious progress in all the arts and sciences, during the last three or four
centuries,” but, in contrast to figures such as Wayland, Channing, Stuart, and especially
Parker, believed that progress shed no new light on the original scriptural truths.57 Fuller
seemed to believe that while historical circumstances determined whether or not slavery
was moral, changes in those circumstances did not alter the original Christian revelation.
In short, he held that both primitive Christians and American nineteenth-century
Protestants had access to the same gospel light needed to determine slavery’s morality,
and when illuminated, understood that the similarities between past and present
circumstances, made slavery moral then and now. Other southerners agreed, allowing for
progress in “physical science,” but maintaining that “in religion and morals, we doubt all
improvements, not known to certain fishermen who lived some eighteen hundred years
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ago.”58 Fuller not only dismissed that humans had grown in their grasp of God’s moral
laws since Christianity’s founding, but he believed that recent biblical scholarship
darkened rather than illuminated static gospel truths. He aimed to remove the occlusion
introduced by modern movements, such as abolitionism, and recover pure primitive
teachings. He cited scriptural passages to provide inferences, proofs, and demonstrations
that “in the days of the Saviour and the apostles, this institution existed everywhere,” and
they “did not declare it to be a sin, but by precept and example permitted it to
continue.”59 Given his assumptions about the universal moral nature of New Testament
actions and the similarities between ancient and modern slavery, Fuller could collapse
vast historical distances and conflate real historical distinctions in positing that “should
they appear now, they would find the same institution. … And they would act just as they
acted then; or rather, they are here in the gospel, and are now doing what they then did.”60
This sense of contemporaneity with the biblical past, its people, its institutions, and its
sentiments, carried forward traditional understandings. The historical turn was not
without its holdouts. Some interpreters continued to insist on reading the Bible as if its
past retained a clear temporal correspondence with the present. Despite his emphasis on
historical contingencies and circumstances, in Fuller’s mind, biblical figures sanctioned
American slavery.
Wayland and Fuller’s 1845 publication became a useful text in the slavery
debates, finding reference among prominent individuals such as Albert Barnes. A
graduate of Princeton Theological Seminary, Barnes soon gained notoriety as head of
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Philadelphia’s First Presbyterian Church, where he championed New School
Presbyterianism, and through his publications on the New Testament, which drew the ire
of his coreligionist, the orthodox Charles Hodge. Trained in biblical criticism, Barnes
added his abilities to the task of discerning Bible’s meaning and relevance on slavery. In
an 1846 publication, he brought his expertise to bear on the issue, while advocating
widespread engagement, noting that “the subject of slavery is one in which all men have
an interest, and which all have a right to discuss.”61 This appeal corresponded to the
prevailing opinion that all could read and understand the Bible, but elevated that belief in
opining that all could learn the principles of biblical interpretation. The growing
emphasis on historical reasoning in both biblical and constitutional hermeneutics
suggested that all could participate as interpreters, and not just biblical and legal scholars.
In laying out his approach, Barnes responded to Fuller but also to Hodge’s Biblical
Repertory, both of which distinguished between slaveholding and slave laws to contend
that “‘the condemnation of the latter does not necessarily involve the condemnation of the
former.’” Shifting attention from whether slavery was wrong in all circumstances, Barnes
responded that the only question “fairly before the American people” was “whether
slavery as it exists in the United States is, or is not, in accordance with the principles and
the spirit of Christianity.”62 In dealing with the various biblical dispensations, Barnes
kept this question at the forefront of his discussion, though he also drew on the idea of the
progress of God’s revelation.
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With the help of cementing canonical divisions among more liberal Christians
that pulled apart the Old and New Testaments and separated their texts from each other,
Barnes examined patriarchal and Mosaic servitude. He narrowed his first consideration to
“whether one who is a slaveholder in the United States, in the manner in which slavery
exists here, is justified in it by the examples of the patriarchs.”63 In determining whether
“the slavery which existed then was essentially the same as that which it is proposed to
vindicate,” Barnes examined terms denoting servitude in the Hebrew scriptures and
concluded that “the mere use of the word in the time of the patriarchs, determines nothing
in the issue before us.”64 As with other antebellum scholars who were attuned to biblical
criticism, Barnes employed his learning to muddy rather than to purify the waters of the
biblical past. Some antislavery constitutionalists would do the same with the founding
era. Even if slavery had existed among the Patriarchs, Barnes explained, existence was no
sign of divine approval. “It is perfectly clear,” he wrote, calling on a now familiar
equation, “that, so far as the conduct of the patriarchs goes, it would be just as easy to
construct an argument in favour of polygamy as in favour of slavery.”65 Regardless of the
status of servitude among the ancients, “the patriarchs were good men in their generation,
and, considering their circumstances, were men eminent for piety. But they were
imperfect men; they lived in the infancy of the world; they had comparatively little light
on the subjects of morals and religion; and it is a very feeble argument which maintains
that a thing is right, because any one or all of the patriarchs practiced it.”66 Barnes held
that even the holy Patriarchs, who were exceptional figures despite their historical
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context, did not transcend that context. Recognizing that most drew on the Mosaic system
to defend southern slavery, Barnes stressed the failure “to compare it with that which
exists in our land.”67 His investigation of the practice turned the application around: “All
the arrangements of law which are made in the slave states, are designed to perpetuate
slavery, not to bring it to an end; all those in the Mosaic statutes were intended to modify
the system, and ultimately abolish it.”68 Barnes, on the one hand, asserted that the
historical differences resulting from moral progress undermined the relevance of outdated
Patriarchal precedents, and, on the other hand, he suggested that present southern laws,
perhaps owing to decline, fell short in relation to enlightened Mosaic laws. Barnes, then,
understood the Mosaic law as interpreters such as Channing and Wayland understood the
apostles’ New Testament teachings. These sorts of antislavery biblical readings, which
called on a past that looked forward to slavery’s abolition, anticipated antislavery
constitutional readings, which also would appeal to a historical period—the founding
era—that expected slavery’s demise.
Before turning to the New Testament, Barnes strove to minimize slavery’s
existence in Judea between the times of Moses and of Christ, which allowed him to posit
the antislavery tendency of Mosaic law and also to counter the claim that Christ, though
familiar with slavery, never denounced it.69 He conceded slavery’s existence in the
apostolic era and followed Channing and Wayland in arguing that “God has in fact
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removed most of the evils of the world by a gradual development of principles which
strike on great wrongs existing in society.”70 Stressing historical “circumstances,” he
explained that
the apostles were strangers in the lands where they published the gospel; they had
no civil power. ... Slavery had existed for ages … it was defended by lawgivers
and moralists; it was interwoven with every custom and habit of social life … and
it was supposed to have the sanction of religion. What would have been the effect
of denouncing it. … [The apostles] would have been regarded as disturbers of the
public peace … and they would have been banished at once from every
slaveholding community—just as abolition agents are now at the South.71
Again unable to resist historical comparison, Barnes cited the gradualist gospel views
found in the Biblical Repertory and aligned them with those of Christ’s apostles in order
to confront the paper’s contention that an argument from expediency made the apostles
duplicitous.72 Barnes made both historical comparisons and distinctions to serve his
purposes. Turning to the case of Onesimus, he again complicated the conflation of
servant and slave, proposing, as had Channing, that Paul had sent him back as a fellow
Christian. He stretched the argument to the brink, positing that “the principles laid down
in the epistle to Philemon … would lead to the universal abolition of slavery.”73 Barnes
concluded that the “fair application,” of both the Mosaic laws and the Christian religion
“would ultimately bring the institution to an end.”74 Such an application, though,
depended on the right circumstances. Barnes believed that these views were “destined
most certainly to increase and prevail.”75 This, according to the reformer, was because of
history’s direction: “The progress towards universal freedom is onward. The spirit of the
70

Ibid., 288, emphasis in original.
Ibid., 291, emphasis in original.
72
Ibid., 297-303.
73
Ibid., 330.
74
Ibid., 229, 372, emphasis in original.
75
Ibid., 378.
71

177

age; the settled principles of liberty; the advances in intelligence and in benevolent
feeling, all are against the system, and it cannot survive the shock when all these are fully
arrayed against it.”76 Like Parker, Barnes posited progress, which highlighted historical
distance from the past to which he appealed. The antislavery seeds had been planted
centuries ago and soon would flower in the fertile grounds of the new age.
This kind of back and forth about what kinds of slavery prevailed in biblical times
and about what portions of the Christian canon justified or condemned the institution held
important implications for how Americans thought about the biblical past. The assertion
that the institution did not exist in Old Testament times gave way to a debate about
whether or not Patriarchal or Mosaic slavery paralleled southern slavery and thus could
be used to uphold or condemn the American institution. This historicized the Old
Testament past.77 Some persisted in appeals to the Hebrew scriptures but the actions and
words of Abraham and even of Moses seemed to lose relevance as polemicists on both
sides agreed that the actions and words of less distant figures like Jesus and Paul mattered
more. The new Gospel trumped the old Law. Southerners such as Fuller strove to fuse the
Testaments, which, if successful, would support the claim that Providence ensured
slavery’s endurance as a universal institution. That effort could prove counterproductive
in a Christian nation, but as slavery’s sanction was clear among the Patriarchs and
Israelites, drawing the Testaments together helped overcome the limitations of a
proslavery reading of Greek scriptures. Some antislavery readers conceded the
persistence of slavery from the times of one Testament to the other, but capitalized on
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those limitations, taking the Gospels’ universal teachings as a condemnation of the
practice and using historical arguments to separate New Testament from southern
slavery. This approach paralleled that of antislavery constitutionalists, who would read
the Constitution in light of the Declaration’s egalitarian statements and use historical
arguments to contrast founding-era expectations about slavery with the protected position
of the peculiar institution in the nineteenth century.
Despite Barnes’ best efforts to refocus the discussion on whether or not the Bible
sanctioned southern slavery, southern proslavery interpreters continued to insist that the
question of consequence was whether or not slavery was always and everywhere
wrong.78 This approach did not make southerners less prone to assert that biblical figures
justified American slavery, but it suggests their awareness of temporal differences.
Contextual readings of the Bible allowed proslavery readers like Richard Fuller to argue
that because God sanctioned different forms of slavery at different times, he sanctioned it
now. But, such readings also helped antislavery readers attack southern slavery as
archaic. Those who accepted slavery’s existence in Old and New Testament times, such
as Wayland and Channing, countered with interpretations focused on the intentions of
Christianity’s founders. This progressive historical view held that the seeds of universal
antislavery principles would outlast and overcome particular sentiments and institutions
peculiar to the times, reaching full fruition in the more democratic and progressive
American present. While also an appeal to a past, this was not an argument to return to or
reclaim the past. The emphasis on submerged universal principles under a surface of
outdated teachings highlighted the foreign nature of the biblical past. As the number of
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the Bible’s useful and permanent teachings shrunk to a few universal principles from a
handful of texts, the remaining instructions and passages were relegated to the status of
passing and particular peculiarities from a distant past. The argument that those universal
principles would find fulfillment in the future drew attention to the distance between the
biblical past and the present. This contention, which retained faith in the sacred texts and
thus stood a better chance of winning adherents than antislavery attempts to dismiss the
Bible as obsolete, held great potential to spread awareness of that distance.

The Sacred Founding Texts and the Shifting Grounds of the Constitutional Debate
The emphasis on using certain portions from a favored past and on uncovering
universal principles expected to flower in time found a clear parallel in constitutional
debates. As demonstrated in Wayland’s argument, appeals to the biblical past could
overlap with appeals to the Revolutionary past, and, as his discussion showed, the recent
American past could be valued as more enlightened than even the sacred Jewish and
Christian pasts. According to Wayland, the universal truths inculcated in the New
Testament received their clearest articulation in the Declaration of Independence. Around
midcentury, the American past became more relevant in determining the fate of
American slavery debates than the biblical past. This is not to say that the biblical debates
subsided, but as politicians began to focus on finding a resolution to the crisis in their
political rather than their religious tradition, even biblical scholars turned their attention
to deciding the constitutional side of the debate. If the distance separating the favored
biblical past from their American present proved too great to bridge in addressing
contemporary problems, perhaps the more recent favored past could offer solutions. As
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Americans appealed to the Revolutionary era for answers, it became clear that historical
change separated even that recent founding moment from the present.
The debates over national religious texts traced in the preceding sections and
chapters did not exactly parallel the debates over national legal texts outlined in the
following sections and chapters, but, as the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, both
came under the scrutiny of historical reasoning, which informed canonical distinctions. In
the biblical argument the New Testament achieved a higher status than the antiquated Old
Testament, despite some southerners’ best efforts to hold them together. In the
constitutional argument, the Constitution achieved a higher status than the Declaration of
Independence, despite some antislavery proponents’ best efforts to hold these founding
documents together. In part, of course, this was because the Constitution was accepted as
that nation’s supreme legal document. But if the New Testament suffered in the eyes of
some abolitionists from its connection with the Old Testament, to the same audience the
Constitution achieved greater stature through its tie to the Declaration. Indeed, despite
Garrisonian and proslavery efforts to sever the connection between these documents, the
former to claim the Declaration and damn the Constitution, and the latter to damn the
Declaration and claim the Constitution, the texts remained tied in the antislavery
imagination. Though the Declaration predated the Constitution, interpreters did not
consider it the product of a separate and peculiar past, as they did the Old in relation to
the New Testament. Millennia separated Moses from John the Revelator, while some of
the same figures that signed the Declaration helped craft the Constitution. To the extent
that the later diverged from the former, then, antislavery advocates could consider it a
retrogressive creation. But, regardless of how one positioned the Declaration in relation
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to the Constitution, the growing emphasis on reading those texts in light of historical
research exposed temporal distance from the founding era.

“We Plant Ourselves upon the Declaration of Our Independence, and the Truths of
Divine Revelation”: The Declaration, the Bible and the Beginnings of Garrisonian AntiConstitutionalism
One can read the constitutional debates as a bout between lightweight antislavery
and heavyweight proslavery forces. Southern slaveholders’ successful efforts to shore up
their institution in the Constitution might be interpreted as a preemptive strike against the
potential threat posed by the Somerset case (1772), wherein Lord Mansfield determined
that only positive law protected slavery.79 Perhaps in response to that decision, which
some interpreted as a natural-law condemnation of slavery, southerners ensured that the
Constitution affirmed the federal consensus that slavery’s regulation should be left to the
states.80 After a time of relative quiet, events such as the War of 1812, the crisis of 1820,
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and Denmark Vesey’s slave rebellion of 1822, brought slavery again to the surface. In the
wake of the Missouri Compromise, which aggravated rather than alleviated the issue,
proslavery and antislavery advocates more fully developed and articulated their views.81
Up until this period, most Americans accepted the federal consensus position, which
forbade federal involvement in determining slavery’s fate. Thus, in the first decades of
the nation’s existence abolition societies worked in loose coalitions for gradual
emancipation through the states. In the 1830s, however, new abolitionist societies began
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calling for immediate emancipation, which challenged the consensus and led Americans
to look to the founding era for answers.82
William Lloyd Garrison, America’s most determined abolitionist, raised the level
of both the biblical and constitutional debates. He did not offer rigorous historical
readings of the Bible or the Constitution, but his early uses and abuses of the nation’s
sacred and legal texts encouraged interpreters to either offer contextual explications to
support their position or to dismiss such explication as unnecessary. Regardless of
whether or not one decided to decipher these texts through historical exegesis, one had to
at least recognize the contextual approach as the prevailing hermeneutic. As outlined
below, Garrison’s early efforts to be heard on the public stage spurred along the move to
interpret the Constitution as a historical text in need of historical explication.
Garrison approached the American past in a conflicted way. He called on the
Revolutionary legacy early and often, though his interest in that period, and in the
Declaration in particular, rested less on past achievements than on the Revolution’s
potential power to revolutionize social relations in the present.83 In 1829, while finding
his voice in the expanding newspaper culture, the twenty-three-year-old Garrison
answered the invitation of the American Colonization Society to speak on the Fourth of
July at the Park Street Church in Boston. Addressing his audience on the existence of
slavery in a presumably free nation, he excoriated American politics as “rotten to the
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core” and designated the Fourth “a day of great lamentation, not of congratulatory joy.”84
Referring to “a very large proportion of our colored population,” he contended that “this
is their country by birth, not by adoption. Their children possess the same inherent and
unalienable rights as ours.”85 Conceding that the free states “are constitutionally involved
in the guilt of slavery,” he called on northerners to unshackle themselves from “unjust
Constitutional provisions,” and urged that “moral influence, when in vigorous exercise, is
irresistible.”86 Here Garrison essentially rewrote “the Declaration of Independence to
include African-Americans.”87 In the course of the next few decades, he and other
abolitionists made it hard to think about slavery without thinking about the enslaved.
In this speech and throughout his career, one finds an overlap between biblical
and Revolutionary appeals.88 Like his Quaker mentor Benjamin Lundy, who Garrison
assisted in editing the Genius of Universal Emancipation from September 1829 until
March 1830, Garrison rooted his antislavery ideas in the Declaration and the Bible.89 In
the inaugural issue of the Liberator, published on January 1, 1831, he referenced his
efforts to “lift up the standard of emancipation in the eyes of the nation, within sight of
Bunker Hill and in the birth place of liberty” and, after recanting his prior “unreflecting”
assent to gradual emancipation, ascribed to the self-evident truths of the Declaration.
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Based on this foundation, he committed to “strenuously contend for the immediate
enfranchisement of our slave population.”90 Garrison grounded his immediatist position
in the Revolutionary past. In the second issue of the Liberator, he held out hope for the
nation’s redemption. “We do not give up our country as sealed over to destruction,” he
wrote, “As long as there remains a single copy of the Declaration of American
Independence, or of the bible, in our land, we will not despair.”91 He left the Constitution
out of his list of redeeming texts as a response to proslavery constitutional arguments,
which exhibited an early lack of faith in the Constitution as an antislavery text, but his
allegiance to the Bible and, especially, the Declaration remained firm.
In the early 1830s, awakened by the southern intransigence resulting from events
such as Nat Turner’s slave rebellion and the nullification crisis, the immediatist
movement confronted and gained numerous converts from the colonization effort,
leading to the establishment of the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) in
Philadelphia in December of 1833. Garrison’s continued valuation of the Bible and the
Declaration was evident in the new organization’s “Declaration of Sentiments” and its
constitution. The constitution opened the call for immediate emancipation by asserting
humanity’s common creation under God, stressing the New Testament command to “love
their neighbours as themselves,” and referencing the guiding egalitarian principles
contained in the Declaration of ‘76.92 The “Declaration of Sentiments” began with a
reference to the egalitarian ideas espoused by the “band of patriots,” but it proceeded to
90

William Lloyd Garrison, “To the Public,” Liberator, 1 January 1831, 1
(APSO), emphasis in original.
91
William Lloyd Garrison, “Our Trust,” Liberator, 8 January 1831, 1 (APSO).
See Mayer, All on Fire, 110-15.
92
Proceedings of the Anti-Slavery Convention, Assembled at Philadelphia,
December 4, 5, and 6, 1833 (New York: Dorr and Butterfield, 1833), 5-6.
186

contend that the mission of the AASS exceeded that of their Revolutionary forebears,
holding that “we have met together for the achievement of an enterprise, without which,
that of our fathers is incomplete; and which, for its magnitude, solemnity, and probable
results upon the destiny of the world, as far transcends theirs, as moral truth does physical
force.”93 Harnessing the power of the Revolutionary past, Garrison asserted the
unprecedented significance of the revolutionary present. Whereas Francis Wayland
would find the full articulation of the New Testament’s universal truths in the
Declaration, Garrison hoped to realize those truths through the AASS. Noting differences
in cause and approach, he opined that the Revolutionaries’ “grievances, great as they
were, were trifling in comparison with the wrongs and sufferings of those for whom we
plead.”94 Even his presentist reading of the Revolution posited historical distinctions in
asserting the moral superiority of the present battle against slavery over the past struggle
against tyranny. Garrison concluded with an affirmation of the twin pillars of his faith,
Revelation and the Declaration, though, at the suggestion of Lucretia Mott, one of the
prominent women in attendance, he changed the order: “We plant ourselves upon the
Declaration of our Independence, and the truths of Divine Revelation, as upon the
EVERLASTING ROCK.”95 As with Francis Wayland’s appeal to the Declaration as a
more complete articulation of inchoate New Testament truths, Mott’s suggestion and
Garrison’s agreement hints at the gradual reordering of favored pasts among some
antislavery thinkers. This reordering placed the Revolutionary era under the same kind of
scrutiny that scholars had subjected the biblical past to. It also suggests that these
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abolitionists granted the Declaration a status similar to that of the New Testament, while,
increasingly, they cast the Constitution as the Old Testament of the Revolutionary canon.
Rather than provide contextual interpretations of these texts, Garrison extracted
abstract ideas and cited ready-made passages. But these efforts to use the Bible, the
Declaration, and the Constitution in a debate of increasing significance led to more
rigorous examinations of those texts as rooted in, instead of outside, of time. Attempts to
use favored pasts in this period inspired critical calls for historical accuracy.96 Americans
were deeply invested in both the American and biblical pasts, and thus depictions of
those pasts garnered special attention. Garrison’s radical application of Christian and
American texts also coincided with the emergence of historical criticism and the growing
emphasis on contextual interpretation in biblical and constitutional hermeneutics. In short
order, constitutional debates, as with biblical debates, became historical contestations,
which led some, including Garrison, to reaffirm their faith in one founding document, the
Declaration, while abandoning to the past other founding texts, including the Constitution
and, later, the Bible.
The constitution and declaration of the AASS affirmed the federal consensus,
admitting that “each State, in which Slavery exists, has, by the Constitution of the United
States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its abolition in said State,” and
conceding “that Congress, under the present national compact, has no right to interfere
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with any of the slave States, in relation to this momentous subject.”97 Garrison’s
reference to the “present” national compact signaled his sense of its impermanence and
anticipated his later call for its abrogation. Even at this early stage he believed that “all
those laws which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are therefore before
God utterly null and void,” specifically arguing that the representation, fugitive slave, and
insurrection clauses “MUST BE BROKEN UP.”98 Still, in issuing this call for
constitutional emendation, he referenced “the highest obligations resting upon the people
of the free States, to remove slavery by moral and political action, as prescribed in the
Constitution of the United States.”99 The AASS held that the Constitution empowered
Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and to forbid its presence in the
territories, and its members used the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to develop
equal protection arguments. These ideas set the parameters for later antislavery
constitutionalism, but during the 1830s, Garrison’s tepid constitutionalism was replaced
by a fiery anti-constitutionalism.100
In the early to mid 1830s, Garrison started casting aspersions on the Constitution
in the pages of the Liberator, even while he retained faith in the Bible and the
Declaration.101 But even as the newspaper assumed a radical edge, there is reason to
believe that he showed some restraint when addressing an American audience. In a letter
to the London Patriot, which was published there in full and republished in the Liberator
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only in part, Garrison hoped to unmask the American Colonization Society and
desacralize the Constitution. In a section excised from the Liberator, he wrote, “I know
that there is much declamation about the sacredness of the compact which was formed
between the free and the slave States. … A sacred compact, forsooth! I pronounce it the
most bloody and heaven-daring arrangement ever made by men for the continuance and
protection of a system of the most atrocious villainy ever exhibited on earth.” The failure
of the document was the failure of its framers, who “were men, like ourselves – as
fallible, as sinful, as weak, as ourselves.” Abolitionists such as Theodore Parker and
Garrison found venerated prophets, apostles, politicians, and statesmen susceptible to the
failures and foibles of human nature. In crafting the time-bound Constitution, such
imperfect men undercut the timeless Declaration, trampling “beneath their feet their own
solemn and heaven-attested declaration, that all men are created equal, and endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights.” The flawed and sinful nature of the compact
removed its power to demand present or future adherence. “They had no lawful power to
bind themselves, or their posterity, for one hour – for one moment – by such an unholy
alliance. It was not valid then – it is not valid now.”102 Though “dripping … with human
blood,” Garrison still argued that the Constitution gave Congress power to restrict slavery
in the territories and guaranteed blacks “their liberty and rights of citizenship,” but when
this antislavery potential of the nation’s supreme legal text failed to bear fruit, his public
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condemnation of the Constitution gained traction.103 As outlined below, this depended, in
part at least, on the publication of Revolutionary era sources that uncovered slavery’s
dark presence at the nation’s founding.

“The Principle of the Declaration Was Embodied in the Constitution”: Madison’s
Papers and the Articulation of Moderate Antislavery Constitutionalism
Following the founding of the AASS, antislavery constitutionalism evolved,
expanded, and diverged in the 1830s and 1840s, finding voice in two broad groups, the
radical and the moderate constitutionalists, whose ideas overlapped at times. Opposed to
Garrisonian nonresistance and disunionism, both of these groups found political
embodiment in the form of the Liberty Party in 1840. Differences among its members led
to the party’s dissolution in 1845, and some of the dislocated moderates soon found a
place in the more prominent Free Soil Party (1848) and, later, in the more influential
Republican Party (1854). This group had powerful proponents in politicians such as
Salmon P. Chase and William Seward. Moderates held that freedom was national and
slavery local, conceding that abolition was up to the states, but holding that the federal
government could not protect slavery or expand its reach.104 The more radical members
of the defunct Liberty Party formed the Liberty League in 1847, the first of a number of
short-lived political parties that served as a platform for radical constitutionalists. Figures
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such as Alvan Stewart, William Goodell, Lysander Spooner, and Gerrit Smith articulated
the radical position, advancing the idea that the Constitution itself opposed slavery.105 Far
from dismissing the Constitution as an outdated legal creed, antislavery constitutionalists
continued to pay allegiance to the nation’s supreme legal text, but their constitutional
approaches still drew attention to historical change and distance.
The radical and moderate constitutional positions obtained their most public
hearing at different points, but each of them received clear articulation in the early 1840s,
following the publication of The Papers of James Madison (1840).106 The publication
might be interpreted as a nation’s attempt to recover the words and deeds of a founding
generation now gone. The passing of time, and of generations, created a desire for
primary sources like Madison’s papers, the publication of which contributed to the
growing emphasis on the need for, or, in some cases, a stress on the irrelevance of,
circumstantial and contextual interpretations of the Constitution. Regardless of how one
valued such readings, debates about their merits spoke to the reality and fear of the fact
that historical change and difference divided the founding past from the present.
Madison’s published papers complicated efforts to read the Constitution as an
antislavery text. As some antislavery biblical interpreters conceded slavery’s existence in
the Bible, even in the New Testament, some moderate antislavery constitutionalists
acknowledged its presence in the Constitution. But, as with the antislavery biblical
interpreters, they also located antislavery sentiment in the chosen founding era. They also
observed that, due to unforeseen economic developments, slavery’s hold on the nation
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increased in spite of the framers’ egalitarian expectations. Even when antislavery
constitutionalists like Goodell and Spooner rejected historical sources as superfluous to
constitutional interpretation—which only highlighted slavery’s place in the founding era
context—they also found antislavery expectations among the framers, which they
believed the corrupting influence of slavery had betrayed. In other words, as in the
biblical debate, antislavery interpreters asserted that the issue was not whether or not
slavery existed in the favored past, many conceded that it did, but whether or not the
favored past’s prominent figures intended that the institution endure into the future. Even
antislavery narratives that professed allegiance to the Constitution, then, could
demonstrate how different the Revolutionary past was from the present in asserting that
the time had arrived to fulfill the expectations of the framers, despite the anachronistic
presence of the Slave Power.
In the wake of Madison’s death on June 28, 1836, President Andrew Jackson
asked Congress to demonstrate their respect to the nation’s illustrious founder, to which
its members responded with a number of resolutions, including one to accept Dolly
Madison’s request to assist in the publication of her husband’s writings about the
Congress of the Confederation and the Constitutional Convention. On November 15,
1836, the prominent widow wrote to Jackson, informing him of the provision in her
husband’s will, wherein he had written, in reference to the Convention, “it is not an
unreasonable inference that a careful and extended report of the proceedings and
discussions of that body, which were with closed doors, by a member who was constant
in his attendance, will be particularly gratifying to the people of the United States.”107 In
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light of such statements, Dolly proposed that “however prevailing the restraint which
veiled … this record of the creation of our Constitution, the grave which has closed over
all those who participated in its formation, has separated their acts from all that is
personal to him or to them.”108 Madison and his fellow founders might have been
uncomfortable with the level of scrutiny that would accompany the publication of such
works, but Madison recognized that, as Jackson put it, such writings “cannot fail … to
confer … accurate knowledge of the principles of their Government, and the
circumstances under which they were recommended and embodied in the constitution, for
adoption.”109 In the congressional discussions relative to the publication of Madison’s
papers, Senator Ashur Robbins of Rhode Island declared that “those who think (if any
think) that the result itself, namely the Constitution … will be enough for the instruction
of mankind on this subject are much mistaken.”110 The Boston Recorder agreed.
Celebrating the publication, the paper asserted that “the exact and authentic information
which they furnish of the feelings, the motives and the words of the illustrious men of
those times, is becoming, if possible, more and more valuable with the lapse of each
successive year. The further we recede from the birth of the constitution,” the paper
stated, “the more precious do contemporary expositions of it become.”111
Most used the occasion to champion the founders and cherish their works. After
hearing Jackson’s letter informing Congress of Madison’s death, Senator William Rives
of Virginia praised the departed as “the founder and author of that glorious Constitution
which is the bond of our union and the charter of our liberties; and it was graciously
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vouchsafed to him,” Rives continued, “in the order of Providence, to witness for a longer
period than any of his illustrious colleagues, the rich blessings which have resulted from
its establishment. He was the last surviving signer of that sacred instrument.” The deaths
of prominent figures often inspire their sacralization, but the passing of a generation can
also induce anxious attempts to reclaim their past deeds and words through historical
research and reasoning. This was especially true of the founding generation. Such
scrutiny, however, could undermine filiopietistic veneration. If Madison’s death served to
“canonize the works of his hands, and surround, with a new veneration, that precious
relic of the wisdom of our departed patriots and sages,” the crisis over slavery
demonstrated that no founders and no founding texts remained beyond reproach.112
The Madison papers spurred criticism of the founders even among moderate
constitutionalists. In 1836, James Birney, who ran for president twice on the Liberty
Party ticket, once in 1840 and again in 1844, established Cincinnati’s Philanthropist. He
served as its editor before turning those duties over to Gamaliel Bailey in 1837. Like
Theodore Weld, Bailey had become an ardent abolitionist through the Lane Seminary
debates in February of 1834. Seven years later, in February of 1841, the Philanthropist,
while under Bailey’s editorship, ran an article that drew on Madison’s papers. It cited the
slave trade and fugitive slave clauses, among others, as “designed to secure Southern
interests.” Casting the Constitution as a “shameful bargain between the Northern and
Southern states,” the author noted that “in the Madison papers, the details of this dark
transaction are given at length.” While noting that “we have been taught to venerate the
character of the framers of the federal constitution,” the writer admonished readers “to
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discriminate in bestowing our respect.” The article pointed out that Virginians Madison,
George Mason and Edmund Randolph had opposed the slave trade and emphasized that
Madison “thought it WRONG TO ADMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION THE IDEA
THAT THERE COULD BE PROPERTY IN MEN.” However, the author concluded that
the accursed compromising spirit dominated then just as it did now—“Like parents, like
children.”113 Historical evidence in the form of Madison’s papers qualified this reader’s
view of the framers and threatened to bolster the ranks of those attacking the
compromised Constitution.
In January of 1843, the Philanthropist published an article that better represented
moderate constitutionalism. In outlining the Liberty Party’s central tenets, this article
offered a radically different perspective of the founding. In a call for Liberty Party
support, the author outlined the party position, “in favor of free-labor, impartial liberty,
and a right construction of the Constitution.” In a moment of political passion and a surge
of patriotic fervor, the author collapsed historical distance and conflated temporal
distinction in fusing the Liberty Party with the Revolutionary party: “We proclaim no
new doctrine—we desire to form no new party. We reiterate the doctrines of our fathers.
We wish to revive the old Liberty party of the times that tried men’s souls. We stand
where Hancock, Jefferson and other old patriots stood in 1776, when … they proclaimed
to all nations the great truths of humanity and freedom.” Without missing a beat, the
writer vindicated the founders even while slighting the Slave Power:
They did not attempt, by subtle argumentation, to prove that slavery is the
foundation of civil liberty.—They did not torture the pages of Inspiration itself
into seeming sanction of that stupendous and criminal solecism, that man can hold
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property in man; they did not stultify, by any miserable limitation or exception,
their grand and comprehensive declaration that ‘all men are created equal,’—that
liberty is the inalienable, God-given right of every human being. They inscribed
this declaration on their banners when they went into conflict for Independence.
To maintain it, they poured out their generous blood like water. To establish it,
they endured all the trials of that protracted and doubtful struggle, until God gave
victory to the right.
Rather than provide a close contextual reading—though mentioning Madison, the author
did not cite his published papers—the article called attention to a lack of specific words
and emphasized the presence of egalitarian ideas and martial deeds. The paper’s
antislavery portrayal of the founding era came, in part at least, as a reaction to the
proslavery interpretation of the Bible and the Constitution. In this response, the author
made a case for historical declension from both the biblical and Revolutionary eras,
faulting the Slave Power for slavery’s and unexpectedly secure presence in the
nineteenth-century republic.114
In characteristic fashion, the moderate author used the Declaration as a lens to rad
the Constitution, asserting that “when our National Independence was achieved, the
principle of the declaration was embodied in the Constitution.” The article conceded that
“the framers of the Constitution did not attempt to put an end to slavery in the states
where it existed” and “incorporated into the Constitution, some provisions, such as the
fugitive slave clause and the three-fifths rule, which experience has shewn to be
subversive of justice and liberty. But,” the writer emphasized, “they did not nationalize
slavery.” Rather than grant Congress “power to establish or continue slavery anywhere.
… the Constitution expressly denies any such power.” Instead, the author continued, the
states maintained “this system, in opposition to the principles of the Declaration and of
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the Constitution and in violation of the plain precepts of Revelation.” The moderates did
not allow the Garrisonians to lay sole claim to either the Bible or the Declaration, and
faulted the states for failing to realize their egalitarian promises. Indeed, the author
posited that the founders—citing Washington, Jefferson, and Madison—had anticipated
that fulfillment. “It was confidently expected that the states … would speedily and
voluntarily abandon [slavery], when the clause in the Constitution, having reference to it
as existing under state authority, would become inoperative, while the sacred instrument
itself would still remain a perfect and consistent expression of the National Will,
breathing only the spirit of justice and human liberty.” The author believed that the
farmers had thought historically in believed that the fruition of their founding prospects
would cleanse the Constitution of its sinful features. Defiantly, the writer asserted that
these “sayings of Revolutionary Fathers” proved “beyond all controversy,” that “the
understanding of our ancestors, at the time of the formation of the Constitution” was “that
slavery should be gradually and, speedily abolished by state authority.” Without ceding
the proslavery reading, the author granted that the Constitution contained proslavery
provisions, before positing an original expectation that time would wash them away.115
The article asserted continuity between the Revolutionaries’ and the Liberty Party’s
ideals, but in referencing an expectation of slavery’s abolition, it also asserted the
importance of change. The change the author found, though, contradicted the antislavery
expectations.
Had those expectations been realized? “Let History answer!” the author boomed,
recalling the previous mention of “experience.” Citing concessions, including slavery’s

115

Ibid.
198

presence in the District of Columbia and the lands obtained through the Louisiana
Purchase and the Adams-Onís Treaty, the writer issued a challenge: “Let any man
examine the history of our government, especially since the overthrow of the friends of
Liberty in the Missouri struggle, and he will be astonished to find how exactly the
national policy has conformed to the interests of the slave-holder.” Though failing to
provide a contextual antislavery interpretation of the Constitution, the author offered a
historical narration of proslavery consolidation. In this article, rather than illuminate the
founding period, history showed declension since that time. Consistent retrogression was
made clear by the fact that “of the Presidents, the slaveholding States, have furnished SIX
occupying the Presidential Chair FOR FORTY YEARS” and “a majority of the Judges of the
Supreme Court are slave-holders.” Indeed, the author argued, “All the Departments of the
Government are in the hands of the slave power, and are all opposed to the progress of
Liberty principles.” The Liberty Party faced an uphill battle, but, in contrast to Garrison,
believed that the present struggle was “not greater than our Fathers surmounted.”116
Finding corrosive change in the rise of the Slave Power, which redirected the
founders’ intended trajectory of historical development by exploiting the Constitution’s
proslavery provisions rather than allowing the organic growth of the antislavery spirit, the
author closed with another appeal to the Revolutionary heritage: “We shall prove
ourselves degenerate sons of the patriots of 1776, if we were not readily to enter into a
second contest for the same great principles with courage and determination like theirs.”
Aiming to “vindicate the reputation of our fathers by delivering the government … from
the corruptions fashioned upon it by slavery” and “make it what our fathers designed it to
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be, a free government,” the article concluded with a broad national appeal. “We wish to
rally an American party upon American principles—the principles of 1776 and 1787. We
desire to vindicate the true construction of the Constitution, and to make the government
conform to the Constitution.”117 While some proslavery biblical interpreters who found
corruption in abolitionism imposed a proslavery stance on Paul and even posited the
apostles’ continued support, some antislavery constitutional interpreters who located
corruption in the Slave Power saw themselves as the rightful legates of founders like
Madison and believed in their continued support—“we have the example and spirits of
our fathers on our side.” Both narratives cultivated awareness of historical change, in the
form of rising abolitionism and an emerging Slave Power, respectively.
To be sure, when antislavery constitutionalists posited continuity between their
ideas and those of the founding generation, it tended to conflate historical difference and
collapse temporal distance. But their historical appeals did not always represent a naïve
desire to recreate a pure past. Granting slavery’s presence at the founding and expressing
a belief in the framers’ original expectations that time would make slavery obsolete
exposed the foreignness of that past. And while proslavery consolidation might
complicate that characterization, antislavery interpreters simply observed that the rise of
the Slave Power was a lamentable anachronistic development. The belief in the framers’
original expectations, and the stark contrast antislavery observers found between those
expectations and the prominence of the Slave Power in the present, further signaled the
historical distance separating Americans from their founding.118
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“Rules the Historian … Out of the Witness Box”: Madison’s Papers and William
Goodell’s Articulation of Radical Antislavery Constitutionalism
A similar belief emerged among the more radical constitutionalists. While Bailey
and politicians like Chase remained moderate in their antislavery constitutionalism, in the
mid to late 1840s, Birney, and abolitionists such as Stewart and Goodell, adopted more
radical positions. Radical constitutionalism found its clearest expression in two
publications—Goodell’s Views of American Constitutional Law (1844) and Spooner’s
The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (1845). Drawing on previous arguments, including
Stewart’s, the authors of these works variously appealed to the due process, privileges
and immunities, habeas corpus, and the guarantee clauses—which they read in light of
the Declaration—while contending that the broad wording of the central clauses often
portrayed as proslavery—including the three-fifths, importation, labor, insurrection and
domestic violence clauses—demanded alternative readings.119 While Garrison used the
Declaration to justify a moral revolution aimed at convincing hearts and minds of the
need to immediately abolish slavery, these interpreters joined with their moderate
counterparts in using its egalitarian principles as a lens through which to read the
Constitution as an antislavery text. And even if they dismissed historical evidence as
extraneous, preferring instead to focus on the Constitution’s words alone, Goodell and
Spooner also made historical arguments to uncover antislavery sentiment in the founding
era and to posit that the perversion of constitutional interpretation hid the framers’
expectations that the Constitution would eventually bring about slavery’s demise. Their
wariness of contextual interpretation, along with their historical narrations of pre- and
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post-founding era developments, contributed to a greater realization that one could not,
nor would one want to, make the traditional assumption of an easy transference of ideas
and beliefs from the Revolutionary past to the present.
Also a newspaper man, William Goodell had served as a leading temperance
reformer and had been involved in the founding of the New-York Anti-Slavery Society
and the AASS. He had helped form the Liberty Party in 1840 and in 1842 he turned his
attention to church reform along abolitionist lines. He opened his 1844 publication with
an appeal not to the “Blackstones and the Manfields of America,” but to “the public
voice,” to “the people … the divinely appointed arbiters of their own destinies … not the
framers, nor yet the arbiters of those original laws, immutable and eternal.”120 As Albert
Barnes had asserted the right of the public to interpret the Bible, Goodell placed his faith
in the public to sanction or condemn constitutional interpretation. This position paralleled
the conventional belief in common sense readings of the Bible. Though such approaches
were at times dismissive of using extra-textual sources in interpretation, historical
argumentation, once reserved for experts, found its way into non-expert settings. The
popular constitutionalisms that emerged during this period accepted and engaged the
historical nature of debates about slavery’s constitutionality. The very appeal to the
public, however hopeful, was symptomatic of the belief that slavery could not keep pace
with the spirit of the times.
From the outset, Goodell made clear his interest in a historical examination of the
issue, valuing appeals to the spirit of the Constitution over strict construction, and writing
of proslavery interpreters that, “beyond the Constitution of 1787-9 and the attendant
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circumstances of its formation and adoption, the claimants are not accustomed to
adventure.” He observed neglect of the Articles of Confederation, the Declaration of
Independence, the principles of common law, and what he called the “unwritten
Constitution.”121 Still, Goodell preferred a strict construction. Referring to Article II,
Section 4, which states that “no Person held to Service or Labour in One State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another … shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to
whom such Service or Labour may be due,” Goodell asked, “Who, unacquainted with the
facts that have taken place, with the past and daily passing history of this country, would
ever have conceived that these words described the case of a fugitive slave, and required
his delivery to the slaveholder?” “No one!” he protested. Proper construction “rules the
Historian … out of the witness box.”122 Goodell argued that a focus on the words of the
three-fifths, importation, insurrection, and domestic violence clauses purged them of their
assumed proslavery protections, while a similar focus upheld antislavery interpretations
of the clauses on congressional power and due process. Here, he also cited Madison to
posit the incongruence between slavery and the guarantee clause, writing that, “The
meaning of ‘a republican form of government’ in this country, in 1789, is sufficiently
ascertained.”123
In turning to an approach focused on the spirit of the Constitution, Goodell upheld
words as important, but stressed that they should be read in light of the spirit of the
Constitution, revealed in “external evidences,” which included the “spirit, design or
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intentions” of the framers and the ratifiers.124 Goodell valued the intentions of the latter
over those of the former, writing that “what the Convention of 1787, or a portion of it,
intended to effect by the Constitution, is not to be confounded with the designs, especially
the paramount object of THE PEOPLE who adopted it. The objects of the Convention, or
members of it, may deserve our attention, and their testimony to the spirit of their times,
may command respect. But their intentions are not to be substituted for the intentions of
THE PEOPLE.”125 This valuation, which supported Goodell’s call for a popular
constitutionalism, followed Madison’s singular direction in 1796 to discover the “voice
of the people” in examining the ratification debates even as it downplayed the importance
of Madison’s papers, which did not show up in Goodell’s bibliography.126 He positioned
the sacred legal text itself against slavery, in large part through an assertion that “the
124
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‘spirit of the Constitution’ is identical with the spirit of the Common Law.” Binding
American common law to a narrow reading of British common law, and to a broad
reading of the Somerset decision in particular, he argued that “to say that there can be
constitutional slavery in the United States … is the same thing as to say, that there is
Common Law slavery, in the United States; an absurdity that, in its own proper form, no
sane man, perhaps, has ever yet been found to utter.”127 Goodell’s legal contention rested
on a historical argument positing continuity between the Constitution and common law.
In turning from the Constitution itself to an exploration of “its earlier days, in its
origins, its birth-place, its parentage, its nursing and swaddling,” Goodell called on what
he later labeled “incontrovertible historical facts” to recover the “‘SPIRIT OF SEVENTYSIX!”
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documents together, but Goodell also bound the Declaration to what he referred to as the
“ANTI-SLAVERY ‘SPIRIT OF THE AGE’ in which the Federal Constitution was
framed and adopted.”129 He wrote that the Declaration used “not only the language of the
Common Law, but the language, likewise—almost to plagiarism—of the popular and
widely current anti-slavery literature of those times.”130 Again citing proslavery neglect
of the Declaration, Goodell used it to write of “the claims of LIBERTY and
EMANCIPATION,”

that “they are of older date, and gain in freshness and vigor the farther

they are traced.”131 Unlike in the biblical debate, antislavery interpreters often focused on
the older of the two canonical documents, a less problematic choice given the short time
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frame that separated them. Furthermore, the Declaration, like the New Testament, was a
relatively succinct statement of principles while the Constitution, like the Old Testament,
set forth in greater details specific legal provisions. Antislavery interpreters found the
former texts less limiting and more supportive of their arguments for freedom. Making a
case for continuity, Goodell imposed constitutional status on the Declaration, writing that
“the fundamental basis and groundwork of AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, remains
unchanged, and in full force” since the Declaration’s signing.132 The Constitution, then,
served as “the more outward form, the minutely detailed provisions … the instruments, of
which [the Declaration’s] principles are the living spirit and substance.”133 Because the
Constitution came soon after the Declaration, Goodell could posit congruence between
spirit and principles. Consequently, he concluded that there had been “no legal slavery in
the United States, since the 4th of July, 1776.”134 As proslavery interpreters bound the
Testaments together to argue for southern slavery’s divine justification, so antislavery
interpreters tied the Declaration and the Constitution together to argue against southern
slavery’s legality. Goodell wrote that “our Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of 1787-9 taken as members of each other, considered as a whole, and
construed by its spirit, constitute a creditable statement of Constitutional Law, and even
without the amendments of which they are susceptible, are amply sufficient in their
provisions, for either the legislative or judicial abolition of slavery.”135 Making mention
of the amendment process, Goodell maintained that historical facts attested to the
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antislavery nature of the Constitution and to its inherent power to cleanse the national
stain.
Goodell’s argument centered on reading the Constitution in light of what he
perceived as antislavery common law and an antislavery Declaration, but like the
moderates, he also made mention of the framers’ expectations. In the midst of his
discussion about the antislavery sentiment of the founding era, he compiled “a list
including the most prominent statesmen of the South as well as the North, proclaiming
before the sun, that SLAVERY was a fast waning system, that must speedily fall.”136
Goodell cited a host of founders, including Madison, Jefferson, Rush, Hamilton,
Franklin, and Jay, to posit an original expectation that slavery was on the road to
extinction. Both moderate and radical antislavery constitutionalists read the founding
American past as a number of antislavery biblical interpreters read the primitive Christian
past: the founders worked to secure slavery’s demise and believed that the cultivation and
spread of egalitarian principles would realize that expectation. In both scenarios, the
emphasis on original expectations of abolition highlighted the reality of slavery’s
presence in the biblical and Revolutionary pasts, which, for its opponents, signaled that
the favored pasts were not golden ages to reclaim but troubled eras with universal
promises to fulfill. And, in their view, the failure of fulfillment was attributable to the
unexpected and anachronistic rise of the Slave Power. The founding era remained a
usable past, but not in terms of recreation but of realizing its hopes and expectations.
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“No Extraneous or Historical Evidence Shall Be Admitted”: Madison’s Papers and the
Lysander Spooner’s Articulation of Radical Antislavery Constitutionalism
Massachusetts man Lysander Spooner had left his career as a lawyer, which he
began in defiance of the state regulation that required non-graduates to study with
attorneys for a period of five years before setting up a practice, and had begun a new
career in mail delivery in violation of federal statutes against private mail delivery
services. In his 1845 publication, the radical provided a similar argument to Goodell’s,
though where Goodell had read the Constitution in the light of the Declaration and
common law, Spooner read the Constitution in the light of the Declaration and natural
law. Insisting that there was “no law but natural law,” he proclaimed American slavery’s
illegality, writing that slavery “has always been a mere abuse, sustained, in the first
instance, merely by the common consent of the strongest party, without any law on the
subject.”137 Though he later dismissed historical evidence as inadmissible in
constitutional interpretation, Spooner’s reading depended on a historical narrative tracing
slavery’s unconstitutionality from the colonial period through the Revolutionary era to
the present. As some antislavery biblical interpreters argued that slavery’s existence in
the Bible did not signify divine sanction, so Spooner stated that “the fact, that slavery was
tolerated in the colonies, is no evidence of its legality.”138 Appealing to Somerset, he
argued, “That decision … settled the law both for England and the colonies. And if so,
there was no constitutional slavery in the colonies up to the time of the revolution.”139
Bringing his narrative up to 1776, Spooner, as with Goodell, proposed that “the
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Declaration,” which established self-evident egalitarian truths, “was certainly the
constitutional law of this country for certain purposes.”140 Continuing his account, he
contended that neither the Articles of Confederation nor the state constitutions of 1789
“established, or recognized slavery,” and proposed that state constitutional
endorsements—“inserted, by amendment, since the adoption of the constitution of the
United States”—resulted from corrupt deviations.141 Spooner valued what he understood
as the continuous unconstitutionality of slavery, and discountenanced what he viewed as
post-founding era constitutional corruptions.
While resting his argument on a broad historical narrative, Spooner’s discussion
of the Constitution itself, much more than Goodell’s, challenged the use of historical
information in interpretation. While Goodell saw some value in intent, Spooner dismissed
as “of no consequence what recognition or sanction the constitution of the United States
may have intended to extend to [slavery].”142 The appeal to intent, in Spooner’s opinion,
made it clear that proslavery interpreters felt insecure in their use of the Constitution
alone, which did not include such terms as slave or slavery. Unlike Barnes, who signaled
that the mere appearance of certain words in the Old Testament did not signify the
presence, much less the sanction, of a particular practice, Spooner stressed that the lack
of certain words in the Constitution attested to its absence. He introduced a distinction
between the intent of the framers and the Constitution itself, writing of proslavery
interpreters who, “by the aid of exterior, circumstantial and historical evidence … attempt
to enforce upon the mind the conclusion that, as matter of fact, such was the intention of
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those who drafted the constitution; and thence they finally infer that such was the
intention of the constitution itself.”143 Critiquing what he viewed as the manipulation of
historical evidence, Spooner argued that one could only gauge intent via “the legal
meaning of the words of an instrument.”144 In seeming alignment with the prevailing
common sense biblical hermeneutic, he narrowed the discussion to the “words alone of
the constitution.”145 Instead of following the conventional rules of interpretation, wherein
a contextual reading overruled a straightforward one when a word or phrase held more
than one meaning, Spooner measured possible meanings against natural law, writing that
“no extraneous or historical evidence shall be admitted to fix upon a statute an unjust or
immoral meaning, when the words themselves of the act are susceptible of an innocent
one.”146 Similar to Theodore Parker’s sense that historical facts taught but did not
embody eternal truths, Spooner held that historical evidence could uphold but not
contradict natural law. Under these rules, he wrote of the labor, three-fifths, importation,
and domestic violence clauses as Goodell had of the labor clause alone: “no one would
have ever dreamed that either of these clauses alone, or that all of them together,
contained so much as an allusion to slavery, had it not been for circumstances extraneous
to the constitution itself.”147 Again, Spooner believed that proslavery interpreters had
used historical evidence to twist the Constitution’s straightforward antislavery meanings.
Turning to provisions for freedom, he argued that states could not withhold federal
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citizenship from those capable of becoming citizens, including blacks, and cited habeas
corpus and the guarantee clause in favor of freedom.148
To drive home his point about the nuisance of historical evidence, Spooner
distinguished between “the intentions of the framers” which “have nothing to do with
fixing the legal meaning of the constitution” and “the intentions of the people at large”
which “are the only ones, that are of any importance to be regarded in determining the
legal meaning of that instrument.”149 Like Goodell, he believed that while the original
understandings of the ratifiers trumped the original intent of the framers, the original
meanings of the document were most important. In dealing with uses of Madison’s
papers, in particular, Spooner asked, “why do the partizans of slavery resort to the
debates of the convention for evidence that the constitution sanctions slavery? Plainly,”
he answered, “for no other reason than because the words of the instrument do not
sanction it.” In opposition to what was quickly becoming the officially endorsed position
that the original intent of the framers mattered most in constitutional interpretation, he
proposed that “no evidence of their intentions, at that time, is applicable to the case.”150
Depicting the framers as “the mere scriveners of the constitution,” he wrote that “their
individual purposes, opinions or expressions, then uttered in secret cabal, though now
revealed, can no more be evidence of the intentions of the people who adopted the
constitution, than the secret opinions or expressions of the scriveners of any other
contract can be offered to prove the intentions of the true parties to such contract.”151 The
value of the framers’ intent depended on their alignment with the people’s intent, and “if
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the instrument had contained any tangible sanction of slavery, the people would sooner
have had it burned by the hands of the common hangman, than they would have adopted
it.”152 Despite this equation, Spooner thought that it amounted to little in terms of
determinative legal principles: “whether such were really the intention of the convention,
or the people, is, at least a matter of conjecture and history, and not of law.”153 As in
biblical debates, interpreters highlighted the conjectural nature of historical research to
advance their positions. After all, Spooner argued, “No two of the members of the
convention would probably have agreed in their representations of what the constitution
really was. No two of the people would have agreed in their understanding of the
constitution when they adopted it.”154 Spooner undermined the assumption of consensus
among the founding generation to prize the words of the Constitution alone in
interpretation. In his opinion, historical discussions about the founding era unnecessarily
complicated otherwise straightforward legal issues. This contention drew attention to
historical distance as it brought to mind the distinct context within which the framers’
crafted the Constitution.
Despite his contention that attention to historical context obfuscated rather than
illuminated constitutional meaning, Spooner crafted a historical argument in labeling
developments since the founding era as distractions. Dismissing governmental practice as
irrelevant in unearthing original meaning, he wrote that “it is of no consequence … what
meaning the government have placed upon the instrument; but only what meaning they
were bound to place upon it from the beginning.” Spooner covered all his bases.
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Discounting contextual interpretation meant to reveal the framers’ intentions and
historical narratives aimed at illuminating governmental use, he sought to recover
original antislavery meanings: “Such was the character of the constitution when it was
offered to the people, and before it was adopted. And if such was its character then, such
is its character still. It cannot have been changed by all the errors and perversions,
intentional or unintentional, of which the government may have since been guilty.”155
Spooner valued continuity if it corresponded with his sense of natural law, which, for
him, was intrinsically antislavery, and condemned continuous practice that deviated from
that sense. He thus proposed that despite developments which suggested the contrary, the
Constitution was “designed to destroy slavery,” an “arbitrary institution,” “whenever its
principles should be carried into full effect.”156 While dismissing contextual readings,
Spooner used historical argumentation to posit the Constitution’s original antislavery
nature, which inherently worked to bring about slavery’s abolition.
Both moderate and radical constitutionalists contended that unfortunate
developments since the founding had derailed the nation from the course toward abolition
that the founders had traced in the Constitution. Some moderates, like Gamaliel Bailey,
proposed that although it contained proslavery provisions, the Constitution’s creators
expected that its general ideas would bring about slavery’s end, an expectation that the
slave states had aborted. Radicals Goodell and Spooner argued that Constitution
articulated the antislavery principles of common law or natural law, respectively, and
implemented the antislavery sentiments of the Declaration and the spirit of the
Revolutionary age. Although they differed in their approach to historical evidence, most
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antislavery readers offered historical accounts that made the historical link between the
Declaration and the Constitution. They insisted that the founding canon contained
universal egalitarian principles and staked their claim to the Revolutionary heritage. Such
efforts seemed to partake of a traditional proclivity to collapse the time separating a
virtuous past from a corrupted present. However, their tales of declension did not demand
a return to a Revolutionary pure period. When moderates acknowledged the
Constitution’s proslavery provisions and when radicals criticized the interpretive use of
historical sources, it suggested that the founding era was a time to learn from rather than
live in. And in positing the original expectation of slavery’s demise, while also tracing
the unexpected rise of a Slave Power out of step with the current era, these readings
honored a past that anticipated change, and thus highlighted historical distance.

“These Pages Prove the Melancholy Fact”: Madison’s Papers and the Constitution as a
Proslavery Compact
In the mid-1840s, Garrisonian Wendell Phillips dismissed these antislavery
readings of the Constitution and used Madison’s papers to do it. William Lloyd
Garrison’s anti-constitutionalism had developed in relation to his perfectionism,
nonresistance, and disunionism, positions adopted and advanced in the late 1830s and
early 1840s.157 The publication of Madison’s papers in 1840 buttressed his anticonstitutional position. The writings of the principal author of the Constitution facilitated
the Garrisonian emphasis on contextual interpretation, an approach that lent credence to
157
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their proslavery readings of the Constitution and undermined the claims of their
antislavery constitutionalist counterparts.158 In short, Madison’s papers assisted Wendell
Phillips in his attempt to damn the Constitution as a proslavery compact conceived in a
time since past and by men now dead.159
Phillips was also from Massachusetts and also had a career as a lawyer.
Awakened by one mob’s unsuccessful attempt to lynch Garrison and another’s murder of
Elijah Lovejoy, Phillips had left aside his lawyering to sound the call for abolition and
disunion. In 1845, he published The Constitution a Proslavery Compact: Or, Selections
from the Madison Papers, which provided extracts from “the [the ratification] Debates on
those clauses of the Constitution which relate to slavery,” along with other related
documents.160 These sources demonstrated, according to Phillips, that the Constitution
granted “the slaveholder distinct privileges and protection for his slave property, in return
for certain commercial concessions on his part toward the North,” and that “the Nation at
large were fully aware of this bargain at the time, and entered into it willingly and with
open eyes.”161 He drew attention to the three-fifths, militia, slave trade, fugitive slave,
and the guarantee clauses, and, in clear contrast to Spooner, wrote that “if indeed they
were ambiguous in their terms, a resort to the history of those times would set the matter
at rest forever.”162 While Spooner thought that the use of historical information in
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constitutional interpretation led to inconclusive findings, Phillips believed that a
historical explication proved determinative.
Phillips aimed to correct those “few persons … of late years,” who, “to serve the
purposes of a party, have tried to prove that the Constitution makes no compromise with
slavery.”163 Believing that such individuals, which undoubtedly included Goodell and
Spooner, had shut their eyes to the “clear light of history,” Phillips asked, “if the
unanimous, concurrent, unbroken practice of every department of the Government,
judicial, legislative, and executive, and the acquiescence of the whole people for fifty
years do not prove which is the true construction, then how and where can such a
question ever be settled?”164 Rather than dismiss the government’s proslavery
interpretations and uses as deviations from antislavery original meanings, Phillips
spotlighted them to demonstrate the intrinsic proslavery nature of the Constitution.
Believing that such an approach yielded the right interpretation, “It follows,” he resolved,
“that at this time and for the last half century, the Constitution of the United States has
been, and still is, a pro-slavery instrument.” Continuity since the founding, in
interpretation and usage, demonstrated the legitimacy of the proslavery reading. Still,
some “assert that that the known anti-slavery spirit of revolutionary times never could
have consented to so infamous a bargain as the Constitution is represented to be, and has
in its present hands become.” However, the present publication provided historical proof
of the framers’ proslavery intentions. In Phillips’s narration, contextual explication
buttressed the historical narration of proslavery continuity. “Now these pages prove the
melancholy fact, that willingly, with deliberate purpose, our fathers bartered honesty for
163
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gain, and became partners with tyrants, that they might share in the profits of their
tyranny.”165 One might locate the appearance of antislavery sentiment in the founders’
writings, but in the context of “all that these Debates have to say on the subject,” one
discovers “the fact, that the Constitution was meant to be, what it has always been
esteemed, a compromise between slavery and freedom.”166 And regardless of “what the
Constitution may become a century hence,” the fact of what “it is” required immediate
annulment and necessitated the stance, “NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!”167
Phillips seemed to allow that the Constitution might become antislavery in time, but the
current climate of affairs made that untenable at present. The times called for a complete
legal revolution rather than constitutional evolution.168
In 1847, Phillips followed up the publication of these selections with a lengthy
review of Spooner’s work. Again noting prospects of a modified Constitution, he stressed
its current status as a proslavery compact: “the Constitution will never be amended by
persuading men that it does not need amendment.”169 Regardless of its potential, or even
its original meaning or intent, “no one has ever denied that the Supreme Court now
construes the Constitution in a pro-slavery sense. This, then, is the law of the land until
altered.”170 The reliance on the Supreme Court to settle the constitutional debate
increased among politicians during the next decade. Phillips referenced legal opinions to
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counter appeals to natural and common law, including Somerset, arguing that “positive
law … can,” in fact, “so establish even Slavery, that courts must treat it as legal.”171
Based on this position, he addressed the three-fifths, fugitive slave, insurrection, and
domestic violence clauses and grounded his interpretation in “extraneous and historical
evidence”—the very kind of information that Spooner had railed against.172
Despite his stated willingness to consider the Constitution without “aid from
collateral history or national circumstances,” Phillips proceeded to contextualize.173 In
contradistinction to Spooner, he advocated the conventional rules of interpretation,
proposing that “words, when doubtful and ambiguous, are to be interpreted by the
context, by the object sought, and by contemporaneous usage.”174 Citing the Federalist
Papers and Madison’s notes, and following the examples of Justices John Marshall and
Joseph Story, Phillips found it “evident that the understanding of the nation at the time”
and the “history and customs of the country” helped determine “with irresistible clearness
the meaning of the Constitution.”175 Willing to set aside the intentions of the framers and
focus on the people in discussing the three-fifths clause, Phillips made use of the 1792
census to evidence the clause’s relationship to slavery. He thus used historical
information to propose that both the framers and the ratifiers understood the proslavery
nature of the Constitution.
In one surprising instance, Phillips’s reading of the founding era matched those of
his interpretive opponents. He granted that the prevailing opinion of the times was that
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the abolition of the slave trade “would ultimately put an end to Slavery,” but found “no
evidence of any general expectation that the constitution would have any influence
otherwise in producing such a result.”176 Rather than use such prospects to read the
Constitution as an antislavery document, Phillips stated that “time has shown they were
mistaken. But that mistake does not free their children from the agreements made under
it. … The only way their sons can free themselves, is to disown their fathers’ act, the
Constitution itself.”177 Albert Barnes had attempted to trace the gradual decline of slavery
between the time of Moses and Christ and Spooner had aimed to outline its quick
undoing from Mansfield to Madison. Phillips provided an alternative account, using
historical evidence to argue that slavery was so engrained in English and colonial
common law that it was taken for granted in the Articles of Confederation and the state
constitutions. In a move reminiscent of liberal Christians’ antislavery biblical readings,
which unhinged the Old from the New Testament, Phillips severed the tie between the
corrupt Constitution and the divine Declaration, writing that “the Declaration had nothing
to do with Slavery.”178 In constitutional as opposed to biblical debates, where separating
the New from the Old Testament seemed to support antislavery readings, the breaking up
of canonical texts stood to hurt rather than help the antislavery interpretation of the
Constitution. Garrisonians seemed to suggest that historical differences made the gap
between past and present too wide to bridge. They strove to relinquish rather than recover
the founding era. Let the dead bury the dead.
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In some ways, Phillips’s approach paralleled that of the antislavery
constitutionalists even if most of his findings did not. Like them, he provided a historical
account, but he traced slavery’s continual and overriding presence before, in, and after
the founding era. The only change he detected was in the newfangled antislavery readings
of the Constitution. Despite important differences between the arguments of the
antislavery constitutionalists and those of Phillips, like them he also identified an original
expectation of slavery’s ultimate abolition, an identification that gained prominence as an
important piece to the antislavery constitutionalists’ puzzle. However, in contrast to
Goodell and Spooner, Phillips privileged contextual interpretation throughout his review.
Of the Constitution, he wrote, “It is not so much a statute as a great national event, and is
to be interpreted not by technical rules, but by liberal reference to the history of the times,
the circumstances which produced it, the great parties and interests represented in it, and
the national objects it has in view.”179 At this juncture in American constitutional
interpretation, most interpreters, with a few antislavery holdouts, agreed with Phillips’s
premise that one needed to attend to context to rightly interpret the Constitution. Even in
combatting Phillips’s interpretation, radical constitutionalists like Joel Tiffany strung
together “historical fact[s]” to “rebut the historical presumption that the founders …
would desire or even consent legally to recognize sanction, or in any manner gauranty
[sic] slavery.”180 This development toward reading the Constitution as a historical
production had a good chance of spreading a sense that one could not assume cultural and
societal sameness across time. That sense further inspired either creative readings or clear
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dismissals of the Constitution. For a time, the later approached seemed like it was on the
ascendant among abolitionists.

Conclusion
As in the emergence of an awareness of historical distance through antebellum
biblical exegesis, the spread of awareness of that distance through antebellum
constitutional interpretation was far from straightforward. However, as in the biblical
debates, while important ideational differences separated these antislavery proponents
from each other, all of their arguments tended to draw attention to historical distance
from the founding era. The publication of Madison’s papers led each group to further
articulate their constitutional understandings. Moderate constitutionalists recognized
slavery’s presence in the Constitution, but emphasized that it existed only as a state
institution. Radical constitutionalists denied its presence, positing that a strict reading of
the text yielded an antislavery construction. Garrisonians responded with historical facts
and appealed to historical figures to argue that the Constitution was a proslavery
compact. Despite their different and at times contrasting approaches to the use of
historical sources, each of these responses highlighted historical distance. In using or
dismissing historical evidence, these groups historicized the Revolutionary past.
Affirming, through historical sources, or denying, through a strict reading, slavery’s
presence in the Constitution highlighted its place in the founding era. One can imagine
someone like Phillips suggesting that the care that framers like Madison took to ensure
that the words slave and slavery did not show up in the Constitution only belied the fact
that the institution loomed large at the founding. The text’s silences spoke volumes.
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Each of these positions also proposed, to one degree or another, that the founding
generation had expected slavery to die out and thus implied that the founders had
anticipated historical change. That implication, too, was complicated by the differences
among the various arguments. Moderates and radicals read the Constitution as consistent
with the Declaration, which allowed them to assert that the framers expected that the
spread of egalitarian ideas would arrest and abolish unjust acts. Even Phillips cited the
importation clause as evidence of a similar prospect. However, while the
constitutionalists posited that the corrupting influence of the rising Slave Power had
perverted the framers’ egalitarian expectations, Phillips found continuity in showing
slavery’s power over the nation. Proslavery interpreters went further in arguing that the
rise of abolitionism as a whole was the era’s most dangerous innovation, but Phillips
attributed change to the antislavery constitutionalists, who had concocted new
interpretations. Each of these positions conceded slavery’s presence at the founding,
posited an expectation of change in the form of slavery’s abolition, and then identified
corrupt change in the form of the Slave Power or irresponsible innovation in the form of
antislavery constitutionalism. These opposing arguments about what constituted expected
and unexpected changes spurred along an awareness of historical contingency. These
varying interpretations also carried profound implications for the realization of historical
distance. The constitutionalists’ attention to original expectations implied that the crucial
issue was not determining slavery’s place in the founding era, but deciphering what the
favored past’s founding figures expected of the institution’s future existence. They held
that the framers had expected slavery’s demise and characterized the rise of the Slave
Power, which had squelched those expectations, as an anachronistic development. Even
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narratives professing allegiance to the Constitution could demonstrate how different the
Revolutionary past was from the present.
In 1845, the same year that Phillips published The Constitution A Proslavery
Compact, Garrison wrote an article that demonstrated a willingness to transfer his
constitutional approach to the Bible. He had once accepted the predominant hermeneutic
in refusing to see the historical distance between his generation and the Bible. In 1831,
his paper wrote of that sacred text—which he identified as God’s “Statute Book”—“It is
immutable; the vicissitudes of time, the waves of revolution, the explosions of empires,
cannot abrogate or change one of its acts. … It is of universal application.”181 However,
Garrison eventually read and heard enough to know that the text he had once cherished as
essential to the redemption of a fallen nation contained fabulous stories and outdated
creeds. The Bible continued to inspire Garrison, but by 1845 he appreciated Thomas
Paine’s use of reason in interpretation. The Bible was “to be examined with the same
freedom as any other book.” Garrison rejected plenary inspiration—“To say that every
thing contained within the lids of the Bible is divinely inspired … is to give utterance to a
bold fiction, and to require the suspension of the reasoning faculties”—and instead
argued that it “must stand or fall by the test of just criticism, by its reasonableness and
utility, by the probabilities of the case, by historical confirmation, by human experience
and observation, by the facts of science, by the intuition of the spirit.” After all, Garrison
wrote, echoing Theodore Parker, “Truth is older than any parchment, and would still
exist, though a universal conflagration should consume all the books in the world.”
Dismissing the idea that the Bible was to be the people’s “master, not their servant,”
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Garrison referenced its sanction of a host of sins, including the right “to enslave human
beings!”182 Slavery, much more than biblical criticism or even a late reading of Paine’s
Age of Reason, shaped Garrison’s contention that the Bible must be measured according
to reason, historical research, and intuition. Slavery brought together constitutional and
biblical interpretation, and rhetorical became real overlap in the responses to the Fugitive
Slave Law.
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CHAPTER 4
“THE CULTURE OF COTTON HAS HEALED ITS DEADLY WOUND”: THE
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, PROSLAVERY CORRUPTION, AND THE SPREAD OF
ANTISLAVERY READINGS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
Moses Stuart upheld the Compromise of 1850 and its attendant Fugitive Slave
Law through a historical explication of both the Bible and the Constitution. By this point
in the nineteenth century, most national commentators agreed about the authoritative
nature of appeals to the Bible and the Constitution, and most interpreters accepted the
historical grounds of interpretation. Stuart claimed status as both authorized interpreter
and national commentator. According to him, the founders of the Christian religion and
the American republic, two disparate groups from distinct pasts, sanctioned the present
law. He recovered the views of past prophets and politicians through historical
interpretation and then collapsed temporal distinction and distance to posit their current
relevance. Most commentators and interpreters accepted Stuart’s reasoning, but his
studied discussion left Theodore Parker unmoved. Historical criticism had nourished his
understanding of historical progress, allowing him to accept Stuart’s interpretation as
historically sound before dismissing the recovered biblical teachings and constitutional
imperatives as dated. He found errant proslavery provisions of past centuries at odds with
the antislavery spirit he described as characteristic of the nineteenth-century present.
This chapter describes how the Fugitive Slave Law incited responses in which
commentators brought together decades of biblical and constitutional argumentation and
demonstrates how the fugitive slave cases that followed turned erstwhile isolated
theological and legal uses of favored pasts into important markers of political posture. It
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also uses the writings and speeches of Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln to trace
the constitutionalization of the slavery issue in the 1850s, which reached its apogee in
Dred Scott (1857). An examination of their writings shows that the new focus on slavery
as a constitutional issue made the Revolutionary era more present than ever, but it also
demonstrates how it carried unique potential to historicize that era. And the process of
historicizing the most recent favored past seemed to suggest that all pasts, and indeed all
existence, bore the marks of time. In the Compromise of 1850 and, later, in Dred Scott,
the proslavery reading of the Constitution, as with the proslavery reading of the Bible,
carried the day. But the argument about the founders’ expediency and original
expectations, which gained powerful adherents, overcame that reading in the Civil War
era. Regardless of which uses of the founding era more influential, those on both sides of
the debates cultivated awareness of historical distance from that period.
The use of the historical distance resulting from linked biblical and constitutional
arguments about slavery, along with a shift of focus to the Constitution, found expression
before the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law. In early January 1848, the New York
Christian Inquirer demonstrated an almost Garrisonian willingness to slough off the
nation’s supposed supreme source of legal instruction. The article in question came on
the heels of the final major battles of the Mexican-American War in late 1847, a conflict
that further divided antislavery and proslavery forces and focused the debate on slavery’s
extension. It also came shortly after an unsuccessful motion to again table abolitionist
petitions. In 1836, Congress had invoked a gag rule against such petitions as part of the
Pinckney Resolutions. This ignited a drawn out battle against the rule, lead by the
indefatigable John Quincy Adams, who ultimately succeeded when Congress rescinded
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the resolution in late 1844.1 In the 1848 article, the Unitarian paper applauded Senator
Thomas Lanier Clingman of North Carolina who, though a “thorough going pro-slavery
man,” had cast the deciding vote “against the rule excluding abolition petitions” in a
session of the Thirtieth Congress in late 1847.2 As in 1843, the Whig senator had been the
only southerner who followed his hero Henry Clay in voting against tabling the
antislavery memorials.3 The Inquirer praised Clingman as a “calm, cool, sagacious, and
even candid reasoner,” but his vote was a function of electioneering and was rooted in a
belief that the petitions posed no threat to slavery. While noting the “care, distinctness,
frankness, and courtesy with which [Clingman] has treated the subject in a recent
speech,” the Inquirer disagreed about the power of the petitions. The author wrote that
“those who are the intelligent and conscientious foes of the institution, know that its
consideration is its condemnation; its trial, its doom.”4 Further along in the discussion,
the article seemed to suggest that the same might be said of the Bible and the
Constitution. When weighed in the balance, these documents might be found wanting.
Historical distance seemed to place them beyond the pale of present relevance.
From the outset, the paper distanced itself from antislavery disunionists, writing
that “we are not among those who think that the Union may not be preserved and slavery
abolished.” It further expressed “little sympathy with those who cannot conscientiously
employ every constitutional means to obtain the great end of emancipation, or who will
1
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not patiently wait so long as they see that any progress is making towards this result.”
While finding evidence of such progress, the author proceeded to use most of the space to
argue that “if it be proved that slavery is constitutional, and that we have no remedy
against it, whatsoever … and that nothing can be constitutionally done by us to arrest its
growth, or to provide means for its diminution and utter extinction, then … is the moment
to determine that we will cut ourselves loose from that abomination, and take the
consequences of dissolution.” While advocating moderation, like Theodore Parker the
paper, rather than dismiss as untenable the proslavery interpretation, proved willing to
accept it and then leave the Constitution and the South behind.5
A realization of the temporal distance from the founding informed this position,
which broadened to include even the Declaration. The writer stated, “we are almost ready
to believe with Mr. Clingman, that the framers of the Constitution did not provide, or
intend to provide, against the spread of slavery.” If further examination demonstrated that
the founding texts, including “the Declaration of Independence itself recognized the
lawfulness of negro-slavery, (which of course it does not,) even then would it follow that,
fifty years afterwards, we had no right to see our duty any more clearly than at the time
we adopted it? If a gross inconsistency were wrought in our Constitution, have we no
right to attempt to work it out?” The author expanded such reasoning further back in
time. “Do we attempt to defend polygamy because it was practiced by the Patriarchs, or
to adopt a monarchical form of government because the Gospel instructs us to honor the
king, or to burn witches because we read, ‘though shalt not suffer a witch to live?’ Are all
the errors and mistakes of good men to be forever maintained by those who see them to
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be such?” In most cases, the overlap in biblical and constitutional debate was rhetorical
rather than real and inadvertent rather than intended. Here, though, the link was clear.
And as in antislavery readings of the New Testament, a belief in the progress of human
insight into moral issues—“Does increased light bring with it no obligation to act up to
its illumination?”—warranted the move to disregard the ideas of the nation’s founding
texts.6
Although the article referenced the ancient biblical past, it remained firmly
focused on the recent Revolutionary era. Commentators’ increasing fixation on that
favored past was in part a function of politics, but it also illustrated the growing belief
that a resolution to the slavery debates rested in wrestling with the nation’s founding legal
text. At the brink of relegating a benighted Constitution to a past fast losing its favor
among radical abolitionists, the Inquirer proposed another solution. “We tell the South—
in our judgment, ‘Slavery is a crime.’ She returns us for answer—‘It is Constitutional.’
‘Very well,’ we reply, ‘suppose it is constitutional, we did not make the Constitution and
… we have not sworn not to see its defects, not to awaken to its immoral concessions and
compromises, not to labor to have it changed and improved!” The paper accepted that the
Constitution was deeply compromised and seriously flawed, but instead of calling for its
eternal abrogation, it proposed human emendation: “‘Do not tell us it is unchangeable,
and that we shall not be permitted to remonstrate against the continuance of its sinful
provisions. We seek to amend the Constitution. … Should we not be traitors to God did
we allow ourselves for a moment to hesitate whether we would continue the Union
forever upon your understanding of it—an interpretation which makes it unconstitutional

6

Ibid.
229

for us to be anything but self-convicted oppressors and man-stealers?’” The paper did not
discuss the framers’ expectations of slavery’s eventual end or appeal to their conceptions
that the Constitution should be amenable to change, ideas that achieved greater relevance
over the next decade. Instead, it asserted that historical distance itself justified
amendment. The article concluded with a demand: “It is time for Webster, and Davis, and
Winthrop, to do something more than give sidewise blows for truth, and justice, and
humanity.” Daniel Webster soon gave yet another sidewise blow, but, to antislavery
proponents, it felt like it came from the enemy.7

“It Is My Judgment That the South Is Right, and the North Is Wrong”: The Fugitive Slave
Law and Daniel Webster on Post-Founding Era Change
By the time Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law as part of the Compromise
of 1850 in September, Webster had long since pledged his support. The law gave federal
teeth to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which was meant to enforce the fugitive slave
clause by encouraging free-state authorities to assist in returning fugitive slaves to their
slave-state masters. In opposition to a number of personal liberty laws that northern states
had enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842),
the new law strengthened the old one significantly. Whereas Prigg had opened the door
to state legislation prohibiting the involvement of state officials, the new law imposed a
fine system for federal marshals and local officers who failed to arrest and return fugitive
slaves, while offering bonuses for their assistance. It also stipulated fines and
imprisonment for those caught supporting fugitive slaves, who had no legal recourse.
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Some northerners interpreted the new law, along with the fugitive slave cases that
followed, as a move to nationalize slavery. The law and the subsequent cases fanned the
flames of antislavery discontent.
At times, as displayed in Christian Inquirer article of January 1848, interpreters
attended to the founding texts of Christianity and of the new republic at once, and no
more so than in the debate over fugitive slaves at midcentury. On March 7, 1850, while
proclaiming allegiance to union over section, Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts
delivered a speech in support of the Compromise of 1850 and its attendant Fugitive Slave
Law. On a number of occasions, including at the groundbreaking of the Bunker Hill
Monument in 1825, the constitutional lawyer, statesman, and celebrated orator had
advanced what scholars describe as a sectional nationalism by imposing a New England
historical account and New England interests on the nation writ large.8 For example, in
his Second Reply to Hayne, part of a debate resulting from the Nullification Crisis, he had
cloaked his sectional stance in national attire, famously closing by issuing the motto:
“Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!”9 The opening of his Seventh
of March speech, then, seemed typical. Expressing a desire to speak “not as a
Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern man, but as an American,” he set out to make a
case “for the preservation of the Union” in addressing slavery, which, given recent
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events, required a “fresh discussion.”10 Webster, an unsuccessful Whig presidential
candidate, proceeded to outline a position that accorded well with the reading of the
moderate antislavery constitutionalists, who conceded slavery’s legality as a state
institution, but stressed what they understood as federal restrictions against its spread.
Before entering into a constitutional discussion, Webster highlighted slavery’s
existence during familiar historical eras, beginning with biblical times. He stated that
“slavery has existed in the world from time immemorial” and “in the earliest periods of
history,” specifically locating the institution “among the Jews,” the Greeks, and the
Romans.11 Slavery and civilization were not antithetical, Webster insisted, and neither
were slavery and Christianity. He informed his listeners that “at the introduction of
Christianity, the Roman world was full of slaves, and I suppose there is to be found no
injunction against that relation between man and man, in the teachings of the Gospel of
Jesus Christ, or of any of his apostles.” Webster was cognizant of the belief among some
northerners that “slavery … whatever may be said of it in the modifications which have
taken place, is not in fact according to the meek spirit of the Gospel.”12 He also
mentioned the stance of many slaveholders, noting that they “take things as they are.”13
Webster likely had in mind the circumstantial argument that slavery’s very existence
manifested its propriety as an institution in the American South. In contrast to antislavery
readers of the Bible who contended that ancient allowance did not imply divine sanction,
many slaveholders equated the institution’s endurance with providential approval. The
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difference between these positions hinged on whether circumstances shaped and in some
ways obscured God’s revelation and providence, or whether circumstances simply
reflected God’s will. Believing the former, some antislavery proponents held that while
long-term historical changes had removed obstructions to the spread of inspired
antislavery sentiment, more recent historical changes had solidified slavery as a
prominent southern institution. This understanding placed great emphasis on the role of
human actors in realizing God’s will. Webster thought that abolitionists went too far in
this regard. Although he did not mention the antislavery New Testament argument, he
used its logic against some of its purveyors. Citing Paul, he warned “‘that we are not to
do evil that good may come.’”14 He found abolitionists’ “too impatient to wait for the
slow progress of moral causes in the improvement of mankind.”15 Perhaps Christ and his
apostles had planted the seeds of slavery’s destruction, but the harvest season had not
arrived. One could not force fruition.
Proceeding to the constitutional debate, Webster considered “the state of
sentiment, North and South, in regard to slavery, at the time this Constitution was
adopted.”16 He called forth the “historical research back to that day” and the “authentic
records still existing among us.”17 While he found that “slavery did exist in the States
before the adoption of this Constitution, and at that time,” he also discovered “from all
the eminent men of the time the clearest expression of their opinion that slavery was an
evil.”18 Like Wendell Phillips, Webster proposed that the founders, and “Mr. Madison” in
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particular, “thought that slavery could not be continued in the country, if the importation
of slaves were made to cease, and therefore,” he stated, “they provided that after a certain
period the importation might be prevented, by the act of the new government.” According
to Webster, this idea did not originate in a desire to spread egalitarian principles, but
rather stemmed from a belief that “the white race would multiply faster than the black
race, and that slavery would therefore gradually wear out and expire.”19 Apparently, a
racist notion of white superiority rather than a humanistic belief in human equality
undergirded the founders’ expectations of slavery’s demise. However, seeming to
contradict his overall argument defending the new law as constitutional, Webster went on
to propose that Madison’s contempt for the idea of property in man accounted for why
the word “slave, or slavery, is not used in the Constitution,” noting that “the Constitution
does not require that ‘fugitive slaves’ shall be delivered up.”20 Appearing to support these
points, Webster made reference to the “concurrent and contemporaneous” transaction of
Congress in passing the Northwest Ordinance. Historical evidence confirmed “historical
truths,” including the “expectation that … slavery would begin to run out”; that
congressional power to prevent slavery’s spread “was executed in the most absolute
manner, and to the fullest extent”; and that “the Convention meant to leave slavery, in the
States, as they found it.”21 Webster’s historical account contained the basic elements of
moderate antislavery constitutionalism.
Once he had outlined the founders’ assumptions about slavery’s fate, he went on
to trace developments since that time, finding that “opinions … have changed, greatly
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changed, changed North, and changed South.”22 While the North grew “much more warm
and strong against slavery,” the South grew “much more warm and strong in its
support.”23 Webster cited proslavery gains in Louisiana, Florida, and Texas and seemed
unsettled by the fact that “the general lead in the politics of the country for three-fourths
of the period that has elapsed since the adoption of the Constitution, has been a Southern
lead.”24 Still, he described the change in the South’s stance as a natural progression.
If developments in the South were regrettable, yet reasonable, changes in the
North’s views of slavery were dangerous. “There has been found at the North,” Webster
observed, “among individuals and among legislators, a disinclination to perform, fully,
their constitutional duties in regard to the return of persons bound to service who have
escaped into the free States. In that respect,” he interjected, “it is my judgment that the
South is right, and the North is wrong.” Although critical of slavery’s spread, Webster
believed that allegiance to the Constitution required northerners to “deliver up fugitives
from service.”25 He had provided a strict reading of the importation clause in his previous
mention of Madison’s careful word choice, but here he left no doubt that the clause
referred to fugitive slaves. He believed that the Constitution originally placed
enforcement in the hands of the state, but, believing that Prigg v. Pennsylvania had
nationalized the issue, now he deferred to “the power of Congress and the national
judicature.” That deferral informed his decision to support the proposed Fugitive Slave
Law “with all its provisions, to the fullest extent.”26 The wayward abolitionists lacked
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justification in rejecting it, both “in the forum of conscience … [and] before the face of
the Constitution,” and might have been at fault for its passage.27 According to Webster,
the Virginia slavery debates of 1831-1832 showed that southerners had considered
abolition, but then came the reckless abolitionists and “every thing that this agitating
people have done has been, not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind
faster the slave population of the South.”28 He agreed that present circumstances placed
the North in a situation that “it never did expect to find itself when they agreed to the
compact of the Constitution,” but faulted northern agitation instead of southern
intransigence for the current crisis.29 And believing disunion to be “a moral
impossibility,” Webster thus championed “Liberty and Union.”30 He illuminated the
founding through historical investigation and although he discovered an expectation of
slavery’s dissolution, he argued that the North had to recognize the proslavery provisions
that post-founding era events bolstered rather than banished. After all, northern
abolitionists were the cause of this unfortunate effect.

“Men Will Be Astonished in the Next Century to Learn That the ‘Model Republic,’ Had
Such an Affection for Slaveholders”: Theodore Parker’s Double Helix of American
Progress and Corruption
To those attentive to Theodore Parker’s observations on the slavery crisis in the
late 1840s, his condemnation of Webster’s speech came as no surprise. Like Webster,
Parker narrated the rise of the Slave Power and of abolitionism, but with other antislavery
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readers he damned proslavery gains as deviations from founding era ideas and glorified
the spread of the antislavery spirit as evidence of history’s progress toward freedom; as a
clear sign that the harvest season had arrived. By 1850, Parker’s reading of the
Constitution in many ways mirrored the approach to the Bible he had developed in the
preceding decades. He had learned to divide transient teachings from permanent truths in
constitutional as well as biblical interpretation, particularly when dealing with slavery.
Like William Garrison, Parker held a somewhat conflicted view of the
Revolutionary era. Recent developments shaped that view. In early February of 1848,
American and Mexican representatives signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ending
conflict between two nations while fomenting discord between two sections. The
territorial gains stirred northern fears of slavery’s spread. Over a month after the war’s
completion, in late March, Parker delivered a discourse praising the recently deceased
John Quincy Adams. He acknowledged that “at the making of the Constitution, the South
out-talked the North,” but, like Garrison, argued that in doing so the South was “violating
the ideas of the Revolution,” or, the “American idea,” as he called it, “the idea that each
man has unalienable rights.31 That idea found clearest expression in the Declaration.
Parker praised Adams for going “back of the Constitution, to the Declaration of
Independence, for the ideas of the Constitution; yes, back to the Declaration to Human
Nature and the Laws of God, to legitimate these ideas.” Parker noted that Adams also
found the idea of liberty in common law. By reading the Constitution in this light, Parker
diverged from Garrison and found resonance with Goodell and Spooner. But he did not
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attempt to explain away the Constitution’s proslavery provisions. He noted that, in
Adams’ view, “the Constitution was not an idol; it was a means, not an end.” As “a
compromise between those ideas and institutions and prejudices existing when it was
made,” Adams “saw that the Constitution is ‘not the work of eternal justice, ruling
through the people,’ but the work ‘of man; frail, fallen, imperfect man, following the
dictates of his nature, and aspiring to be perfect.’”32 As in his biblical criticism, Parker
drew attention to the imperfections of the authors and their textual creation. Even though
he recognized what he viewed as transient proslavery clauses, with Adams he could read
the Constitution “as an instrument for the defence of the Rights of man.”33
Parker thus described slavery as “a lion who rent the Constitution, trampled under
foot the Declaration of Independence, and tore the Bible to pieces.”34 Slavery stood in
opposition to the American ideas that “shine out in all our history—I should say, our
early history.”35 Parker’s qualification implied that something had changed since the
founding era. In a December 1848 discourse on the Free Soil Party, Parker described the
change as an unexpected divergence from founding-era ideas. He linked the Free Soil
attack on slavery’s extension to the founding era, insisting that “it does not appear that
the men who framed the Constitution, or the people who accepted it, ever contemplated
the extension of slavery beyond the limits of the United States at that time. … The
principle of the Wilmot Proviso boasts the same origin as the Declaration of
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Independence.”36 Webster echoed some of these sentiments in his subsequent Seventh of
March speech. Indeed, he would use words similar to Parker, who stated that “in 1787,
the best and the most celebrated statesmen were publicly active on the side of freedom.
Some thought slavery a sin, others a mistake, but nearly all in the Convention thought it
an error.” Parker traced out a familiar antislavery declension narrative, noting that while
“the North granted the southern demands” and “the anti-slavery spirit cooled down. …
The Missouri Compromise again disturbed the public mind. But that was soon
forgotten.”37 Since that time, pecuniary interests sapped Americans’ moral stamina and
muffled antislavery voices. These changes, along with more recent developments, led to
the devolution of the original federalist and anti-federalist parties into new parties, “in
which guise some of their fathers would scarcely recognize the family type.”38 Slavery’s
growing presence in American politics made it clear that theirs was not the republic of
their ancestors.
This kind of narration of declension alone did not signal a new awareness of
historical distance. The jeremiad had long been part of the human and the American
experience. But this was not a simple narration of decline or a nostalgic call to recover
the past. Rather than despair, Parker posited the parallel progress of antislavery
sentiment. “Where sin abounded,” he stated, “grace doth much more abound. There rose
up one man,” meaning Garrison, “who would not compromise, nor be silent,—who
would be heard.”39 Parker, who expected new Christs to appear, compared conscientious
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abolitionists to the Galilean in his intended understatement that “a Man who had not
where to lay his head ... has had some influence on the history of the world.”40
Christianity’s humble beginnings matched those of American abolitionism. The
antislavery idea was the American idea—the Declaration’s assertion that all are created
equal—and it was “bottomed on Christianity.”41 Similar to Francis Wayland, Parker
linked Christianity with the Declaration, but he located fulfillment not in Revolutionary
era legal texts, but rather in present ideas and actions. He described abolitionism as the
“idea of the time” and as consistent with “the spirit of the age.”42 This idea “went on,
spite of the most entire, the most bitter, the most heartless and unrelenting opposition
ever known in America.”43 Parker agreed with Garrison that the current crisis outmatched
that of the Revolution. The antislavery idea had not found a home among a political party
yet—the Free Soil Party fell short—“the time has not come for that.”44 Thus, “the
revolution in ideas is not over till” the “motto ‘No more slave territory’” gives way to
“‘No slavery in America,’ nor the corresponding revolution in deeds while a single slave
remains in America. A man who studies the great movements of mankind feels sure that
that day is not far off.”45 This historical narration of the post-founding era paralleled
Webster’s later account in many ways, but Parker described the oft-submerged
development of antislavery sentiment as natural, and proposed that it would overcome
what he understood to be the unnatural growth of the Slave Power. The scalpel of
antislavery sentiment would cut out the cancerous tumor of proslavery power.
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Although he had shown a willingness to follow antislavery constitutionalists in
making the Constitution cohere to the Declaration, Parker’s loyalties lay with the idea of
freedom rather than with the nation’s written legal creed. He stated that if the Free Soil
Party embraced “the idea of freedom, no constitutional scruple will long hold them from
destroying the ‘peculiar institution.’” Parker felt sure that the long-awaited day was near.
He observed, “What slavery is in the middle of the nineteenth century is quite plain; what
it will be at the beginning of the twentieth it is not difficult to foresee.” Plainly, slavery
belonged in a ruder time and place, and the further spread of antislavery ideas would
ensure it erasure from America. In his Seventh of March speech, Webster placed the
blame for slavery’s continuance at the feet of the abolitionists. Here, Parker conceded
that that “the slave power has gained a great victory” in election of Zachary Taylor, but
then declared that “one more such will cost its life.”46 Proslavery forces won a few more
victories—including the Fugitive Slave Law (1850), the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854),
and Dred Scott (1857)—but Parker was not far off as such victories bolstered the
antislavery ranks. While he was confident that antislavery ideas would triumph over
proslavery politics, slavery qualified his view of America as exceptional. “Men will be
astonished in the next century to learn that the ‘model republic,’ had such an affection for
slaveholders.”47 America could seem ancient rather than modern. Citing a deed of sale in
which a slave had been sold to President Zachary Taylor, Parker demonstrated a
remarkable sense of historical distance, “If this document had been discovered among
some Egyptian papyri, with the date 1848 before Christ, it would have been remarkable
as a sign of the times. In a republic, nearly four thousand years later, it has a meaning
46
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which some future historian will appreciate.”48 The meaning, one might surmise, was that
the peculiar institution was anachronistic.
Parker’s account highlighted historical contingency and distance. More than other
antislavery interpreters, he demonstrated an ambivalence about change since the founding
era. He believed that the lamentable rise of the Slave Power was only matched by the
glorious spread of antislavery sentiment. This kind of narration, coupled with the idea
that slavery challenged exalted understandings about the American republic, created a
sense of the contingent nature of historical change. It also spread awareness of historical
distance. On the one hand, Parker depicted the sale of slaves as a barbaric practice
characteristic of ancient times. One the other hand, he described the spread of antislavery
sentiment as representative of the “spirit of the [present] age.” In turn, that portrayal
made sharper the claim that the Slave Power flowed against the nineteenth-century
current. In allowing that slavery fit comfortably in the biblical past, and even in the
Revolutionary past, and then arguing that it had an awkward existence in the present,
Parker drew attention to and used historical distance to damn the peculiar institution.
Expressing concern that “another compromise is to be feared,” Parker remained
certain of the ultimate triumph of the American idea.49 But when that compromise came
in 1850 and it received Webster’s stamp of approval, Parker’s optimism seemed to
waver. In a 25 March speech at Boston’s Faneuil Hall, Parker noted the solemnity of the
present century, stating that “this age is full of great questions, but this of Freedom is the
chief.” That seminal question meant political conflict between “the party of Slavery” and
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“the party of Freedom,” one of which “is to swallow up all the other parties.”50 In that
battle, the Massachusetts Senator had struck a blow in favor of the former through his
Seventh of March speech, which Parker considered the “most cowardly” of all Webster’s
wrongs.51 He drove home his point with a historical comparison: “I know no deed in
American history, done by a son of New England, to which I can compare this, but the
act of Benedict Arnold!”52 Even abolitionists who drew attention to historical distance,
like Parker, continued to find the Revolution useful, at least to highlight current
cowardice. Adding to his prior historical narration, he located antislavery victories in
1774 (a resolution against slave importation), 1776 (the Declaration), 1778 (a
Confederacy without a fugitive slave provision), and 1787 (the Northwest Ordinance). In
this strained account, the Constitution was neutral. Parker noted an antislavery blow in
the 1808 abolition of the slave trade, but then traced proslavery advances in 1803 (the
Louisiana Purchase), 1819 (the acquisition of Florida), 1820 (the western expansion of
slavery), 1845 (the Texas annexation), and 1848 (Mexican cession).53 The narration
placed emphasis not on the Constitution, but on pre and post-founding-era developments
and on Webster’s politically motivated approval of the “Bill of abominations,” which
soon passed as the Fugitive Slave Law. The new law stood in line with a string of
proslavery successes since 1808.54 Projecting retrogression into the future, Parker
lamented, “In 1750, in all the United States, but two hundred thousand” slaves labored
beneath the republic’s false banner, “now, three millions. In 1950, let Mr. Webster’s
50

Theodore Parker, “A Speech at a Meeting of the Citizens of Boston in Faneuil
Hall,” in Speeches, 3 vols. (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1861), 3:2.
51
Ibid., 3:3.
52
Ibid., 3:33.
53
Ibid., 3:6-7.
54
Ibid., 3:19-30, quotation on 22.
243

counsels be followed, there will be thirty millions.”55 Parker showed that he could create
a useful future just as well as he could create a useful past, and that future looked bleak.
Perhaps the proslavery compromise would not translate into antislavery success after all.
Though he passed over it earlier in the speech, close to his conclusion Parker
trained his focus on the Constitution and its framers. If, at times, he read that document as
antislavery in spirit, he did not overlook its errors, nor forgive the failures of the framers,
but he attributed those failures to the limitations of that age. He explained that in framing
the Constitution, “Our fathers made a political, and a commercial, and a moral error—
shall we repeat it?” he asked. “They did a wrong shall we extend and multiply the wrong?
Was it an error in our fathers; not barely a wrong—was it a sin? No, not in them; they
knew it not. But what in them to establish was only an error, in us to extend or to fester is
a sin!”56 Parker’s sense of historical progress—by which errors became sins—could
encourage a rather sympathetic approach to the actions and teachings of past figures,
although that corresponded with a move to place the past on a lower moral standing
relative to the present rather than an effort to understand the past on its own terms. Parker
believed that, like Paul, the framers’ eyes were not open to evil. However, time and
progress made contemporary Christian Americans culpable. Developments since the
founding had made the sin of slavery even more apparent, and thus to overlook its
continued existence implicated the entire nation. In 1850, Webster had more light than
Paul or Madison and thus merited greater condemnation. It was left to see how his
contemporaries would respond.
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“Even a Bad Bargain Must Be Kept”: Moses Stuart and the Valuing of Original
Meanings over Original Expectations
When religious radicals such as Parker damned Webster’s placating stance, a
number of New England’s prominent citizens rose to defend him, including the venerable
Congregationalist Moses Stuart, who had resigned from his post at Andover in 1848. In
Conscience and the Constitution (1850), Stuart, America’s most eminent biblical scholar,
applied his learning to the nation’s religious and legal texts. The significance of the
moment did not escape him. He wrote that “never, since the Declaration of Independence,
and the formation of the United States Constitution, has there been so much deep feeling
excited, or so much effort called forth.”57 Early on, Stuart, who prided himself for staying
out of politics in the past but who wanted to avoid violence at all costs, made clear his
position, declaring, “I am ready to support every shade of sentiment, on every topic upon
which Mr. Webster’s speech touches.”58 Although he provided a constitutional as well as
a biblical defense of Webster, Stuart was particularly worried that respondents might
dishonor Paul, writing, “that the great apostle himself may be brought into some
disrepute, among a certain class of readers, by my exposure of his sentiments on the
present occasions, is what I fear.”59 Some of slavery’s opponents believed that an open
consideration of the issue would bring about its demise. Stuart worried that a similar fate
might await Paul’s standing through a discussion of his teachings on slavery. In the early
1840s, Parker had already written that “Paul had not his eye open to the evil, but sent
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back a fugitive.”60 Stuart’s argument allowed Parker to further articulate his disapproval
of the ancient apostle’s teaching.
Following Webster’s lead, Stuart began with the Bible. Before addressing the
New Testament debate, he aimed to settle the argument from the Old Testament. He first
established “the great antiquity of slavery.” In the antebellum era, Americans often
authorized an idea or an institution by appealing to its antiquity, but that justification
became increasingly precarious when new light seemed to show that the ancients’ words
and deeds were immoral rather than immortal. Historical research, though, could also
place them in a positive light relative to modern practices. While showing that Abraham
had a vast cadre of slaves, Stuart acknowledged that the patriarch’s “relation to these
slaves was somewhat different from that of master to slave among us.”61 Too much of a
scholar not to notice historical differences, Stuart granted that in Abrahamic slavery,
which he compared to Eastern servitude, slaves were “generally treated with less rigor,
and more as human beings should be treated, than they are in most countries called
Christian.”62 Patriarchal slavery still possessed features that were distasteful to modern
sensibilities. For example, bondwomen often acted as concubines. Slavery, in this
instance, suffered from its Old Testament association with polygamy, though Stuart, as
with other proslavery interpreters, believed the gospel had replaced the latter vice with
the original institution of monogamous marriage. Though Stuart held that the Patriarchs
did not intend to do wrong in this regard, he wrote that “this will not justify us in
imitating them. … They do not concern us; for the blessed God, by his gospel, having
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scattered the darkness of early ages, has made us to walk in the clear light of the Sun of
Righteousness. … Every man’s conduct is to be judged of in most cases, at least in some
good measure, by the light he has, and by the age and circumstances in which he lived.”63
Stuart, in essence, agreed with Parker and other antislavery interpreters in emphasizing
the progress of human understanding relative to God’s revelation. In gaining a more
complete and accurate picture of biblical times, all of these interpreters recognized that
historical distance separated the past, especially the patriarchal past, from the present.
Becoming more familiar with a past period, and thus with its peculiarities, drew attention
to its estrangement from current era.
Similar to Theodore Weld’s analysis, Stuart dismissed the idea that the Patriarchs
were worthy of imitation and also distinguished between the Patriarchal and the “Mosaic
Constitution and Laws.”64 Using Exodus 21 as his text, he outlined “the picture of the
slavery of Hebrews among Hebrews.” He noted that at Sinai Moses “declared that
Hebrew man-servants should be free after six years,” but only forty years later did he
make that law applicable to female servants. To account for this inconsistency, Stuart
applied the argument from expediency, often used to explain the apostles’ actions also
applied to the framers of the Constitution, to Moses. He wrote that the ancient lawgiver
“had common sense and judgment enough to see, that legislation could not change the
established internal structure of a nation or common wealth in a day.”65 Here appealing to
historical particularity to explain Moses’s actions, Stuart proceeded to assume temporal
sameness by contrasting such actions with those of the abolitionists, who “think that his
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eyes were but half opened.”66 Although historical distance made the ancient Patriarchs’
actions irrelevant, for some reason the laws of the less ancient Moses remained pertinent.
Citing Deuteronomy 23, Stuart explained that if a slave had escaped from a heathen
master he might find asylum among the Hebrews, but not so for a slave who had escaped
from a Hebrew master, for “reclamation of him could be lawfully made.”67 With this
understanding, Stuart wondered “how can we appeal to the passage in question, to justify,
yea even to urge, the retention of fugitive bond-men in our own country?”68 While
highlighting historical difference to undermine antislavery uses of the Old Testament,
Stuart all but conflated Mosaic religion with modern American Christianity in suggesting
that Moses sanctioned the Fugitive Slave Law. He granted that “the Mosaic dispensation
was a preparatory one,” writing that “none can now crave liberty to purchase slaves of
the Gentiles or Jews, on the ground of Mosaic permission.”69 As Molly Oshatz argues,
slavery alone directed Stuart to recognize the archaic nature of some biblical texts. He did
not believe that the Old Testament sanctioned American slavery.70 However, he still
appealed to the Old Testament to defend the Fugitive Slave Law. Indeed, he proposed
that “if Abolitionists are right in their position, then Moses is greatly in the wrong.”71
Similar to Richard Fuller, Stuart simply wanted to demonstrate that slavery was not
malum in se (sinful in itself), but in doing so he suggested that despite significant
historical differences and vast historical distances, the Old Testament stood on the side of
fugitive-seeking slaveholders.
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He granted that the Mosaic Law “was confined to one nation, and was never
designed to be a permanent and universal religion,” but proceeded to argue that “the
moral and spiritual part of it … has its basis in the relations of God to man, and of men to
God and to each other,” and thus concluded that “they are unrepealed and irrepealable.”72
Finding continuity between Moses and Christ on this matter, Stuart again used the
argument from expediency, this time applying it to the New Testament. He believed that
“the Saviour uttered sentiments, which, in their ultimate effects, must abolish—totally
and forever abolish—all slavery. … But where did he intermeddle with the then existing
relations between master and slave? Not a word is to be found in the Gospels indicative
of such an interposition.”73 In essence, this argument paralleled that of Stuart’s student
Francis Wayland and Stuart’s Unitarian correspondent William Channing, both of whom
only later adopted immediate emancipationist views. It even matched that of the more
radical Albert Barnes. But while these figures had come to believe that enough time had
passed to cultivate the antislavery seeds sowed in New Testament times, Stuart seemed to
forget the historical distance he had referenced in stating that Christ’s “policy differed …
from that of the immediate Emancipationists.” After inculcating principles that “would
banish slavery from the face of the earth,” Christ left “the completion of the work to time,
and to the slow but sure operation of the principles which he inculcated. … He, it would
seem, believed that the sudden breaking up of the then existing frame-work of society,
would have occasioned evils greater than slavery.”74 Stuart, as with Wayland, Channing,
and Barnes, believed that Jesus had planted antislavery seeds, but apparently thought that
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time had not yet nourished them. 1800 years later, Christ still counseled patience and
perseverance. Despite his keen awareness of historical difference, Stuart seemed to
suggest that little, with regard to slavery, had changed since Jesus introduced the gospel.
Turning to Paul, who had encouraged obedience amongst slaves, Stuart feared
that some “do not think that any serious regard be paid to his teachings or his example, in
respect to the matter before us.” Chiding his American contemporaries, he wrote that “an
honest deist … might consistently ignore Paul. But this will not do for Christians.”75 If
Moses’s morals still applied, then certainly Paul’s injunctions still mattered. Stuart called
on biblical criticism to assist in his interpretation. He read a passage from 1 Corinthians 7
as evidence that Paul did not believe that conversion changed the convert’s status.
Building a contextual case, he noted that “even De Wette, (who for his high libertynotions was banished from Germany), in his Commentary on the passage, seems plainly
to accede to the force of this reasoning.”76 Servants and slaves “are not to be anxious and
uneasy and discontented. … It should suffice, that they are the Lord’s freemen.” It was
De Wette, of course, who was largely responsible for Parker’s response to Stuart. Stuart
affirmed that the gospel was for slaves as well, but like Joseph Buckminster, he held that
eternal salvation had no bearing on temporal servitude. Again comparing the abolitionists
to the first Christians, Stuart worried that “if the great apostle himself were to reappear on
earth, and come now into the midst of us … he would unquestionably incur the danger of
being mobbed.”77 Despite this conflation of temporal distinction, Stuart referenced the
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difference between Mosaic theocracy and the American democracy and even of the civil
conditions of the early Christians he declared, “How entirely different were those from
our own!”78 While Wayland had contrasted ancient and American governance to assert
the present possibility of popular legislation—“we make our own laws”—Stuart
contrasted the Mosaic and Christian dispensations with nineteenth-century America to
explain the biblical figures’ inability to change legislation. “Paul, Peter, and other
disciples, thought it best to wait with patience for the greater prevalence of Christianity,
and its more matured state, before they urged obligations on masters to free their
slaves.”79 Stuart failed to notice that the changes in governance he referenced might allow
Americans to do what the apostles could not: create laws to abolish slavery. As with most
American commentators, Stuart did not consider the implications of his argument. He did
not recognize that in pointing out the historical distinctions between the biblical pasts and
the American present, he undermined his historical comparisons. The new realization of
historical distance and difference resulting from biblical and constitutional interpretation
emerged in relation to the persistence of traditional interpretive assumptions.
Stuart concluded his treatment with a discussion of how Christian principles
should inform Americans’ behavior in regards to slavery. In doing so, he coupled his
biblical interpretation with a constitutional reading of the fugitive slave clause. He
brought the Declaration and the Constitution together, as he had the Old and New
Testaments, but rather than read the latter in the light of the former, he reversed the
relationship, denying that the Declaration was meant to condemn slavery before strongly
dismissing the idea of a “palpable disagreement between the Declaration of
78
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Independence, and the Constitution of the United States!”80 Though he had joined
biblical and constitutional arguments in defense of the Fugitive Slave Law, he left little
question as to which canonical text mattered most in this discussion. In what might have
been a surprising concession, earlier in the text he had argued that “even if the Bible had
neither said nor implied anything in relation to this whole matter, the solemn compact
which we have made, before heaven and earth, to deliver up fugitives … is enough to
settle the question of legal right on the part of the master, whatever we may think of his
claim when viewed in the light of Christianity.”81 Stuart understood that in terms of
legality, constitutional law trumped Christian sentiment, and grasped that the debate
increasingly revolved around question of legality rather than those of morality. The
qualitative nature of Stuart’s statement—“the question of legal right”—guarded readers
from the conclusion that he, like some radical abolitionists, had also privileged the
Revolutionary over the biblical past, but even this orthodox biblical scholar understood
that constitutional interpretation carried unmatched consequences in the political
environment of 1850. Stuart still held up the Bible as the central moral guide, and
believed that both it and the Constitution trumped conscience.
Turning to the oft-debated New Testament passage wherein Paul sends Onesimus,
an escaped slave and recent Christian convert, back to his master Philemon, Stuart used
historical reasoning to dismantle claims, put forth by antislavery writers, including
Channing and Barnes, that Onesimus was something other than a slave. His orthodoxy
demanded a literal reading of the text and a unilateral application of its moral lessons.
“Paul’s Christian conscience,” in contrast to the abolitionists’ rejection of slaveholders’
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rights, “would not permit him to injure the vested rights of Philemon.”82 Returning his
attention to the nation’s more recent sacred text, he argued that the Constitution protected
the sovereignty of southern states and their property laws, and then dismissed claims that
valued conscience over Constitution. Stuart called on the nation’s founding generation as
he castigated abolitionists like Parker, asking his contemporaries, “can we respect a
conscience, which puts the broad seal of disgrace and infamy on those immortal men and
patriots, who formed our Constitution, and who in all our States accepted and approved
of it?”83 Stuart appealed to past figures of originating moments, biblical and
Revolutionary, and illuminated their views through historical explication, only to again
collapse temporal distance. If the apostle Paul “were now among us” his life would be in
danger; if the founder John Jay could see his son William Jay, an active member of the
AASS, this “immortal ancestor” would look on “with a mixture of sorrow and of
frowning.”84 Stuart accepted history as the common discursive currency, but other
factors, including religious beliefs and political motivations, constrained his historical
sensibilities. He reached into the past and used historical explication to recover and apply
the original meanings of founding documents of church and state.
In this somewhat erratic discussion, Stuart went on to argue that slavery “is a
glaring contradiction of the first and fundamental principle, not only of the Bible which
declares that all are of one blood, but of our Declaration of Independence, which avers,
that all men are born with an inherent and inalienable right to life, liberty, and
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property.”85 His mention of property must have drawn wry smiles from proslavery
readers and dim frowns from their antislavery counterparts. Stuart further tied together
the New Testament and the Declaration, and bound both to the spirit of the Revolutionary
age, writing that the latter reiterated the Golden Rule, “a truly Christian and gospel
principle. It is the unquestionable index of all but universal American feeling in 1776.”
Stuart seemed to agree with the antislavery constitutionalists that at the ratification of the
Constitution “it was then universally understood among all the States who formed it, that
slavery was to be got rid of,” though he added, “just as soon as it could be done
peaceably and with safety.”86 With Webster, Stuart argued that the time for abolition had
not arrived, in large part due to abolitionism. He opined that “the liberation of the slaves
is put back at least half a century, by this ill-timed, violent, and most injudicious
movement.”87 Far from representing the spirit of the age, abolitionism kept America
behind the times. Like Parker, Stuart did believe that “the spirit of freedom is waking the
world to new life.”88 However, he maintained that the North remained bound “so long as
the Article in the Constitution remains,” for “even a bad bargain must be kept.”89

Parker’s “‘Short and Easy Method’”: An Archaic Bible and an Outdated Constitution
Stuart’s lengthy and studied defense of Webster’s position had no impact on
Parker, who had arrived at his heterodox view of the New Testament in the early 1840s
and since then had adopted a similar view of the Constitution. According to him, both
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texts had been written by good men, who nonetheless could not escape the influence of
the erroneous notions of their times. In a speech delivered at the New England AntiSlavery Convention in late May, two months after he gave his response to Webster at
Faneuil Hall, Parker somberly retraced the advances of the dominant Slave Power in the
irreconcilable conflict between the “idea of Freedom” and the “idea of Slavery.”90
Finding “much to discourage a man who believes in the progress of his race,” he outlined
developments since 1789, lamenting that “since the adoption of the Constitution,
protected by that shield, mastering the energies of the nation, and fighting with that
weapon, slavery has been continually aggressive.”91 In this narrative the Constitution was
no longer neutral, but signaled rather a fatal first step in the proslavery rise to its present
political prominence in 1850. Parker’s depiction of proslavery advances as aggressive
matched his belief that slavery itself was out of step with the general sentiment of the
nineteenth century. The state of affairs in 1850 reminded him of “the spirit which
prevailed in the Roman Senate, A. D. 62, when about four hundred slaves were crucified.”
He found Tacitus’s account of the event “instructive, too, at these times.”92 In contrast to
some of Stuart’s historical comparisons, Parker’s was meant to evidence the regressed
state of the American nation rather than condemn the actions of the abolitionists or
confirm the current relevance of ancient deeds.
In their speeches, Webster and Stuart specifically supported the Fugitive Slave
Law, but in 1850 such support was tantamount to a defense of slavery itself. Viewing
Webster’s speech as the latest in a long line of proslavery consolidations, Parker still held
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out hope. He expected that the people of Massachusetts would not countenance
Webster’s act, which he again compared to “the treachery of Benedict Arnold.”93 He did
not believe that the Bay State would “efface Lexington and Bunker Hill from her
memory.”94 Although the Constitution marked the beginning of the current crisis, Parker
still knew how to use the Revolutionary past for his purposes. Referencing the “orthodox
minister” from Andover, he proposed “a ‘short and easy method’ with Professor Stuart,
and all other men who defend slavery out of the Bible. If the Bible defends slavery, it is
not so much better for slavery, but so much the worse for the Bible.”95 Parker did not
discriminate among biblical texts or between patriarchs, prophets, and apostles. “If
Christianity supports American slavery, so much the worse for Christianity,” he declared,
“We all know it does not, never did, and never can. But if Paul was an apologist for
slavery, so much the worse for Paul.”96 Parker’s wry comment carried awful weight; if
and when the traditional canon contradicts conscience, conscience trumps canon. Rather
than argue, as Barnes had, that Paul had instructed Philemon to receive Onesimus as a
brother and a freeman in Christ, or, as Channing and Wayland had, that Paul, aware of his
circumstances, had inculcated principles meant to abolish slavery, Parker granted the
accuracy of Stuart’s understanding of the passage’s original meaning only to then devalue
its relevance as a moral guide in the present. What, though, of Stuart’s enlistment of the
Constitution? Parker made it clear that he was no respecter of founding documents.
Earlier in the speech, he referenced the Free Soil Party’s effort to oppose “slavery so far
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as it is possible to do, and yet comply with the Constitution.”97 He honored Salmon
Chase and William Seward, who offered up “very noble words against slavery; heroic
words in behalf of freedom,” but he called on them to go further in putting an end to the
institution, warning that “if the Constitution of the United States will not allow it, there is
another Constitution that will.”98 Rather than struggle to salvage the nation’s founding
religious and legal texts through creative interpretations, Parker stood ready to admit that
those documents had worn out their welcome in the antislavery nineteenth-century.
Webster, Stuart, and Parker each provided interpretations of the Bible and the
Constitution and offered historical accounts that drew attention to real temporal
distinctions dividing biblical from modern times and that highlighted real historical
changes separating the founding era from the present. Webster and Stuart agreed that
Christ and his apostles had inculcated principles meant to extinguish slavery’s searing
flames and that the framers had expected the clinging of chains to eventually cease, but
both attributed the republic’s failure to realize the egalitarian promises found in the
Revolutionary and, presumably, the biblical pasts to the counterproductive efforts of the
American abolitionists. In their attempts to quench the flames, the abolitionists had only
added fuel to the fire. Stuart, in particular, denied the importance of historical distinctions
when he used biblical precedent to condemn the actions of the abolitionists. However, in
defending the actions of Moses and the apostles as expedient, his argument highlighted
those historical distinctions. Slavery forced Stuart to recognize, a greater extent than
before, that the sacred writers and actors had accommodated to their times. Such
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recognition drew attention to historical distance, even when Stuart still made crosstemporal applications in his biblical interpretations.
Parker offered an alternative account that made more direct use of historical
distance. He placed the blame for unfulfilled promises at the feet of the Slave Power and
its conspirators in the North. He explained the failures of both Christian and national
founders through a historical explanation that stressed the progress of moral
understanding. The sin of slavery was not in the unenlightened mothers and fathers
whose eyes were shut to evil but in the illuminated sons and daughters who knew better.
The emphasis on corruptions in the form of the rise of abolitionism or, in Parker’s case,
of the Slave Power suggested that historical development was a contingent process and
that historical distance left a chasm between present and past. In conjunction with his
sense of the progress of moral understanding, Parker’s depiction of proslavery actions as
anachronistic stressed that substantial historical changes had created a gulf between
Americans and their favored biblical and Revolutionary pasts. It also checked a sense of
America’s status on the world stage, but Parker remained convinced that the nineteenth
century was an age of freedom, an age to fulfill the promises of the fathers. So did
Frederick Douglass.

“The Original Intent and Meaning of the Constitution … Makes It a Pro-Slavery
Instrument”: Frederick Douglass’s Early Garrisonian Approach to the Constitution
Each of these interpreters recognized the importance of the Bible in the slavery
debates and spent some time explicating its meaning. However, even theologians and
ministers such as Stuart and Parker recognized that constitutional interpretation had taken
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on a determinative role in the debates. Most parties involved came to believe that the fate
of four million slaves did not rest in biblical exegesis but rather in constitutional
construction. Even the Declaration of Independence, a sacralized text, retained relevance
only to the extent that it could be used as the key to unlocking the Constitution’s
meaning. The constitutionalization of slavery during the 1850s directed an unprecedented
level of scrutiny toward the Constitution and the founding era, fulfilling a potential
inadvertently created by the founding generation.99
In the controversy surrounding the Fugitive Slave Law and the subsequent
fugitive slave cases, Frederick Douglass, once America’s most famous fugitive slave—
his English supporters had purchased his freedom in 1846—changed his opinion of the
Constitution. In the spring of 1851, the onetime anti-constitutional Garrisonian converted
to Gerrit Smith’s radical constitutionalism. Most of the prominent antebellum antislavery
approaches to the Constitution found a voice in Douglass at one time or another. The
evolution of his constitutional views demonstrates the lure of radical constitutionalism
but also the lingering influence of the Garrisonian interpretation, with its emphasis on
contextual and historical reasoning. Even as Douglass, convinced by the arguments of
antislavery constitutionalists such as Alvan Stewart, William Goodell, and Lysander
Spooner, adopted Smith’s position, he retained an interest in understanding the intentions
and expectations of the framers. Before these interpretive approaches to the Constitution
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found their most public hearing in Dred Scott, they clashed among various groups of
antislavery advocates and within the mind of Douglass.100
Illuminated through the dark aftermath of the Fugitive Slave Law, Douglass’s
path to antislavery constitutionalism was a gradual climb. In the same year that Spooner
published The Unconstitutionality of Slavery and Phillips published The Constitution a
Pro-Slavery Compact, the famous fugitive published his autobiography, Narrative of the
Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave (1845), and immediately set sail for a
speaking tour to Ireland and Britain. It was clear that, at this point, Douglass was a
Garrisonian. Free to speak his mind about his country before a foreign audience,
including the foreign newspaper reporters who recorded his words, Douglass often
highlighted the hypocrisy of the supposed democracy, which “proclaimed to the world
that all mankind were created freeborn; and for the maintenance of that principle she
solemnly swore before high Heaven that she would vindicate and uphold it by force, at
expense, at the sacrifice of life. … But alas! how had she carried out her pledge: what
was the condition of slavery there?”101 Douglass believed in the egalitarian principles he
located in the Declaration of Independence, principles for which black Revolutionaries
had died—“for it was a negro who shed the first blood”—but, like Garrison, he found
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treachery in the states’ union “under one constitution,” a Constitution that “protected and
supported slavery.”102
In Douglass, too, one finds a deep interest in the Bible as well as the Constitution.
Unlike Parker, his critique of the latter text did not follow from or transfer to his view of
the former. He often criticized the so-called Christian nation, where “Bibles and slaveholders go hand in hand,” for corrupting scripture, and during his tour he frequently
discouraged the Irish Free Church from accepting funds from their false brethren in the
American South.103 The corroding power of slavery and the resulting proslavery
interpretation of the Bible, rather than the Bible itself, was the problem. Indeed, whereas
proslavery biblical interpreters fused the Testaments together to defend slavery, Douglass
united them to condemn the institution. In one 1845 speech, he cited a letter from Moses
Stuart, whom he described as “an advocate for slavery,” wherein the Andover divine
instructed his correspondent that Paul had sent back Onesimus “into slavery for life.”
Douglass referenced a passage from Deuteronomy, the very one Stuart wrestled from
antislavery interpreters in Conscience and the Constitution, to argue that because “there
was no such thing known among the Jews as slavery for life,” Paul must have sent back
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Onesimus “not as a slave who could be sold in the market, but as a beloved brother.”104
According to the record of a May 1846 speech, he again made the same argument. “I do
not agree with the opinion that the apostle Paul recognised Onesimus as the property of
Philemon. The Jewish law says: ‘Thou shalt not deliver a man back to his master; he shall
dwell with thee in the land.’ I do not think, that if, under Moses and the prophets, it
would have been wrong to return me back to bondage, that in the nineteenth century of
the Christian era it would be right to send me back. I think, however, it would be right to
send back the money.” Douglass’s demand on the Free Church drew laughter and cheers
from his audience.105 Even as he selectively called on both the Old and New Testaments,
and collapsed time in his application of the scriptures, his reference to the current century
exposed the vast temporal gap from the times in which the sacred writers had penned
them. The slavery debates cultivated a sense of historical distance even among those who
still assumed contemporaneity with the past. Although he was unfamiliar with biblical
criticism, Douglass believed in progress and implied historical distance from the biblical
past, which could make appeals to the Bible problematic.
Similar to Parker, Douglass believed that although “there never was so great a
determination among large numbers to get rid of [slavery] as at the present time,” the
southern institution had a stranglehold on the American nation, which he described as
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“the sheet-anchor of slavery throughout the world.”106 In Douglass’s mind, the United
States was the last great defender of slavery and slavery was the last great barrier to
human progress. American slavery stood in strange juxtaposition to the spread of
antislavery sentiment. The endurance of the former depended on “slave-holding religion
in the south and a pro-slavery religion in the north,” and its secure status rested on
proslavery constitutional provisions and a proslavery government. In an August 1846
speech in England, Douglass set out to “give the meeting a history of the American
government.” According to contemporary reports, he explained that “there was a clause
in the general Constitution to the effect that the general government should not interfere
with institutions in the states. Thus whilst the general government could not put down
slavery, it had been prostituted to uphold it, and thereby slavery was made a national
institution.” Douglass referenced “one clause in the American Constitution” in particular,
“which made it the duty of the several states to return the slave to his master when he
escaped from bondage.”107 This particular clause soon received a major renovation, and
that renovation turned up the heat in constitutional debates.
In 1847, Douglass returned from his speaking tour a free and independent man,
set on establishing a newspaper through which an independent African American voice
could enter the public sphere. With assistance from the same friends who had purchased
his freedom, Douglass soon established the North Star. Scholar T. Gregory Garvey
describes the paper’s creation as a strategic move to claim structural equality on the
public stage and to shift the center of attention from Douglass himself to the Constitution.
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Douglass aimed to become a participant in, rather than just an object of, debate. Garrison,
his mentor, had successfully applied the revivalistic methods of the Second Great
Awakening to secular debates, which assisted him in efforts to reject conventional
discourse and “come out” from traditional religious and political institutions. In order to
embrace come-outerism like Garrison one had to be firmly situated within American
society and thus Douglass was in no such position to imitate his friend. Instead, he
struggled for recognition in the political culture of the time. His move to reposition
himself away from the stance of his erstwhile guide was emblematic of a greater
defection from come-outerism and disunionism to political abolitionism around 1850,
when many abolitionists determined that Garrison’s approach was unrealistic and
ineffective. Douglass’s evolving view of the Constitution accompanied his own move
away from Garrisonian disunionism.108
The question of constitutional interpretation started to weigh heavily on his mind
in the late 1840s. When pressed on the issue in early 1849, he agreed that, if strictly
construed, the Constitution was “not a pro-slavery instrument.” However, retaining a
Garrisonian approach at this point, he wrote in the North Star that “I now hold, as I have
ever done, that the original intent and meaning of the Constitution (the one given to it by
the men who framed it, those who adopted, and the one given to it by the Supreme Court
of the United States) makes it a pro-slavery instrument.”109 Douglass’s statement, which
echoed Wendell Phillips’s argument of continuity between the intent of the Constitution’s
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framers and ratifiers and its subsequent interpretations, generated a response from New
York abolitionist Gerrit Smith. The recent Liberty Party candidate’s reply led Douglass to
offer clarification, which demonstrated how closely he followed along the path that
Garrison and Phillips had paved during the last decade. He wrote that “the Constitution of
the United States, standing alone, and construed only in the light of its letter, without
reference to the opinions of the men who framed and adopted it, or to the uniform,
universal and undeviating practice of the nation under it, from the time of its adoption
until now, is not a pro-slavery instrument.”110 Again, he granted that if one read the
words of the text and determined its meaning without an appeal to context or history, the
Constitution was neutral on the issue. But Douglass did interpret that text in light of its
framers’ original intent and its subsequent use and thus he continued to reject antislavery
readings.
Laying stress on the Constitution’s temporal nature, Douglass emphasized that “it
is human, and must be explained in the light of those maxims and principles which
human beings have laid down as guides to the understanding of all written instruments,
covenants, contracts and agreements, emanating from human beings. … In this light,” he
explained, “we hold it to be a most cunningly-devised and wicked compact.”111 This
approach, claiming to use “facts, rather than theory,” allowed Douglass to damn the
document as the creation of imperfect and time-bound beings. The Constitution, like the
Bible, was becoming a text among texts and as such, it could be read without legal
expertise. “Having a terrestrial, and not a celestial origin,” he wrote, “we find no

110

Frederick Douglass, “The Constitution and Slavery,” North Star, 16 March
1849, in Life and Writings, 1:362, emphasis in original.
111
Ibid., 1:362.
265

difficulty in ascertaining its meaning in all the parts which we allege to relate to slavery.
Slavery existed before the Constitution, in the very States by whom it was made and
adopted.—Slaveholders took a large share in making it. It was made in view of the
existence of slavery, and in a manner well calculated to aid and strengthen that heavendaring crime.”112 Slavery, it seemed, was not only part of the framers’ original intent, but
its continued existence seemed to be part of their original expectation. Dismissing the
arguments of Spooner and others, just as Phillips had, Douglass interpreted the threefifths, insurrection, slave trade, fugitive slave, and domestic violence clauses in light of
statements made by members of the Convention. Satisfied that he had made manifest the
document’s temporal and corrupt nature, he proposed that “it is truly a compact
demanding immediate disannulment.”113 Douglass’s reading implied that because the
Constitution was a human document, created in time and subject to temporal vicissitude,
it was not immutable and could be and should be replaced with a more suitable guide.
He retained this position for about two more years, but even here he expressed an
openness to considering Smith’s contentions and invited his interpretive opponent to use
the North Star to further explain them. Douglass wrote, “If the Constitution can be so
turned, and [Smith] can satisfy us of the fact, we shall readily, gladly and zealously turn
our feeble energies in that direction.”114 Douglass backed up his claim in accepting
proposals to further debate the issue, as in New York City in May 1849, when he engaged
Samuel Ringgold Ward, an African American Congregationalist minister and orator.
While Ward believed that if the Constitution had acknowledged the “right to hold
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property in person … it would be a direct violation of the principles for which the fathers
of the Republic struggled,” the gist of his argument rested in a familiar focus on words
alone and a disregard for the “intentions and sentiments of the framers of the
Constitution.”115 In response to Ward, Douglass read “from the Madison Papers” to show
that “the North bowed to the mandates of Slavery.”116 He believed that historical
evidence unlocked the Constitution’s true meaning, and he found it supportive of a
proslavery interpretation.
Douglass, though, remained open to debate. At a multi-day antislavery conference
in Syracuse in early 1850, he found himself again discussing the issue with Ward, Smith,
Parker Pillsbury—a Congregationalist minister and a lecturing agent for antislavery
societies—and other abolitionists. Douglass, in the absence of Garrison, outlined the anticonstitutional position. “We want to say to slaveholders,” he said to his fellow
abolitionists, “we admit your views of the Constitution, but we war on that and on
you.”117 Douglass emphasized the hypocrisy of the framers, who “laid down the doctrines
of equality, consent, and [taught] that resistance to tyrants is obedience to God” but,
“after they had achieved independence,” who then “attempted to unite Liberty in holy
wedlock with the dead body of Slavery, and the whole was tainted.”118 To counter the
prevalent filiopietism, Douglass declared, “I know they were slaveholders. This one fact
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is enough for me.” He was just getting started. “Talk to me of the love of liberty of your
Washingtons, Jeffersons, Henrys. … He who does not love Justice and Liberty for all,
does not love Liberty and justice. They wrote of Liberty in the Declaration of
Independence with one hand, and with the other clutched their brother by the throat!
These are the men who formed the union. … Give me NO UNION WITH
SLAVEHOLDERS!”119 In essence, the abolitionists all agreed that the framers, based on
extra-constitutional historical evidence, intended to sanction slavery, but while the radical
constitutionalists wanted to turn attention from those intentions to the language of the
Constitution itself, the anti-constitutionalists focused on those intentions. While many
Americans, including those in the slavery debates, claimed affinity with the founders, the
anti-constitutionalists strove to distance themselves from them and their proslavery
compact.
Ward responded with the familiar appeal to “plain language,” and went so far as
to suggest that “almost the words of the Declaration are enacted in the Constitution—to
be found in the fifth amendment. Truth in the Declaration, and Good in the Constitution,
are one.”120 Once again, an interpreter brought together these founding documents, just as
Douglass had brought together the Old and New Testaments, to attack the proslavery
position. The discussion was soon sidetracked when attendees began debating the status
of the Liberty Party. Douglass set them straight. The tangential deliberation “hinders the
discussion of the constitutional questions,” he stated, “which is THE QUESTION OF
THE DAY, as far as Anti-Slavery in this country is concerned.”121 The question of the
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day would soon become the question of the decade. The constitutionalization of the issue
began in earnest during this period. Returning his fellow abolitionists to the question at
hand, Douglass restated a willingness to be persuaded. “He wished to address himself to
the ‘bridge’ to be passed over, till we reach the spot where we are to have an AntiSlavery interpretation of the Constitution.” Douglass, however, still could not accept that
interpretation. Like Phillips, he believed that because politicians “all concede to the
Supreme Court, the right to determine the meaning of that instrument,” their
interpretation “is LAW to all intents and purposes.” The observed deference shown to the
Supreme Court increased leading up to Dred Scott, but that development coincided with
the emergence of popular constitutionalisms, which placed interpretation in the hands of
the people rather than the Court. Douglass, like Parker, would promote such an approach.
Smith, showing him the way, asked him to “suppose Justice in this city bring in a false or
corrupt judgment; would you overturn the government? No! turn out the Justice. … You
may have the wisest and purest Constitution, and have it perverted. Your only security is
in the sentiment of the country.” At this point, Douglass remained unmoved. The
“overwhelming array of testimony” created too large a chasm to traverse.122

“We Are in the Presence of No Ordinary Assembly”: Benjamin Robbins Curtis’s Time
Travel and the Founders on Fugitive Slaves
The Fugitive Slave Law and the cases that followed provided the impetus that
Douglass needed to bridge that chasm. The controversies that erupted through attempts to
reclaim fugitive slaves led some abolitionists, like Douglass, to reconsider, and other
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abolitionists, like Theodore Parker, to further articulate, their positions. Indeed, as the
human element became undeniable and as conflict seemed more inevitable, people in
prominent positions felt compelled to verbalize and defend their constitutional
interpretations. More than the Fugitive Slave Law itself, the fugitive slave cases that
followed incited northerners to stake their grounds. Even before 1850, fugitive slave
cases had deepened existing divisions. For example, the arrest of fugitive slave George
Latimer in 1842 cemented the Garrisonian view of the Constitution as a proslavery
compact.123 The cases that succeeded the Compromise of 1850 brought the constitutional
issue further to the fore, leading some to dig in their heels in defense of slaveholders’
constitutional rights, while also radicalized much of New England against slavery.
During this time, decades of seemingly isolated constitutional debating provided judges
and policy-makers with national talking points.
Parker dramatically depicted the volatile situation in a September 1850 speech on
“The Function and Place of Conscience, in Relation to the Laws of Men.” Finding a
loophole in the contractual obligation to uphold the land’s supreme source of legal
authority, he contrasted the constant laws of God—“they never change”—with the
changing laws of man—they “depend … on the finite will of man.”124 Parker explained
that though the static laws of God reside within man as conscience, conscience was
“relatively perfect. … It is often immature in the young, who have not had time for the
growth … and in the old, who have checked and hindered its development.”125 This
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description matched Parker’s sympathetic approach to eminent historical figures, who
sanctioned slavery in their ignorance, and his damning attack on present proslavery
supporters, who sanctioned slavery in spite of their illumination because they had
allowed it to canker their souls. Sin, Parker believed, resulted when individuals knew evil
but did not cast it out. Those who listened to conscience would acknowledge the sin of
slavery and would be obligated to cast aside the Constitution to cleanse the nation.
“Suppose,” Parker directed, that “a man has sworn to keep the Constitution of the United
States, and the Constitution is found to be wrong in certain particulars: then his oath is
not morally binding, for … he is morally bound to keep the law of God as fast as he
learns it.”126 Parker identified the fugitive slave clause, especially in its most recent
iteration, as wrong. Indeed, God’s law told him that “the man who attacks me to reduce
me to slavery, in that moment of attack alienates his right to life, and if I were the
fugitive, and could escape in no other way, I would kill him with as little compunction as
I would drive a mosquito from my face.”127 A particular kind of historical understanding
underlay Parker’s violent rhetoric. Believing in the progress of conscience, he found
moral blindness but no sin in Paul, nor even in framers like Madison, though they had
done wrong, but he could not hold nineteenth-century Americans guiltless, including the
“eminent theologian of New England,” who bound himself to compact.128 As for himself,
Parker preferred “conscience to cotton,” to the Bible, and to the Constitution.129
Parker outlined the path of conscience for citizens. “It is plain to me,” he stated,
“that it is the natural duty of citizens to rescue every fugitive slave from the hands of the
126
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marshal who essays to return him to bondage.”130 A number of Boston’s residents
followed that path when the Fugitive Slave Law placed William and Ellen Craft in
imminent danger, while others valued Constitution over conscience. Successfully
escaping from Georgia to Boston in late 1848, the Crafts had publicly recounted their
harrowing and clever getaway to great effect on numerous occasions. But in October of
1850 their popularity almost cost them their freedom when bounty hunters nearly
captured them. In this tense setting, Harvard graduate and Massachusetts lawyer
Benjamin Robbins Curtis prepared a legal opinion defending the constitutionality of the
Act for US Marshal Charles Devens, who was charged to apprehend the Crafts. Within a
week Benjamin Curtis further outlined his defense in a “Constitutional Meeting,” which
his younger brother George Ticknor Curtis, also a Harvard graduate and a Massachusetts
lawyer, had helped organize.131
On November 26, 1850, “the Citizens of Boston and its vicinity, who reverence
the Constitution of the United States; who wish to discountenance a spirit of disobedience
to the laws of the land,” met in the famed Faneuil Hall, a virtual battleground for groups
claiming the Revolutionary legacy.132 Indeed, John C. Warren, a Boston surgeon and a
nephew of famous Revolutionary martyr Joseph Warren, who had been memorialized in
various forms, including John Trumbull’s painting The Death of Warren (1786), presided
over the meeting. In his brief speech, Warren described the Constitution not as a legal
text but as an epochal divider between dark and light, stagnancy and progress, savagery
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and civilization. Speaking with the authority of honor and experience, he outlined the
desperate state of the colonies “during a period when there was no Constitution and no
Union; when there was no commerce, no manufactures, little of agriculture, or of any of
the arts calculated to make a powerful and happy people. … It was a period when men’s
hands were turned against their neighbors,” he explained, “when the courts were beset
with armed men, when law and justice were trampled under foot, when our best towns
and villages were threatened with pillage, fire, and the sword; when the soil was polluted
with the blood of its own citizens. … What a dark moment was this!”133 Warren painted a
sad scene, but it was not without its happy features.
“In the midst of this gloom,” he recounted to his listeners, “a ray of light showed
itself. A Constitution was proposed, and … adopted as a bond of everlasting union.
Under this Constitution,” he observed, “a new order of things has arisen. Commerce and
agriculture have revived. Manufactures have everywhere grown up. Education, literature,
and science, have been diffused in all our cities and towns. The highest prosperity has
pervaded the nation, and presented to the wondering eyes of Europe the spectacle of a
federal republic, free without licentiousness, and rich without luxury.” The Constitution
had ushered in a new and unmatched era; an unprecedented period of peace and
prosperity. Having provided this triumphalist narrative, Warren wondered, “is there any
one desirous of returning to the disunion of 1786?”134 The implication was that anticonstitutionalism and disunion would undo over a half-century of progress, leaving
Americans in a dark and dilapidated past state. Warren did not mention the Declaration.
The Revolution was not meant to be lived in but to be learned from. Like the opposite
133
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narrative of decline since the founding era, this sort of historical narration of progress
alone stood little chance of spreading a sense of the historical change that would induce
Americans to reconsider their relationship to favored pasts and their readings of sacred
texts. Indeed, these sorts of narratives differed little from Puritan calls for renewal or
enlightenment pronouncements of progress. Warren’s narration demonstrates that
traditional narratives of historical change and development persisted alongside those
more capable of raising historical awareness. But in focusing on a specific moment in
time and on a specific historical text, Curtis’s tale of temporal division did draw further
attention to that moment and that text, encouraging further exploration.
Speaking next, Benjamin Curtis, who had helped organized Boston’s reception
for Webster following his Seventh of March speech, echoed Warren’s pledge to “the
whole CONSTITUTION and the whole UNION.”135 He made explicit what Warren had
implied about disunionism. Making reference to a number of recent dangerous
declarations, including the blasphemous higher-law proposition, made by abolitionists in
Faneuil Hall, “that an article of the Constitution of the United States shall not be
executed, law or no law,” and Parker’s violent statements in his September sermon, he
damned anti-constitutional ideas as radical and deserving of “the rebuke of every good
citizen.”136 Curtis compared the minority position he attacked, which aimed at revolution,
with that of the more prominent if less defined Free Soilers, who recognized the
constitutional presence of the fugitive slave clause and, in general, saw the need to keep
the contract, but could not consent “to its being done in a particular way, or by any
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particular means, or in any modern instance.” Aware of the antislavery emphasis on
temporal distinction in their efforts to dismiss the Constitution’s proslavery injunctions,
Curtis sought to close the gap between the time of ratification and the present.
To determine the lawfulness of the anti-Fugitive Slave Law propositions, Curtis
turned to history. He found that all legal theorists, from the early modern Dutch jurist
Hugo Grotius to the contemporary German-American jurist Francis Lieber, had held as
binding and enforceable interstate contracts dealing with the legal status of persons
traveling among states. Locating this legal maxim in the Constitution itself, Curtis carried
his listeners back to the Massachusetts ratification debates. “The question is,” he
explained, “whether this Commonwealth, acted within the bounds of right, in 1788, when
it entered into the compact in question.”137 Curtis’s speech was not simply a history
lesson, but an experiment in time travel. “We are in the presence of no ordinary
assembly,” he wrote, awakening the imagination of his audience. “In the chair is John
Hancock. … There is Theophulis Parsons. … There is Samuel Adams.”138 Curtis
wondered if such illustrious men as these had made “a compact so grossly immoral, that
their children may not fairly execute it, but must now overthrow and destroy the work of
their hands.” Figures like Parker and Douglass might have responded that the founders
had expected that time would save their children the trouble. Curtis, though, conflated
time. “It is but the other day,” he noted, “we were shedding our blood to obtain the
Constitutions under which we live—Constitutions of our own choice and making—and
now we are unsheathing the sword to overturn them.”139 While Parker stressed the
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historical distance between the founding generation and his own to implicate the latter
group, Curtis drew those generations together, which made the abolitionists’ position
seem violently schizophrenic. “May the State make a promise to-day,” he railed on, “and
to-morrow say, ‘On the whole, our interest did not require that promise, and it is not to be
kept?”140 Curtis’s argument represented a striking example of the ways in which
conventional conceptions of the close relationship between the present and a favored past
maintained their hold on the antebellum American imagination. Indeed, it suggests that in
some respects, slavery, encouraged and deepened the proclivity to conflate distinct
historical contexts.
And yet, while his speech tended to collapse time in ways that might leave
modern hearers dizzy, Curtis recognized time’s passage in positing his own version of
original expectation. He stated that “men of forecast must then have foreseen, and
subsequent events have demonstrated … that without an obligation to restore fugitives
from service, Constitution or no Constitution, Union or no Union, we could not expect to
live in peace with the Slaveholding States.”141 As in the biblical debates, wherein
interpreters stressed the prophets and apostles’ expedient approach to ancient servitude,
Curtis highlighted the framers’ reasoned approach to American slavery. As historian
Stuart Streichler notes, “Curtis suggested that the framers recognized the issue as
potentially divisive and, for that reasons, establish guiding principles.”142 However, this
version of original expectation emphasized continuity in slavery’s protection rather than
change in its eventual abolition. “History proves” Curtis wrote, that the nation cannot
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endure without a compact. As evidence, he referenced George Washington’s efforts in
1789 to stop Georgia fugitives from escaping to Spanish Florida.143 Stating that the
Constitution “comes as near to perfection as the lot of humanity permits,” Curtis
concluded his argument in warning that breaking the “promise which our wise and good
fathers made” would produce fatal results.144 Like Douglass, Curtis recognized that laws
were man-made, but it was for that very reason he thought it unreasonable to measure
them according to a standard of natural or divine justice. And although he believed that
common law and even the Constitution must be flexible and adapt to changing
circumstances to a certain extent, he believed that clear provisions, such as the fugitive
slave clause, did not allow for change. He believed that the founding generation had
thought historically, but did not seem to think that fact justified historical thinking among
their sons and daughters. Indeed, because he did not believe in the progress of moral
sentiment as did Parker and assumed temporal contemporaneity with the founding era, he
could reject the idea that the time since then had created new imperatives with respect to
fugitive slaves.
In an 1850 Thanksgiving Day sermon, Parker responded to both Stuart and Curtis.
He never embraced the Garrisonian contention that the Constitution must be scrapped for
slavery to be abolished, but he proved willing to cast it aside, along with the Bible, if
other means fell short. He wondered if “the professor,” meaning Stuart, “was mistaken
more than the apostle,” but repeated his position that if the Old and New Testaments
justify slavery, “so much the worse for them both.”145 Parker continued to believe that the
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people of 1787 expected slavery “would die ‘of a rapid consumption,’” and mourned that
“the culture of cotton has healed its deadly wound.”146 Given the direction of the nation,
soon the only resolution might rest in replacing the Constitution. Speaking of Curtis and
his ilk, Parker noted, “Men say there is danger of disunion, of our losing fealty for the
Constitution. I do not believe it yet!” he announced. “Suppose it be so,” he continued,
“The Constitution is the machinery of the national mill; and suppose we agree to take it
out and put in new; we might get worse, very true, but we might get better. There have
been some modern improvements; we might introduce them to the State as well as the
mill.”147 Once again, Parker narrated both the corrupt rise of the Slave Power and the
progress and spread of antislavery sentiment—“the spirit of the age, which is the public
opinion of the nations, is against slavery.”148 He believed that the latter sentiment, one
characteristic of the nineteenth century, might require a new Constitution to overcome the
former power, one characteristic of former centuries.

“The Statesmen of That Early Period Held Slavery to Be an Expiring Institution”:
Frederick Douglass’s Smithian Approach to the Constitution
While the controversy over fugitive slaves prompted some abolitionists to show at
least a willingness to adopt Garrisonian measures, it helped others in their conversion
from anti-constitutionalism to antislavery constitutionalism. In April of 1850, Frederick
Douglass still maintained, “for the present, that the Constitution, being at war with itself,
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cannot be lived up to.”149 John Stauffer places Douglass’s conversion to Gerrit Smith’s
reading of the Constitution at the anti-fugitive slave bill convention held a few months
later, in August, in Cazenovia, New York.150 It was six months after that, in January of
1851, that Douglass wrote to Smith, explaining that although he could “not yet see that
instrument in the same light in which you view it, I am so much impressed by your
reasoning that I have about decided to let Slaveholders and their Northern abettors have
the Laboring oar in putting a proslavery interpretation upon the Constitution.”151
Douglass still believed that the slaveholders “are doubtless right so far as the intentions of
the framers of the Constitution are concerned” and wondered, “may we avail ourselves of
legal rules which enable us to defeat even the wicked intentions of our Constitution
makers?” Soon enough, he joined Smith in flinging those intentions, to the extent that
they could be proven authentic, “to the winds.”152 Meanwhile, the furor over fugitive
slaves soon escalated.
In April of 1851, George Curtis, Benjamin Curtis’s brother and Boston’s US
Commissioner, issued a certificate of removal for Thomas Sims, another Georgia fugitive
living in Boston. George Curtis had also been in charge of issuing arrest warrants for the
Crafts and for Virginia native Shadrach Minkins, also known as Frederick Jenkins.
However, the Boston Vigilance Committee, one of a number of such committees
organized to assist fugitive slaves threatened with capture and re-enslavement, had hid
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the Crafts in various dwellings, including Parker’s home, and had helped them escape to
England in late 1850. To the chagrin of Benjamin Curtis, they also successfully saved
Shadrach from his would-be captors in February of 1851. In his journal, Parker placed
Shadrach’s rescue on par with famous Revolutionary acts, estimating the event to be “the
most noble deed done in Boston since the destruction of the tea in 1773.”153 Sims was not
as fortunate. Beginning on April 4, 1851, his lawyers, including prominent local attorneys
Richard Henry Dana Jr. and Charles Sumner, made arguments to free him in a courtroom
that doubled as a federal prison. A week later, George Curtis, through his certificate of
removal, placed 300 policemen in position to march Sims back to bondage.
Such developments corresponded with Douglass’s decision to make his
transformation public. On May 21, he informed Gerrit Smith that he had adopted
antislavery constitutionalism months before and asked his correspondent to give “a little
attention to any controversy which may arise between my old friends and me, in regard to
my present position on the Constitution questions.”154 Then, on May 23, feeling pressure
from the AASS to state his position, Douglass announced in the North Star that “we have
arrived at the firm conviction that the Constitution, construed in the light of well
established rules of legal interpretation, might be made consistent in its details with the
noble purposes avowed in its preamble; and that hereafter we should insist upon the
application of such rules to that instrument, and demand that it be wielded in behalf of
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emancipation.”155 Douglass had been blinded in seeking “its meaning in the history and
practice of the nation under it,” but a “careful study of the writings of Lysander Spooner,
of Gerrit Smith, and of William Goodell” had given him sight.156 As the rise of
abolitionism had incited southerners’ to craft proslavery defenses, proslavery incursions
encouraged more and more antislavery northerners to adopt antislavery readings of the
founding and the Constitution. As Parker proved willing to move toward Garrison’s
reading of the Constitution, Douglass gave up the Garrisonian interpretation for a
Smithian one, while also maintaining his distance from the views of figures like Curtis.
Douglass was not prepared to fully leave behind the Garrisonian approach,
however. He now believed that he was “only in reason and in conscience bound to learn
the intentions of those who framed the Constitution in the Constitution itself,” but the
extra-constitutional intentions continued to bother him, in part because of certain
abolitionists’ “resolute determination to see slavery in the Constitution.”157 Douglass
soon discovered a way to read those intentions differently. In a July 1851 editorial in his
newly formed eponymous paper, which resulted from the merger of the North Star and
Smith’s Liberty Party Paper, Douglass referenced the Pennsylvania Freeman, an
abolitionist newspaper that claimed Quaker poet John Greenleaf Whittier as a past editor.
The Freeman had taken umbrage with Douglass’s new constitutional stance and
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countered it with an interpretation based on the framers’ intentions and the practice of the
government since the founding era, an approach that Douglass had once defended. Rather
than dismiss their findings as irrelevant, he proceeded along a new line of inquiry. Citing
the Freeman’s statement that they could “‘hardly conceive of a fact in law or history
being proved more conclusively, than is the fact that the Constitution was intended to
protect slavery,’” Douglass then asked “who the persons were who intended that the
Constitution should protect slavery?” and who was “the name of the author of that history
who has so conclusively proved that the Constitution was intended to protect slavery.”158
The paper might have supplied names like Madison and Phillips, but Douglass’s playful
point had a serious edge. In terms of “traditional history … we shall find many
conflicting versions about the very point which is so conclusively proved.”159 Similar to a
number of biblical interpreters, Douglass introduced historical pyrrhonism into the
debate, which called into question all historical accounts. The move, though, also opened
the door to alternative narratives.
Douglass outlined a range of prominent readings. He first described a version he
identified with the late leading southern political theorist, John C. Calhoun. This
Calhounian version found slavery “co-extensive with the Constitution” and understood
the right to property in men as holding the same constitutional status as the right to other
forms of property. Douglass then explained what amounted to the federal consensus
position, which designated slavery as a state institution. He then expounded a third view,
prominent among antislavery interpreters, which held, “that contributing to the extension
and perpetuity of slavery was never dreamed of by the men of the Revolution, and their
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immediate descendants; but that, on the contrary, the fathers of the Revolution sought to
limit, circumscribe, and to hasten the extinction of slavery.”160 Douglass’s own version of
the founding era followed from the third.
Earlier in the article he had written of the founders, “It does seem to us highly
commendable to take the most favorable possible view of the motives and intentions of
men, and especially of those men who lived in the stormy and trying time in which the
Constitution was orginated [sic] and adopted.”161 Similar to Parker’s reading, this
sympathetic approach to the Revolutionary generation valued context and circumstance.
But where Parker’s reading allowed him to dismiss their views, Douglass’s supported his
antislavery interpretation. He offered a reading that most northern interpreters seemed to
agree with, including figures like Webster and Stuart. He wrote that, “In reading the
sentiments of the most influential men of the period, and to which the Constitution was
framed and adopted, it is evident that slavery was looked upon as a great evil. … The
writings of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Monroe, Hamilton, Luther
Martin, Patrick Henry, John Jay, and a host of other great men, fathers of the Republic,
all go to establish this conviction.” To this, Douglass added another frequently expressed
belief about the founders. “We take to be true—that the statesmen of that early period
held slavery to be an expiring institution. We doubt if there were more than a dozen men
in the Convention … who did not expect that slavery in this country would cease forever
long before the year 1851.” Combined with the precise language of the Constitution,
Douglass believed that these historical facts are “no slight testimony in proof of the
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intention to make the Constitution a permanent liberty document.”162 Historical evidence
could be used to develop a range of narratives, even one countering the version Wendell
Phillips presented in The Constitution A Proslavery Compact, a version that Douglass
himself had promoted. Ultimately, Douglass argued that the real question rested with the
language of the Constitution and if it was discovered that the slaveholding founders
sought to protect slavery as an institution, then “their intention was wicked, and contrary
to the spirit and letter of the Constitution.”163 Douglass’s emphasis on spirit, which
echoed antislavery readings of the Bible, as well as William Goodell’s antislavery
constitutional interpretation, supported his move to stress the interpretive role of the
people. He remained concerned with the framers’ intentions, but if those fell short other
means existed to read the Constitution as “a permanent liberty document.”
In closing his discussion, Douglass again drew attention to the difficulty of
discovering the true intentions of the framers, a problem that he believed would only
increase over time. “How are we to know now, or a century hence, what were the motives
and intentions of the various parties to the Constitution of the U.S.A.” he asked. In
emphasizing the messiness of the past, Douglass echoed Lysander Spooner and
contradicted Wendell Phillips. The problem was further complicated by proslavery
incursions since the founding era. “Nothing is more evident,” he wrote, “than that as
slavery becomes strong, the pretensions of slaveholders range higher and broader, and
their claims to be protected under the Constitution become more and more unreasonable
and audacious.”164 Proslavery gains obscured the Constitution’s original intent and
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meaning. And if one was going to appeal to intent outside of the Constitution, “there
must be no ambiguity about it.”165 Ambiguity about the framers’ intentions authorized
Douglass to introduce his own historical narrative, one that located antislavery sentiments
and expectations at the writing and ratification of the Constitution and then traced
slavery’s corrupting and obscuring influence since that time.
Even though Douglass now read and would continue to read the founding era
through an antislavery lens, he still had occasion to refer to the framers’ failures. The idea
that they held divergent and conflicting opinions on slavery permitted him to suggest that
the evolving views of the people mattered most in constitutional interpretation. One
might expect him to appeal to the intentions of the people who ratified the Constitution,
but the ratifiers’ views were even more ambiguous than the intentions of the framers. The
voice of the people in the present matter most.166 Of course, Douglass had like-minded
contemporaries in mind. In a speech on the Fugitive Slave Law, given at the National
Free Soil Convention in August of 1852, Douglass, now “proud to be one of the disciples
of Gerrit Smith,” separated his enlightened listeners from their shortsighted forefathers.
“It has been said that our fathers entered into a covenant for this slave-catching,” he told
his audience. “Who were your daddies?” he asked, drawing their laughter. “I take it they
were men, and so are you. You are the sons of your fathers; and if you find your fathers
exercising any rights that you don’t find among your rights, you may be sure that they
have transcended their limits. If they have made a covenant that you should do that which
they have no right to do themselves, they transcended their own authority, and surely it is
165
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not binding on you.” The transient laws of the illustrious ancestors held no claim on their
illuminated descendants. “The binding quality of law,” Douglass explained, “is its
reasonableness,” and the reasonableness of the fugitive slave clause had long since
expired, if it every existed at all.167 Like Parker, Douglass believed that “he who has God
and conscience on his side, has a majority against the universe. Though he does not
represent the present state, he represents the future state.”168 The abolitionists anticipated
a glorious millennium even while hell extended its borders.
Despite his future projections rooted in present fears, like Parker, Douglass
believed that the nineteenth-century was an age of freedom, and as he had made clear in
his cutting 1852 speech, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July,” he believed that this
should be especially applicable in the American republic. By describing slavery as the
great contradiction of a supposed free land and by highlighting the hypocrisy of
slaveholding in a presumably Christian nation, Douglass was not simply pointing out
America’s most glaring flaw; he was also claiming a right to its most glowing promises.
During the 1850s, his antislavery reading of the founding period, which he had briefly
outlined in the July 1851 article, evolved to a point where he revalued the intentions of
the framers in constitutional interpretation. In contrast to his use of intentions in the
1840s, which he used to highlight the Constitution’s proslavery provisions, in the 1850s
Douglass stressed the framers’ egalitarian expectations. He again privileged contextual
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interpretation, but unlike Parker he had come to believe that the Garrisonian contention
was without merit.169
Tracing Douglass’s changing approach to the Constitution displays the central
features of the period’s most prominent antislavery approaches to the Constitution and
also shows how the Fugitive Slave Law and the fugitive slave cases initiated a move
among some northerners to adopt an antislavery view of the Constitution and the
founding era. It also demonstrates that constitutional interpretation, even more than
biblical interpretation, was “THE QUESTION OF THE DAY.” In Douglass’s case, this
shift in focus may have allowed him to hold onto his rather blunt antislavery reading of
the Bible, which increasingly escaped the public penetrating readings of Stuart and
others. But even with the Bible, Douglass grasped the temporal barrier between ancient
and modern times. Perhaps the very distance separating biblical times from the nineteenth
century, which was much greater than the gap dividing Revolutionary times from the
present, allowed readers of the Bible, in contrast to readers of the Constitution, to more
easily ignore troubling historical evidence. On the other hand, as was the case with
Douglass, the greater availability of historical knowledge about the more recent founding
era revealed certain discrepancies, allowing readers to introduce alternative accounts.
Regardless of the exact nature of the relationship between an awareness of
historical discrepancies and approaches to historical texts, in constitutional interpretation
both the Garrisonian and Smithian approaches carried implications for how one thought
about the relationship between the founding era and the present. Like Parker, sometimes
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Douglass drew attention to the nation’s failure to realize the founders’ expectations, and
sometimes he exposed the failures of the founders themselves. That dual emphasis
indicated historical distance in highlighting original context, but also in sounding the
discordance between original expectations and actual circumstances. And when these
figures went on to contrast slavery’s corrupting presence with the current era’s call for
freedom, it further signaled that historical distance.
The figure of Frederick Douglass, a fugitive turned freeman, served as a constant
reminder that behind the high-level debates in which he participated stood suffering men,
women, and children. At times, as with Theodore Weld’s American Slavery As It Is
(1839), which he had authored with Angelina and Sarah Grimké, abolitionists strove to
highlight the sad situation of the blacks in bondage in hopes of stirring northern
sympathies.170 But antislavery readings of the Constitution and the founding era often
remained at the level of abstraction. A number of realities, including the presence of free
African Americans in the North, could bring their enslaved brothers and sisters in the
South to the minds of white northerners. In a strange irony, attempts to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Law in the 1850s placed other African Americans on the national stage,
making it harder for northerners to forget the human lives at stake. These developments
anticipated Dred Scott, when the focus on another African American turned attention to
black Revolutionary forebears. The place of former slaves such as Frederick Douglass
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and slaves such as Dred Scott in the national consciousness made it rather difficult to
discuss slavery without discussing southern slaves, or, rather, without discussing blacks
and their status in America as slaves but also as freemen.

“Giving up the OLD for the NEW Faith”: Anthony Burns, a Burning Constitution, and
Abraham Lincoln’s Juxtaposition of Founding-Era Expectations and Slavery’s Extension
Between Douglass’s shift in constitutional views and Scott’s trial before the
Supreme Court, another black figure captured the nation’s, or at least New England’s,
attention. Back in November of 1851, after receiving an appointment to the US Supreme
Court at the recommendation of Daniel Webster, Benjamin Curtis presided over a grand
jury charge against African American lawyer Robert Morris for his alleged participation
in the rescue of Shadrach. Almost three years later, in the summer of 1854, Morris and
Richard Henry Dana Jr. acted as attorneys for Anthony Burns in perhaps the most
important fugitive slave case in American history. Having escaped from Richmond in
early 1854, Burns was arrested and jailed in a Boston courthouse in late May. When
abolitionists drummed up resistance during the proceedings, as they had successfully
done during previous cases, President Franklin Pierce sent federal troops to maintain
order. And when US Commissioner Edward G. Loring remanded Burns to his Virginia
owner and directed federal troops to escort him to a ship bound for slavery, New England
burst into a panic. The already animated Garrison declared that Loring had pronounced
Burns “no man, but a thing … the Declaration of Independence to be a lie, George
Washington and his associates traitors and cutthroats, the Golden Rule an absurdity, and
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Jesus of Nazareth an impostor.”171 Notably, he left out the Constitution. Amos Adams
Lawrence of Groton, Massachusetts wrote of the marked results of the federal show of
force, “We went to bed one night old-fashioned, conservative, compromise Union Whigs
& waked up stark mad Abolitionists.”172 Most conservatives remained conservative, but
many of those on the fence joined the emboldened radicals on the ground.
In the aftermath of this trial, Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis issued an
indictment against Phillips and Parker. The indictment did not lead to convictions, though
it did provide more fodder for Parker’s attack on Curtis as a pawn of proslavery
powers.173 Burns’s forced return to servitude heightened the exchange in this tug-a-war
between conciliatory government action and antagonistic abolitionist response.
Abolitionists’ fury had already been sparked with the passage of Illinois Senator Stephen
A. Douglas’s Kansas-Nebraska Act, which Pierce had signed into law on May 30. The
new law repealed the Missouri Compromise and instituted popular sovereignty, which
permitted settlers to decide whether or not to introduce slavery into territories previously
closed to that institution. In the wake of these seeming proslavery advancements, the
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society declared the Fourth of July a day of public
mourning. If the society needed a death for the occasion, Garrison would provide them
one in his immolation of a prominent document.

171

[William Lloyd Garrison], “The Deed of Infamy Consummated,” Liberator, 9
June 1854, 90 (APSO).
172
Amos Lawrence to Giles Richard, 1 June 1854, quoted in James M.
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), 120.
173
See Theodore Parker, The Trial of Theodore Parker, for the “Misdemeanor”
of A Speech in Faneuil Hall against Kidnapping (Boston, 1855).
290

During the society’s meeting in Framingham, Massachusetts, Henry David
Thoreau, the Transcendentalist who had refused to pay taxes in opposition to the
Mexican-American War and had written Resistance to Civil Government (1849), urged
that “the law will never make men free; it is men who have got to make the law free.”174
Similar to the idea expressed in Francis Wayland’s biblical argument, Thoreau suggested
that Americans had the power to legally abolish slavery. This might involve an
amendment process, but Garrison had a more radical resolution in mind. Once again, he
praised the Declaration of Independence, but, in his view, this was the nation’s only
fireproof document. First, Garrison burnt a copy of the Fugitive Slave Law. Next came
Loring’s decision in the Burns case and the grand jury’s indictment that followed.
Finally, the unrelenting abolitionist put the nation’s sacred legal document, the US
Constitution, to the torch. The visible act symbolized what Garrison had been preaching
for over a decade. It represented the culmination of his contempt. When prominent judges
and politicians, including Justice Curtis and President Pierce, commanded Americans to
recognize and obey the proslavery provisions, some abolitionists had no other choice but
to raze a corrupt Constitution and break with an unsalvageable South. The outmoded
document and the old-fashioned region deserved each other.175
Other options, though, were available. Although the fugitive slave cases boosted
the ranks of the abolitionists and raised their temperatures, to many more antislavery
advocates, including both newcomers like Amos Lawrence and veterans like Frederick
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Douglass, it signaled the need to use political, constitutional, and even violent means.
These trends further undermined Garrison’s come-outerism and his non-violence.
Especially in the wake of the late European revolutions, slavery’s enemies in America
began to call on the martial legacy of their own Revolution, which raised questions about
Garrison’s particular claim on the Declaration and his push for a revolution in
sentiments.176 His anti-constitutionalism also found few adherents during this period.
Douglass’s own appeal to the Constitution grew stronger in the creation of the Radical
Abolition Party that he helped organize with William Goodell, Gerrit Smith, and James
McCune Smith, a black physician and one of the era’s most avid abolitionists. These
figures cherished the Constitution, along with the Bible, as sacred creeds. Millenarian in
their mindset, this interracial alliance launched a holy crusade against the last great
obstacle to the establishment of heaven on earth: slavery. Such ideas informed John
Brown’s religiously motivated violent foray into the belly of the beast, but they also
influenced those more interested in political measures.177
More specifically, the kind of constitutional reading that Douglass had adopted
and advanced began to show up in the speeches of a certain Illinois lawyer in the mid1850s. Abraham Lincoln had served a two-year term in the US House of Representatives
between 1847 and 1849 before returning to practice law in Springfield, Illinois. The
Kansas-Nebraska Act led him back to politics. He ran for but did not fill a seat in the US
Senate in late 1854. Two years later, he placed second in the bid for the vice presidential
candidate of the newly formed Republican Party. In 1858, Stephen A. Douglas defeated
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him in a race for the US Senate. Then, in 1860, six years after his reentry into politics,
Lincoln, the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, won election over his rival
Douglas. Lincoln’s position on slavery was key to his politics in the 1850s, and that
position rested on an antislavery reading of the Constitution and the founding era.
Lincoln voiced that reading in his “Peoria Speech,” given on October 16, 1854,
which marked his return to politics and signaled the rise of slavery as the central issue in
his political thought. After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in late May, Lincoln
holed himself up in the Illinois state library in Springfield and, as historian James Oakes
writes, dedicated his time to “researching the history of slavery in the United States.”178
Armed with historical evidence, Lincoln took to the political battlefield in August.
Eventually, he convinced Douglas, his political foe, to engage in a fight of words. In their
16 October debate, Lincoln neatly summarized his position.
Following Douglas’s evening speech, Lincoln adjourned the meeting until seven
o’clock in the evening, when he arose to discuss the recent repeal of the Missouri
Compromise. He made clear the distinction between slavery as an “EXISTING
institution” and its unfortunate “EXTENSION,” showing allegiance to the federal
consensus.179 Informing his listeners of his historical findings, Lincoln began with preratification legislation. Of the Northwest Ordinance, he stated that Jefferson “conceived
of the idea of taking that occasion, to prevent slavery ever going into the north-western
territory.” Lincoln’s historical narration posited continuity on this point.
“Thenceforward,” he explained, “for sixty-one years, all parties acted in quiet obedience

178
179

Oakes, The Radical and the Republican, 53.
Abraham Lincoln, “Speech at Peoria, October 16, 1854,” in Collected Works,

2:248.
293

to this ordinance. It is now what Jefferson foresaw and intended—the happy home of
teeming millions of free, white prosperous people, and no slave amongst them.” Training
his focus on slavery’s extension allowed Lincoln to posit continuous assent to Jefferson’s
founding expectations. Further, in highlighting extra-constitutional documents and
developments, Lincoln avoided the criticism that figures like Lysander Spooner faced
when they appealed to the Constitution’s words alone to interpret it as an antislavery
document. In using pre-ratification enactments, Lincoln also diverted attention from the
Garrisonian emphasis on the ratification debates. Or, rather, as with Frederick Douglass
and other antislavery readers, Lincoln used the Declaration and the Revolution to
illuminate those debates. In contrast to John C. Warren’s fear of returning to the period
before ratification, he hoped to rediscover the time “away back of the constitution, in the
pure fresh, free breath of the revolution.”180
Returning to post-founding era developments, Lincoln proceeded to trace
continuity from the Northwest Ordinance to the Missouri Compromise and from the
Missouri Compromise to the Compromise of 1850. In contrast to Garrisonians, who
posited consistency between a proslavery Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Law, or
antislavery constitutionalists, who outlined decline from an antislavery Constitution to
the Fugitive Slave Law, Lincoln traced efforts to contain slavery from the period before
the founding to the present. His narrow focus on slavery’s extension permitted that
reading. In his account, the aberrant Kansas-Nebraska Act interrupted the sequence.
“Now new light breaks upon us,” he scoffed, “Now congress declares this ought never to
have been.” Of slaveholders’ desire to take slaves into Nebraska he stated, “That perfect
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liberty they sigh for—the liberty of making slaves of other people—Jefferson never
thought of.”181 Over the next decade plus, Lincoln’s position came to rest on what he
believed founders like Jefferson did and did not intend. In his political speeches of the
late 1850s, Lincoln began to emphasize the various ways in which the founders’
expectations had failed to reach fruition. With the dissemination of these high profile
speeches, the potential awareness of historical change and thus distance from the
founding era became more pronounced.
Lincoln contrasted the principles underlying the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise—which he described as “covert real zeal for the spread of slavery”—with
those of the founding era. He could “not but hate” the former, especially because “it
forces so many really good men amongst ourselves into an open war with the very
fundamental principles of civil liberty—criticising the Declaration of Independence, and
insisting that there is not right principle of action but self-interest.” Although southerners
had voiced such criticism from the time of the Missouri crisis, Lincoln described it as a
new development, which gave his narrative bite. He stressed that he was not after social
or political equality for blacks. He did not go so far as to agree with southerners who
argued that their institution ensured progress, but he acknowledged that “they are just
what we would be in their situation.”182 He confessed that he knew not how to best
resolve the situation and acknowledged slaveholders’ “constitutional rights,” expressing,
in particular, his willingness to uphold the Fugitive Slave Law and stating firmly that
despite a number of degrading provisions, he did not “propose to destroy, or alter, or
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disregard the constitution.”183 Lincoln even stated that, as much as he hated slavery, he
“would consent to the extension of it rather than see the Union dissolved.”184 This
preservationist position guided Lincoln’s politics throughout the remainder of his life.
However, even as he eased southerners’ fears of abolition, he indicted them for their
immoral institution. He believed that the consciousness of the southern people told them
that “there is humanity in the negro.”185 He held up as “the sheet anchor of American
republicanism” the principle he found in the Declaration’s Preamble that “no man is good
enough to govern another man, without that other’s consent.”186 This appeal to what he
understood as founding-era axioms guided his attack on slavery’s extension, “the great
Behemoth of danger.”187
Glad that Douglas had referenced the examples of the “revolutionary fathers,”
Lincoln expressed a love for “the sentiments of those old-time men; and” noted that he
“shall be most happy to abide by their opinions.” He granted the Constitution’s emphasis
on state sovereignty, but wondered if it had “any reference to the carrying of slavery into
NEW COUNTRIES?” The answer depended on a historical examination. “We will let the
fathers themselves answer it,” Lincoln stated, before pointing out that it was the men of
the Revolution and the Constitution who had passed the Ordinance of 1787. Of their
views and Douglas’s on this issue, he held that “it is a question of discrimination between
them and him.”188 Lincoln’s historical examination again broadened to back his antiextension position. He objected to the idea of a moral right to enslave fellow humans
183
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“because the fathers of the republic eschewed, and rejected it. The argument of
‘Necessity’ was the only argument they ever admitted in favor of slavery. … They cast
blame upon the British King for having permitted its introduction. BEFORE the
constitution, they prohibited its introduction into the north-western Territory…AT the
framing and adoption of the constitution, they forbore to so much as mention the word
‘slave’ or ‘slavery’ in the whole instrument.” Lincoln’s “argument of necessity”
supported his own expedient approach to slavery and placed geographical and
chronological limits on the Constitution’s proslavery provisions. The founders “hid
away” those provisions “just as an afflicted man hides away a wen or a cancer, which he
dares not cut out at once, lest he bleed to death; with the promise, nevertheless, that the
cutting may begin at the end of a given time.”189 Rather than focus on the spread of
antislavery sentiment, as did Theodore Parker, after referencing an original expectation of
slavery’s removal, Lincoln traced post-founding era acts aimed at realizing those
expectations, including laws limiting and prohibiting the non-domestic slave trade and
plans for gradual emancipation in slave states. It seemed that the new nation was on track
to fulfill the founders’ promises.
“The institution was rapidly becoming extinct within these limits,” Lincoln
proposed, “but NOW it is to be transformed into a ‘sacred right.’” The innovation was a
deviation from founding era ideals, a “giving up [of] the OLD for the NEW faith. Near
eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now from that
beginning we have run down to the other declaration, that for SOME men to enslave
OTHERS is a ‘sacred right of self-government.’ These principles can not stand together.”
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Much distinguished Parker’s and Douglass’s positions from Lincoln’s, but the aspirant
for an Illinois senatorial seat agreed that slavery in the present and founding era ideals of
self-government stood in stark opposition. Indeed, he proposed that if the Declaration had
been called “‘a self-evident lie’” in “old Independence Hall” as it had been in a recent
statement supporting the Kansas-Nebraska bill, “the very door-keeper would have
throttled the man, and thrust him into the street.” Lincoln did not assert that the founders,
if present, would support or attack the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, as Moses Stuart had in
reference to the Fugitive Slave Law, but he argued that “the spirit of seventy-six and the
spirit of Nebraska, are utter antagonisms,” lamenting that “the former is being rapidly
displaced by the latter.”190 This development had temporal implications. Quoting a recent
article from the Daily News (London), Lincoln noted the apprehension of “the liberal
party throughout the world … ‘that the one retrograde institution in America, [was]
undermining the principles of progress, and fatally violating the noblest political system
the world ever saw.’” The work echoed Frederick Douglass’s prior claim that America
was behind the times in its protection of a anachronistic institution. Lincoln agreed with
Stephen Douglas that, “in point of mere fact,” the “government was made for the white
people and not for the negroes,” but he feared that turning from the “earliest practice, and
first precept of our ancient faith” would threaten “even the white man’s charter of
freedom.”191 Unlike the abolitionists, Lincoln cherished the memory of Henry Clay and
Daniel Webster and his focus on extension led him to describe only the most recent
developments as evidence of the deterioration of founding-era ideals, but like the
abolitionists, his narration tended to expose temporal distance since that time.
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Conclusion
Lincoln never went as far as Douglass in reading the Constitution as an
antislavery document. He certainly never proposed the position of Parker, much less
Garrison or Phillips, in showing a willingness to abandon the nation’s legal creed. Indeed,
in many respects, Lincoln’s position was closer to the unionism of Webster, Stuart, and
Curtis than that of the abolitionists. In stating his intention to uphold the Constitution and
its proslavery clauses, including the fugitive slave clause, and to respect slavery where it
already existed, Lincoln swore allegiance to the federal consensus. The contextual
reading he presented in his Peoria speech granted the presence of slavery at the founding
and stressed the efforts to limit its spread as a state institution. Indeed, Lincoln found
continuity in this containment policy from before ratification until 1850. He believed his
expedient approach to slavery matched his own. However, his narrative echoed that of
certain abolitionists in important respects. His focus on the Declaration, which only
increased over the next decade, and his reading of the Constitution as consistent with that
document paralleled the speeches and writings of figures such as Parker and Douglass.
While Parker saw a gradual growth of the Slave Power since the founding era, Lincoln
discovered radical proslavery intrusions only in 1854, but both identified southern
betrayal from founding era principles meant to eventually stamp out slavery. While
Douglass sought racial equality, Lincoln focused on containing slavery, but both insisted
on the contradiction between the peculiar institution and the principles found in the
Declaration’s Preamble. And both began to use historical insights to highlight what they
heralded as the founders’ original antislavery expectations.
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Although important differences distinguished these historical narratives from each
other, the similarities among them drew attention to historical distance. In identifying the
founding fathers’ original expectations of slavery’s ultimate abolition, the narratives of
Parker, Douglass, and Lincoln granted the legal presence of slavery in the founding era.
Indeed, their emphasis on original expectations rested on the fact that proslavery forces
had exerted a prominent role in the founding era. That emphasis, coupled with their
assertions that enough time had passed—as a result of the spread of antislavery sentiment
or of federal acts that hemmed in slavery—to fulfill the framers’ expectations exposed
that times now were quite different than at ratification. In tracing deviations from the
framers’ original expectations, either since ratification or since the passing of the KansasNebraska Act, these accounts identified unexpected change resulting in the solidification
of an anachronistic institution. In doing so, they did not signal their authors’ desire to
return to the favored past, as did most previous narratives of decline and corruption.
Rather, they represented the hope that Americans could finally complete the struggle that
the nation’s founders had started in 1776. Even in 1854, Lincoln condemned slavery
itself, though he focused on its extension. His more moderate approach served his
political cause, but his prominent position on the public stage also exposed the
antislavery historical narrative, and its implications, to a broad American public.
Paradoxically, that narrative received perhaps its most public forum in Dred Scott (1857).
Indeed, Dred Scott gave a national platform for both the proslavery and the
antislavery readings of the Constitution. In a strange twist of irony, the radical
Garrisonian reading received the imprimatur of the US Supreme Court through Chief
Justice Roger Taney’s decision. The irony worked both ways, however. In focusing
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attention on Dred Scott and his ancestors, the Court’s decision placed an unprecedented
amount of attention on blacks and their Revolutionary era ancestors. Turning attention to
the historical question of whether or not blacks had been citizens at the nation’s founding
shifted focus away from the Constitution’s proslavery clauses, including the fugitive
slave clause. The change in historical focus inspired a change in political stance.
Benjamin Curtis, who abolitionists had often attacked as a proslavery man, stood
opposite the Court in arguing that in some states blacks had, in fact, voted as citizens
during the ratification process. Even though the debate following the decision revolved
around the second major question involved, that of whether the Constitution authorized
or prohibited slavery in the territories, it was Curtis’s argument about blacks in the
founding era that reverberated in antislavery publications. Similar to the narratives
advanced by his erstwhile abolitionist opponents, that argument posited the presence of
antislavery sentiments at the founding and highlighted the unfortunate deviation from the
framers’ antislavery expectations. Here, Curtis’s understanding of the Constitution as a
flexible document served him well. He advanced his argument through a careful
explication, and then returned it in more articulate form for politicians like Lincoln to
use. This synergistic process spread the potential to realize the extent of historical
distance since the founding era.
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CHAPTER 5
“TIMES NOW ARE NOT AS THEY WERE”: THE DRED SCOTT DECISION AND
SLAVERY’S INTRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL DISTANCE
One respondent to Dred Scott contended that Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s
deciding opinion “does not rest so much upon any interpretation of the law as it does
upon a construction of the facts of history.”1 Though perhaps mistaken in assuming a
clear distinction between legal and historical interpretation, especially given the thenrecent trend toward using historical argumentation in constitutional debates, the
respondent had a point. The decision did rest on a historical argument, which
demonstrated that the Chief Justice accepted the historical grounds of debate that had
been prepared through decades of interpretive emphasis on the historical explication of
sacred religious and legal texts. Taney believed that a historically grounded decision
would settle the constitutional debate over slavery. He insisted that slavery’s
constitutional viability in the nineteenth-century present depended on an understanding of
1

“History, as Expounded by the Supreme Court,” 541. Mastering the vast
scholarship on Dred Scott is a formidable task. Attending to works addressing the role of
history in the decision, however, requires much less fortitude. In his classic text, The
Dred Scott Case, Don Fehrenbacher finds Taney’s historical arguments defective. A
number of historians agree. See, for example, David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis:
America Before the Civil War, 1848-1861, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (1976; repr., New
York: Harper, 2011), 267-96; and Forbes, The Missouri Compromise, 286-90. Some,
though, argue for the firmness of Taney’s constitutional and historical argument. For
example, in Origins of the Dred Scott Case: Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the Supreme
Court, 1837-1857 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2006), Austin Allen argues
that histories which castigate Taney’s decision as a politically-driven perversion of
history obscure the Court’s more immediate motivations to protect slavery and corporate
capitalism, and also betray the ambiguity of the historical record to which Taney
appealed. In Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), Mark Graber reached a similar conclusion. While focused on the
importance of historical argumentation in this case, I am less interested in the historical
soundness of the arguments than in their implications for a growing awareness of
historical distance and change.
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its place in the Revolutionary past. In the syllabus of the decision, written by Taney
himself, he asserted that “when the Constitution was adopted, they [blacks] were not
regarded in any of the States as members of the community which constituted the State,
and were not numbered among its ‘people or citizens.’” Based on this observation he
concluded that “the special rights and immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to
them,” and, consequently, “they are not entitled to sue … in a court of the United States.”
Taney conflated blacks at the founding with blacks in the present through his fluid use of
pronouns—from “they” to “them” and back to “they.” His historical narration designated
blacks as non-citizens in 1787 and thus, given his assumption of the Constitution’s
timelessness, he rendered “African American” a misnomer in 1857.2
The static nature of the Constitution seemed to place blacks, once and for all,
beyond the pale of American citizenry, but what about the contingent and fluid nature of
the republic’s history? Perhaps the Revolutionary generation had denied their black
contemporaries citizenship, but some radical abolitionists had raised the question: what if
their sons and daughters wanted to grant their descendants that status? Figures such as
Parker and Douglass had contended that regardless of what the framers had intended, the
current generation was duty bound to embrace the spirit of the present age by abolishing
slavery and extending the blessings of liberty. Even in declaring that the words of the
fathers held sway, Taney himself demonstrated an awareness of a cultural shift: “The
change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race which has taken place
since the adoption of the Constitution cannot change its construction and meaning, and it
must be construed and administered now according to its true meaning and intention

2

Scott v. Sandford, 60 US, 393.
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when it was formed and adopted.”3 As much as Daniel Webster and Benjamin Curtis,
Taney observed changes in northern sentiment and, more clearly than they, he asserted
that those changes had no place in constitutional interpretation. Though created and
ratified in time, the Constitution’s significance transcended temporality, preventing
subsequent departures. Times had changed, Taney allowed, but the meaning of the
nation’s sacred text had not.4 Because the founders had designated blacks non-citizens at
the founding, Taney insisted, he could not now declare them citizens, despite a shift in
public opinion. A focus on perceived static original meanings rather than an emphasis on

3

Ibid., 393. The published version of the decision, which I use here, includes
additions that Taney incorporated after the ruling to buttress his argument.
4
As Chief Justice, Taney was not wholly against appeals to change. In fact, in
Charles River Bridge (1837), he famously ruled in favor of commercial progress by
arguing that a contract with the Warren Bridge Company did not violate the contract
originally issued to the Charles River Bridge Company. Strictly construing the original
charter allowed him to rule in favor of the former company without violating the
Constitution’s contract clause. If the opposite ruling prevailed, Taney argued, “We shall
be thrown back to the improvements of the last century, and be obliged to stand still until
the claims of the old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied and they shall consent to
permit these States to avail themselves of the lights of modern science and to partake of
the benefit of those improvements which are now adding to the wealth and prosperity and
the convenience and comfort of every other part of the civilized world.” Justice John
McLean made a similar argument in his concurring opinion, noting that “the settlement of
our country is comparatively recent, and its rapid growth in population and advance in
improvements have prevented, in a great degree, interests from being acquired by
immemorial usage. Such evidence of right is found in countries where society has
become more fixed and improvements are in a great degree stationary.” McLean also
contextualized the contract clause, drawing attention to “the history of our revolution”
and “the time the Constitution was adopted,” to contend that the present case does not
“come within the scope of that provision.” Justice Joseph Story dissented, in part,
because he believed the decision would hinder commerce by discouraging companies
from entering into contracts. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren
Bridge, 36 US 420, 553, 563, 572-73, 573 (1837). In this decision, then, Taney claimed
continuity with the founding even as he prescribed progress. Though a good candidate to
evidence change and distance since the Revolutionary era, the issue of commerce did not
draw as much attention to that period nor introduce as much division and disagreement as
the slavery issue. On the historical components of this decision, see Kunal Parker,
Common Law, 128-58.
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original expectations, directed Taney’s interpretation. Taney seemed set on recreating the
founding era, or at least, on recovering what he perceived to be the legal principles that
governed social relations between slave and master in that period. But, as in many of the
debates that preceded his decision, the explicit attempt to disregard the interpretive
importance of change highlighted its presence and, at least to antislavery respondents,
drew further attention to the reality of the historical distance that separated the 1850s
from the Revolutionary moment.
The strict adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning and, increasingly, the
framers’ original intent began to dominate constitutionalism in the antebellum period,
largely foreclosing the possibility of decisions informed by the notion that historical
distance and change demanded an adaptable constitution.5 Among the framers
themselves, originalist appeals often focused on the document’s language rather than the
subjective views of either its creators or ratifiers.6 In the debate over the Bank of the
United States in the 1790s, James Madison had placed emphasis on the understanding of
the people, through ratification, rather than the intent of the framers, through inscription,

5

Perhaps Brian Dirck overreaches in asserting that “nearly all of [Lincoln’s]
fellow Americans in that time period were what modern constitutional scholars call
‘originalists’; that is, they believed the language of the Constitution was what its authors
said it was, no more and no less,” but this description might apply to most Americans
who set out to interpret the Constitution in that period. Brian R. Dirck, Lincoln and the
Constitution (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), 29.
6
On this kind of originalism in the early republic, see H. Jefferson Powell, “The
Original Understanding of Original Intent,” Harvard Law Review 98 (March 1985): 885948. In response to Powell’s article on original intent, Charles A. Lofgren pointed out the
distinction between framers and ratifiers in contending that some looked to the later for
insight into original intent. Charles A. Lofgren, “The Original Understanding of Original
Intent?” Constitutional Commentary 5 (1988): 77-113. Jack Rakove also attends the issue
of originalism in his discussion of the creation of the Constitution and contextualizes
Madison’s politically informed implication that one should examine the ratification
debates in expounding the Constitution. Rakove, Original Meanings, 2-22, 339-65.
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though he usually appealed to the text itself.7 Attention to the ratifiers later emerged in
the writings of the radical antislavery constitutionalists, but William Goodell’s and
Lysander Spooner’s strict focus on the original meanings of the words alone overrode
their interest in the ratifiers’ original understandings. Their arguments came in response
to the shift in interpretive focus toward determining and using the framers’ intent, which
followed from the publication of Madison’s papers in 1840. Such appeals often attended
to the opinions of the ratifiers and the broader Western audience as crucial contextual
pieces to the framers’ textual puzzle. In either case, whether the emphasis was on the
framers or the ratifiers, or even on the words of the document alone, most constitutional
thinkers consistently sought to uncover and put to use static and consensus original ideas,
which often required ignoring contradictions, differing opinions, and the Anti-Federalist
tradition as a whole.8 Frederick Douglass highlighted discrepancies among the framers’
intentions, which allowed him to insert the people as rightful interpreters, but most of the
era’s constitutionalists had words and people from the Revolutionary past determine the
meaning and relevance of the Constitution in the nineteenth-century present.9 The
Constitution was either a static proslavery or antislavery document. Antebellum
constitutional construction most often dictated that Americans either accept the original
ideas or reject them and, to a large extent, the document containing the words from which
they emerged. This dissertation demonstrates that room existed to debate slavery’s
7

See James Madison, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United
States (1825-1837), 4th Congress, 1st Session, v. 5, p. 776. See note 126 of chapter 3.
8
On the persistence of the Anti-Federalist tradition, see Saul Cornell, The Other
Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
9
Rakove rightly explains that “all appeals to original meaning, intention, and
understanding of the Constitution are inherently historical in nature.” Rakove, Original
Meanings, 9.
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constitutionality, but it also shows that the timeless components of the canon could also
trump historical change.
And yet, if the passage of time did not demand a new construction, what if the
framers themselves had aimed to bequeath an interpretive approach that demanded
openness to historical change? If they intended to convey that the Constitution should
adapt over time and in relation to new contingencies, then interpreters might argue that
shifts in public opinion demanded a new construction. Perhaps the founders had denied
most of their black contemporaries citizenship, but what if those same founders had
anticipated that their sons and daughters would grant all black Americans that status in
the future? Antislavery reading hinted at these questions. Most came up short, in part due
to their focus on slavery itself, but a wide range of antislavery thinkers had argued that
the founding generation had expected slavery’s eventual abolition. These ideas informed
parts of the arguments of those who dissented from Taney’s opinion, including John
McLean and Benjamin Curtis, each of whom reasoned that the founders had foreseen the
institution’s eventual demise and had written with that vision in mind. Such thinkers
began to sense that the framers had created the Constitution as a legal text meant to
answer both present and future concerns—that the framers’ original intent was
adaptability. In this period, one can detect the buds of a kind of originalist living
constitutionalism, arising from seeds laid by some of the framers themselves, who
conceived their creation with the expectation that it would adapt to new circumstances.10

10

A well-known example of the framers’ effort to create an adaptable constitution
is found in the Committee of Detail’s draft of the Constitution. In the preamble, John
Randolph’s first of two related principles of constitution-making stressed inserting
“essential principles only; lest the operations of government should be clogged by
rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated
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The Garrisonian reading of the Constitution as a static proslavery document received the
Chief Justice’s stamp of approval in Dred Scott, but the antislavery interpretation of
original expectation also achieved a prominent status in McLean’s and Curtis’s dissenting
opinions, opinions which fostered an emerging view of the Constitution as a document
which endured because it could adapt to the needs of different people in different times.
The Dred Scott decision focused on what Taney viewed as negative change, or, in
his words, unfortunate deviations “in public opinion or feeling.” He provided the ultimate
counter-narrative to the antislavery account of the lamentable rise of the Slave Power.
Antislavery proponents often balanced their narratives with observations of the spread of
antislavery sentiment. That combination unveiled historical distance, which they used to
argue that time had come realize the framers’ expectations. In contrast, Taney’s emphasis
on negative change, in the form of the spread of abolitionist ideology, justified his
attempt to collapse the historical distance that his reading revealed.11 If temporal distance
resulted from unwanted change, then few could protest restorative appeals to a pure past.
Similar to the arguments that Daniel Webster, Moses Stuart, and even Benjamin Curtis
had made in 1850, Taney used the static and synchronic historical components of the
Revolutionary golden age (i.e. late eighteenth-century ideas of black inferiority) to
combat the changing and diachronic historical components of, in his view, corrupted
to times and events.” John Randolph, “Draft Sketch of the Constitution,” in Supplement
to Max Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. James H. Hutson (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 183. The first full articulation of a living US
Constitution emerged much later among legal realists, including Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis, in the early twentieth century. See H. L. Pohlman, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: Free Speech and Living Constitutionalism (New York: New
York University Press, 1991); and Philippa Strum, “Brandeis and the Living
Constitution,” in Brandeis in America, ed. Nelson L. Dawson (Lexington: The University
of Kentucky Press, 1989), 118-32.
11
Scott v. Sandford, 60 US, 426.
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American history (i.e. the rise of abolitionist-informed egalitarian sentiment). In response
to unwanted change, he emphatically asserted that the Constitution “must be construed
now as it was understood at the time of its adoption.” The founding document, he urged,
continued to speak “not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent
with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on and
adopted by the people of the United States.”12 Taney collapsed time just as Stuart had
when he asserted that Paul supported the Fugitive Slave Law, or as Curtis had when he
insisted that the anti-constitutionalists were betraying the legacy of those who had died to
obtain a constitution “but the other day.” The Chief Justice held that changes in public
sentiment did not allow him to ignore what he believed to be the framers’ intentions and
extend the rights of citizenship to those of the African race.
There was an irony built into this debate. As with America’s biblical interpreters,
Taney made the following hermeneutical assertion: times change, but the meaning and
authority of sacred texts do not. In emphasizing the latter point, he brought new attention
to the former. The allowance that times change, even when cast as irrelevant to
interpretation and construction, highlighted that fact. Taney’s efforts to brush aside the
new ideas imposed by change to recover and apply the original ideas that they masked
necessarily designated those original ideas as old. Indeed, in some ways the tendency to
depict change as corruption, more than as progress, highlighted historical distance.
Change cast as continuous with the founding muted the dissonance resulting from
distance, while change deemed to be discontinuous with the founding amplified it.
Interpretations such as Taney’s, which aimed to expose historical change as distractive
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regression and to reject its constructional value, drew attention to the reality of historical
distance. To be sure, in a setting where a consensus position about the negative value of
change goes unchallenged, that reality is obscured by anxious attempts to overcome
historical distance and reclaim a pure past. But in the 1850s, where antislavery readers
called the negative change Taney identified “progress,” and associated that progress with
the promises that figures in the past expected their predecessors to fulfill in the future, it
raised awareness of historical distance in an unprecedented manner.
In the antebellum period, slavery, more than any other issue, had the potential to
deepen Americans’ awareness of historical distance from the founding era and to force
them to reinterpret the Constitution in light of such awareness. Dred Scott embodied that
potentiality. The historical arguments in the deciding and the dissenting opinions
exhibited the fact that more than just chronological difference stood between nineteenthcentury Americans and their Revolutionary predecessors. That realization threatened to
undermine the continued usefulness of the Revolutionary era and its texts. The process of
historicizing the sacred biblical past had suggested that no historical period remained safe
from historical criticism, but the sacralized founding era might have seemed too close and
too useful to be historically distant. Thus, when constitutional argumentation over slavery
indicated that historical distance separated Americans from even their most recent
favored past, it sent the signal to some that no historical era could be relied on to
transcend time. In a time and place that measured historical progress in terms of a
nation’s promised destiny toward a millennial existence, historical awareness of the
Revolutionary era and slavery’s vicissitudes in the mid-nineteenth century could lead
some to conceive of even the present as bound by temporal constraints.
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A “Dark and Fell Spirit”: Slavery’s Unwelcome Introduction of Historical Distance
As with the fugitive slave cases that followed the Fugitive Slave Law, Dred Scott
brought a great deal of attention to an African American. Dred Scott’s case induced
debate about, the exploits and status of his Revolutionary forebears, which, in turn,
incited contemporaries, black and white, to further action on behalf of enslaved African
Americans. As the federal government’s efforts to return fugitives to enslavement
brought increased clamoring for their freedom, the Supreme Court’s attempt to withhold
citizenship from Dred Scott and his contemporaries encouraged the fervent articulation of
historical arguments aimed at demonstrating their fitness for citizenship. Rather than
settle the debate with a historically grounded decision, Taney gave it new life on an everexpanding public stage. And it became clear that on that stage, even in terms of
constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court was only one of a number of actors.
Dred Scott was born into slavery in Southampton County, Virginia, near the turn
of the century. He grew and toiled under the ownership of Peter Blow. In 1830, Blow
relocated to St. Louis and, after his death in 1832, his heirs sold Scott to John Emerson, a
doctor in the US Army. In 1834, Emerson was assigned to Fort Armstrong at Rock Island
in the free state of Illinois, where he remained with Scott until May of 1836, when he was
transferred to Fort Snelling, Wisconsin Territory, where the Northwest Ordinance and the
Missouri Compromise were understood to prohibit slavery. While at Fort Snelling, Scott
married Harriet Robinson, who became Emerson’s slave. In 1837, Emerson rented out
Dred and Harriet at Fort Snelling, while he responded to the Army’s call to Missouri, and
later Louisiana. In early 1838, Emerson married Eliza Irene Sanford, and soon called on
the Scotts to join him in Louisiana. Before the year’s end, Emerson traveled back to Fort
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Snelling with his wife and the Scotts. En route, Harriet gave birth to a baby girl, named
Eliza. In 1840, while John Emerson served in the Seminole War, Eliza Emerson and the
Scotts returned to St. Louis, where she hired them out. John was discharged from the
Army in 1842 and died the following year, leaving his estate to Eliza. Perhaps the
realization that his slave status transcended the mortality of his owner stirred in Scott a
desire to break from servitude before his own demise.13
In 1846, Scott attempted to purchase his family’s freedom, but Eliza refused.
Scott then took legal action, suing for his release from enslavement in the St. Louis
County Circuit Court, where his lawyers argued that his residence in free regions granted
him emancipation. The court ruled against Scott and his family, which now included
another girl, Lizzie, before the judge ordered a retrial due to hearsay. After numerous
delays, Scott v. Emerson began in January of 1850. The Missouri jury found that
Emerson had illegally held Dred and Harriet in Illinois and Wisconsin and awarded the
Scotts their freedom. Eliza, though, won an appeal before the Supreme Court of Missouri,
which, in November of 1852, reversed the decision. Judge William Scott echoed Webster
and anticipated Taney in his reference to the unfortunate evolution of northerners’ views
on slavery, but rather than dismissing it as blinding and irrelevant, he based his argument
on this development.14
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This chapter provides only a partial discussion of the biographical and legal
aspects of Dred Scott’s pursuit of freedom. Along with Fehrenbacher’s The Dred Scott
Case, see, for example, Ethan Greenberg’s narrative in Dred Scott and the Dangers of a
Political Court (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), for an outline and analysis of the
legal story. For biographical information on the Scott family, see Lea VanderVelde, Mrs.
Dred Scott: A Life on Slavery’s Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Far from dismissing them as unfortunate deviations, as had Webster and Stuart, or
mere distractions, as would Taney, Judge Scott cited changes in public opinion as the
basis for his departure from precedent. Recognizing relevant state rulings, he noted that
“cases of this kind are not strangers in our courts,” and acknowledged that “persons have
been frequently here adjudged to be entitled to their freedom, on the ground that their
master held them in slavery in territories or States in which that institution was
prohibited.”15 Scott then turned to Taney’s recent ruling in Strader v. Graham (1851), a
Supreme Court case dealing with the status of slaves who had been taken from Kentucky
to Ohio and had then fled to Canada. Taney had dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, placing the fate of the escaped slaves in the hands of Kentucky judges. Scott
cited Taney’s ruling “to show, that the comity extended to the laws of other States, is a
matter of discretion, to be determined by the courts of that State in which the laws are
proposed to be enforced. If it is a matter of discretion,” he continued, “that discretion
must be controlled by circumstances.”16 Circumstance, rather than precedent, Scott
contended, must dictate. He designated the spread of unsavory antislavery sentiment as
the case’s controlling circumstance: “Times now are not as they were when the former
decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been
possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in
the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and
destruction of our government.”17 Scott concluded that “under such circumstances it does
not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which
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might gratify this spirit.”18 Scott thus argued that in excited situations, construction
should answer present needs, rather than blindly follow precedential decision.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hamilton Rowan Gamble dismissed the
importance of change and instead appealed to static principles tied to precedent.19 He
protested that “there is with me, nothing in the law relating to slavery, which
distinguishes it from the law on any other subject, or allows any more accommodation to
the temporary public excitements which are gathered around it.”20 The established law
should not accommodate itself to contemporary developments. Indeed, Gamble
proceeded to argue that “the judicial mind, calm and self balanced, should adhere to
principles established when there was no feeling to disturb the view of the legal questions
upon which the rights of parties depend."21 Cases that should serve as precedent were
“decided when the public mind was tranquil, and when the tribunals maintained in their
decisions, the principles which had always received the approbation of an enlightened
public opinion.”22 Gamble indicted the Court for wavering in the midst of a public
maelstrom, arguing that “times may have changed, public feeling may have changed, but
principles have not and do not change; and, in my judgment, there can be no safe basis
for judicial decisions, but in those principles, which are immutable.”23 Both sides
acknowledged change, but while one delivered an opinion in response to it, the other
contended that law must function outside of and above change.
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In Scott v. Emerson the judge ruling against Dred Scott crafted his opinion as a
response to change while the judge opining in his favor formulated a position
independent of change and centered in static legal principles. In Scott v. Sandford the side
ruling against Scott dismissed changes since the founding era as irrelevant and rested its
opinion on static legal principles while the side opining in favor of Scott appealed, at
least in part, to an original expectation of change. The cases’ different central sources of
legal instruction—precedent in Scott v. Emerson and the Constitution in Scott v.
Sandford—largely account for this apparent irony. Politics and public sentiment informed
both decisions. Indeed, Chief Justice Taney’s historically based constitutional decision
suggests that antislavery historical readings of the Constitution shaped his ruling. But
rather than point those readings as informative in construction, as Judge Scott had
identified “a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery” as the circumstance controlling
construction in his decision, Taney joined the conversation. In doing so, his appeal to the
highest law of the land and its static original ideas led him to dismiss as irrelevant
evolving public opinion even as it incited his response. Judge Scott, in contrast, had
turned to precedent, which he dismissed in favor of circumstance, thanks to Taney’s
recent ruling in Strader v. Graham. Without a fixed point in the past to compare with the
present, and to thus recognize substantial changes from one period to another, Scott v.
Emerson did not hold the same potential to draw attention to historical distance as Scott v.
Sandford. Soon, that potential began to surface.
During the time of this ruling Eliza moved to Massachusetts and Emerson’s estate
seems to have been transferred to her brother, John F. A. Sanford (misspelled as Sandford
in the court records), who returned from Missouri to New York, where he was a resident,
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in 1853. On the basis of diverse citizenship, wherein a case involving citizens from
different states placed it under federal jurisdiction, Scott’s lawyers obtained a hearing
before the federal district court in Missouri. This brought the question of Scott’s
citizenship to the forefront. The judge directed the jury to rely on Missouri law and to
decide in favor of Sanford, who rejected Scott’s citizenship claims because “his ancestors
were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro
slaves.”24 This decision centered the case on historical readings of the founding era. On a
writ of error, Scott’s attorneys appealed to the US Supreme Court. The stage was nearly
set for Taney’s decision, though a few more crucial pieces had to be put in place.
The ramping up of conflict between political parties in the 1840s and 50s
contributed to politically motivated legal rulings. The political nature of Dred Scott
hinged on the Court’s decision to deliver a broad ruling addressing the issue of slavery in
the territories. James Buchanan, whose election as President in 1856 came in the midst of
rising sectional tensions, believed that resolving the territorial problem would help avert
the ominous collision. He and other politicians looked to the Supreme Court for an
answer. An opportunity presented itself in Scott v. Sandford. The President-elect hoped
that before taking up residence in the White House in the spring of 1857, the Court would
settle the debate for all time, or at least for his term, and he took steps to ensure bipartisan
support for a broad decision. In February, he wrote to Justice John Catron, a Jackson
appointee, inquiring about the forthcoming ruling and pointing out the timely and lasting
benefits of a broad decision. Catron’s first few responses promised little. Initially, the
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Court decided to have Justice Samuel Nelson of New York write a narrow opinion based
on the reasoning behind Strader v. Graham, which would return jurisdiction to Missouri
courts. However, the threat of extensive dissenting opinions from McLean and Curtis,
along with interest, inside and outside the Court, in a broad proslavery decision, seems to
have led the Court to take the pen from Nelson and place it in the hand of Taney, who set
out to build on the federal district court’s assertion that Scott’s ancestors “were brought
into this country and sold as negro slaves.” Catron apprised Buchanan of this pleasing
development, but noted that the decision needed northern support. He suggested that
Buchanan implore his fellow Pennsylvanian, Justice Robert Cooper Grier, to join the
majority. Buchanan did so and succeeded, allowing Taney to address the question of
congressional power in the territories. In short order, Republicans attacked Buchanan and
Taney as co-conspirators with the Slave Power and a decision meant to unite the nation
left it further divided. Far from providing a lasting resolution, Taney’s pronouncements
thrust the nation toward conflict.25
The immediate background to the Dred Scott decision along with the history of
Dred Scott’s case demonstrates a convergence of certain events and ideas that culminated
in Taney’s deciding opinion. The initial cases focused on the question of Scott’s freedom,
based on the fact that his owner, John Emerson, had taken him into free regions. The
Missouri rulings focused on either using or dismissing precedential decisions to decide
the fate of Scott and his family. The nature of the case changed when Scott’s lawyers
obtained a hearing before the federal district court of Missouri on the basis of diverse
citizenship. This placed the case under federal jurisdiction and highlighted the question of
25

On the Court’s reversal and Buchanan’s involvement, see Fehrenbacher, The
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Scott’s citizenship. Further, the district court based its ruling on a historical assertion
about Scott’s ancestors, which focused attention on the founding era and the Constitution.
When these developments combined with Buchanan’s push for a broad decision and the
threat of expansive dissenting opinions from Curtis and McLean, Chief Justice Taney
responded with a landmark constitutional decision based on historical assertions about
the Revolutionary past. In doing so, he responded to immediate concerns and the case’s
deeper backdrop, but he also delivered his decision in a culture where, as a result of
decades of argumentation, interpreters had come to view contextual readings of the
nation’s sacred legal text as definitive in deciding slavery’s fate. Taney accepted that
conclusion and hoped to end the debates with a decisive ruling.

“The Fixed Opinions Concerning That Race”: The Taney Court and the Constitution’s
Static Proslavery Meanings
Taney’s reached the proslavery position he promoted in Dred Scott gradually. His
evolving stance on slavery was somewhat representative of southerners more generally.
In 1818, while defending abolitionist minister Jacob Gruber, who had been indicted for a
sermon that presumably promoted rebellion, Taney condemned slavery as an institution
in need of gradual abolishment. He did so as a slaveholding attorney from Maryland and
that same year he began manumitting his own slaves. During this period, he also
supported the colonization movement and voted to limit the growth of slavery while
serving in the Maryland Senate. But these antislavery words and deeds seem to have been
his last. In the 1820s he argued against slaves and in favor of slaveholders and in 1832, as
US attorney general, Taney officially defended the constitutionality of South Carolina’s
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statute that allowed for the arrest of black seamen arriving in Charleston. In response, at
least in part, to abolitionism’s rise and events such as Nat Turner’s rebellion, he gradually
became an emphatic proslavery supporter, as exhibited in his positions in Groves v.
Slaughter (1841), Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), and Strader v. Graham (1851). The
eagerness with which he delivered and defended his broad decision in Scott v. Sandford
attested to the completion of a shift from a view of slavery as a domestic blot in need of
eventual removal to a clear conviction that the institution was a civilizing blessing in
need of vigilant protection. While change in public sentiment contributed to this personal
change of heart, Taney was resolved to not allow the former development to cloud his
constitutional construction, preferring rather to uncover and apply what he understood to
be the founders’ static original ideas.26
After deciding questions of jurisdiction, he turned to the issue of US citizenship,
opening with a methodological appeal to “the sense in which that word [citizen] is used
in the Constitution,” and proceeded to pose the question of whether “a negro whose
ancestors were imported to this country and sold as slaves” could obtain citizenship.27
The Chief Justice used a historical argument to conclude that such a descendent could not
claim citizenship, because his ancestors “were at that time considered as a subordinate
and inferior class of beings … whether emancipated or not.”28 To uncover the intent of
the framers and the meaning of the Constitution, he invoked what he perceived to be the
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understanding of the audience for whom they wrote and the popular sentiment of the
times. The approach allowed Taney to use legal formalism to absolve the Court of any
moral failing in sanctioning slavery: “it is not the province of the court to decide upon the
justice or injustice … of these laws.”29 He left that responsibility to the framers and
ratifiers. “The duty of the court,” he maintained, “is to interpret the instrument they have
framed with the best lights we can obtain … and to administer it … according to its true
intent and meaning when it was adopted.”30 In his reading, those of African descent were
not citizens of states at the writing and ratification of the Constitution and, though states
in the new nation retained the power to grant citizenship, this state-level status was
distinct from federal citizenship. Taney later referenced the slave-trade and fugitive-slave
clauses to demonstrate that the prevailing “opinion of the time” was that blacks were
property.31 The privileged place that biblical scholars like Joseph Buckminster and Moses
Stuart gave to historical explication found correspondence among antebellum legal
theorists like Taney, who also emphasized the interpretational value of “the best lights”
and who also found justification for slavery, or for proslavery legislation, in their favored
past. These historical lights illuminated a founding generation’s position on slavery,
which interpreters such as Stuart and Taney called forth to uphold the division between
“the unhappy black race … from the white by indelible marks.”32 Such appeals claimed
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to value historical context in discerning the Constitution’s original meaning and intent,
but this kind of construction disregarded the interpretive value of change over time.33
Rather than confine his discussion to the nation’s sacred legal document, Taney
used extra-constitutional sources from the Revolutionary era—as Buckminster had used
extra-biblical sources from the New Testament era—including the Articles of
Confederation, “the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the
Declaration of Independence” to “show that neither the class of persons who had been
imported as slaves nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then
acknowledged as part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words
used in that memorable instrument.”34 The appeal to an authoritative historical text was
also an appeal to continuity. Just as European Americans were linked to their founding
predecessors, and thus could claim promised constitutional privileges, so African
Americans, free and slave, were linked to their enslaved ancestors, and thus remained
ineligible for such privileges. Forming a new nation signaled a sharp break from the past,
but in Taney’s reading it also froze the inequities of a particular moment and ensured
their persistence for all succeeding time. Blacks could not be citizens at the founding, but
could be property, and so, seventy years later, Dred Scott could be held as property, in
both free and slave regions, but could not sue in court. Taney’s historical narration held
Scott hostage in the present by denying his ancestors citizenship in the past.
Perhaps in response to antislavery anti-constitutionalists, who held onto the
ostensibly universal ideas of the Declaration as timeless truths, Taney aimed to bind it to
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a particular moment and thus restrain its original meaning even while retaining its
relevance. He was more likely contending with antislavery constitutionalists, who bound
the Constitution to the Declaration and the perceived antislavery spirit of the
Revolutionary age. In contrast, Taney subjected the Declaration to the Constitution and to
the perceived proslavery spirit of that era. He cited the paragraph containing the phrase
“all men are created equal,” and, in a striking acknowledgment, granted that “the general
words … would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a
similar instrument at this day would be so understood.”35 Taney drew attention to
memorable words with seemingly universal applicability and admitted that developments
since their utterance would give them a more egalitarian meaning. However, he held that
precisely because the inclusive signification of the phrase rested on changes subsequent
to ratification, this signification must be dismissed for an original and more exclusive
meaning. “It is too clear for dispute,” he asserted,
that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no
part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the language, as
understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished
men who framed the Declaration of Independence, would have been utterly and
flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of sympathy
of mankind to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and
received universal rebuke and reprobation.36
Aware of changing perceptions and sympathies, which gave old words new
significations, Taney explicitly rendered them irrelevant to constitutional interpretation
and construction. He appealed to the period’s domestic and international audience, using
late eighteenth-century Western public sentiment to establish that the framers “spoke and
acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary
35
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language of the day, and no one misunderstood.”37 Many antislavery biblical and
constitutional readers had posited that the Christian and national founders, respectively,
had used discretion in undermining slavery, and thus some of their words and actions
might be misconstrued as revealing that they had intended to sanction and preserve the
institution when, in fact, they hoped for and expected its deterioration. William Garrison
and Wendell Phillips rejected such explanations as naïve and so did Taney.
Taney needed the founders to speak for slavery. “We refer to these historical
facts” he explained, “for the purpose of showing the fixed opinions concerning that race
upon which the statesmen of that day spoke and acted.”38 The thrust of Taney’s opinion
relied on fixed ideas, but he also drew on historical continuity for support. He cited
legislation forbidding interracial marriage in the northern states of Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, from before ratification up to 1844.39
He identified and dismissed historical change in applying the Constitution, but used
historical continuity to assert the utter improbability that the framers intended to bless
blacks or their descendants with the rights and privileges of citizenship.
Taney outlined the “historical facts” of popular perceptions of blacks from the
Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary pasts, which he then used as binding truths in the
present. Far from neglecting historical change, he highlighted it, but only to warn that
deviating developments might obscure one’s vision of the founding moment. Precisely
because he believed “it is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion … at
the time of the Declaration of Independence and when the Constitution of the United
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States was framed and adopted,” Taney stressed the clarifying value of his historical
lesson.40 Like Frederick Douglass, he referenced the challenge of unearthing past
thought, but he was much more confident in his ability to bring that thought to light and
much more emphatic in stressing its determinative value. He presumed that “no one …
supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race,
in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were
intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.”41 Taney’s mention of “no
one” was more wishful mandate than accurate accounting, as the dissenters soon
demonstrated, but in a clash of historical modes, Taney’s constitutional construction
determined that the synchronic trumped the diachronic, unless the diachronic revealed
continuity. The opinions of the founding era trumped those of the present, unless those of
the present matched them, in which case the historical eras complemented rather than
contradicted each other. If the Constitution itself proved unjust, a problem when justice
was placed in the hands of the framers, then “there is a mode prescribed in the instrument
itself by which it may be amended.”42 But readers should not force current ideas about
blacks into the text, for “it is obvious,” in the light of Taney’s historical rendering, “that
they were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were
conferring special rights and privileges on citizens.”43 Like an archaeologist in search of a
relic, Taney brushed aside the accruing dirt and dross that threatened to hide original
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truths. Scott, historical excavation showed, would have been a non-citizen when the
document was written, and as such, could not now sue in federal court.
Having provided his lengthy historical lesson, Taney concluded that the case
rested outside federal jurisdiction. He thus relied on the precedent set by the Supreme
Court of Missouri, which wielded state law to cast Scott as a slave. For all intents and
purposes, Taney had ruled on the matter at hand and might have closed his decision.
Instead, he took the opportunity to deliver an executive-backed pronouncement,
dismissed by the dissenters as lacking authority and attacked in the press as obiter
dictum, on the question of Congress’s power over slavery in the territories.44
On this matter, too, Taney stressed the value of uncovering particular
circumstances in revealing the framers’ intent. He again rested his argument on an
examination of the “history of the times,” which led him to narrowly argue that the
constitutional clause granting Congress governmental power in the territories referred
strictly to the land held in common at the time of ratification and did not apply to
territories that the nation might subsequently acquire.45 In contrast to his ruling on
African American citizenship, he argued that the Constitution restricted application to a
set time in the past rather than stretching into the present. In an extended discussion,
Taney aimed to establish that the power granted in said clause “has no bearing on the
present controversy” but “is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory
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which at that time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States.”46 He emphasized
the importance of bringing “this part of the history of these cessions” to bear on
constitutional phraseology.47 Throughout this portion of his historical lesson, Taney
emphasized the “specific,” “particular,” and “local” nature of the powers in question.48
This construction let him “put aside … any argument, drawn from precedents, showing
the extent of the power which the General Government exercised over slavery in this
Territory.”49 Change was a double-edged sword, but in Taney’s hands the side that
seemed to contradict the Constitution’s original meaning and intent was left blunt.
Taney’s history dictated that blacks were not citizens at the founding, and thus
were not citizens now, despite changes in public opinion; it also dictated that although
Congress possessed power over the territories held at the founding, it held no power over
property held in the territories obtained through the Louisiana Purchase and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, despite divergent legal decisions. In Taney’s reading, any deviation
from the Constitution’s narrowly construed original meanings, even a tradition of legal
precedent granting Congress power over subsequently acquired territories, must be
dismissed. Any continuity, then, that did not stretch back to the very moment of the
framing, must be invalidated as change. The consistency of Taney’s position rested on
discerning intention. If the founders intended that a principle endure as a general and
universal rule then any departure from that principle must be deemed unconstitutional. If
they intended that a principle answer specific and particular questions, then continued
application of that principle must be dismissed as unconstitutional.
46
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As in the biblical debates, only historical research and reasoning, or at least the
appearance of such, could allow the interpreter to claim authority to distinguish the
particular from the universal. In helping uncover specific and local meanings, such as the
territorial clause, the historical reading drew attention to historical distance. In a more
critical light, one might suggest that Taney used that distance to dismiss as specific and
local those meanings that contradicted his position. Such usage, however, highlighted the
difficulty of distinguishing transient from permanent and of determining what historical
distance made or did not make irrelevant. Taney managed to avoid this messiness with
blunt assertions about what was timeless and what was timely, as in his discussion of
fugitive slaves. He argued that the government set up by the framers “is pledged to
protect [a slaveholder’s right to traffic his property] in all future time if the slave
escapes.”50 Almost in passing Taney declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional,
and he did so through a historical explication.
While some of the justices providing concurring or separate opinions offered little
more than their general assent—Pennsylvania native Justice Grier’s brief statement,
which amounted to less than a page, attested to his role as the token northern supporter
Buchanan wanted him to be—others, including proslavery Justices Peter Vivian Daniel,
John A. Campbell, and John Catron, followed Taney in offering historical arguments.51 In

50

Ibid., 451-52.
For Grier’s opinion, see Scott v. Sandford, 60 US, 469. Not all of the justices
who provided concurring and separate opinions decided on each of the issues Taney
addressed and some distinctions exist between their opinions and Taney’s decision, but,
as Fehrenbacher makes clear, “none of the major rulings in Taney’s opinion can be
pushed aside as unauthoritative.” Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 333. Still, Catron,
Campbell, and Nelson did not discuss the status of free African Americans in their
decisions. Earl Maltz contends that this refusal to engage the issue demonstrates the
persistence of doctrinal imperatives even at the height of the sectional debate. Earl M.
51

327

his opinion, Daniel asserted that “the following are truths which a knowledge of the
history of the world, and particularly of that of our own country, compels us to know—
that the African negro race never have been acknowledged as belonging to the family of
nations.”52 Clearly, the Court’s focus on African Americans could just as easily serve to
spread racist proslavery positions than raise awareness of suffering slaves. To give his
assent further credence the Virginian compared American with Roman slavery, citing
classical precedent for not granting citizenship upon emancipation.53 In his opinion,
Campbell also aimed to interpret the Constitution “by the light of the circumstances in
which the Convention was placed.”54 Just as Joseph Buckminster and Moses Stuart had
argued that Christian conversion did not alter a slave’s status, Campbell argued that “the
American Revolution was not a social revolution. … It was a political revolution, by
which thirteen dependent colonies became thirteen independent states.”55 As with Taney,
Campbell of Alabama, who later served as Assistant Secretary of War for the
Confederacy, determined that the claim granting Congress present power in the territories
“is not supported by historical evidence drawn from the Revolution, the Confederation, or
the deliberations which preceded the ratification of the Federal Constitution.”56 Catron, a
Tennessee native who had fathered a slave—James P. Thomas—who had obtained
freedom in 1851, also emphasized that “every provision in that instrument has a history
that must be understood before the brief and sententious language employed can be
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comprehended in the relations its authors intended.”57 “Historical facts,” he determined,
demonstrated the specific and limited nature of congressional powers.58 The Taney Court
gave official sanction to the priority of using the framers’ intent as paramount in
constitutional construction and to the importance of historical explication in uncovering
that intent.
Historical investigation, the Taney Court argued, demonstrated that the founders
had intended to deny those of African heritage and their descendants federal citizenship,
to grant Congress power only over those territories held in common at the time of
ratification, and to protect private property, including slaves, in all acquired territories
throughout all future time. When deemed continuous from the period of the framing,
public sentiment and legal decisions—including, for example, racist ideas about blacks
and marriage laws against miscegenation—illuminated original intent. When determined
to be deviations from that period, public sentiment and legal decisions, including, for
example, more egalitarian ideas about blacks, legislation giving Congress power over
slavery in the territories, or precedent granting former slaves freedom, obscured original
intent. In a way, the Taney Court allowed for change or deviation in construction, but
only if one could determine that the framers had created a clause only for specific, local,
and temporary application. Limiting application of the clause on congressional power,
then, was not an appeal to change or deviation, but rather continuity, because such a
limitation was part of the original intent. In another way, the Taney Court dismissed
continuity as inadmissible in construction, but only if one could determine that views on
the issue in question did not stretch back to the framers. An appeal to precedent granting
57
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slaves freedom, then, was not a claim to continuity, but rather a symptom of the kind of
change that Taney found distracting in construction. In short, the Court recognized that
temporal differences separated the Revolutionary past from their mid-nineteenth-century
present, but characterized those differences as an interpretational problem to be overcome
through historical excavation rather than a reality requiring a more liberal construction.
But deeper and more precise historical excavation might produce very different results.

“Its Tendencies Would Greatly Ameliorate Their Condition”: John McLean and an
Original Expectation of Change
Dissent from the Court’s proslavery decision by northern justices was not a
foregone conclusion and was, in some ways, a surprise. Grier of Pennsylvania, a cousin
of Alexander H. Stephens, had his marching orders from the President. Samuel Nelson of
New York was a political wanderer and, at present, a northern “doughface” Democrat.
John McLean of Ohio was a Republican in 1857, but he had been associated with nearly
every party across the antebellum political spectrum, making it difficult to discern where
his allegiance lay. While fairly stable in their political ties, Benjamin Curtis and his
brother George Curtis had conflicting positions on slavery-related issues. Benjamin had
served as counsel for the defense in Commonwealth v. Aves (1836), which addressed
whether the defendant in the North could hold a child slave for his daughter from the
South. As counsel for Aves, Benjamin had worked to ensure continued enslavement.
Further, as outlined above, in the early 1850s he had staunchly defended the Constitution
and the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law against abolitionists’ arguments and
had issued indictments against those attempting to support fugitive slaves. Even when he
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opined in favor of Dred Scott’s freedom in 1857, Benjamin still disapproved of
abolitionism. As US commissioner in Boston, Benjamin’s brother George had complied
with the Fugitive Slave Law in issuing arrest warrants and certificates of removal for the
capture and return of various fugitive slaves. Now, as Scott’s co-counsel, he argued on
behalf of another former slave. Although McLean was against slavery’s extension,
neither he nor Benjamin Curtis had aligned themselves with antislavery forces. But,
whatever their political motivations, their research convinced them that history conflicted
with Taney’s reading of the Constitution.59
Like the Court, McLean and Curtis based their opinions on an appeal to original
intent, illuminated through historical research. In many ways, the justices simply differed
on what historical investigation revealed about that intent, but the intentions they ascribed
to the founders corresponded with crucial distinctions in historical thinking. Where the
Court appealed to the popular opinion of the times to argue that the framers never
intended to bless those of African descent with citizenship, McLean and Curtis argued
that in a number of states, including North Carolina, blacks had, in fact, voted at the time
of ratification, which they described as an outward sign of citizenship. On this point, the
dissenting justices also cited an original expectation of change. Their reasoning echoed
and in some ways extended the arguments of antislavery constitutionalists in opining that
the framers had expected that future developments would expand constitutional rights
and protections to free blacks. Where the Court highlighted particular historical
circumstances to constrain the clause granting Congress territorial power to temporary
and local application, the dissenters contended that the framers constructed the passage
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with an eye toward present and future concerns. These opinions implied that because the
framers had expected certain changes, change should be used rather than dismissed in
constitutional interpretation. To be sure, an appeal to an original expectation of change
might mute an awareness of its contingent nature and mitigate the realization of historical
distance: the expectation of change removes its surprise and, if realized, suggests
inevitability, while also drawing together the time in which those changes occur and the
predictive moment in the past. Nevertheless, in following antislavery writers in also
pointing out developments that militated against the realization of the framers’
expectations, McLean and Curtis highlighted the contingent nature of change and the
reality of temporal difference.
McLean offered the shorter of the two dissenting opinions, but, covering thirtyfive pages, it was more extensive than any single concurring or separate opinion.60 He
opened by declaring defective the plaintiff’s plea that “a free negro of the African race,
whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a ‘citizen’ within
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.” McLean argued that Scott, as a
freeman born under the Constitution and a resident of a state different from Sanford,
could claim accesses to the privileges and immunities clause and sue in federal court.
Defending this position required that he take apart the central components of Taney’s
decision. McLean started, though, by questioning the relevance of the Court’s extra-legal
assertion “that a colored citizen would not be an agreeable member of society.” By
ascribing this view to the framers and their audience, Taney had attempted to make this a
constitutional and thus a legal position. But McLean considered this “more a matter of
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taste than of law,” and regardless of the merits of this assertion, evidence showed that
African Americas had, in fact, voted as members of American states.61
Upon labeling the plea defective and dismissing one of the Court’s central claims
as superfluous, McLean proceeded to discuss the principles of the decision. He stressed
that “slavery is emphatically a State institution.”62 Each justice agreed with this federal
consensus position. However, while the majority argued that the Constitution protected
slaveholders’ property rights in free regions, McLean argued that slaveholders lost those
municipal rights when they entered free regions with their slaves. He explained that
although the laws of England did not prohibit but only did not authorize slavery, the
Somerset decision made it illegal to hold slaves taken there. And, he continued, “the
jurisdiction which prohibits slavery is much stronger in behalf of the slave within it than
where it only does not authorize it.”63 McLean implied that if the laws of England freed
slaves upon arrival, then so should the laws of the US territories, which prohibited
slavery. On the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, he contextualized
the passage in question and argued that the Missouri Compromise was consistent with the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the enactment of which rested on an act of Congress under
the Constitution, even though it was drafted under the Articles of Confederation. McLean
also outlined state Supreme Court decisions, mostly from Missouri, which showed that
the common law that made Scott free in free regions protected his free status in slave
regions. Dred Scott v. Emerson, McLean concluded, had “overruled the settled law for

61

Ibid., 533.
Ibid., 536.
63
Ibid., 548.
62

333

near thirty years,” which, along with its failure to take into account the Missouri
Compromise and the Illinois Constitution, led him to dismiss that ruling.64
Throughout this portion of his opinion, McLean grounded his reasoning in
historical evidence. He noted that “it is refreshing to turn to the early incidents of our
history and learn wisdom from the acts of the great men who have gone to their
account.”65 Like Taney, McLean valued legislative actions deemed continuous with the
founding, but he also valued the consistency of post-founding judicial decisions. He
upheld case law as constitutional, but placed emphasis on the sequential nature of these
rulings rather than on the continuity between them and the founding, and in this instance,
then, he privileged the interpretive value of history’s diachronic mode. Without the
primacy of the Constitution, appeals to common law’s consistency valued continuity. In
light of the founding moment, however, McLean’s appeal valued change as well.
As both sides appealed to original intent, both sides also held exalted views of the
framers and aimed to extract and apply the venerable ideas found in the sacralized
Constitution. Filiopietism, though, permitted multiple readings. The Constitution gave
power to reclaim fugitive slaves, but, McLean argued, the right to a slave as property was
municipal. He insisted, as a number of moderate and radical antislavery constitutionalists
had, including Lincoln, that “we know as a historical fact that James Madison, that great
and good man … was solicitous to guard the language of that instrument so as not to
convey the idea that there could be property in man.”66 McLean viewed the slave trade
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and slave trafficking as relics from a bygone era and condemned interpretations which
appealed to an outdated past. “I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay as a
means of construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that
period into a traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by
Christian nations.”67 McLean’s teleological sense of historical development, which was
reminiscent of Joseph C. Warren’s depiction of a dark pre-framing era, contained more
than a hint of exceptionalism, but it also corresponded with a view of the framers as
creating a Constitution amenable to change. In contrast to Peter Daniel’s denial that the
Revolution had implications for social relations, McLean, again echoing antislavery
arguments, wrote that “our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom, and
while I admit the Government was not made especially for the colored race, yet many of
them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised, the rights of suffrage when
the Constitution was adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent person that its
tendencies would greatly ameliorate their condition.”68 McLean had his eye on the
founding era, but also on the founders’ and even the ratifying citizens’ view of the future.
He explained how several of the new states abolished slavery in their jurisdictions, which
confirmed the “well known fact that a belief was cherished by the leading men, South as
well as North, that the institution of slavery would gradually decline until it would
become extinct.”69 Such original expectations demanded that subsequent interpreters give
the Constitution a new construction.
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However, new contingencies arose, including the “increased value of slave labor,
in the culture of cotton and sugar,” which “prevented the realization of this
expectation.”70 In stark contrast to William Scott’s description of the rise of abolitionism
as unfortunate change, McLean ascribed unfortunate change to the same sources as
Parker and Lincoln, citing corrupt interests and the “degradation of negro slavery in our
country.”71 Instead of emphasizing the supposed degraded state of blacks as a number of
the justices had, the dissenters stressed the degraded nature of “negro slavery,” which had
hindered expected increases in egalitarian sentiment and commensurate legislation.
Similar to Taney, McLean argued that historical change might obscure original intent, or,
in this case, original expectation, though he described such corruption as a decline of
rather than a rise in egalitarian sentiment. However, McLean also held that the
inevitability of historical change, as an interpretive lens gifted by the founders
themselves, might reveal as much as it might obscure. Brushing aside unexpected change
in the form of proslavery consolidation, then, illuminated original expectation in the form
of the framers’ expectations of slavery’s demise. McLean’s juxtaposition of expected and
actual developments drew attention to historical contingency and distance.

“The Great Truths They Asserted on That Solemn Occasion, They Were Ready and
Anxious to Make Effectual”: Benjamin Curtis and an Original Expectation of Change
Reaching sixty-nine pages, Curtis’s dissenting opinion, comparable in length only
to Taney’s fifty-four-page decision, covered much of the same material as McLean’s. It
began with an examination of the plea, an inference of which he found problematic:
70
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“That the plaintiff himself was a slave at the time of action brought is a substantive fact
having no necessary connection with the fact that his parents were sold as slaves.”72
Curtis summarily undermined the conflation between black slaves of the Revolutionary
past and their living and possibly free descendants. He proceeded to address the actual
question raised by the plea of whether one’s ancestral tie to slaves invalidated claims to
citizenship. Curtis argued that states retained the right to determine citizenship under the
Constitution and because the Confederation could not grant citizenship, state citizenship
constituted federal citizenship, and thus citizens of states became federal citizens at the
founding. So, in a number of states, free blacks gained US citizenship at birth. While
dismissing as unfounded the fear that citizenship would lead to full civic equality, as
made clear in the case of minors and women, Curtis concluded that “in some of the
original thirteen states, free colored persons,” who descended from slaves, “were citizens
of those States,” voted at the time of ratification, and had the right to sue.73 Thus he
proved incorrect the plea that no person descending from African slaves can be a citizen.
Rather than conflate Scott with his enslaved ancestors, Curtis linked him to the
contingent potential that blacks at the founding could be either slave or free.
In focusing on the relationship between blacks and their ancestors, Taney had
broadened the terms of debate. In turn, he and a number of the other justices provided
official sanction, not only to proslavery interpretations of the Constitution, but also to
racist ideas about blacks from the past and the present. However, the new focus also
allowed the dissenters to give weight to antislavery readings of the Constitution focused
on original expectations, to demonstrate that free blacks had voted as citizens during
72
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ratification, and to attack as immaterial racist assumptions about whether blacks made
good citizens. As Stuart Streichler notes, “when Justice Curtis placed blacks at this
extraordinary moment in American constitutional history—this novel exercise in
republican government, with sovereignty exercised by the people in an unprecedented
manner—he effectively repudiated the racist rationale for excluding blacks from political
participation in the ordinary acts of government.”74 The nature of the debate further
allowed McLean and Curtis to consider the framers’ original expectations about the place
of African Americans in America’s future and both believed that historical research
showed that the framers had anticipated beneficial changes for blacks.
In an interesting aside, Curtis distinguished between what he viewed as facts—
that “free colored persons, before and after the time of the formation of the Constitution,
were citizens”—and what he understood as opinions irrelevant to deciding the case at
hand.75 He would not “enter into an examination of the existing opinions of that period
respecting the African race, nor into any discussion concerning the meaning of those who
asserted, in the Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”76 While casting this particular historical discussion
as superfluous, Curtis still felt obliged to offer his
own opinion … that a calm comparison of these assertions of universal abstract
truths and of their own individual opinions and acts would not leave these men
under any reproach of inconsistency; that the great truths they asserted on that
solemn occasion, they were ready and anxious to make effectual, wherever a
necessary regard to circumstances, which no statesman can disregard without
producing more evil than good, would allow; and that it would not be just to them
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nor true in itself to allege that they intended to say that the Creator of all men had
endowed the white race, exclusively, with the great natural rights which the
Declaration of Independence asserts. But this is not the place of [sic] vindicate
their memory. As I conceive, we should deal here not with such disputes, if there
can be a dispute concerning this subject, but with those substantial facts evinced
by the written Constitutions of States and by the notorious practice under them.77
Curtis agreed with McLean about the Revolutionary period’s egalitarian “tendencies”
but, in essence, conceded that had Jefferson meant to include those of African descent in
the designation “all men,” the founders well might have, in Taney’s words, “received
universal rebuke and reprobation,” thus “producing more evil than good.” And yet, Curtis
thought that the founders’ conscious “regard to circumstances” signaled their desire to
“make effectual” the egalitarian principles for all Americans, including blacks, when
circumstances allowed. In essence, Curtis’s reading of the Constitution, which he seemed
content to read in light of the Declaration, matched antislavery readings of the New
Testament, including those of William Channing and Francis Wayland, and Lincoln’s
reading of the Declaration, each of which stressed the expediency of their authors. He
contradicted Taney’s interpretive directive to dismiss changes in popular sentiment when
it could be shown that the framers expected those changes. In other words, precisely
because they anticipated alterations to their historical setting, changes in that context
should allow their descendants to adapt the meaning of the Constitution’s language to the
circumstances of the times. Indeed, although Curtis did not believe that all change,
including proslavery advances, should inform construction, he applied his understanding
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of common law to the Constitution, holding that in general terms constitutional
application should evolve in relation to historical development.78
Following his discussion of the plea, Curtis shifted attention to the questions of
Scott’s status and Congress’s powers. As with McLean, he cited decisions showing that
“in the absence of positive law to the contrary,” Missouri common law should comply
with “foreign [state] laws” prohibiting slavery, regardless of “any impressions it may
have that a change in foreign opinion and action on the subject of slavery may afford a
reason why the State should change its own action.”79 In direct opposition the prior ruling
of Missouri’s Judge William Scott and in agreement with Missouri’s dissenting Judge
Hamilton Gamble, Curtis argued that comity was not a matter of “discretion” to be
“controlled by circumstances.”80 Although he believed that the Constitution should adapt
in relation to expected, natural and sustained developments, Curtis believed that
temporary excitements and political motivations should not lead to changes in
constitutional application. And he, as with Lincoln, believed that sudden departures in
terms of legislative and judicial decisions about slavery’s extension had resulted from
temporary excitements.
In dealing with Scott’s status, Curtis further argued that, coupled with his
residence in a free region, Scott’s marriage to Harriet equated to irrevocable
emancipation on the part of John Emerson. Regarding the powers of Congress, Curtis
stressed the importance of attending “to some facts respecting this subject which existed
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when the Constitution was framed and adopted,” an approach which would “shed much
light” on the issue.81 Like McLean, he aimed to evidence the Convention’s familiarity
with the Northwest Ordinance and while allowing that the clause referred to immediate
concerns, he argued that it was also meant to apply to later land acquisitions. In Curtis’s
reading, the drafters of the Constitution attended to present circumstances while also
making provisions for future developments. Similar to biblical interpreter Moses Stuart,
he coupled historical with grammatical interpretation, noting that “there is not, in my
judgment, anything in the language, the history, or the subject matter of this article which
restricts its operation to territory owned by the United States when the Constitution was
adopted.”82 In response to the claim that the territorial powers granted Congress excluded
legislation on slavery, Curtis argued that “when the Constitution of the United States was
framed and adopted, the allowance and the prohibition of negro slavery were recognised
subjects of municipal legislation” before adding, in reference to the intent of the
congressional clause, that “the allowance or the prohibition of slavery comes within the
known and recognised scope of that purpose and object.”83 As proof, he traced eight
instances in which Congress had prohibited slavery and six in which it had allowed
slavery, citing examples stretching from the presidency of George Washington to that of
John Quincy Adams, “including all who were in public life when the Constitution was
adopted.”84 Again, like Taney, Curtis valued historical continuity: “If the practical
construction of the Constitution contemporaneously with its going into effect, by men
intimately acquainted with its history from their personal participation in framing and
81
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adopting it, and continued by them through a long series of acts of the gravest
importance, be entitled to weight in the judicial mind on a question of construction, it
would seem to be difficult to resist the force of the acts above adverted to.”85 Curtis used
historical argumentation to contend that legislation since ratification corresponded with
the framers’ original intention that the clause referring to congressional power include
decisions relative to slavery and extend to territories acquired in the future.
Pausing on this point, Curtis censured what he viewed as a new reading resulting
from political passion. He outlined three political responses to the question, including an
antislavery argument positing that Congress can prohibit but not establish slavery in the
territories, the popular sovereignty position, which would leave the decision up to the
people who inhabit a territory, and the proslavery argument that slaveholders can take
slaves into any territory without fear of being deprived of their property. Each of these
arguments denied Congress power either to allow or to prohibit slavery in the territories.
“The question” was whether such arguments “are sufficient to authorize this court to
insert into this clause … an exception of the exclusion or allowance of slavery not found
therein.” Because he believed that the framers had been clear on the clause’s present and
future purpose, Curtis demanded a strict reading and application. To introduce an
exception into the Constitution, “upon reasons purely political, renders its judicial
interpretation impossible.”86 Curtis explained, “Political reasons have not the requisite
certainty to afford rules of judicial interpretation. They are different in different men.
They are different in the same men at different times. And when a strict interpretation of
the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is
85
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abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning,
we have no longer a Constitution.”87 In such cases, government becomes “an exponent of
the will of Congress,” or “of the individual political opinions of the members of this
court.”88 If “the Constitution itself” or “the history of this provision” showed intent on the
part of the framers and ratifiers to introduce an exception, Curtis must carefully weigh
“such considerations. … But where the Constitution has said all needful rules and
regulations,” he required something other than volatile “abstract political reasoning” to
alter his construction.89 Curtis implied that he would have also dissented if the Court had
sanctioned the antislavery contention that Congress could prohibit but not allow slavery
in the territories, but his historical narration tracing restrictions on slavery’s extension
from the founding era suggested that he might have accepted that reading as consistent
with the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent and with the continuous practice of government.
Political interests and, it seems, the prospect of a broad dissent motivated Taney’s
historically based decision. Perhaps he had perceived that Curtis planned on making a
historical argument. Perhaps Curtis’s historical argument only came in response to
Taney’s decision. Regardless, that decision led Curtis to fault the Court not only for what
he described as a politically motivated ruling, but also because he understood those
motivations and that ruling to be deviations from original meanings and subsequent
practices consistent with those meanings.
Restating his position, Curtis found it “rational to conclude” that because “they
who framed and adopted the constitution” were aware of the municipal legality of slavery

87

Ibid., 620-21.
Ibid., 621.
89
Ibid., 621, 623.
88

343

“it was their intention to leave to the discretion of Congress what regulations, if any,
should be made concerning slavery therein.”90 Clearly, Curtis, as well as McLean, aimed
to recover the Constitution’s treasured timeless meanings, and to draw on legislative acts
and judicial decisions continuous with the period in which the framers had crafted it. But,
in the view of these dissenters, some of those timeless meanings allowed for and even
required that the Constitution to evolve with historical development.
In both the decision and the dissent the justices recognized the reality of temporal
change and historical distance, but the two sides valued these realities differently. Taney
argued that some constitutional passages referred strictly to temporary and local
concerns—such as that conferring upon Congress power in the territories—thus rendering
unconstitutional subsequent legislative uses of those clauses. On the surface this reading
seems to prescribe interpretational changes in relation to historical developments, but in
fact it proscribes these changes by implying that the framers had not made provisions for
such developments, including, in this instance, new land acquisitions. In essence, the
clause still applied, but in the negative: because the passage did not positively grant
Congress power over slavery in territories subsequently acquired, succeeding use of that
power was unconstitutional. In such cases, provisions that the framers did make for the
future, including the protection of individual property rights, came into play. Historical
change, in short, must not lead to changes in constitutional interpretation or application,
but must yield to static meanings.
In contrast, McLean and Curtis opined that the framers crafted the Constitution
with an awareness that the future might, owing to historical changes—such as expected
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land acquisitions or shifts in public opinion—require new interpretations, or, more
specifically, new constructions. Theirs was not the full-blown living constitutionalism
that emerged much later, but rather an appeal to original intent wherein the framers’
conceived of the potential need for a constitution adaptable to temporal changes and
amenable to new circumstances. The amendment mechanism, which Taney referenced,
spoke to the future-oriented nature of the framers’ project and of law-making in general.
And yet, the prospect of emendation called for interpretive restraint. Precisely because a
mechanism existed for official changes in the form of amendments, informal changes in
the form of new interpretations and constructions seemed illegitimate.91 But there had not
been an amendment since 1804, and the two that followed the 1789 Bill of Rights seemed
more like administrative alterations than drastic constitutional changes, which suggested
that weighty formal emendations were a thing of the past. Perhaps the growing gap since
such changes, like the historical distance from the founding era, opened up space for
interpretive freedom. The dissenters’ opinions implied that if one found that the framers
created a document with an expectation of change then the main text of the Constitution
could and should, of necessity, be molded to the exigencies of the times in which it
persisted. Indeed, in this formulation, endurance depended on adaptability. This kind of
an appeal to original intent countenanced and even required a Constitution amenable to
change, or, at least, to expected changes.
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As noted above, searching out an original expectation of change tends to qualify
or dismiss its interpretive value. The justices revered and upheld the Constitution; and
their historical arguments, far from undermining its present applicability, aimed to
illuminate its original meaning for contemporary use. While one side dismissed change as
irrelevant because it was inconsistent with original meaning, intent, and understanding,
the other posited the importance of change because it was grounded in the framers’
original expectations. Both sides, though, highlighted historical change in tracing
deviations from original intent and original expectation, respectively. Taney’s earnest
attempts to set aside perceived deviations from original ideas (e.g. shifts in public opinion
to more egalitarian views about blacks) and to collapse the time between the present and
the founding era to reclaim those ideas attested to the realities of historical change and
distance. Similarly, when present circumstances seemed to contradict the original
expectations of change identified by Curtis and McLean (i.e. when the period saw the rise
of the Slave Power instead of witnessing slavery’s demise and when the Court relied on
emerging proslavery political stances to craft innovative readings of the congressional
clause) it also drew attention to temporal vicissitude and dislocation. These contestations
highlighted historical contingency and, regardless of their view of change, when both
sides discussed and dealt with it in opposing ways it exposed the reality of the historical
distance separating the founding era from their present. The relatively short time between
the two periods protected the revered Constitution from widespread cries of
obsolescence, but such discussions raised questions about its relationship to temporal
evolution, which, in turn, cultivated a realization that changes since the founding era had
created a vast temporal gap between present and favored past.
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While McLean and Curtis grounded their positions in historical arguments, both
also appealed, if only once or twice, to the kind of legal and extra-legal reasoning that
some antislavery thinkers embraced in their attacks on the Slave Power. The dissenters
seemed to follow Lord Mansfield’s condemnation of slavery as “so odious, that nothing
can be suffered to support it, but positive law.”92 Curtis echoed Mansfield in stating that
“slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal law.”93 McLean
agreed that “all slavery has its origin in power, and is against right.”94 Slavery, in their
view, as with Lysander Spooner’s, contradicted natural law, and thus was only protected
by local law.95 The appeal to abstract truths, used by slavery’s opponents to supplement
or cast aside traditional sources of religious, moral, political, and legal reasoning, also
found its way into more orthodox settings. McLean contended that “a slave is not a mere
chattel. He bears the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man,
and he is destined to an endless existence.”96 McLean’s statement seemed to suggest that
while prior circumstances had placed blacks in an unfavorable position in relation to
divine and human laws, their static and universal connection to the divine meant that
changes in historical circumstances could alter blacks’ relationship to the laws of God
and man. Even though the thrust of the dissenters’ opinions was moderate, McLean
seemed to suggest that not only did Scott and his fellow African Americans, free and
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enslaved, possess the potential for citizenship, which both historical and extra-historical
sources revealed, but developments indicated that the requisite circumstances were now,
or soon would be, in place for the realization of that potential.

“It Was an Inconsistency … Which It Was Supposed the Progress of Events Would
Remove:” The Antislavery Response and the Revolutionary Past as an “Epoch for All
Coming Time”
Such circumstances depended, in part, on the public response. The Republican
press did not wait for the decision to denounce the Court. In the spring of 1856, a few
northern newspapers learned that the ruling would, in all likelihood, not favor Scott and
began their attack in advance. Before and after the decision, detractors leveled their
assaults on the Court, depicted as overreaching and conspiratorial, rather than the
specifics of the decision. The historical debate between Taney and Curtis continued with
the publication of the dissenting opinions and the revision and publication of the Chief
Justice’s decision, which he bolstered with historical evidence. However, newspapers like
Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune focused on the decision’s breadth instead of its
content.97 Rather than attend to the question of citizenship or the authority of precedent,
the Court’s critics determined that Taney’s ruling on the territorial question was
unwarranted. One historian suggests that this allowed Republicans who were eager to
disassociate themselves from radical abolitionists to damn much of the opinion as dicta
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without appearing to dismiss the law in toto.98 A number of southern and northern
Democratic newspapers heralded the opinion and, to the chagrin of the Republicans, tied
criticism of the Court with that of the Constitution. The Iowa State Democrat concluded
that the Republicans “hate the Constitution, the Bible, and God.”99 The polemical and
political nature of the response worked against a close examination of the decision, but
some critical observers took notice of its historical components.
Most legal respondents focused on the jurisdictional and territorial questions, the
latter of which raised historical issues that Thomas Hart Benton, a rare antislavery
Democrat, addressed in his lengthy Historical and Legal Examination (1857). Benton
agreed with Taney that the clause on congressional power referred specifically to the
disposal of public lands held at the time of ratification, but he directly countered the
Chief Justice in dismissing the importance of the constitutional debate and positing that
historical evidence demonstrated Congress’s repeated use of power in the territories. That
fact sanctioned Congress’s continued use. Benton highlighted the importance of historical
continuity, not from the period of the Constitution’s creation and ratification, but from
the first instances in which Congress asserted its territorial powers. The issue rested in
federal government’s sovereignty rather than the Constitution’s meaning. In appealing to
congressional action rather than original meaning, intent, understanding, or expectation,
the aged Benton—he died at the age of 76 in April of 1858—showed that he was out of
step with his contemporaries’ emphasis on contextual readings of the Constitution. He
largely left unattended the question of whether or not the Constitution forbade or
warranted a new construction resulting from change. In making the issue non98
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constitutional, however, his examination suggested that on this question, and perhaps on
others as well, legal scholars needed to look to post-founding extra-constitutional
developments for direction. Benton’s argument called into question the Constitution’s
reach and scope, though he had no intention of casting it on the scrap heap of history.100
After Dred Scott, however, more abolitionists were ready to follow Garrison and
Phillips in challenging aloud the relevance of a tired old document in the vibrant new
nineteenth century. Such responses arose most comfortably among those whose reliance
on abstract sources of truth extended far beyond McLean’s brief appeal to divine law. For
example, the Oneida Circular, a product of John Humphrey Noyes’s perfectionist
community, was among the first papers to respond to Dred Scott by tossing aside the
Constitution in favor of a higher guide. Back in 1854, the paper had joined with figures
such as Parker and Douglass in critiquing the “undue veneration for the codes and
formulas of our forefathers” and, with Garrisonians, assented to the position that the
Constitution should bend to the dictates of man rather than the reverse.101 In its March
1857 issue, it perceived that “there is an instinct for broader freedom growing in the
country, than that which became embodied in the Constitution of the United States.
Musty precedent and time-honored institutions,” it contended, “have not stood, and in the
long run cannot stand, against the instinct of freedom.”102 The outdated Constitution and
the antiquated slave institution would give way to the voice of the people and the
progress of freedom. In the same issue, another writer observed that “all profess to
venerate that instrument, and worship the same long list of saints of the American
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calendar who made it. And yet,” the perfectionist continued, “that same instrument, in
plain words … binds each State, through all time, to respect all the laws that every other
State may make to hold men to service.” Rather than attempting to salvage the
Constitution and its creators by proposing formal or informal emendation, the author
contended that “if the ‘Expounders’ of the Constitution would cease their quarrel about
its meaning, and begin to criticize the instrument itself, and the virtues and talents of the
men who made it, there would be more hope of progress, if not of peace.”103 A growing
number of higher-law idealists were ready to accept as historically sound the proslavery
interpretation and then dismiss the Constitution, its creators, and their views as outdated.
As expected, Garrison’s Liberator also gave voice to critics of the nation’s
founding document, some of whose patience with the appeal to legal means had worn
out. In May, it published the proceedings of the AASS’s recent annual meeting in New
York City, which featured speakers such as Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Thomas
Wentworth Higginson, and Robert Purvis. Even though he decried Taney’s decision as
marked by “a daring disregard of all historical verity” and “a wanton perversion of the
Constitution of the United States,” Garrison outlined the proslavery nature of the
document and traced the history of its proslavery use before reaffirming that it “is nothing
better than ‘a covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”104 Higginson was less
ready to damn the Constitution, but only because he believed it could be used as a means
to an end. “Give us a Supreme Court that is favorable to liberty,” he declared, “and the
Constitution is an anti-slavery document to-morrow.” His approval of interpretive
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relativism stood in stark opposition to Curtis’s critique of the Court’s politically
motivated decision. Unsurprisingly, Higginson approved of whatever methods needed to
achieve emancipation, “Constitution or no Constitution.”105 Purvis, an African American
abolitionist who helped Garrison found the AASS in 1833, viewed “the doctrine of the
anti-slavery character of the American Constitution” as “one of the most absurd and
preposterous that ever was broached. It is so contrary to history and common sense.”106
Phillips, directing his comments to antislavery constitutionalists, expressed a desire to
“exercise” the “timidity” of “a set of men who are exceedingly tender of the flower-pot—
the Constitution.”107 Two evening speakers, namely William H. Furness and J. R. W.
Sloane, recognized the problem Phillips had highlighted. Furness noted that “the
reverence existing in our day for the Constitution and the Union is like that of the ancient
Jews for the Temple.”108 Sloane lamented that a “man who had sworn to support that
instrument could recognize no higher law” but must “either to obey the Constitution and
disregard his conscience, or obey his conscience and forsake the Constitution.”109 This
group left no doubt about which source held their allegiance.
On June 16, 1858, a group of African Americans in New Bedford dismissed
Taney’s decision as “a palpably vain, arrogant assumption, unsustained by history,
justice, reason or common sense.” This collection of “Colored Citizens” resolved to
“neither recognize nor respect any laws for slavery, whether from Moses, Paul, or Taney.
We spurn and trample them all under our feet as in violation of the laws of God and the
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rights of men.” On this issue, at least, certain pasts, including the revered Mosaic and
Apostolic pasts, no longer spoke to the needs of present. Still, with Frederick Douglass,
the group held out hope for a constitutional resolution, resolving to “begin and continue
to petition and memorialize Congress until our grievances are heard and redressed.”110
Although the Garrisonian reading of the Constitution rang out more loudly and
more frequently than ever, it issued from ever more isolated venues. Rather than reject
the Constitution as a proslavery instrument, most antislavery respondents to Dred Scott
upheld it and its creators by reiterating the alternative antislavery historical accounts and
again contending that the framers had expected change. This obviated the choice between
conscience and Constitution. A number of Taney’s critics focused on the stark
distinctions in historical understanding and argumentation between the Chief Justice and
Curtis. While southerners upheld the decision as historically sound, their opponents
dismissed Taney’s opinion and those of his concurring colleagues as historically faulty.
One commenter, at least, even challenged Justice Peter Daniel’s appeal to the classical
past.111 Most centered their historical discussions on the founding era, its documents, and
relevant developments since that period. They did so, in part, due to the belief that while
few could follow legal reasoning, almost all could understand American history, and, as
one newspaper writer put it, Taney’s decision “does not rest so much upon any
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interpretation of the law as it does upon a construction of the facts of history.”112 Taney
had made constitutional interpretation as much a matter of history as of law, and most
respondents, including dissenters, met him on those grounds, grounds that a growing
number of commentators felt comfortable surveying. The nature of Taney’s reasoning
allowed abolitionist papers like The Independent, a New York weekly, to argue that the
decision contradicted “the notorious facts of history.”113 In rebutting Taney, critics
followed Curtis’s contention that free blacks were citizens at the founding and further
proposed that the period saw an evolution in public sentiment with respect to African
Americans.
In May of 1857, Putnam’s, a New York monthly literary magazine, carried an
article that put forth the central critiques of those aiming to uphold a static antislavery
view of the founding era. Following the contention that the case rested more in historical
facts than in legal reasoning, the author countered Taney’s portrayal of the founding era
in asserting that “no period in the world’s development has won for itself a more distinct
and signal character than the latter half of the eighteenth century.”114 As William Goodell
had, the writer saw the Revolutionary period as an egalitarian age. In particular, the piece
referred to the growing application of “the ideas of human rights” and designated 1776 as
“an epoch for all coming time.”115 A writer for the National Era, a Washington based
abolition paper, agreed, labeling “the Revolutionary era” as “an Antislavery era: an era in
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which the Public Opinion in all the Colonies, expect Georgia and South Carolina, was as
repugnant to the idea of property in human beings, black or white, as it is now in the Free
States of this Union.”116 While recovering static Revolutionary ideals, these articles
echoed histories like those of George Bancroft in positing pre-Revolutionary progress
toward an epochal break. The author of the Putnam article further complained that Taney
“post-dates the period of the black-plague which ravaged human conscience by a half
century at least; just as the spirit of his decision is a whole century behind his own
times.”117 It seemed that, not only did Taney’s historical account contain anachronisms,
but his decision itself was anachronistic. This author went beyond figures such as Parker
and Douglass in conflating the Revolutionary era with the nineteenth century, but he
joined them in positing that the Chief Justice’s opinion stood in direct opposition to the
antislavery spirit of the age.
Incorporating and expanding a major component of the antislavery constitutional
readings that had emerged during the previous two decades, the writer proceeded to trace
“changes in opinion in regard to slavery” from the sixteenth century forward, citing
European and English developments before echoing previous writers in turning to
revered statesmen such as Jefferson and Madison whose language in the Declaration and
the Constitution suggested that they “looked towards a speedy and universal freedom.”118
Going much further than Curtis had, the author proposed that Taney had misrepresented
“the prevailing sentiment of the Fathers of the Republic and of the civilized world” and
had also erred in “his special application of that sentiment to the exclusion of Africans
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from the rank of citizens.”119 As the dissenters had explained, historical evidence showed
that voting restrictions were based on property ownership rather than color and that free
blacks had voted as citizens to ratify the Constitution.120 This historical review and
revision aimed “to vindicate the truth of history, and, above all, to rescue the good names
of our fathers and from abuse that immortal document—the Declaration of
Independence.”121 The desire to defend the founders differed from the arguments of
abolitionist such as Parker and Douglass, though this stress on the Declaration, aimed to
counter Taney’s usage, was symptomatic of the popular antislavery reading that placed
the Constitution in the light of the Declaration’s universal promises. While holding onto
the Constitution, this move harnessed the power that anti-constitutionalists like Garrison
and Phillips found in the Declaration. As with some antislavery biblical readers, when
historical research raised questions about canonical choices, some antislavery readers of
the nation’s founding texts managed to retain a belief in the more troublesome document
by reading it through the lens of the more helpful document. That process, however,
could also lend credence to the decision among some to discard most teachings from the
founding era as transient while locating fewer and fewer permanents truths in that
presumably timeless favored past.
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An article in a later edition of Putnam’s also exhibited the common desire to
assert the continued relevance of the founders and their most timeless statements. The
author aimed not only to vindicate the names of the founding fathers but also to make
some of them, specifically Jefferson and Adams, stand alongside Taney’s antislavery
critics. It asked: “Were they with us to-day, is there a doubt that they would unite in the
most determined resistance to the effort … to establish … a custom which they
considered to be wholly an evil, and for a speedy extirpation of which their hope was
coördinate with their faith in the progressive civilization of mankind?”122 A careful
redaction of the framers’ writings allowed the writer to conflate time and claim the
continuity of antislavery sentiment. Just as Moses Stuart had called on the Christian and
national founders to support the Fugitive Slave Law, this author called on the founding
fathers to support abolitionism. Again, the traditional tendency to conflate historical
distance from the favored past persisted. And yet, though less nuanced than the
arguments of McLean and Curtis, the article also posited an original expectation that the
extinction of slavery would parallel the predicted advance of American civilization. This
insistence suggested that the author did not hope for a return to an era in which slavery
was countenanced. Further, that the expectation of slavery’s demise remained a
potentiality rather than a realization called into question the nation’s direction since the
founding era and signaled dissonance and distance from that period.
Whereas some detractors depicted the Revolutionary period as “an Anti-Slavery
era,” others harnessed the other component of antislavery historical argumentation,
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narrating a tale of declension since that promising period, engaging not only the justices’
debate of historical facts but also their sense of historical development. An article from
the August edition of the New Haven antislavery New Englander critiqued Taney’s
decision in a review of the published report. Following Curtis, the author mustered
historical evidence to establish both state and federal citizenship of free blacks under the
Confederation and the Constitution. The writer, who later critiqued Taney for failing to
distinguish between free and enslaved blacks, contended that the “present body of
citizens of the United States is made up in part of the descendants of these original
citizens, both white and black. The children of the original citizens were born citizens,
and the same is true of their descendants down to the present time.”123 While Taney had
conflated Dred Scott with enslaved blacks at the founding to posit his unfitness for
citizenship, this writer brought together free blacks from that era with their free
descendants in the present to assert their right to citizenship. And those citizens warranted
protection, including the right to sue, under the immunities and privileges clause.
“Historical facts,” the author argued, formed the bedrock of this historical account and
this interpretation of the Constitution.124
Turning to Taney’s argument, the writer examined the various historical sources,
beginning with the laws of the colonies, used by the Chief Justice to demonstrate black
degradation. Like McLean, the reviewer dismissed this portion of the decision as
irrelevant, noting that blacks were citizens despite such views, and proceeded to analyze
the language of the Declaration and the Constitution. Rather than argue that the
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phraseology matched a growing antislavery sentiment, he proposed that “these great men
were inconsistent. Their inconsistency, however, was precisely the inconsistency of all
great, philosophical statesmen, whose views are in advance of the age in which they live,
and the circumstances which surround them. Moreover, it was an inconsistency which
was acknowledged at the time, but which it was supposed the progress of events would
remove.”125 Similar to antislavery biblical and constitutional interpreters who put forth
arguments from expediency, the reviewer depicted the founders as ahead of their time in
terms of their egalitarian sentiments. In essence, such readings suggested that the framers
themselves ratified a sense of historical awareness and that a recognition of the
limitations of the framers’ context required allegiance to a construction open to historical
change. The author heralded the founders as hopeful prophets and posited an original
expectation that events would result in the spread of inclusive and egalitarian principles.
As with so many others, the writer found declension instead of progress, noting that
Taney “speaks as if there had been a great change in this country in favor of the blacks,
since the Revolution, so great that, while in 1776, the sentence that ‘all men are created
equal,’ would of course be understood to mean only white men, now it would be
understood to embrace the whole human family. We wish we could think so, but we
believe the reverse is nearer the reality.”126 Citing the disenfranchisement of blacks in
several states, the author traced “a great apostasy … from the opinions of the
Revolutionary era.”127 Instead of outlining an increase in liberal sentiment, which masked
more racially exclusive original meanings, the writer, like Lincoln, rejected Taney’s
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reference to the spread of antislavery thought and instead outlined a growth of prejudicial
feeling, which obscured more inclusive original expectations.
The reviewer also examined Taney’s appeal to state laws and found there an even
greater “misapprehension of historical facts.”128 The writer perceived a presentist analysis
in Taney’s discussion of southern states, such as Virginia, and northern states, such as
Connecticut. The author believed that the Chief Justice was a better politician than a
historian, or, consequently, a constitutional interpreter, understanding him as “manifestly
judging of the Virginia of the Revolution, and of the other slave states of that period, by
the Virginia of to-day.”129 With respect to the North, the writer noted that free blacks had
been citizens and even electors in Connecticut until 1818, before making a strikingly
modernist critique of Taney’s historical method, questioning, “is it not obvious that Judge
Taney is interpreting past history with the feelings of the present?”130 The availability of
this critique depended on an awareness and even an assumption of historical distance.
While depicting Taney’s historical argument as presentist, the author portrayed
the framers as forward-thinking personalities who promoted advanced principles. Thus,
the reviewer remained consistent in critiquing as misguided Taney’s attempt to overlook
the “plainest language of the Constitution” and determine “what the circumstances of the
case show they must have meant,” and then positing that “it is but fair to take into view
the new emergencies which have arisen, and act as we are sure they would have acted if
these circumstances had existed then.”131 The obvious implication of this statement was
that different circumstances existed in 1857 than existed in 1787, but the author also
128
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implied that if the framers had predicted the emergence of the Slave Power rather than
expecting the advance and spread of egalitarian sentiment, they would have taken greater
measures to ensure slavery’s demise. The founders, despite their progressive ideals, were
not prophets. Northerners, then, should feel secure in their allegiance to the founding
generation by taking measures to abolish slavery themselves. The reviewer appealed to
the framers’ original intent and expectations as more important than the potentially
obscuring original meaning and understanding, including the period’s reigning racist
sentiment. The author also held that change, in the form of corrupting proslavery
ideology, suppressed those original expectations, in the form of progressive antislavery
ideals. In attributing uniquely held egalitarian principles to specific historical figures and
in tracing the failure rather than fruition of those principles, this account drew attention to
the historical distance from the favored founding era that resulted not only from rot but
also from the inevitable passage of time.

Conclusion
By the spring of 1857, politicians looked to the Supreme Court to resolve the
historical debate over the constitutionality of southern slavery. Dred Scott’s case, like no
prior legal development, led the Court to fixate on the Revolutionary past in an attempt to
discern and explain the framer’s original intent, the Constitution’s original meaning, and
the people’s original understanding. The Dred Scott decision, as with no other event, led
American observers and commentators to engage this historical debate.
Constitutionalizing issues was common in the antebellum era, but this issue, in particular,
required a sustained struggle to ascertain the meaning of the founding era and founding-
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era documents. As with biblical interpretation, most found what they were looking for in
the founding period, the founders, and the Constitution. Most interpreters held that if one
could only read the supreme legal text in the light of historical context, one could resolve
the slavery issue now and for all time. This approach allowed for a surprisingly rich range
of interpretations, just as it had in the biblical debates, the analysis of which reveals a
spectrum of readings that exposed the presence of historical distance from the founding
era even while limiting its interpretational value.
Justices and respondents on both sides of the widening sectional divide
understood that the Dred Scott case was bound up with questions of history and time.
Taney’s decision verified and amplified the decidedly historical nature of the
battleground that had been chosen in the constitutional debates over slavery of the
preceding two decades. He used a historical argument to contend that the framers
intended to deny African Americans federal citizenship then and in the future, to restrict
congressional power to lands held at the time of ratification, and to protect private
property in territories held or acquired for all succeeding time. These static and original
meanings, supported by public understanding and legal decisions deemed continuous
with the founding era, trumped the new meanings that subsequent discontinuous
deviations, including shifting public opinion or new legislation, imposed on the
Constitution. Historical distance was recognized but then dismissed in the name of legal
truth. McLean and Curtis met Taney on the chosen historical grounds. They also sought
to recover original meaning, intent, and understanding but their view included original
expectation too, as they believed that the framers anticipated changes on such issues as
the status of African Americans and territorial acquisition. The purpose of constitutional
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construction was to rescue the permanent from the transient, as in biblical interpretation,
but if one of the recovered permanent ideas included an openness to change, then the
Constitution should be construed in the light of expected developments.
Although most critics condemned Taney’s decision by dismissing the Court as
conspiratorial or the ruling as overreaching, some addressed his constitutional
construction and the historical questions it raised. Thomas Hart Benton concentrated on
the territorial issue, which he made non-constitutional. He privileged successive postfounding congressional action over static constitutional meanings, thus valuing
diachronic development over synchronic stasis. Most abolitionists focused on African
American citizenship and attacked Taney’s historical narrative of the Revolutionary era.
They depicted the framers as crafting an antislavery Declaration and Constitution to an
increasingly antislavery Western world. Such respondents appealed to static original
meanings, as Taney had, but ones critical rather than supportive of the proslavery
position. Their creative historical revisions made the founders look as much like
contemporary northern abolitionists as Taney had made them look like contemporary
proslavery southerners. This narrative implied that reversals had taken place since the
founding era—which signaled a kind of historical change—but failed to account for those
reversals.
Rather than paint with such broad strokes, some antislavery respondents,
including the author of the article on “Negro Citizenship” in the New Englander, depicted
the founding fathers as forward thinking in their antislavery positions—as creating an
antislavery Constitution in spite of their proslavery constituents and audiences. This
permitted these respondents to posit the failure of the founders’ original expectation that
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their egalitarian principles would find more adherents among later generations, a view
obscured by an apostasy from these ideas. Historical progress should have spurred the
growth of progressive sentiments, but decline incited the spread of old corrupting power
relations. The founders’ exceptional ideas remained hidden behind the common views of
their contemporaries and descendants. Similar to the opinions of McLean and Curtis, this
narrative valued changes that were consistent with original expectation while
condemning those that deviated from that expectation. More than those who depicted the
founding era as either a static proslavery or antislavery age, these narratives drew
attention to historical distance even as they sought to collapse time and reclaim the rare
pure and permanent principles that they located in the past.
In contrast to these positions, Oneida perfectionists and Garrisonian abolitionists,
even while condemning Taney’s narrative as a perversion of history and a misreading of
the Constitution, grew louder in dismissing the Constitution as an outdated creed that was
unable to keep up with the march of freedom’s progress. They insisted that the document
was created and functioned as a proslavery legal text and that it stood in the way of
freedom. A timeless conscience trumped a time-bound Constitution. Their appeal to the
Declaration’s universal assertions and the Revolution’s immediacy was an attempt to
snatch universal truths from the clutches of a past, the pastness of which seemed more
and more clear. In their case, the realization of historical change and distance did not
inform constitutional interpretation, it made the interpreted text irrelevant.
None of the pro-constitutional approaches fully valued change as a viable
interpretive tool. Taney cast changes that were inconsistent with his conception of
founding-era ideas as confusing to construction. Most abolitionist critics discovered
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antislavery advocates where Taney had found proslavery proponents, which often had the
effect of ignoring changes and collapsing temporal distinction. Even though McLean,
Curtis, and a number of antislavery respondents pointed to the framers’ original
expectation of change, binding change to expectation undermined an appreciation of its
contingent nature. Depicting change as positive or negative and measuring it as consistent
or inconsistent with founding ideals qualified its interpretational value.
However, even attempts to dismiss change as irrelevant or efforts to value it only
in relation to original expectations brought new attention to its existence as a historical
reality. Indeed, although change more openly informed the decision in Scott v. Emerson
than in Scott v. Sandford, and while radical abolitionists like Garrison more directly
stressed the Constitution’s time-bound nature than did the Court or the dissenters, Dred
Scott held a unique potential to cultivate an awareness of historical change. Argued on a
national stage, the opposing justices’ contrasting identifications of deviations from the
original intent, meaning, understanding, and expectations of historical figures from a set
historical period uniquely spotlighted change and highlighted its contingent nature. The
opposing emphases on deviations from the founding era, in terms of antislavery
innovation and proslavery consolidation, drew more attention to the reality of historical
change than the opposing foci on continuities, in terms of popular antislavery sentiment
and proslavery government protection, from that same period. The call to disregard
unwanted and unexpected change spotlighted its presence and signaled its power to
divide the present from the past.
At times, the focus on negative change in Dred Scott and in the responses to that
decision signaled a hope to return to the favored founding era and a belief in the
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possibility of recreating the circumstances of that time. It certainly exhibited a desire to
ignore changes in the application of the nation’s sacred legal text. However, opposing
arguments about the framers’ intent and opposing narratives about developments since
ratification belied the assumption that one could collapse time. That realization expanded
as Dred Scott provided a public stage for pre-existing arguments and invited more
participants to the debate, despite the Court’s attempt to close the discussion. Some
continued to ignore the historical differences between past and present or to insist on the
need to view the founding era as either proslavery or antislavery and to then read the
Constitution as a static text. However, the antislavery narrative stressing the framers’
expectations of abolition eventually overwhelmed those readings. It granted slavery’s
presence in the founding era even as it called on nineteenth-century Americans to fulfill
the framers’ egalitarian expectations. Antebellum constitutional interpreters struggled to
recover timeless legal truths from the Revolutionary past. That endeavor shed new light
on historical change and drew unprecedented attention to historical distance.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing narrative demonstrates that Roger Taney’s Dred Scott decision is
best understood against the backdrop of a climactic constitutional debate that partook of
the same kind of historical argumentation characteristic of a protracted biblical debate.1
The explosive constitutional crises of the mid-nineteenth century seemed a world apart
from the genteel biblical discussions of the previous generation, but, in fact, the two
discourses, which at times involved the same participants, engaged the same central
conceptual riddle: what to do with history. And they both touched on the same ethical
dilemma: what to do with slavery. Indeed, slavery created overlap between these
discourses and made more acute the antebellum confrontation with history. Prior
exposure to and engagements with biblical criticism and the resulting emphasis on a
historical explication of the Bible created the preconditions for that development.
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Joseph Stevens Buckminster
departed from a traditional view of temporality that treated the Bible as perpetually
contemporary and instead stressed reading biblical texts in their historical contexts,
rejecting the assumption that each text and teaching was timeless. This emphasis brought
new attention to historical difference and distance. However, when confronting the
potentially incendiary issue of slavery, Buckminster ignored the distance that his reading
revealed when he insisted on the relevance of Paul’s directive that the fugitive return to
his master. From the start, the issue of slavery was implicated in work that promoted
historical awareness, but not always in clear or consistent ways. In succeeding decades,
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the proclivity to collapse time—that is, to ignore historical distance in applying historical
texts—persisted in both biblical exegesis and constitutional interpretation even as these
readings brought new evidence of that distance to the fore. In light of that evidence, some
abolitionists spotlighted historical distance and threw out the sacred religious and legal
texts as obsolete. In either accentuating or dismissing the applicability of those texts on
the question of slavery, a wide array of American figures began to take note of historical
distance; some adopted the position that historical awareness was essential to correct
interpretation, some doggedly insisted it was not, but whether they rejected historical
awareness or embraced it, all had to deal with it. In using historical arguments either to
preserve the sacred texts and sanction slavery or to abolish both the texts and the
institution, many interpreters drew attention to the temporal gap separating nineteenthcentury Americans from their most favored pasts. This demonstrates the emergence of a
modern historical consciousness among a number of antebellum Americans in the form
of an awareness of historical distance from periods with seemingly timeless appeal.
Alongside the opposed paths that either preserved or abolished both the sacred
texts and slavery, historical awareness produced a middle path, one that preserved the
sacred texts and abolished slavery. In the 1830s, religious thinkers such as William
Channing and Francis Wayland conceded slavery’s legal presence in the biblical past, but
posited that the apostles had shown prudence by sowing the seeds of slavery’s
destruction. Moses Stuart also believed that Christian principles would ultimately cleanse
America of slavery’s stain, but cited the expediency of the apostles to condemn the
immediacy of the abolitionists. In the 1840s, constitutionalists such as William Goodell
and Lysander Spooner, even while they rejected the use of historical information as

368

extraneous, similarly averred that the founding fathers had crafted the Constitution with
the expectation of slavery’s institutional demise. Even abolitionists Theodore Parker and
Frederick Douglass, who granted slavery’s presence at the founding and proved willing
to cast aside the sacred texts if necessary, maintained that those texts should adapt to
meet the framers’ antislavery expectations. Their historical readings highlighted historical
distance to preserve the sacred texts and position them against slavery. In a culture that
obsessively looked to the founding generation for its cues, these abolitionists described
founding fathers who had anticipated significant historical change and expected that
change to influence future interpretations of their work. These interpreters, then, argued
that the Constitution must be read as a historically situated text and further proposed that
because the framers themselves recognized that fact, they offered attentive nineteenthcentury Americans a profound authorization to think historically. This kind of reasoning
allowed these antislavery readers to continue to use the favored founding era. Abraham
Lincoln’s June 1857 response to Dred Scott owed much to this reading.
The decades of interpretive debates outlined in the foregoing chapters illuminates
and explains the historical nature of that reading. Lincoln’s contention that Taney’s
opinion rested “on assumed historical facts which are not really true,” was symptomatic
of the interpretive emphasis on context that had emerged in both biblical and
constitutional interpretation.2 Figures on all sides of the slavery issue had to deal in
historical terms. In claiming that the Declaration’s signers “did not mean to assert the
obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality,” but did intend “to
declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances
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should permit,” Lincoln built on antislavery efforts to locate within the Constitution an
original expectation of the spread of the Declaration’s egalitarian ideals.3 This was not an
attempt to reclaim the present’s contemporaneity with a golden age but rather an
assertion of an original expectation that change would produce different circumstances,
ones in which original promises could be fulfilled. This position rested on the
contention—hardly unique to Lincoln in 1857—that the founders had assumed that times
would change and that new historical contexts would arise, introducing qualitative
historical differences. They thought historically and so, Lincoln declared, must their
nineteenth-century progeny. His attempt, on a national stage, to recover specific universal
principles from an otherwise transient era drew unprecedented attention to the historical
distance that separated America’s familiar and favored past from the present.
As this analysis has demonstrated, this was not a straightforward development. In
some respects, the slavery debates created a longing for the past. Lamenting the spread of
abolitionism or condemning the rise of the Slave Power could serve to further idealize the
biblical and founding eras as favored pasts offering up timeless proslavery or antislavery
truths. Simply identifying change, particularly in tracing decline, does not create
awareness of the historical distance that results with the recognition that a past constitutes
a distinct and unrecoverable temporal era. Indeed, insisting on decline often represents an
effort to collapse historical distance and recover the prerogatives of the past. The
contextual interpretations and historical narratives examined herein cultivated but also
restricted a sense of historical distance when they posited that the biblical and
3
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Revolutionary eras contained original meanings with current relevance that historical
deviations had obscured: context and change introduced a kind of distance from those
pasts but one that Americans could and should overcome. This golden age sensibility
tended to conflate historical difference and ignore historical change in ways characteristic
of traditional hermeneutics. As we might expect, earlier modes of historical thought
persisted while more modern understandings began to emerge. While the slavery debates
encouraged interpretive approaches that revealed historical distance, they also
encouraged attempts to collapse time and reclaim the favored biblical and founding eras.
And yet, the process of reclaiming certain biblical and founding-era ideas through
historical investigation indicated the irrelevance of other ideas from those periods.
Appealing to specific parts of a past as useful indictments of the current state of affairs
implied that the remaining parts of that past were obsolete. To leading abolitionists,
including Parker and Douglass, the recognition of slavery’s religiously and legally
sanctioned presence in those eras rendered them unfit for recovery. Some applicants, such
as Richard Fuller, Roger Taney, and a number of his antislavery respondents, ignored
problematic evidence and aimed to reclaim the whole biblical past or the entire founding
era, including its peoples, documents, teachings, and laws, as either proslavery or
antislavery, but many more narrowed their reclamation efforts to certain figures, texts,
and ideas. Instead of characterizing biblical times, spanning Old and New Testament
periods, as critical of slavery, many antislavery biblical readers upheld specific authors,
books, and verses as unique. When historical insight undermined efforts to describe the
Abrahamic, Mosaic, and Christian dispensations as epochs of freedom, readers such as
Channing and Wayland restricted their focus to Christ and his apostles and their
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antislavery principles. Some, including Parker, laid stress on specific biblical words and
phrases, such as Christ’s injunction to treat others as one would want to be treated.
Similarly, instead of describing the period between 1776 and 1789 as an “epoch for all
coming time” and labeling it as “an Anti-Slavery era,” many antislavery constitutional
interpreters upheld certain people, documents, or phrases as exceptional. When historical
evidence complicated attempts to cast the entire period as antislavery, readers such as
Lincoln narrowed their gaze from the sentiment of the Western audience and the
American ratifiers to the founders of the Declaration and the framers of the Constitution
and their original expectations of change. Some, such as Goodell and Spooner, appealed
to the words of the Constitution alone, while others, like Garrison, used an even smaller
lens to emphasize a specific phrase from a brief declaration of rights: “all men are created
equal.” Clear words held more straightforward significations than complicated historical
figures and their creations. In a period when slavery cultivated greater interest in favored
pasts, narrow historical claims implied broad dismissals of the biblical and founding eras
that historical explication had shown to be less than appealing. In the attempt to rescue
universal ideas from the sands of time, this sifting process began to exhibit that both pasts
were foreign countries. Context may or may not have mattered, depending on one’s
interpretive preferences, but whether they argued for or against the use of historical
sources, Americans increasingly had to consider the contexts that historical readings had
exposed. And once they separated out timeless gems from the historical chaff of oncefamiliar eras, those pasts remained favored and timeless only in a newly restricted sense.
Most antislavery historical claims, then, did not signify a desire to collapse time
and return to a pure past state. Their assertions of historical declension were not
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jeremiadic calls for recovery, but rather appeals to pasts that anticipated historical
change. Unlike their early modern forebears, slavery’s critics did not really long to
recreate biblical times, nor did they seek a return to the founding era—periods that
sanctioned slavery—but desired to fulfill the promises and expectations of those eras. At
times, when finding slavery’s stranglehold on the hearts of men in the biblical period, in
the founding era, and in the present, antislavery narrators implied that not much had
changed after all and that the distance between then and now was not so great. But
insisting that the circumstances now existed to realize the progressive hopes and promises
of those periods suggested that qualitative differences distinguished the present from the
past. The implication was that while antislavery sentiment had been an exceptional and
proslavery sentiment a prominent feature in the Revolutionary past, proslavery sentiment
was now the anachronistic and antislavery sentiment the characteristic element in the
nineteenth-century present. To be sure, as this analysis has detailed, antebellum thinkers
acknowledged historical distance in inconsistent, imprecise, and often idiosyncratic ways,
but their interpretive debates over slavery made that distance difficult to ignore. And
when they historicized the Bible and the Constitution (texts with the greatest purchase on
temporal transcendence) and their pasts (epochs with timeless appeal) it suggested that if
these texts and pasts could be historicized, everything could be historicized.
This analysis reveals the dialectical nature of this development. Using historical
reasoning to read America’s sacred religious and legal texts brought new attention to
historical distance from America’s favored pasts. In turn, that awareness led antislavery
interpreters to use historical distance in different ways. It helped some dispatch the Bible
and the Constitution as outdated products of the past, but it also supported the more

373

consequential interpretive move to read these texts as containing hidden or abstract truths
and principles that time and new circumstances would cause to grow and flourish. Never
before had historical change carried with it the insight and even the imperative that one
must read sacred texts in view of historical distance. In the case of the Bible, that
understanding cultivated the belief in new revelations and insights—although that
remained a somewhat isolated, if still a varied and important, phenomenon—and paved
the way for alternatives to the literalist hermeneutic that had come to dominate Protestant
biblical interpretation in the United States. In the case of the Constitution, awareness of
historical distance supported an influential reading that the framers had molded the
document to adapt to change. That approach secured its continued usefulness in an
unstable nation. It allowed Abraham Lincoln to claim that the framers had expected
someone like him to use the Constitution to save a nation in its moment of deepest crisis.

Historical Distance and Historical Relevance
At times, my analysis of this particular development of American historical
consciousness has approached the conclusion that an awareness of historical distance
renders the past and its products, including the most favored and familiar historical eras
and their texts, irrelevant. A few antebellum thinkers considered it best to leave behind
most if not all of the biblical and founding periods and to discard their venerable texts,
the contextual examination of which exposed the failings of their authors. However, to
the extent that they had become conscious of the historical distances dividing the biblical
and founding eras from their present, many Americans ignored them, or, in the case of a
number of the individuals and groups discussed above, formulated ways to read those
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historical texts and periods in light of those distances. In other words, awareness of
historical distance allowed and allows Americans to continue to use the past. In
concluding, then, I hope to address some of the ways in which this particular narrative
matters because of, rather than in spite of, our recognition of the profound differences
that separate us from the period under examination.
In historiographical terms, this dissertation corrects the traditional view of
American historical thought by demonstrating the antebellum emergence of ideas
characteristic of a modern historical consciousness. It reveals the nature of antebellum
historical awareness through a close reading of biblical and constitutional interpretation
rather than by examining historical methodologies or philosophical approaches to the
past. This method demonstrates that antebellum historical awareness took the form of a
realization of historical distance. In particular, it highlights the growing awareness of the
chasms of temporal distance that divided Americans from the biblical and founding eras
and made those pasts foreign rather than familiar. This non-traditional account shows the
complicated nature of historical awareness and the uneven development of antebellum
American historical consciousness in particular. The peculiar institution and the peculiar
shape of American history guided that process. The slavery debates directed Americans’
to train their focus on their favored pasts for answers and encouraged contextual
interpretations of the sacred texts from those periods. That attention shifted from the
distant biblical pasts to the recent founding era, the period identified as the starting point
of the nation’s history. A sustained focus on the Constitution created awareness of
historical distance even from that familiar period, which signaled the near completion of
a historicization process that grounded all epochs of existence within time.

375

Along with these historiographical concerns, the historical significance of this
particular narrative also corresponds to the amount of light it sheds on broader historical
developments in the antebellum era. The history of biblical criticism in America, when
explored in terms of its contribution to contextual interpretation, suggests that European
biblical scholarship, including German biblical criticism, had a greater influence in
antebellum America than previously thought. While casting aspersions on European
thinkers, including English deists and German liberals, American biblical scholars
incorporated a number of their hermeneutical lessons, especially those that emphasized
the use of historical tools to determine the authenticity and meaning of biblical passages.
Some molded the historical language and lessons of biblical criticism to uphold and
advance evidentialist thought, but biblical scholarship also introduced historical
reasoning that Transcendentalists, often depicted as ahistorical thinkers, used to
undermine the historical foundations of religious faith. This dissertation demonstrates
that historical explication became standard among a wide variety of religious thinkers,
altering our perception of orthodox figures like Charles Hodge and liberal
Transcendentalists like Theodore Parker, both of whom used contextual interpretation to
cultivate faith in atemporal truths.
The focus on Parker, who acts as a hinge in this dissertation, highlights the
important overlap between antebellum religious and legal thought in the form of biblical
and constitutional interpretation. As these interpretive practices have constituted the
foundations on which crucial traditions in American intellectual thought have taken
shape, including progressivism and conservatism, examining them in tandem sheds light
on some of the core concerns in American cultural and intellectual life. The historical
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relationship between religion and law has, of course, been traced elsewhere, but the
continued exploration of the cross-pollination between religious and legal interpretive
strategies, in particular, promises to bear further fruit. We might consider, for example,
whether American religious traditions that remained open to and even expectant of new
revelation were more attuned to historical change and distance in their constitutional
readings than those who sought religious instruction from the Bible alone.
The attention to interpretive strategies focused on resolving the debate over
southern slavery also illuminates antebellum American constitutionalism. This
dissertation shows that the passing of the founding generation and the publication of
founding-era texts spurred along an interest in contextual readings of the Constitution
focused on uncovering the framers’ original intent. It also shows how the slavery crisis
further fueled that interest, resulting in interpretations stressing the framers’ original
expectations. While a clear articulation of living constitutionalism did not emerge until
legal positivist Oliver Wendell Holmes outlined the idea in the late nineteenth century,
the foundations of an interpretive approach stressing adaptation to changing contexts
stretch back to the framers themselves and to the constitutional thought of early jurists
such as John Marshall.4 Still, the slavery crisis encouraged contextual readings of the
Constitution in a singular way, which inspired the assertion that the framers’ had crafted
the Constitution prospectively, with change in mind. Although the antislavery focus on
the specific original expectation of slavery’s eventual institutional collapse restrained the
move toward a more complete understanding of the Constitution as a flexible and living
4

For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Marshall referenced the
necessary and proper clause as a provision “made in a constitution intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to various crises of human affairs.”
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheaton) 316, 415.
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text, it gave Lincoln the interpretive components he needed to consider it the framers’
will that he read the Constitution in light of his own historical context.
The crisis setting soon allowed Lincoln to tie the imperative to preserve the Union
to the framers’ expectations of slavery’s abolition. Perhaps they had anticipated that a
different set of circumstances would bring about those expectations, but regardless of
how they had expected slavery to end, that they had expected it gave Lincoln foundingera support to proceed along a course of emancipation once the cause of Union became
bound up with the call for abolition. That convergence resulted from another dialectical
process. Slavery raised the stakes of biblical and constitutional interpretation and,
because Americans increasingly looked to the biblical and founding eras for resolutions
to their most pressing social problems, biblical and constitutional interpretation played a
role in raising the slavery controversy to a level of crisis and conflict. The expansion of
American political culture in this period, which opened the door for a wider range of
individuals and groups to discuss and debate a broader scope of issues with political
relevance, charged this development. The interpretive debates traced herein, then, provide
an important lens through which to view the crucial antebellum intellectual debates that
heightened tensions between religious groups, political parties, and sections. In the tense
decades of the 1840s and 1850s, distinct political parties and groups used the historical
distance those debates revealed to further their purposes.
This leads to a final point about the historical relevance of this dissertation. The
thinkers and writers discussed in these pages, including those most willing to recognize
and incorporate historical change and distance in their arguments, put the past to political
uses. That can be seen most clearly in the varieties of antislavery and abolitionists uses of
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the founding era and its texts. In attending to these varieties, this dissertation highlights
the distinctions not only between antislavery and abolitionist thinkers, but also among
them. For example, Parker’s and Lincoln’s views of blacks constrained their relatively
broad conceptions of equality. The same sense of progress that convinced Parker of the
inevitable triumph of antislavery sentiment, led him to categorize African Americans in
racial terms, as when he argued in January of 1858 that “the African is the most docile
and pliant of all the races of men,” before asserting that “the stroke of an axe would have
settled the matter [of slavery] long ago. But the black man would not strike.”5 A few
months later, in July of 1858, Lincoln made it clear that he did “not understand the
Declaration to mean that all men were created equal in all respects,” and later concluded
that “what I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races.”6
Lincoln thought it would be best if both slavery and blacks were removed from American
soil. And while his reading of the Constitution and the founding era encouraged him to
erase the peculiar institution from that document and that period, it also complicated
African American efforts to remember and use their past in seeking a more expansive
place on the nineteenth-century American stage.
However, the constitutional debates unsettled the historical understandings of the
founding era, which made it possible to advance readings that not only opposed
proslavery interpretations but that also challenged the racial ideas of figures like Parker
and Lincoln. Frederick Douglass, more than most, pointed out the difficulties involved in

5

Theodore Parker, The Present Aspect of Slavery in America and the Immediate
Duty of the North: A Speech Delivered in the Hall of the State House, before the
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Convention, on Friday Night, January 29, 1858 (Boston:
Bela Marsh, 1858), 5, 7.
6
Lincoln, “Speech at Springfield,” in Collected Works, 2:520, 520-21.
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efforts to discern the framers’ intentions, which allowed him and others to reintroduce
overlooked black Revolutionary actors in an attempt to combat racist notions about
African American capacities as soldiers and citizens. As Douglass stated in response to
Dred Scott, “the Constitution, as well as the Declaration of Independence, and the
sentiments of the founders of the Republic, give us a platform broad enough, and strong
enough, to support the most comprehensive plans for the freedom and elevation of all the
people of this country, without regard to color, class, or clime.”7 Douglass held that a
recognition of historical distance demanded the expansion of freedom beyond what black
Revolutionaries had experienced or even what figures like Parker and Lincoln proposed.
On 5 March 1858, in response to Taney’s Dred Scott decision, a group of black
and white Americans met in Faneuil Hall to commemorate the death of Crispus Attucks,
upheld by African Americans as “the earliest martyr of American Independence.”8
Fittingly, African American historian William C. Nell, who had published The Colored
Patriots of the American Revolution in 1855, organized the commemoration.9 The
commemorative speeches made it clear that remembering the past had a clear and present
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Frederick Douglass, “The Dred Scott Decision: An Address Delivered, in Part,
in New York, New York, in May 1857,” in Frederick Douglass Papers, Series One,
3:169, 171-72.
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“The Boston Massacre, March 5, 1770: Commemorative Festival in Faneuil
Hall,” Liberator, 12 March 1858, 42 (APSO). Douglass had countered white assumptions
with similar historical appeals since the 1840s. See, for example, Douglass, “American
Prejudice Against Color,” 1:69; and Frederick Douglass, “Slavery and America’s Bastard
Republicanism,” 1:80. Others also critiqued Taney’s decision by pointing to black
Revolutionaries. See, for example, William Penn, “Letter from Hon. Joshua R. Giddings
to Judge Taney,” Liberator, 3 April 1857, 54-55 (APSO); “Colored Citizen Soldiers of
the Revolution,” Liberator, 18 September 1857, 152 (APSO); “Spirit Meeting of the
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9
William C. Nell, The Colored Patriots of the American Revolution, with
Sketches of Several Distinguished Colored Persons: To Which Is Added a Brief Survey of
the Condition and Prospects of Colored Americans (Boston: Robert F. Wallcut, 1855).
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purpose. A number of the speakers pointed to Attucks and his counterparts to counter
Parker’s recent statements about black feebleness. Wendell Phillips identified “another
ATTUCKS,” in the struggle to free Anthony Burns.10 John Stewart Rock, an African
American doctor and abolitionist, lamented that “our fathers fought nobly for freedom,
but they were not victorious. They fought for liberty, but they got slavery.” Rock
predicted, however, that African Americans would be more successful in following the
example of their forebears. “Sooner or later,” he stated, “the clashing of arms will be
heard in this country, and the black man’s services will be needed: 150,000 freemen
capable of bearing arms … and three quarters of a million slaves, wild with enthusiasm
caused by the dawn of the glorious opportunity of being able to strike a genuine blow for
freedom, will be a power which white men will be ‘bound to respect.’”11 The Civil War
did not play out exactly as Rock had foretold, but it did allow African Americans to
prove, once again, their military prowess and their rightful claim to citizenship.12 As Nell
had noted in an 1857 letter to Wendell Phillips about his book Colored Patriots, “Each
name and every past has its use.”13 An awareness of historical distance and changed
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“The Boston Massacre,” 43.
Ibid., 42.
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circumstances made those uses clearer, and, before long, demanded formal constitutional
amendments alongside the informal emendations that preceded them.14
This dissertation adds a crucial component to our understanding of the rise of a
modern American historical consciousness. It shows that even the idea of what it means
to think historically has a history. This narrative also provides historical demonstration
that historical awareness does not preclude the use of favored pasts and their sacred texts.
Indeed it shows that when humans gain awareness of historical distance from favored
pasts, those pasts and their texts remain useful in efforts to establish and maintain
religious and political identities or to exclude or include individuals or groups from the
benefits of claiming certain religious, legal, and political traditions. These discussions
remain salient in our own political culture. In his second inaugural, President Barack
Obama appealed to the American founding even as he acknowledged historical distance.
He asserted that “we have always understood that when times change, so must we; that
fidelity to our founding principles requires new responses to new challenges.” Reciting
the phrase “all men are created equal,” he implored Americans to help “bridge the
meaning of those words with the realities of our time.”15 Long before President Obama
uttered these words, Americans, including another American president, negotiated the
relationship between favored pasts, sacred texts, and the present, and in doing so raised
awareness of the historical distance that we take for granted.
14

The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, of course, officially superseded
the Dred Scott decision, but that process was well under way during the Civil War. As the
Liberator commented on the raising of African American regiments in early 1863, “the
necessities of the country had reversed the Dred Scott decision.” “The Negro Regiment—
Meeting of the Colored Citizens,” Liberator, February 20, 1863, 31 (APSO).
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